

One Zambia, many histories

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One Zambia, many histories

Towards a history of post-colonial Zambia

Edited by

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Foreword

The history of post-independent African countries is only just beginning to be written. For too long, the history of post-colonial Africa has been used as the site for analyses in political science, economics, development or whatever. It may be possible to make such analyses, if that is what is wanted, but they can only rest on the results of careful historical reconstruction. This is what this book provides, to a degree which in my experience is virtually unprecedented.

The question is then, of course, what history is to be written. One of the great virtues of this book is that it shies away from the narrative of post-independence Zambian history which UNIP under Kaunda attempted to impose on the country. Until the re-introduction of multi-party democracy in the 1990s, an attempt was made to snaffle all forms of dissent, which entailed *inter alia* that movements of opposition were not only repressed but also ignored in the dominant discourse. One major feature of this book, one that I totally, endorse, is that movements of opposition, and dissident individuals, are brought back into the story. Zambia may have remained one nation, but that nation's history is much more complicated than the rulers under UNIP would have had us believe – and also more complicated than the post-UNIP rulers would argue, so that a story of continual struggle against a monolithic state would also not apply. For this reason it is good that this volume has so much on religion, on the trade unions, on the women's movement and on the creation of a self-conscious civil society. Polyvalence is seriously important to understand histories.

Nevertheless, there is a great deal to be done. It would be churlish when celebrating what there is to pay too much attention to what still has to happen. Perhaps it is that historians are happier with failure in a good cause than failure in a dubious one. I can only hope that in a few years the many histories of independent Zambia will include a critical biography of Kenneth Kaunda, and the equivalent studies of UNIP rule, a good economic history of the crash of the copper industry and the inclusion of Western Zambia into Zambian national history. There could also be fascinating studies of less contentious matters, say the Tazam railway and the Kafue dam. The many histories are far from exhausted, but this is a great beginning.

Robert Ross
Leiden University

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Abbreviations

AMA	Africa Muslim Agency
ANC	African National Congress (of Northern Rhodesia, later Zambia)
ANIP	African National Independence Party
AZ	Agenda for Zambia
CBC/ZCBC	Consumer Buying Corporation of Zambia
CCZ	Christian Council of Zambia
COZ	Credit Organisation of Zambia
DC	District Commissioner
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
ECZ	Electoral Commission of Zambia
EFZ	Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia
FDD	Forum for Democracy and Development
FFTUZ	Federation of Free Trade Unions of Zambia
FLNC	<i>Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo</i>
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
HP	Heritage Party
ICOZ	Independent Churches Organisation of Zambia
IETZ	Islamic Education Trust of Zambia
ILO	International Labour Office
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INDECO	Industrial Development Corporation
IWCTZ	Islamic Welfare Centre Trust of Zambia
LAZ	Law Association of Zambia
LICET	Lusaka Islamic Cultural and Educational Foundation
LMWT	Lusaka Muslim Women Trust
MIST	Makeni Islamic Society Trust
MMD	Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
MUZ	Mineworkers' Union of Zambia
NADA	National Democratic Alliance
NGOCC	Non-Governmental Organisations Coordinating Committee
NPP	National Progress Party
NRR	Northern Rhodesian Regiment

NUBEGW	National Union of Building, Engineering and General Workers
NUCIW	National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers
PC	Provincial Commissioner
PDC	People's Democratic Congress
PF	Patriotic Front
PSRP	Poverty Strategy Reduction Programme
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SDP	Social Democratic Party
TBN	Trinity Broadcasting Corporation
TEVET(A)	Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training (Authority)
UCZ	United Church of Zambia
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UFP	United Federal Party
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFP	United National Freedom Party
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UNITA	<i>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</i>
UNZA	University of Zambia
UPND	United Party for National Development
UPP	United Progressive Party
ZANAMA	Zambia National Marketeers Association
ZANC	Zambia African National Congress
ZCC	Zambian Christian Council
ZEC	Zambia Episcopal Conference
ZCTU	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
ZINCOM	Zambia Industrial and Commercial Association
ZNBC	Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation
ZNUT	Zambia National Union of Teachers
ZNWLG	Zambia National Women's Lobby Group
ZPA	Zambia Privatisation Agency
ZTC	Zambesi Trading Company
ZUFIAW	Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers

1

Introduction

Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar
& Giacomo Macola

In August 2005, the Network for Historical Research in Zambia (NHRZ) organised a three-day conference entitled *Zambia: Independence and After. Towards A Historiography*.¹ The event was attended by no less than fifty participants, and papers were prepared and presented by speakers from Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, the DRC, Canada, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In summing up the conference, Dr. Webby Kalikiti, the then head of the department of History of the University of Zambia, noted, *inter alia*:

Over the past three days, we have had twenty-two paper presentations on eight themes that have attempted to provide perspectives on current research on Zambia. [...] There is certainly need for a new Zambian historiography. Whereas historical studies elsewhere in the Western world, and indeed even in some of our neighbouring countries, have moved into new directions, here in Zambia we have remained stuck in the past. When I joined the university, the Marxist and neo-Marxist historical paradigm was the norm for historical discourse, and such historical texts as Walter Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Dar-es-Salaam, 1971) were required reading for all first-year students. The theory of underdevelopment reigned supreme. This still remains largely the case today. Attempts to discard inadequate intellectual paradigms and adopt more insightful approaches are often met with

¹ The conference was held at the Commonwealth Youth Programme Africa Centre, University of Zambia campus, Lusaka, on 11-13 August 2005. It was partly funded by the African Studies Centre, University of Leiden, and facilitated by the Centre of African Studies of the University of Cambridge.

resistance from both students and some local academics. It is through conferences such as this one that, together, we can chart a new course.²

Before the proceedings were brought to an end, it was decided that a number of the conference papers be selected, and that, following, in some instances, substantial revision, these be published in an edited collection. The editors, however, also reserved the right to commission entirely new contributions with a view to filling some of the most obvious lacunae that had emerged during the conference. Four of the twelve essays presented in this volume fall into this latter category.

At independence from Britain in 1964, Zambia, rich in copper deposits and agricultural potential, was rated as one of the most prosperous countries in sub-Saharan Africa. To be sure, there were huge inequalities in income distribution, but these, many interested observers assumed, would soon be reversed by the enlightened social policies of President Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP), the protagonist of nationalist agitation in the early 1960s and Zambia's ruling party from 1964.

Unfortunately the great expectations of independence were soon dashed for the overwhelming majority of Zambians. Mismanagement, patronage, corruption and growing political authoritarianism all took their toll. The nationalized economy came to be truly ravaged when, in the early 1970s, the world price for copper collapsed and the oil crisis hit home. And the economic decline was exacerbated by the destabilizing effect on Zambia, one of the so-called 'front-line states', of the guerrilla wars waged in Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. By the late 1970s, shortages of such basic foodstuffs as maize-meal, sugar, salt and cooking oil were commonplace, and queuing for essential commodities had become a significant part of everyday life in the urban areas of the country. By the beginning of the following decade, after a number of earlier aborted attempts, Zambia, bereft of capital, had half-heartedly submitted to the Structural Adjustment Programmes advocated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Food riots in Zambia's urban centres in 1986, as well as consistent defaulting on debt repayments and servicing, led to a temporary suspension of relations with the IMF and the further decline of what had once been widely seen as a vibrant economy, society and culture.

By weakening state patronage, economic crisis ushered in political reform. In 1991, one-party rule in Zambia, which had officially begun in 1972-73, was ended when the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), led by trade unionist Frederick Chiluba, was swept to power in the first multi-party elections after nearly twenty years. But far from arresting the social and economic decline

² The full text of Dr. Kalikiti's speech is to be found in the *NHRZ's Newsletter*, 3 (2005), 14-17.

of Zambia's people, and despite the continent-wide enthusiasm that accompanied his accession to power, Chiluba's appointees soon appeared to be as clientelistic and corrupt, and their democratic credentials as questionable, as those of Kaunda and his lieutenants. By the time Chiluba was evicted from power in 2001, unemployment, malnutrition and infant mortality were all at higher levels than they had been at any other stage in Zambia's post-colonial history. Coupled to this, the HIV/AIDS pandemic had shifted from being an obscure notion and threat to a lived reality.

In the last few years, however, Zambia's liberalized economy has been experiencing a degree of sustained growth, while a culture of human and civic rights is finally showing unmistakable signs of consolidation. Nonetheless, tremendous income inequalities are still the norm, and the costs of education, housing, healthcare, nutrition and so on, are far beyond the reach of the majority of ordinary Zambians. Whereas Zambian life expectancy stood at no less than 50 at independence, forty years later it had declined to a staggering 35.

In contrast to the rich tradition of academic analysis and understanding of the pre-colonial and colonial history of Zambia, the above-sketched post-colonial trajectory has been all but ignored by historians.³ The teleological assumptions of state-led developmentalism, the cultural hegemony of UNIP and its conflation with national interests, and a narrow focus on Zambia's progressive diplomatic role in Southern African affairs, have all contributed to a dearth of studies centring on the diverse lived experiences of Zambians.⁴ Zambia's economic decline and the consequent reduction in practical opportunities for research (particularly for Zambian scholars) have also prevented the development of a grounded and sophisticated post-colonial historiography. Much work since the late 1980s has taken the form of disparate studies inspired by new interests in democratisation, economic liberalization, and other contemporary

³ A point most recently made by G. Macola, “‘It means as if we are excluded from the good freedom’: Thwarted expectations of independence in the Luapula province of Zambia, 1964-6’, *Journal of African History*, 47 (2006), 43. A manifest proof of the paucity of historical work being conducted in present-day Zambia is J.-P. Daloz and J.D. Chileshe, eds, *La Zambie contemporaine* (Paris, 1996), none of whose essays adopt an explicitly historical perspective. More satisfactory in this regard – though still predominantly concerned with the colonial era – is B.J. Phiri, *A political history of Zambia: From the colonial period to the 3rd republic, 1890-2001* (Trenton and Asmara, 2004).

⁴ The principal examples of the literature we wish to take issue with are: R. Hall, *The high price of principles: Kaunda and the white south* (London, 1969); W. Tordoff, ed., *Politics in Zambia* (Manchester, 1974); J. Pettman, *Zambia: Security and conflict* (Lewes, 1974); D.G. Anglin and T.M. Shaw, *Zambia's foreign policy: Studies in diplomacy and dependence* (Boulder, 1979); C. Gertzel, ed., *The dynamics of the one-party state in Zambia* (Manchester, 1984).

trends. But these researches, though pertinent to the country's current concerns and commendable for implicitly redressing the inbuilt nationalist bias of much of the earlier literature, are often insufficiently contextualized in Zambian history and political cultures.⁵ This volume, consisting of contributions by historians and social scientists adopting an historical perspective, seeks partly to rectify this comparative scholarly neglect and to deepen understanding of post-colonial Zambia by bringing a new historical awareness and sensibility to a field of studies hitherto dominated by the synchronic approach and preoccupations of political science, development economics and anthropology.

History in the present

Both the popular appeal and the academic weakness of history in present-day Zambia are borne out by the frequent use of highly selective, simplified or even plainly fanciful versions of the past in contemporary political debate. A few weeks before the opening of the NHRZ conference, populist opposition leader Michael Sata, the President of the Patriotic Front, a splinter group of the ruling MMD, claimed that a revolution was being provoked by the policies implemented by the incumbent Republican President, Patrick Levy Mwanawasa, whom he accused of behaving like the former 'colonial governor' Roy Welensky, 'who went on the rampage suppressing people'.⁶ Invoking in such dramatic popular images of the colonial era, Sata sought to relate the alleged inequity and inefficiency of the current Zambian administration to a perceived historical past that holds within it all that is unjust. Clearly, for Sata, the colonial

⁵ See, e.g., M. Bratton, 'Economic crisis and political realignment in Zambia', in: J. Widner, ed., *Economic change and political liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Baltimore and London, 1994), 101-28; J.O. Ihonvbere, *Economic crisis, civil society, and democratization: The case of Zambia* (Trenton, 1996); J.K. van Donge, 'Reflections on donors, opposition and popular will in the 1996 Zambian general elections', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36 (1998), 71-99; D.M.C. Bartlett, 'Civil society and democracy: A Zambian case study', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 26 (2000), 429-46; L. Rakner, *Political and economic liberalization in Zambia, 1991-2001* (Uppsala, 2003); B.E. Whitaker, 'Citizens and foreigners: Democratization and the politics of exclusion in Africa', *African Studies Review*, 48 (2005), 109-26. Partial exceptions to the rule are the well-informed and incisive C. Baylies and M. Szeftel, 'The fall and rise of multi-party politics in Zambia', *Review of African Political Economy*, 54 (1992), 75-91, and M. Szeftel, "Eat with us": Managing corruption and patronage under Zambia's three republics, 1964-99', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 18 (2000), 207-224.

⁶ S. Mupuchi, 'A revolution is being provoked, says Sata', *The Post*, 20 June 2005. Welensky, of course, was not a former colonial governor, but the Prime Minister of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland between 1956 and 1963, the year of its demise.

administration and the Federal Government of Welensky embodied the epitome of injustice; and the maverick politician was well aware that his remarks would strike a chord of recognition amongst Zambians, for whom the injustice of the colonial era still rankles.

Indeed, it can be argued that the colonial past of Zambia continues to serve as a touchstone by which to test and evaluate the present. Every year, the much-advertised celebrations held to mark the Africa Freedom Day offer Zambian Presidents and government top brass an opportunity to re-enact the drama of the anti-colonial agitation through high-sounding speeches and the bestowal of a subtly graded array of Republican awards to 'freedom fighter' of some (or little) renown. In recent years, however, the celebrations have been losing some of their poignancy and effectiveness, partly because critics of the current administration have been increasingly prepared to contest these brash attempts at legitimization through the appeal to a Manichean historical orthodoxy that glosses over the fractiousness of Zambian nationalism and the all-too-obvious failure of the promises it had once held out.

A widely read popular satirist, for instance, imagined a short dialogue in which Kalaki, Sara, Jennifer, and Amock watched the Freedom Day proceedings on television:

'Let's see if they award a Freedom medal to yet another ancient leftover who has just been discovered to have thrown a stone at the colonial government in 1960' [...] 'Lucky the old boy didn't get killed by his own stone when it came back down again', [Kalaki] replied. 'But why can't we find heroic stone throwers nowadays?' 'The heroic age of the stone thrower is over', explained Amock. 'Nowadays they are called terrorists, traitors, usurpers, rioters, anarchists or coup plotters. After 1964, all stone throwing became a criminal activity [...] nowadays you can become a hero by arresting a stone thrower, not being one. By arresting a stone thrower you are defending our freedom. That's the way to get a medal, and become a freedom fighter'.

'But where', wondered Sara, 'is this freedom that these heroes are defending?' 'There it is!' laughed Jennifer, pointing at the TV. 'The ruling class are keeping it safe, there in State House. They have the freedom to feed each other cake. Freedom to drink, and freedom to dance. They have the freedom to educate their children in England, buy their clothes in Paris, and seek medical attention in South Africa'.

'Just like the previous white elite!' snorted Sara.

'Of course', said Jennifer. 'Our gallant freedom fighters chased out the white elite and replaced it with our own elite. That was the whole idea! Wasn't that enough for you?'⁷

Although far from being fully entrenched and institutionalized (the author of the above piece, Englishman Roy Clark, has repeatedly been threatened with deportation), this freedom of expression belies the extravagant claims of popu-

⁷ Kalaki News, 'Freedom Day', *The Post*, 26 May 2005.

list politicians and is indicative the paradigm shift that has taken place in Zambia since the intellectually stifling days of the one-party state (1973 to 1991). There is, in contemporary Zambia, an environment in which people can – and do – say exactly what they feel and believe, and they often do so by drawing on specific understandings and interpretations of the past. Convicted stone-throwers of the past have become heroes in the present, post-colonial elites are equated with their colonial predecessors, and disgraced former president Chiluba, who oversaw the wholesale privatisation of Zambia's assets in the 1990s, is allowed to berate his erstwhile political allies in the MMD in the strident language of student activists by stating that 'it [was] time that Zambia fought and controlled imperialists and their running dogs'.⁸ Given this incessant blurring of historical fact, fiction and opinion, it is hardly surprising that there should be some Zambian intellectuals who have sought to call the historical past to order and reinstate the clear boundaries of yesteryear. Historian-polemicist Owen Sichone, for instance, wrote caustically of the newly rediscovered anti-imperialist vocation of the MMD leaders, 'those champions of capitalism, foreign direct investment, retrenchments and human sacrifice for the sake of debt repayment'.⁹

There is clearly a freer atmosphere of political and intellectual discourse in present-day Zambia than there ever has been during the past forty years.¹⁰ Yet it is precisely in this new dawn of openness that attention needs to be drawn to a past and a history that can be tested according to rigorous academic criteria and not merely used and abused in the heat of political competition.

Autobiography and history, torture and memory

It is regrettable that the intellectual space thrown open by Zambia's political liberalization has so far been more readily occupied by memorialists than professional historians. In what is certainly a sign of an ongoing generational shift, numerous protagonists of Zambia's early independent years have recently turned to the past and the pen with a view to describing, explaining, and justifying the choices and decisions of their lives. Invariably male, the authors of the most significant of these autobiographies all played a role in the nationalist movement and then gained a position of influence within, or in close association with, the government and the civil service of the new state. In later years, a good many of these distinguished protagonists of Zambian political life turned

⁸ 'Anti-corruption fight is an agenda of foreign forces', *The Post*, 6 June 2005.

⁹ (O. Sichone, 'Imperialism and Zambia', *The Post*, 8 June 2005).

¹⁰ As Miles Larmer has recently argued in an inspiring review article on which the next section draws substantially: 'What went wrong? Zambian political biography and post-colonial discourses of decline', *Historia* (Pretoria), 51 (2006), 235-256.

their backs on UNIP and were instrumental in ushering in the economic, political, and social changes that have characterised the years of liberalization and multi-partyism in the country from 1991 to the present.¹¹

Whether juicy or desperately boring, well written or barely readable, these autobiographies cannot take the place of formal histories. To be sure, they represent important historical sources that provide insights into the workings of the post-colonial Zambian state and the manner in which its leaders have sought to justify its frequently changing policy orientations. Yet these remain ‘ego-documents’, or, in the worst cases, and to use Macola’s polemical turn of phrase, ‘dehumanised and monolithic commemorative monuments’.¹² These are *not* attempts at an objective history. One, to take but one of the most glaring examples of the principal shortcoming of the genre, cannot expect elder statesmen to admit to their (indirect) complicity in the use of torture against opponents.

Between 1979 and 1980, a small group of Zambian professionals and Congolese dissidents plotted a coup against the increasingly unpopular Kaunda. As shown by Larmer’s contribution to this volume, the acknowledged leaders of this heterogeneous coalition of conspirators were Valentine Musakanya, a former governor of the Bank of Zambia, noted businessman and secret financier of the United Progressive Party (UPP), an offshoot of UNIP that had posed a serious threat to the governing party’s position until its ban in 1972; Pierce Annfield, a white lawyer who had earlier led the defences of a number of opponents of UNIP, including Alice Lenshina and Simon Kapwepwe; Deogratias Symba, one of the leaders of the *Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo*, which had recently suffered defeat at the hands of Mobutu and his Western backers in two ill-fated invasions of Katanga from Angola (Shaba I and II, 1977-1978); and Edward Shamwana, a lawyer and colleague of Musakanya. After details of the impending coup were leaked to the authorities, Annfield was able to flee the country, but his fellow plotters were less fortunate or well-connected and ended up in detention. Musakanya and two other alleged conspirators were, as implied even by the Supreme Court that eventually acquitted them in 1985, severely tortured, an experience from which Musakanya never truly recovered, dying prematurely in 1994.

¹¹ S.B. Zukas, *Into exile and back* (Lusaka, 2002); A. Sardanis, *Africa: Another side of the coin. Northern Rhodesia’s final years and Zambia’s nationhood* (London and New York, 2002); J. Mwanakatwe, *Teacher, politician, lawyer: My autobiography* (Lusaka, 2003). E. Mudenda, *Zambia: A generation of struggle* (Harare, 1999), is also partly autobiographical. Less personalized Zambian attempts at post-colonial history-writing are B.S. Chisala, *The downfall of president Kaunda* (Lusaka, 1994), and J. Mwanakatwe, *End of Kaunda Era* (Lusaka, 1994).

¹² G. Macola, review of Mwanakatwe (to whose work the above remarks apply) and Zukas’s autobiographies, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 30 (2004), 903.

While Simon Ber Zukas, the leading white opponent of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland before his deportation to England in 1952, is honest enough in his autobiography to express his horror at the torture that destroyed Musakanya,¹³ Andrew Sardanis, the one-time head of the Zambian Industrial Development Corporation and another recent Zambian memorialist, prefers instead to emphasize his shock at his former friend Musakanya having become a pawn ‘in the hands of apartheid South Africa’ (whose putative involvement in the coup is not, at present, supported by any definitive evidence), and, to the outrage of the families concerned, sees fit explicitly to deny the use of torture on the part of the Zambian authorities (for which, on the contrary, there is abundant proof).¹⁴ This little exercise in source criticism illustrates a more general point: the conventions and the set of political and personal imperatives to which they obey make autobiographies an altogether different product from academic histories. By occupying the space left open by the absence of the latter, the former are contributing to popularize versions of Zambia’s most recent past that are not simply factually inaccurate, but also, and more seriously, unacceptably romanticized and homogeneous.

Hidden histories

With their conscious and unconscious lacunae, political memoirs are ill-equipped to deal, not only with the darker side of Zambia’s independence, but also with the many and varied lines of conflict and contestation that complicated and enriched the country’s historical landscape from the early 1960s. In this sense, contemporary Zambian autobiographies replicate and magnify the failings of earlier Zambianist political science, whose almost exclusive focus on UNIP and the structures of its state provided the unwitting excuse for overlooking the histories of all the actors and social forces situated outside the ambit of the ‘people’s party’. Poignant examples of this historical paramnesia are the facile dismissal of the unspectacular, but nonetheless significant, challenge to UNIP posed by Nkumbula’s African National Congress (ANC) throughout the

¹³ Zukas, *Into exile and back*, 151. Mwanakatwe (who acted as Musakanya’s lawyer!) coyly calls it ‘prolonged interrogation’ through which the ‘police managed to get [Musakanya] “to tell it all” to their satisfaction.’ *Teacher, politician, lawyer*, 327.

¹⁴ Sardanis, *Africa*, 290-1. Sardanis’s distasteful editorial choices are perhaps a consequence of his adulation for Kaunda, ‘a magnanimous and forgiving man’, who would have certainly pardoned the leading plotters if only they had been ‘prepared to swallow their pride.’ Also, Sardanis’ stance may not be unrelated to the fact that, according to at least one of the surviving coup plotters, Goodwin Mumba, unsubstantiated reports circulated in the aftermath of the coup to the effect that the whistle-blower had been none other than Sardanis himself. For a different version, see Zukas, *Into exile and back*, 153.

First Republic,¹⁵ and, especially, the trajectory of the followers of the Lampa Church of Alice Lenshina.

In 1968, four years after independence and the traumatic events described in Gordon's chapter, Elias Mulenga, the son of Alice Lenshina, wrote from exile to the Prime Minister of Great Britain and sought to draw attention to the forgotten history and plight of his mother's scattered followers:

[...] the ferocious UNIP leaders called at [sic] troops of soldiers, who went through the sect villages under the guidance of UNIP members. Mercilessly, uncountable people of the sect were shot to death. Some were left orphans while others were widows and widowers. At the sect headquarters (Sion), almost everyone was killed. The leader of the sect (Alice Lenshina) and a few of the members were [sic] survived. The survivors had to spend many days into [sic] the wilderness.¹⁶

The pencilled words of Mulenga, a deacon in the church founded by his mother, to Harold Wilson exposed a part of Zambia's and UNIP's past that had but very little bearing on the humanist ideology publicly espoused by the party and its leader, Kenneth Kaunda. Mulenga's desperate denunciation ran counter to the generally positive image of Zambia portrayed at the time by interested academics – an image that glossed over the considerable violence and repression that had accompanied the birth of the country and that continued to lurk below its surface.¹⁷

Let us therefore be blunt. In the eyes of the editors, the major contribution of this volume is to remind readers that Zambian post-colonial history does not amount to a history of UNIP and its developmentalist agenda, and that a fuller and more honest account of the country's most recent past must place at the centre of the analysis the counter-hegemonic political and religious histories and projects that stubbornly refused to be silenced in the name of national unity. Writing about Kenya, John Lonsdale put it more eloquently than these editors could: 'Kenya's nationalism, like all nationalism, was the work of many wills,

¹⁵ See, e.g., C. Gertzel, C. Baylies and M. Szeftel, 'Introduction: The making of the one-party state', in Gertzel, *Dynamics*, 7.

¹⁶ E. Mulenga to H. Wilson, Bulawayo, 30 July 1968, National Archives of the UK, Foreign and Commonwealth Office 29/368.

¹⁷ Andrew D. Roberts, the best historian of Zambia to date, was a notable exception, for as early as September 1964, he argued that the still ongoing suppression of the Lampa Church by the UNIP government was casting a dark shadow over 'the future of dissenting groups' in newly independent African countries. ('The Lampa tragedy', *Peace News* (London), 11 Sept. 1964.) For a later, and much more exhaustive, analysis by the same author, see 'The Lampa Church of Alice Lenshina', in: R.I. Rotberg and A.A. Mazrui, eds, *Protest and power in black Africa* (New York, 1970), 513-68.

with many visions of the future. It is an impoverished nationhood that fails to recognize them'.¹⁸

Structure of the book

The history of political and religious dissent – the subject of three of the four papers that constitute Part I of this volume – was, understandably, the principal victim of the process of selective historical obliteration brought about by the alliance between UNIP and its Western and African academic apologists. But Macola, Gordon and Larmer's chapters do not merely insert for the first time within the mainstream of Zambian historiography the memory of obscure and subaltern political ideas and actors. For by suggesting that the political impact and social appeal of these alternative projects and movements was much more significant than it has hitherto been assumed, they effectively call into question the real extent of the hegemony of UNIP and its ability to impose a singular narrative of nation-building upon a fragmented and refractory body politic. Taken together, the articles demonstrate, in Larmer's words, that the 'divisions and problems experienced by Zambia during its Second Republic had their origins in the significant social, ethnic and regional conflicts experienced in the supposed honeymoon period of the late 1960s' (Larmer, in this volume, p. 107). If nothing else, the survival – and, in the late 1960s, growing strength – of a regionalized ANC under the shrewd leadership of Nkumbula and the continuing concern about the Lampa exiles in neighbouring Katanga served to entrench the authoritarian inclination of UNIP nationalism and reinforce its 'determination swiftly to abandon a multi-party system that it had always intimately resented and deemed unsuitable to the country's needs' (Macola, p. 19). While, as argued especially by DeRoche, there is little doubt that the authoritarianism of UNIP was partly a consequence of the adverse geopolitical context faced by Zambia in the aftermath of the Rhodesian UDI of 1965, it is also true that a strong degree of instrumentality motivated the often unsubstantiated accusations of betrayal waged against Kapwepwe's UPP both before and after the party's official demise early in 1972. And yet, that this and other opposition parties responded to a deeply felt dissatisfaction with the post-colonial political dispensation is brought out by the UPP's underground survival throughout most of the 1970s and later re-emergence during the manoeuvres and alliances that would eventually ensue in the formation of the MMD. From this perspective, the triumph of the MMD in 1991 is to be interpreted as the result of the final coming to fruition

¹⁸ 'Introduction', in: E.S. Atieno Odhiambo and J. Lonsdale, eds, *Mau mau & nationhood: Arms, authority & narration* (Oxford, Nairobi and Athens [OH], 2003), p. 5.

of disparate and deep-rooted oppositional trajectories that the UNIP one-party state had proved unable to do away with in the 1970s and 1980s.

If the silence surrounding the activities of UNIP's opponents obeyed to a clear political logic, the dismissal of post-colonial religiosity as a worthy subject of analysis had possibly more to do with what Hinfelaar calls the 'modernist expectations to the effect that religious institutions and beliefs would slowly retreat with the demise of colonialism' (Hinfelaar, p. 134). Yet, by confining the study of popular beliefs to the realm of religious studies or anthropology,¹⁹ political scientists and development economists have overlooked a key determinant of social action and introduced an artificial compartmentalization of human behaviour that does not speak to the daily experience of most ordinary Zambians. The coming of Zambian independence clearly meant different things to different people. With the benefit of hindsight, popular expectations and appraisals of political transformation might have been better analysed from within the field of religious history, for the millenarian ideals and beliefs ascribed to the Lumpa of Alice Lenshina in the run-up to independence were not, in essence, dissimilar from those espoused by the young UNIP activists who supported Kaunda. After all, Gordon himself sees the UNIP-Lumpa clash of the early 1960s as having been partly precipitated by the 'absolute, almost theocratic, commitment demanded by local cadres of the nationalist movement' (Gordon, p. 47). Kaunda was certainly not unaware of the palingenetic hopes of his supporters and, more in general, their deeply felt religiosity. It was this realization – Hinfelaar argues – that accounts for his frequent appeals to Christian morality and concerted attempts at minimizing the potential for open confrontation between his regime and the Catholic hierarchy through both rhetorical and co-optive means. Hinfelaar's call for a more sustained scholarly involvement in the study of the political implications of Zambian religiosity is taken up by Cheyeka and F. Phiri, who, in the last two essays of Part II of this volume, examine, respectively, the growth of Zambian Charismatic churches and their alliance with the MMD administration, and the contemporary revival of Islam and local Muslim associations.

'Religion and religious movements' – Cheyeka reminds us – 'neither originate nor survive in a social vacuum, and economic factors are seldom irrelevant to their emergence and subsequent development' (Cheyeka, p. 162). This being the case, we are fortunate to be able to present, in Part III of this volume, two contributions by long-established scholars of Zambia. Focusing, respectively, on the impact of nationalization on rural retail-trading networks from the late 1960s, and the effects of the ongoing economic liberalization on Lusaka's mar-

¹⁹ See G. ter Haar, *Spirit of Africa: The healing ministry of Archbishop Milingo* (London, 1992), and P. Gifford, *African Christianity: Its public role* (London, 1996).

ket vendors, Macmillan and Tranberg Hansen's essays complement each other both chronologically and thematically. In opposition to much contemporary discourse on development, both authors take issue with the supposed neutrality of economics and bring out the ways in which the economic welfare (or lack thereof) of the Zambian population over the past forty years has been closely and directly shaped by what were ultimately political choices. If Macmillan's piece can be read as an indictment of UNIP's ill-informed and poorly executed economic policies – a well-recognized theme in the specialist literature,²⁰ but one that the author approaches from a wholly original perspective – Hansen's work blames the locally-enforced, but donor-driven, free-market policies for having had 'adverse ramifications for the access to commercial and residential space of the great majority of Lusaka's population whose livelihoods depend on the informal economy'. Tranberg Hansen's empathetic treatment of the daily struggles of the urban poor also shows the benefits that stems from the adoption of an historically-informed perspective. For in contrast to most contemporary surveys of informal trading, she dwells on the historical roots of the phenomenon in Lusaka and provides a crisp overview of the changes in gender and age that have taken place within the sector.

If the future articulation of such socio-economic phenomena as those examined by Tranberg Hansen is presently uncertain, the same applies to the still unfolding political dynamics that form the subject of the fourth and final section of this volume. While the peaceful outcome of the heavily contested parliamentary and presidential elections of 2006 confounded the worst predictions of the prophets of doom, Mulenga, B.J. Phiri and Gould essays discuss some of the factors that continue to militate against the consolidation of Zambian democracy. A combination of past and present, endogenous and exogamous trends accounts for both the marginalization of trade unions in the Third Republic (the subject of Mulenga's piece) and the poor electoral performances of female candidates in the general elections of 2001, the efforts of the Zambia National Women's Lobby Group notwithstanding (see B.J. Phiri's contribution). It is paradoxical that where Kaunda failed, Zambia's greatest trade unionist, Frederick Chiluba, and economic liberalization should have succeeded. Fragmented, penniless and emasculated, the Zambian labour movement is currently a shadow of its former self, and its future ability to influence the country's economic

²⁰ See, e.g., P. Meyns, 'The political economy of Zambia', and M. Burdette, 'Were the copper nationalizations worth-while?', both in: K. Woldring, ed., *Beyond political independence: Zambia's development predicament in the 1980s* (Berlin, New York and Amsterdam, 1984), 7-22, 23-71, and M. Vaughan, 'Exploitation and neglect: Rural producers and the state in Malawi and Zambia', in: D. Birmingham and P. Martin, eds, *History of central Africa: The contemporary years since 1960* (Harlow, 1997), 167-201.

policy doubtful. The existence of a thriving civil society is commonly seen as an indispensable feature of liberal democracies.²¹ It is therefore fitting that the book should end with an examination of the ambivalent efforts on the part of the Oasis Forum, an unparalleled alliance of Zambia's mainstream civic leadership, to energize political debate and mount a challenge to the established order from outside post-colonial formal political structures and institutions. In assessing the relevance of the notion of 'subsidiary sovereignty' to understand the trajectory of the Oasis Forum, Gould makes a case for overcoming the binary between 'internalist' and 'externalist' paradigms. 'Asking where the blame lies for Zambia's marginal position in the world order would seem to be the wrong question. What we need to understand better is how, *specifically*, do the internal and external factors interact to produce states of subsidiary sovereignty' (Gould, p. 291). Gould's ensuing call for close empirical studies and 'rigorous scrutiny of the unfolding history of independent Zambia' (p. 307) is one that the editors of this collection most wholeheartedly support.

Let us end with a disclaimer. In publishing this volume, the editors are painfully aware of its shortcomings. For even within its predominantly political purview, this remains a preliminary – and therefore somewhat superficial – historical survey. The notion of politics that informs this volume, in particular, is entirely conventional and displays none of the subtleties of the culturally-informed understanding advocated by Englund in a recent, and loosely comparable, collection of essays on contemporary Malawi.²² On the other hand, while making no claim to empirical or analytical completeness, it is hoped that the pioneering studies presented here will go some way towards laying the bases for subtler and more coherent future syntheses. Zambia and its historians urgently need them.

²¹ But for counter-arguments, see Bartlett, 'Civil society and democracy', and, more generally, P. Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as political instrument* (Oxford and Bloomington, 1999), esp. chapters 2 and 3.

²² H. Englund, ed., *A democracy of chameleons: Politics and culture in the new Malawi* (Uppsala, 2002).

PART I:

**POLITICAL UNITY AND
DISSENT**



Photo 1 Harry Nkumbula emphasizing his non-racial credentials, Lusaka city airport, prior to independence

2

Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, UNIP and the roots of authoritarianism in nationalist Zambia¹

Giacomo Macola

Introduction

Zambia's First Republic, between 1964, the year of independence, and 1973, when the one-party regime came into being, witnessed a gradual reduction of toleration for internal dissent and a general contraction of civil liberties. This hardening of the political dispensation had undoubtedly something to do with Zambia's vulnerable 'frontline' position. But it was also a consequence of the rapid and widespread disaffection caused by the ruling party's inability to meet popular expectations of independence.² This essay contends that the immediate antecedents of these later developments are to be found in the early 1960s, when UNIP and the ANC, the party from which UNIP had sprung and which it

¹ I wish to thank Ompie Nkumbula, Bob Liebenthal and Bruce Munyama for their frank and illuminating comments on the paper. Faithful to the proverbial bonhomie of their illustrious relation, all three readers took even the most unpleasant of my written remarks on the chin and politely agreed to disagree with me on a number of issues. I, indeed, remain personally responsible for any error or misconception that remain in this article despite their much appreciated cooperation.

² On this broader theme, see G. Macola, "It means as if we are excluded from the good freedom": Thwarted expectations of independence in the Luapula province of Zambia, 1964-1966', *Journal of African History*, 47 (2006), 43-56; and M. Larmer, "A little bit like a volcano": The United Progressive Party and resistance to one-party rule in Zambia, 1964-1980', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 39 (2006), forthcoming.

eventually defeated in the general elections of 1964, were entangled in a vicious struggle for power and pre-eminence.

A close examination of UNIP literature during these heady years – the subject of the first part of this chapter – reveals the fundamentally authoritarian character of the brand of nationalism espoused by the party's leaders and activists. With party and nation seen as coterminous, the assertion of minority views and alternative political projects was viewed with profound suspicion.³ The tendency to identify opposition to UNIP as illegitimate and 'treasonable' went hand-in-hand with the denial of the right to full political citizenship in the new institutional dispensation to Nkumbula and his ANC.

In the second and third parts of the paper, after a rapid analysis of the ANC's inchoate ideology and fragile administrative structures, I discuss the conspiratorial strategies adopted by this latter party and its leader in response to UNIP's exclusionary nation-building paradigm. While Nkumbula's alliance with Katangese President Tshombe brought home to the future leaders of independent Zambia the country's manifest geopolitical weakness and permeability to external efforts at destabilization, his tolerance of ethnic politics and ambiguity towards the use of political violence led to the consolidation of regionalist feelings among the Bantu Botatwe of the Central and Southern provinces.⁴ Not only did the Bantu Botatwe continuing isolation from the Zambian body politic weaken UNIP's claim to be the sole legitimate embodiment of the blossoming nation,⁵ but it also posed a concrete political menace once it threatened to coalesce with the disillusionment of erstwhile UNIP's supporters from other provinces and ethnic groups. Both processes contributed to bolstering up UNIP's authoritarianism and determination swiftly to abandon a multi-party system that it had always intimately resented and deemed unsuitable to the country's needs.

³ Recent, inspiring analyses of the undemocratic nature of the ideology of hegemonic nationalist parties elsewhere in the region are J.R. Brennan, 'The short history of political opposition & multi-party democracy in Tanganyika, 1958-64', in: G.H. Maddox and J.L. Giblin, eds, *In search of a nation: Histories of authority & dissidence in Tanzania* (Oxford, Dar es Salaam and Athens, 2005), 250-76; T. Ranger, 'Introduction to volume two', in: Id., ed., *The historical dimensions of democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe. Volume Two: Nationalism, democracy and human rights* (Harare, 2003), 1-37; and, especially, J. McCracken, 'Democracy and nationalism in historical perspective: The case of Malawi', *African Affairs*, 97 (1998), 231-49. For a more contemporary perspective, see H. Melber, 'The culture of politics', in: Id., ed., *Namibia: A decade of independence 1990-2000* (Windhoek, 2000), esp. 181-87.

⁴ Bantu Botatwe is here used as a crude synonym for Tonga, Ilia and Lenje. For a fuller explanation, see below.

⁵ A point first made by A.D. Roberts, *A history of Zambia* (London, 1976), 242.



Photo 2 African National Congress Officials, 1956. Left to right:
 R.C. Kamanga (Vice-Treasurer), E.M. Liso (Vice-President),
 S.M. Kapwepwe (Treasurer-General), H.M. Nkumbula
 (National President), K.D. Kaunda (Secretary-General),
 T. Mukupo (Vice-Secretary-General)

The nature of UNIP nationalism

Until the late 1950s, Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula was very much the public face of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia (colonial Zambia). The darling of progressive observers (Doris Lessing, for one, considered him a 'magnificent orator' and an 'extraordinarily nice man'⁶) and the scourge of supporters of the white-dominated Central African Federation, Nkumbula had up to then followed what might be termed a 'classic' nationalist trajectory. As most other emerging African leaders, he had come of age under missionary tutelage – in his case, that of the Methodist Missionary Society, which monopolized evangelical and educational activities in Namwala, his home district in Northern Rhodesia's Southern province, and by which young Harry had been employed as a primary

⁶ D. Lessing, *Walking in the Shade: Volume Two of my autobiography, 1949-1962* (London, 1997), 181, 183.

school teacher in the late 1930s. Nkumbula's first openly political experiences had taken place in the cosmopolitan environment of the Copperbelt, the colony's urban and mining district, where he had settled in 1940 to take up the position of headmaster of Mufulira and, later, Wusakile African schools. A founding member of the Kitwe African Welfare Society and the African Teachers' Association, Nkumbula had sat on such colonial advisory bodies as the Kitwe Urban Advisory Council and the Western province's African Provincial Council. In 1946, aged thirty, he had embarked on a period of further studies at Makerere University College and the University of London. While at the London School of Economics in the late 1940s, Nkumbula had been drawn into Pan-Africanist circles and worked closely with Hastings Kamuzu Banda, the future President of Malawi, with whom he co-authored 'Federation in Central Africa', 'a point-by-point rebuttal of federationist arguments as well as the first comprehensive statement of political objectives ever made by Nyasas and Rhodesians'.⁷ Upon his return to Northern Rhodesia in 1950, Nkumbula had replaced the ineffective Godwin Mbikusita-Lewanika as president of the newly formed Northern Rhodesia's African National Congress (ANC) and spearheaded the party's vehement – if ultimately unsuccessful – anti-Federation campaign.⁸

It had all turned sour in 1958, when, as a result of Nkumbula's increasingly autocratic running of the party, refractoriness to criticism and grudging acceptance of the gradualist approach to African political advancement enshrined in the constitution promulgated by Governor Benson in that same year, a group of younger radicals led by Kenneth Kaunda and Simon Kapwepwe – Congress's erstwhile secretary general and treasurer, respectively – had broken away and given birth to the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC).⁹ ZANC, which unlike the ANC had resolved to boycott the impending elections to the Legislative Council, was banned by the colonial government in March 1959, less than five months after its inception. Although deported to remote rural areas, its top leaders continued to command considerable support and to influence the pace of African politics in Northern Rhodesia. In the latter part of 1959, after two of

⁷ R.I. Rotberg, *The rise of nationalism in Central Africa: The making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964* (Cambridge [Mass.], 1965), 224.

⁸ A comprehensive analysis of Nkumbula's formative years will be found in: G. Macola, *Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula and the making of Zambia's political culture*, forthcoming. On Mbikusita-Lewanika, see B.J. Phiri, 'Coping with contradictions – class, ethnicity and nationalism: The case of Godwin A. Mbikusita-Lewanika and Zambian nationalism', unpublished paper, 1999.

⁹ For a detailed treatment of the circumstances leading to the formation of ZANC, see K.D. Kaunda to T. Fox-Pitt, Lusaka, 2 Dec. 1958, National Archives of Zambia (NAZ), Lusaka, HM 71/1; D.C. Mulford, *Zambia: The politics of independence, 1957-1964* (Oxford, 1967), chapter 2; and W.K. Sikalumbi (ed. H.W. Langworthy), *Before UNIP* (Lusaka, n.d. [but 1977]), 101-125.

ZANC's offshoots, Paul Kalichini's ANIP and Dixon Konkola's UNFP, had merged into the United National Independence Party (UNIP), the ANC suffered a second crippling blow. Having failed in its bid to oust Nkumbula from the presidency of the party in September, a well-organized faction led by Mainza Chona and Titus Mukupo joined hands with the new organisation. Chona served as UNIP's interim national president until the release of Kaunda at the beginning of 1960.¹⁰ The consequences of the two successive breakaways were momentous, for while the creation of ZANC in October 1958 had detached from ANC its 'most able and militant national leaders', the departure of Chona and Mukupo, 'splitting away large segments of ANC's provincial-, district- and branch-level organization', threw the party's overall administrative structure into disarray.¹¹ From then onwards, the lives of Nkumbula and his party would be dominated by a furious struggle for survival.

ZANC/UNIP was a much younger party than the ANC – after the two splits, Job Michello, Nkumbula's new national secretary, spoke explicitly of 'old hands of Congress [being] back at the helm'¹² – and its version of political nationalism, built around the demands for immediate independence, the dissolution of Federation and universal adult suffrage, more impatient and less constitutional. Right from the outset, its leaders were convinced the future was theirs, as shown by the confident and condescending tone of early anti-Nkumbula writings. If Wittington Sikalumbi, the former vice-secretary-general of ZANC, poked fun at Nkumbula – 'Mr. Easy come and Easy go with the money and a gentleman who wants to look [more] English than the English' – and dismissed speculations on his political future – 'let fools talk about him' – Kalichini was certain that the 'last days' of Congress 'in the political arena [were] not remote'.¹³ Another ZANC restrictee, Sikota Wina, '[knew] Nkumbula was gone from the scene of nationalism. [...]. From this point onwards it should be plain sailing'.¹⁴

Once these optimistic expectations of a rapid demise did not materialize, and despite the occasional co-operation between the two parties on constitutional matters between 1960 and 1961, UNIP's appraisals of Nkumbula became unmistakably harsher. Harry's love for the good life offered UNIP's moralists plenty of cheap ammunitions. In his newsletter, Nephias Tembo, one of the party's key organizers in the Copperbelt, urged Kaunda not to stipulate any kind of alliance with

¹⁰ For all of the above, see Mulford, *Zambia*, chapter 3.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 135-6.

¹² J.E.M. Michello to E.M. Liso, Lusaka, 22 Oct. 1959, United National Independence Party's Archives (UNIPA), Lusaka, ANC 7/107. Cf. also Mulford, *Zambia*, 238.

¹³ W.K. Sikalumbi to [R.S.K. Makasa], Namwala, 29 July 1959, NAZ, HM 76/PP/1; P.J. Kalichini to T. Fox-Pitt, Lusaka, 5 Aug. 1959, UNIPA, UNIP 6/7/4.

¹⁴ S. Wina to W.K. Sikalumbi, [Luwingu], 19 Aug. 1959, NAZ, HM 76/PP/1.

the pleasure-loving Nkumbula who has gone down to the level of a garden boy. Nkumbula, internationally, is finished; and locally he has no intelligent following. He is an alcoholic wreck and UNIP has no time to rebuild such wastrels surrounded by prostitutes and rogues.¹⁵

As suggested by the above quotation, UNIP's wrath at Nkumbula was more and more frequently converted into a blanket condemnation of his remaining followers – 'idiots', 'simple souls', 'Tonga peasant farmers [...] whom [he] robs [of] their money to squander on beer and other immoral ways'.¹⁶

These increasingly vitriolic attacks reached their climax with the 'Catalogue of Nkumbula's political masturbation', an incendiary pamphlet issued by the divisional headquarters of UNIP in the Southern province at the beginning of 1962. The text consists of a list of Nkumbula's alleged financial and political blunders from the mid-1950s. Its vocabulary is both chilling and revealing. Nkumbula was a 'political rat', a 'gangster', a 'hopeless and thinkless [sic] rotting [sic] politician' who 'delayed our freedom'.

Thank God, UNIP was born mainly to save our lot from entering into Harry's Kingdom [of] tribalism, idiocy, drunkenness, uselessness and thinklessness [sic]. Candidly, imperialism survives well on rotten minded politicians like this our politically useless man Harry Nkumbula.¹⁷

The road accident in which Nkumbula was involved in July 1960, and for which he was eventually incarcerated between April 1961 and January 1962, is described in the following terms. On his way back from Katanga, where he had visited 'this primitive clumsy looking man-eater', Moise Tshombe, Nkumbula

[killed] an innocent African constable. Drunk with the mighty and precious blood of our brother [...], the whole ANC was transformed into a pile of fools barking day and night like desperate wounded dogs [...].¹⁸

It is tempting to explain away the virulence of the 'Catalogue' by pointing to its authors' geographical provenance. After all, these were Southern province-based officials whose efforts to hold the UNIP fort against a still hegemonic

¹⁵ N. Tembo, 'Copperbelt Circular no. 5. Organ of UNIP – Western Division', Ndola, n.d. [but March 1960], UNIPA, ANC 5/15.

¹⁶ [S.M. Kapwepwe] to W.K. Sikalumbi, Mongu, 7 Dec. 1959, NAZ, HM 76/PP/1; N. Tembo to S. Zukas, Ndola, 16 Jan. 1961, NAZ, HM 75/PP/1; UNIP (Southern Division), 'Circular no. 2', 23 April 1961, UNIPA, ANC 5/15.

¹⁷ F.S. Mubanga, L.S. Chivuno and A.B. Chisanga, 'Catalogue of Nkumbula's political masturbation', Monze, 16 Jan. 1962, UNIPA, ANC 7/48.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* Nkumbula's alleged trip to Katanga in 1960 was probably a 'literary flourish', for the ANC's national president is not likely to have paid his first visit to Tshombe until the beginning of the following year. The ANC National Assembly discussed the possibility of suing UNIP for producing the 'nasty document'; Minutes of the ANC National Assembly, Lusaka, 10 March 1962, UNIPA, ANC 7/45.

ANC were meeting with very scant success. Nonetheless, I would suggest the entire anti-Nkumbula campaign from the end of 1959 was shaped by – and drew its strength from – less superficial ideological motives and processes. By refusing to go away, or to be slotted in the passive, tailor-made position of ‘National Guardian’ that Wina at one point imagined for him,¹⁹ Nkumbula threatened to unmask the fragility of the edifice of UNIP nationalism. As Nkumbula’s survival against the odds forced UNIP to face the uncomfortable truth that a significant proportion of the future electorate did not subscribe to its nationalist vision and project, the party leadership reacted by elaborating an intellectual equivalence between party and national membership. As early as November 1959, UNIP portrayed itself as ‘the only party which command[ed] the respect, confidence and unanimous support of the African people in Northern Rhodesia’.²⁰ UNIP’s dominance – Munukayumbwa Sipalo, the then national secretary of the party, argued a few months later – stemmed from its ‘superior’ ‘devotion’ to the national cause and ‘knowledge of the wants of our people’.²¹ The homology between party and nation in UNIP thought was brought out most clearly by Kaunda in January 1961. The ‘silly and small men’ who opposed UNIP, the party’s president said in his speech to the National Council, should realise that its historical role was ‘to save the people of Zambia [...]. We must forget our individualism and put the Nation first before us. The party is supreme’.²² With UNIP conceived of as the embodiment of the embryonic nation, party ideologues found it both easy and natural to view the ANC as an ‘illegitimate organisation’.²³

By denying Nkumbula and his party full rights to political citizenship in the new institutional dispensation that was then materializing, UNIP embarked on a dangerous intellectual trajectory, the endpoint of which would be the vindication of intolerance not only for open political opposition, but for independent expressions of the civil society as well. Taking place outside the party’s ambit, the latter presented UNIP with as unacceptable a threat as the former. When, in the summer of 1963, the secretary of the Broken Hill-Mumbwa region of UNIP asked the party’s headquarters how best to deal with a newly created ‘Lambala-Lima Education and Cultural Society’, Aaron Milner, the deputy national secretary, recommended that it be ‘crushed’.

¹⁹ S. Wina to H.M. Nkumbula, Lusaka, 10 Dec. 1959, UNIPA, ANC 7/55.

²⁰ ‘Memorandum on constitutional changes submitted to His Excellency the Governor, Sir Evelyn Hone, by a delegation from the Central Council of the United National Independence Party on 24th November, 1959’, UNIPA, ANC 5/15.

²¹ *Voice of UNIP*, May 1960.

²² Minutes of the UNIP National Council, Lusaka, 18 Jan. 1961, UNIPA, UNIP 1/1/3.

²³ S. Wina, in: *Voice of UNIP*, Feb. 1962.

Our people must work towards the freedom of Zambia. This can only be done by having a National Party UNIP which has proved by its past record that the freedom of Zambia is in UNIP.²⁴

A similar fate awaited the Northern Rhodesia's National Council of Women, founded on the Copperbelt at about the same time. The Council folded in the summer of 1964, a few months after the formation of an all-UNIP cabinet. It had been heavily criticized by Chona and Minister Dingiswayo Banda, who accused it of confining 'itself to the educated class and clash[ing] with our [UNIP's] Women's Brigade'.²⁵ Following the demise of the organisation, a distraught former member wrote a polemical letter to the press, stating that she had been wrong in assuming that:

everyone had the liberty to join any organisation, as long as one does not interfere with other people's rights. The UNIP Women's Brigade is a political body, and even though UNIP is the ruling party, there is no obligation for everyone to join it. We need an organisation which can co-ordinate all the activities of women's organisations. I don't see how the Women's Brigade can do this since some of its members cannot even tolerate the ideas of members of other political parties.²⁶

Kaunda, UNIP's key policy-maker, has frequently been portrayed as having exerted a moderating influence over his more radical and authoritarian subordinates.²⁷ Yet there is little doubt that it was his appraisal of UNIP's historical mission and emphasis on 'absolute UNITY' vis-à-vis the enemies of the nation that provided his lieutenants with the opportunity to articulate and popularize a monolithic vision of Zambian society and a hegemonic project with precious little room left for seeing minority or alternative views as legitimate.²⁸ The idiom of intolerance was frequently infused with religious overtones. Sipalo spoke openly of 'His Holiness' Kaunda confronting a legion of 'African Judas Escariots [sic]'.²⁹ Among the latter was undoubtedly Lawrence Chola Kati-lungu, the moderate trade unionist who served as acting national president of the ANC during most of Nkumbula's jail term and whose death in a road accident at the end of 1961 Sipalo deemed 'very heartening'.³⁰ The ideological seeds of the one-party state and its natural corollaries, a much-heralded belief in

²⁴ A. Simbule to M.M. Chona, Broken Hill, 31 Aug. 1963; A. Milner to A. Simbule, n.p. [but Lusaka (?)], 13 Sept. 1963, UNIPA, UNIP 5/8/1/2/13.

²⁵ *Central African Mail*, 17 July 1964.

²⁶ *Central African Mail*, 7 Aug. 1964.

²⁷ See, e.g., F. Macpherson, *Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia: The times and the man* (Lusaka, 1974), 299, 308-10, and chapter 12.

²⁸ Kaunda's quote is taken from the 'National president's speech at Magoye Conference in August 1962', UNIPA, UNIP16/1/16.

²⁹ *Voice of UNIP*, May 1960.

³⁰ M. Sipalo to R. Makasa, Accra, 8 Dec. 1961, UNIPA, UNIP 9/1/24.

the leader's infallibility and a totalitarian ambition to quash and/or encapsulate autonomous social movements, were already firmly embedded in the Zambian political soil well before the formal declaration of independence in October 1964.

Inter-party violence – an aspect of Zambian nationalist history grossly and culpably underestimated by such standard accounts as Mulford's and Rotberg's³¹ – was a consequence of this ideologically saturated context. The existence of a causal link between the nature of UNIP's nationalism and the rise of political violence was implied as early as April 1960 by the provincial president of the ANC Women's League in the Copperbelt. UNIP officials and members, said Mrs. Bwalya, were:

‘creating absolute hatred with their fellow Africans. They are committed in a way to violence of all kinds while we are committed to non-violence. Our people are attacked every now and again and are seriously beaten while we [...] do not make any tit for tat’.³²

More will be said below about the dynamics of inter-party warfare in the early 1960s and the ANC's alleged commitment to peaceful political competition. At this stage, and with a view to rounding up our argument so far, it suffices to point out that in the Copperbelt and other areas where UNIP was gaining the upper hand over Nkumbula's party, political violence was almost always a consequence of card-demanding,³³ the exercise through which grass roots militants checked and enforced membership of the new nation through its most visible manifestation: the possession of a UNIP card. To be found without a card meant nothing less than rejecting national affiliation and its necessary attributes: Freedom and independence. Speaking in the Legislative Council during a debate on ‘week-end rioting’ in the Copperbelt, Kaunda bemoaned the widespread tendency to see ‘a person [who] carries a different party card’ as an ‘enemy who should be hit at any time’.³⁴ What the then Minister of Local Government and Social Welfare appears not to have realized was that, far from being a result of the lack of ‘education of the public’, inter-party violence was the natural offshoot of an exclusionary political philosophy to the formulation of which he himself had made a decisive contribution.

³¹ Mulford, *Zambia*; Rotberg, *Rise of nationalism*. Marginally more satisfactory on this point is Macpherson, *Kenneth Kaunda*.

³² Minutes of the ANC National Assembly, Lusaka, 14-19 April 1960, UNIPA, ANC 7/73.

³³ See, e.g., the findings of Northern Rhodesia Government, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Unrest on the Copperbelt, July-August, 1963* (Lusaka, 1963).

³⁴ *The legislative council debates: Official report of the first session of the twelfth legislative council (Resumed)*, 18 June 1963, cols. 44-45

The ideology and structure of the ANC

Nkumbula's initial reaction to the formation of ZANC was to blame his 'ambitious' opponents for having 'torn apart the solidarity of the Africans against colonialism and imperialism'.³⁵ Nkumbula's defence of his nationalist credentials also passed through a series of spirited performances in the Legislative Council, where he sat briefly between 1959 and 1960. On 25 June 1959, for instance, he opposed the extension of the anti-ZANC regulations by pointing out that 'detention or further legislation to detain people is not the answer.

The only way we can get any amicable solution in this country is to give the people what they want. If we do not [...], then we shall be sitting in this House day after day, passing legislation after legislation. We shall be declaring states of emergency time and again'.³⁶

Of more lasting legacy, perhaps, was the sustained appeal to his personal history of militancy and leadership. ANC propaganda sought to counter the youthful enthusiasm of UNIP by stressing what Michello called Nkumbula's 'world of experience' and the need to be led by 'one who has been on the battlefield long enough', 'one who has an Incyclopedia [sic] of the past at the back of his mind, for reference at will. One who is in reality an International Driver, and not a Learner Driver'.³⁷ Nkumbula was the initiator of modern African politics in Northern Rhodesia. By denying him the respect traditionally accorded to fathers and elders, UNIP's leaders and supporters behaved no better than 'juvenile delinquents'.³⁸ The ANC – Michello told the press in April 1962 – was a party of 'adults'; UNIP consisted of 'teenagers and loafers'.³⁹ This aspect of the ANC's discourse was more than a simple propaganda ploy, for the dismissal of UNIP's founders as mere 'boys' was as distinguishing a feature of private exchanges between ANC top leaders as it was of the texts they wrote for

³⁵ Untitled and undated (but late 1958 [?]) fragment in Nkumbula's handwriting, UNIPA, ANC 3/30. See also 'Nkumbula on the Kaunda split', *Freedom Magazine*, June 1959.

³⁶ *The legislative council debates: Official report of the first session of the eleventh legislative council (Resumed)*, 23 June 1959 – 7 August 1959, col. 98.

³⁷ J.E.M. Michello to 'All chiefs and people of Northern Rhodesia', Lusaka, 4 Sept. 1959, UNIPA, ANC 7/65. Excerpts reprinted in *Freedom Magazine*, May 1960.

³⁸ S.V. Kasonde, in: *Week by Week*, 18 Feb. 1961.

³⁹ J.E.M. Michello, 'Press statement', n.p. [but Lusaka], 24 April 1962, UNIPA, ANC 7/93.

public consumption.⁴⁰ Conversely, members of the ANC executive would routinely address Nkumbula as 'Sir' or even 'father'.⁴¹

Of course, para-political loyalties and the celebration of gerontocracy could not be expected to keep the party together in the long run. What was most needed clearly to distinguish it from UNIP was a coherent political philosophy. And it was precisely at this level that the ANC was found wanting, for what is most striking about the party's ideology until at least 1961 is its overall contradictoriness. For more than two years after the formation of ZANC, the ANC leadership appeared to be groping in the dark, sending mixed messages to the future electorate and losing much valuable ground to its 'African socialist' rivals. Take, for instance, the 'Provincial statement' issued in mid-1960 by Amos Sichilaba, the influential provincial general secretary of the party in the Southern province. The 'moderate' (and, as will be seen below, somewhat hypocritical) denunciation of UNIP's 'policy of intimidation' and penchant for 'arson [and] stone throwing' did not prevent Sichilaba from accusing Kaunda of opposing the nationalization of the mines and, hence, 'complete African Independence [sic]'.⁴² Sichilaba's source was probably *Freedom Magazine* of May 1960, where Edward Mungoni Liso, the then head of the publicity bureau of the ANC, had suggested that Kaunda, who could not 'withstand temptations of the capitalists', was on the payroll of Rhodesian Selection Trust, one of the two Copperbelt mining giants. The wording of Liso's editorial, in turn, may not have been unrelated to the fact that during the same spring of 1960 Michello was striving to re-establish contact with the International Union of Socialist Youth and Nehru.⁴³ These weak and improvised attempts to position the party to the left of UNIP were temporarily dropped in October, when the ANC headquarters issued an abrupt statement commending 'private enterprise' and 'cuts in public expenditure'.⁴⁴ But the party's ideological gyrations were not yet over, for in January 1961 John Banda, Nkumbula's deputy, sought to reinvigorate the argument about UNIP's duplicity and covert imperialist leanings by calling into

⁴⁰ See, e.g., J.E.M. Michello to H.M. Nkumbula, n.p. [but Lusaka], 5 Dec. 1960, UNIPA, ANC 2/21.

⁴¹ See, e.g., B. L. Lombe to H.M. Nkumbula, Mufulira, 26 Mar. 1959, UNIPA, ANC 7/55. In this same missive, Lombe informed Nkumbula of his intention of calling his newborn son 'Nkumbula II'.

⁴² A.S. Sichilaba, 'Provincial statement', n.p. [but Monze (?)], n.d. [but mid-1960], UNIPA, ANC 2/14.

⁴³ J.E.M. Michello to Youth Section (Convention Peoples' Party of Ghana), n.p. [but Lusaka], 27 April 1960; and J.E.M. Michello to J. Nehru, n.p. [but Lusaka], 13 May 1960, UNIPA, ANC 2/22.

⁴⁴ ANC, 'Press statement', Lusaka, 19 Oct. 1960, ANC 7/93.

question its professed policy of ‘multiracialism’: ‘[t]hey are trying to please two masters. We have one master to please, the AFRICAN’.⁴⁵

Signs of greater ideological cohesion around a moderate platform became detectable during Katilungu’s brief interlude as acting national president from April 1961. For the first time, Kaunda’s white supporters and ‘advisors’ were accused of hostility towards ‘the Western World’.⁴⁶ Thereafter, open professions of anti-Communism became more frequent and raucous. The consolidation of the alliance with the secessionist regime of Katanga – about which more will be said below – had an obvious bearing on the ideological positioning of the ANC. Another key turning point was the *chachacha*, the campaign of civil disobedience launched by UNIP against the constitutional proposals for Northern Rhodesia issued by Secretary of State Macleod in June. By dissociating itself from the ongoing ‘disturbances’, the ANC took its sharpest yet turn to the right of the political spectrum. While confirming UNIP’s assessment of the ANC leaders as ‘cowards’ and ‘stooges’,⁴⁷ Katilungu and Nkumbula’s refusal to mobilize their followers against the Macleod plan granted their party an incontrovertible badge of moderation and provided it with the chance to dispute UNIP and Kaunda’s much-heralded commitment to non-violence.⁴⁸ Sykes Ndilila was among the first ANC officials to seize the opportunity.

Mr. Kaunda himself has preached non-violence several times [...]. But according to what his followers are doing, does it appear that they agree with what he says [?] Kaunda further preaches the protection of property, persons of all races and the protection of minority races [...]. Either Kaunda is dishonest in what he says or his followers do not obey him. [...]. Can people who burn the only schools for their children protect you and your property? You have a good sense of humour. [...]. [W]hen Mr. Harry Nkumbula or his deputy Mr. Katilungu say non-violence, it is really so in word and deed. And when they say that they will protect people of all races and property, they really mean so. [...]. Congress leaders have proved to you and to the whole world that they are responsible and that they can rule this country without bloodshed.⁴⁹

If anti-Communism and anti-Pan-Africanism came to dominate the ANC’s public discourse throughout 1962, Nkumbula’s release from prison at the beginning of the year also coincided with the adoption of a more explicit and informed liberal-democratic agenda. In an important interview in July, Nkumbula accused UNIP of ‘believe[ing] in a totalitarian form of government’ upheld

⁴⁵ C.J.A. Banda, ‘Press statement’, n.p., 24 Jan. 1961, ANC 7/93.

⁴⁶ *Week by Week*, 20 May 1961.

⁴⁷ M.M. Chona to J.E.M. Michello, Lusaka, 22 Aug. 1961, UNIPA, ANC 9/36.

⁴⁸ Mulford, *Zambia*, 243.

⁴⁹ S. Ndilila to ‘All members of all races’, Broken Hill, n.d. [but summer of 1961 (?)], UNIPA, ANC 7/93.

by ‘coercion and intimidation’. His party, on the contrary, was committed to ‘private enterprise’ and the ‘complete freedom of the individual’. Perceptively, Nkumbula pointed out that UNIP struggled to reconcile its vision of Zambian future with the existence of a strong parliamentary opposition. This was little wonder – he concluded – since ‘UNIP has aligned itself with the Casablanca Group of countries, which are Communist inclined. We in the ANC to the Monrovia Group which is democratically inclined. [...] Kaunda is not carrying out his own policies. They are Nkrumah’s ideas’.⁵⁰

The coherence and candidness of Nkumbula’s liberalism should not be overemphasized, for, as will be seen below, his professed support for the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy did not amount to a rejection of such opportunistic forms of political mobilization as ethnic chauvinism and violence. What needs to be stressed, however, is that Nkumbula’s opposition to UNIP’s state-driven blueprint for economic development from 1962 was both a cause and a consequence of his party’s enduring popularity among market-oriented agricultural producers in the Central and Southern provinces. Building upon the legacy of Congress-sponsored agricultural protests from ca. 1950,⁵¹ Nkumbula had openly employed his position in the Legislative Council in 1959-60 to voice the multiple concerns of an increasingly differentiated peasantry. While his denunciation of the inefficiency and authoritarianism of the Ministry of African Agriculture’s soil conservation measures had been meant to court the support of subsistence farmers, upon whom the burden of unpaid conservation work tended invariably to fall,⁵² by questioning the performance of the African Farming Improvement Fund, Nkumbula had explicitly claimed for himself the role of spokesman of those ‘rich peasants’ who felt systematically discriminated by the workings of the colonial state’s credit and marketing systems.⁵³

By 1962 – and thanks also to the fervour with which Nkumbula and his lieutenants kept at the centre of the political debate the themes of the ‘lost lands’

⁵⁰ ‘Nkumbula: I am against merger’, *Central African Mail*, 24 July 1962.

⁵¹ See T. Rasmussen, ‘The popular basis of anti-colonial protest’, in: W. Tordoff, ed., *Politics in Zambia* (Manchester, 1974), 51-53, and, especially, M.R. Dixon-Fyle, ‘Politics and agrarian change among the plateau tonga of Northern Rhodesia, c. 1924-63’, PhD, University of London, 1976, chapters 6 and 7.

⁵² *Legislative Council Debates*, 6 Aug. 1959, col. 1167. See also S.N. Chipungu, *The state, technology and peasant differentiation in Zambia: A case study of the Southern province, 1930-1986* (Lusaka, 1988), 112-13.

⁵³ *Legislative council debates*, 9 July, 6 Aug. 1959, cols. 366-67, 1169-74, 1184; *The legislative council debates: Official report of the second session of the Eleventh legislative council (Resumed)*, 3 Aug. 1960, cols. 1219-21. Here, my overall interpretation owes much to J.C. Momba, ‘Peasant differentiation and rural party politics in colonial Zambia’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 11 (1985), 281-94.

and the inadequacy of the ‘Native Reserves’ along the line of rail⁵⁴ – few informed observers could miss the rural orientation of the ANC. Agricultural matters featured prominently in the otherwise bland and unremarkable campaign material issued by the party on the eve of the first Northern Rhodesian General Elections of October. In September, Nkumbula spoke of the need for a ‘mighty agricultural revolution’, which he sought to justify by pointing to the vagaries of the international price of copper: ‘should those market prices be unsympathetic, then we should have to depend on our agricultural industry to offset losses and maintain a balance of overall trading, possibly even in a sense subsidising the metal industries’.⁵⁵ The results of the elections – in which the ANC scooped three of the four lower roll seats comprised within the borders of the Southern and Central provinces – confirmed the successful outcome of Nkumbula’s attempt to portray himself and his organization as the defenders of rural interests and respectability against the onslaught of UNIP’s ‘young urbanised boys’.⁵⁶

The ideological cohesion that the ANC lacked in 1959-61 was compounded by its increasingly obvious administrative meltdown. Most of the organizational problems faced by the ANC stemmed from its desperate financial position. Nkumbula’s flamboyant life style and, more importantly, the haemorrhage of members and subscribers to the advantage of UNIP meant that the party proved less and less able to service existing debts without having access to new lines of credit.⁵⁷ And with the ANC being widely perceived as being on the verge of total collapse, creditors themselves became both stricter and more assertive. The first of a long series of bankruptcy summons and notices was served upon Nkumbula in as early as September 1959.⁵⁸ In May 1960, with Harry’s trip to the London Federal Review Conference looming large on the horizon, national treasurer Wingford Jere was forced openly to admit that the coffers of the party were ‘empty’.⁵⁹ So dire was Jere and the party’s predicament that the costs of Nkumbula’s defence during the trial that followed his car accident in June could

⁵⁴ See, e.g., *The legislative council debates: Official report of the first session of the eleventh legislative council (Resumed)*, 26 Nov. 1959, col. 83; and ‘Land’, *Freedom Magazine*, May 1960.

⁵⁵ H.M. Nkumbula, ‘Presidential address 1962’, Lusaka, 19 Sept. 1962, UNIPA, ANC 7/101.

⁵⁶ Quote taken from J.T. Mawere to H.M. Nkumbula, Fort Jameson, 13 Apr. 1962, UNIPA, ANC 9/6.

⁵⁷ Minutes of the ANC National Assembly, 14-19 April 1960.

⁵⁸ Ellis & Co. to H.M. Nkumbula, Lusaka, 16 Sept. 1959, UNIPA, ANC 9/48.

⁵⁹ W.K. Jere, ‘Statement from the national treasury’, *Freedom Magazine*, May 1960.

only be met through *ad hoc* fund-raising campaigns launched in Lusaka, the Copperbelt and elsewhere.⁶⁰

Lack of resources greatly reduced the party's effectiveness at both the national and provincial levels. While Lusaka-based leaders could not tour the country as much as the threat posed by UNIP would have warranted, provincial officials had to cope with insufficient means and the erratic payment of personal allowances and emoluments.⁶¹ The chaotic series of provincial reshuffles by which the party was plagued in the years that followed the exit of Chona and Mukupo was partly a consequence of this state of affairs. In UNIP-dominated regions, where the costs and risks of political involvement were even higher than elsewhere, provincial officials were hard to find and harder to retain. Most new appointees would routinely hand in their notices after a mere few months in office or, at best, request a transfer to a less demanding area. Notable exceptions to the rule were the Southern and Central provinces, where the party could still count on strong mass support. In administrative terms, the Bantu Botatwe strongholds of the party were islands of stability, with the composition of provincial executives in both Monze and Lusaka-Broken Hill exhibiting a remarkable degree of continuity throughout the early 1960s. This, in turn, may have contributed to the coeval 'southernization' of the ANC's national executive, where the positions of president, chairman, secretary, publicity officer and treasurer were all held by either southerners (Nkumbula, Millambo, Michello and Liso) or former Southern province-based officials (Jere).

This was the party over which Nkumbula presided with an iron fist. For, and this is one of the many paradoxes and contradictions that characterized his political life, Nkumbula's liberal-democratic faith and opposition to the one-party state did not prevent him from establishing a truly dictatorial hold over the ANC. Having granted Nkumbula the constitutional right to appoint and dismiss members of both the national and provincial executives in 1959,⁶² the party was centralized to an extent unimaginable even by UNIP. The obvious disadvantage of the concentration of administrative powers in Nkumbula was that the party was brought to a complete standstill during the president's enforced or wilful absences. On the other hand, it was precisely the 'patrimonial' nature of his rule that empowered Nkumbula freely to pursue those buccaneering strategies to which the ANC ultimately owed its survival in the early 1960. It is to these latter that we now turn.

⁶⁰ W.K. Jere to [B. Mulenga], n.p. [but Lusaka], 26 July 1960, UNIPA, ANC 7/70; and J.E.M. Michello to ANC district chairman (Mumbwa East), Lusaka, 2 Aug. 1960, UNIPA, ANC 2/8.

⁶¹ See, e.g., Minutes of the ANC National Assembly, 14-19 April 1960.

⁶² Mulford, *Zambia*, 128.

Beneath the surface of formal politics

The alliance with Katanga

The formation of ZANC/UNIP ushered in a period of increasing international isolation for Nkumbula, whose former place in the hearts and minds of African and European anti-colonial leaders was rapidly taken over by Kaunda and his organization. When, in December 1958, both Nkumbula and Kaunda attended the All African Peoples' Conference in newly independent Ghana, the former was genuinely 'hurt' to discover that the latter was now Kwame Nkrumah and Kamuzu Banda's preferred interlocutor. Old acquaintances from his London days 'would not pay attention to [him]'. George Padmore, now serving as Nkrumah's special advisor, only 'listened to Kaunda, who acted as Banda's agent. [...]. Nobody listened to me with sympathy [...]' Harry felt as if his 'presence [was] repugnant' to the conference's organizers and delegates.⁶³ Ghanaian authorities did not see fit to reply to this and later lamentations or to consider Nkumbula's request 'for financial assistance amounting to £6,000'.⁶⁴

Snubbed by Pan-Africanists, Nkumbula did not fare much better with British supporters of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia. Although Nkumbula managed to retain a few 'Labour Party friends',⁶⁵ the Labour Commonwealth office soon resolved to throw its weight behind the newly formed UNIP, with which it was keen to establish a 'close liaison' from as early as the end of 1959.⁶⁶ The same was true of such influential pressure groups as Fenner Brockway's Movement for Colonial Freedom, Arthur Creech Jones' Fabian Colonial Bureau and Thomas Fox-Pitt's Anti-Slavery Society. Writing to Chona at the time of his faction's merger with UNIP, Fox-Pitt typified the feelings of many of his colleagues by stating categorically that while Nkumbula went 'unregretted or regretted only by a few hangers on', Kaunda, once released, 'will solve many of your problems for you and for the country and the Government if they have the sense to realize it'.⁶⁷

This painful process of international marginalization was probably no less significant a factor than the ANC's financial crisis in strengthening Nkumbula's resolve to seek for new allies across the Katangese border, where Moïse Tshombe, the president of the secessionist regime since July 1960, was prepared to use his virtually limitless resources to ease the diplomatic isolation by which

⁶³ H.M. Nkumbula to J. Markham, n.p., 6 Jan. 1959, encl. in: Id. to id., n.p., 13 Feb. 1959, UNIPA, ANC 2/22.

⁶⁴ H.M. Nkumbula to A.Y.K. Djin, n.p., 27 February 1959, UNIPA, ANC 4/8.

⁶⁵ Tembo to Zukas, 16 Jan. 1961.

⁶⁶ J. Hatch to F. Chitambala, London, 31 Dec. 1959, UNIPA, UNIP 6/7/13.

⁶⁷ T. Fox-Pitt to M.M. Chona, London, 1 Oct. 1959, UNIPA, UNIP 6/7/4; T. Fox-Pitt to M.M. Chona, London, 18 Dec. 1959, UNIPA, UNIP 6/7/3.

his splinter state threatened to be suffocated and ensure the installation of a friendly government in neighbouring Northern Rhodesia. Nkumbula's first meeting with Tshombe seems to have taken place shortly before the ANC president's incarceration in April 1961.⁶⁸ But as early as February of the same year, the UNIP's national secretary had denounced Nkumbula's overtures towards the 'imperialist puppet Tshombe. [...]. It is obvious that if Tshombe and Nkumbula start working together, then our political problems will be immensely increased'.⁶⁹ In May, Katilungu, acting national president of the ANC, issued a statement condemning Kamuzu Banda for 'demand[ing] that M. Tshombe be murdered in his telegram to [Congolese] President Kasavubu. [...]. The African National Congress has taken no sides in Congo situation, but believes that Congo leaders if given the chance, including Moise Tshombe, would be able to find their solution'.⁷⁰ During the same month, Ronald John Japau, Tshombe's fellow Lunda and the ANC's provincial general secretary in the North-Western province, paid his first visit to Elisabethville, where he was delayed until August by the Katangese president's promise of 'some valuable goods to help the ANC activities'.⁷¹

While it is difficult to gauge the precise volume of Katangese financial assistance to the ANC in 1961, there is little doubt that the sums involved were considerable, oscillating between Mulford's estimate of £10,000 and the *African Mail*'s reported figure of '2,000,000 francs (about £14,000) and six Land Rovers'.⁷² Before the end of the year, Berrings Lombe, the ANC's deputy national secretary, settled in Katanga as the party's local representative.⁷³ Thanks to Lombe's exertions in Elisabethville and the ANC's ever more open professions of support for the secession,⁷⁴ the flow of Katangese aid continued

⁶⁸ This can be deduced from 'Money and trucks to ANC from Katanga', *African Mail*, 1 Nov. 1961.

⁶⁹ M. Sipalo to Q. Armah, n.p. [but Lusaka], 27 Feb. 1961, UNIPA, UNIP 6/7/3.

⁷⁰ Reproduced in *Week by Week*, 20 May 1961.

⁷¹ B. Mashata to J. Michello, Mashata's village, 1 Aug. 1961, UNIPA, ANC 2/7. For a more detailed treatment of the links between Katanga and Northern Rhodesia's North-Western province, see M. Larmer and G. Macola, 'The origins, context and political significance of the Mushala Rebellion against the Zambian one-party state'. *International Journal of African Historical Studies* (forthcoming).

⁷² Cf. Mulford, *Zambia*, 241, and 'Money and trucks to ANC'. The six land rovers mentioned by the *African Mail* may (or may not) have comprised the five vehicles that Japau is said to have obtained from Katanga at some point between 1961 and 1962. Interview with Winston Japau, Mwinilunga, 1 Aug. 2005.

⁷³ The approximate date of Lombe's move can be inferred from 'Top ANC official stuck in Katanga', *Central African Mail*, 27 March 1962, and B. Lombe, 'Press statement', Elisabethville, n.d. [but early April 1962], UNIPA, ANC 2/21.

⁷⁴ See, e.g., R.J. Japau and B. Mashata to 'National Peace Council', Mwinilunga, 28 Dec. 1961, UNIPA, ANC 2/7.

unabated and may well have reached a grand total of £25,000 by February 1962.⁷⁵ With ANC officials and Katangese dignitaries exchanging frequent visits throughout the year, UNIP was left ranting at Nkumbula's party – 'which was bankrupt [but] has suddenly become very wealthy, purchasing 20 motor vehicles; its officials have bought expensive suits and watches as well as furniture and other luxuries' – and stigmatizing its alleged decision to dispatch some of its members to Katanga to receive military instruction.⁷⁶ UNIP's denunciations notwithstanding, following a new request from Nkumbula to Godefroid Munongo, the redoubtable Katangese Interior Minister, an additional £20,000 were seemingly made available to the ANC in September.⁷⁷

The solidity of the ANC's alliance with Tshombe, and Federal Prime Minister Welensky's absolute certainty that a UNIP victory in the general elections of October 1962 would ensue in the immediate dissolution of his cherished Federation, help explaining the relative ease with which Nkumbula pulled off his greatest yet tactical masterstroke. By dangling before Welensky and John Roberts' eyes the possibility of a future coalition government between their United Federal Party (UFP) and the ANC, Nkumbula convinced them to support each other's candidates on the so-called 'national roll', which comprised both upper (i.e. white) and lower roll voters. To the dismay and fury of UNIP – which only learnt of its existence on nomination day – the circumscribed electoral alliance between the UFP and the ANC proved successful, culminating in the ANC supplementing its three lower roll seats with two 'national' ones (these would become four after the by-elections of December). As a result of Nkumbula's coup – and since neither UNIP nor the UFP had the numbers to form monochrome governments – the ANC now 'held the balance of power, a position of immense influence, [...] radically disproportionate to the party's actual strength in the country'.⁷⁸ Having used the UFP's votes to the greatest possible advantage and forced UNIP to enter negotiations from a

⁷⁵ 'Congress money mystery', *Central African Mail*, 27 Feb. 1962.

⁷⁶ J.K. Chivunga, W.K. Sikalumbi, J.K. Mulenga, and R.S.K. Makasa, 'Memorandum circulated by the United National Independence Party [...] to the emergency conference of the Pan-African Movement of East and Central Africa held at Mbeya, Tanganyika, on 13th to 14th May 1962', UNIPA, UNIP 9/1/44. The source of the allegations made in the memorandum was 'ANC "soldiers" in Katanga', *Central African Mail*, 8 May 1962. A later eyewitness report that appears to confirm their veracity (A. Wilson, "ANC soldiers" in Katanga: new facts', *Central African Mail*, 31 July 1962) was explicitly – if unconvincingly – refuted by Nkumbula in an *ad hoc* press conference held on 16 Aug. 1962, UNIPA, ANC 7/93. And see also Macpherson, *Kenneth Kaunda*, 388-90.

⁷⁷ H.M. Nkumbula to G. Munongo, Lusaka, 7 July 1962, UNIPA, ANC 7/54; 'ANC plans own radio link-up', *Central African Mail*, 11 Sept. 1962.

⁷⁸ Mulford, *Zambia*, 286.

paradoxical position of weakness, Nkumbula proceeded to drop his federal allies and stipulate a coalition pact with UNIP. Despite having nearly twice as many parliamentarians as the ANC, UNIP was eventually compelled to accede to Nkumbula's demands and allocate his party half of the six full ministerial posts reserved for elected representatives in the new cabinet.⁷⁹

Though the undisputed winner of the electoral contest, Education Minister Nkumbula's position at the beginning of 1963 was fraught with dangers. For while relationships with UNIP remained tense and unfriendly both within and outside the cabinet, by forming a government with the latter party, Nkumbula was now exposed to the threat of retaliation from his former, disgruntled sponsors. Nkumbula had explicitly sought Tshombe's blessing before signing his pact with 'Lumumbist' UNIP in December 1962.⁸⁰ But there was little that he could do to reclaim his erstwhile stature among Katangese leaders. After the end of the secession in January 1963, the deposed Katangese president became deeply wary of Nkumbula and must have regarded his renewed requests for financial succour as, at best, impudent. The same, of course, was true of Welensky and the UFP (NPP from April 1963). Though resigned to the impending dissolution of Federation,⁸¹ federal politicians were not ready to forgive what Welensky called Nkumbula's "breach of faith"⁸² and began actively to plot his demise by supporting the activities of a rebel faction grouped around national secretary Michello. The formation of Michello's ephemeral PDC in August 1963 would soon remind Nkumbula of the power and vindictiveness of his enemies.

With the ending of Katangese support, the ANC was plunged back into a state of serious financial turmoil. Late in the summer of 1963, the party's debts were already 'in the region of £25,000'.⁸³ There was to be no repeat of Nkumbula's coup of 1962 in the run-up to the general elections of January 1964, when a penniless ANC was cut down to size by a triumphant UNIP, the party under which Zambia would eventually achieve full independence in October 1964. Nonetheless, however short-lived, Nkumbula's Katangese venture in the early 1960s had left a lasting imprint upon Zambian politics. For the ANC, the Katangese episode meant that the temptation remained inscribed in the party's DNA of overcoming the problem of limited internal popularity by enlisting the

⁷⁹ The above paragraph provides a greatly simplified account of what was in fact a dense and convoluted set of events. For a fuller narrative, see Mulford, *Zambia*, chapter 7.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 293-95.

⁸¹ J.R.T. Wood, *The Welensky Papers: A history of the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (Durban, 1983), 1123.

⁸² Quoted in Mulford, *Zambia*, 307.

⁸³ 'NR men beg at Moise's hotel', *Central African Mail*, 24 Aug. 1963.

support of powerful – if ideologically suspect – foreign partners. UNIP, on the other hand, was left with an enduring suspicion of external meddling; its readiness to resort to any means in order to prevent it would vindicate and bolster up its already entrenched authoritarian inclinations.

Ethnic politics

Even though Nkumbula never renounced the national frame of reference within which his early political career had taken place and was wont publicly to ‘repudiate tribal chauvinism wherever it prevails among Africans’,⁸⁴ it is clear that his political survival in the early 1960s owed much to the regionalization of his party and ethnicization of its support base. As pointed out above, the ANC’s half-baked liberal-democratic, free-market agenda was broad (or loose) enough to appeal to both market-oriented and subsistence farmers in the Southern and Central provinces, whose principal tribal groups – Tonga, Ilala and Lenje – spoke mutually intelligible dialects and had indeed been conceived of by missionaries and colonial administrators as forming one distinct linguistic and cultural entity, the Bantu Botatwe.⁸⁵ However, it was precisely the politicization of these cultural affinities under the sponsorship of the ANC that cemented the solidarity between potentially antagonistic strata of rural producers. The ethnic propaganda of the ANC took two different forms, each of which suited to a particular political arena.

At the local level, the mobilization of regionalist feelings passed through the expression of open hostility towards the Bemba and Bemba-speaking peoples, with whom the formation of ZANC/UNIP was closely associated and who, in virtue of their long experience of labour migrancy, were seen as embodying that urban ethos against which the more sedentary Bantu Botatwe were prepared to rally. Unencumbered by the party’s national leadership, ANC provincial officials consistently portrayed UNIP founders and supporters as uprooted and poor ‘thieves’ whose political activities were solely designed to rob honest peasants of the hard-won fruits of their agricultural labour. A UNIP government – ordinary members of the ANC were told and generally believed throughout the early 1960s and beyond – would put the Bemba in a position to colonize the Southern province and take away its women and cattle.⁸⁶ ‘[Y]our land’ – future MP Edgar

⁸⁴ H.M. Nkumbula, ‘President’s speech on the public meeting: 13th September, 1959’, UNIPA, ANC 2/13.

⁸⁵ E. Colson, ‘The Bantu Botatwe: Changing political definitions in southern Zambia’, in: D. Parkin, L. Caplan and H. Fisher, eds, *The politics of cultural performance* (Providence and Oxford, 1996), 62-63.

⁸⁶ The above section is based mainly on interviews with Daniel Simoloka, Choma, 14 August 2003, and Job Michello, Lusaka, 15 Feb. 2003. But see also C.J.A. Banda to ‘Dear sir’, Lusaka, 13 July 1962, UNIPA, ANC 7/69; M. Lukata to ‘UNIP H.Q.’,

Musangu warned Choma voters at the beginning of January 1964 – will only ‘be safe’ in the event of an ANC’s electoral victory; ‘no piece of it will be given to Bembas and all jobs will be open to local people’.⁸⁷ The scare tactics used by the ANC were much the same in Mumbwa, one of the party’s strongholds in the Central province, where such Tonga supporters of UNIP as Chona and Elijah Mudenda were ridiculed as ‘educated fools’ and mere ‘tools of the Bemba Regime’.⁸⁸

The emphasis placed by ANC propagandists on the alleged fragility of Kaunda’s position amounted to a variation on the theme of Bemba mischievousness. The leadership of Kaunda, whose parents hailed from present-day Malawi, was said to be resented by ‘true’ Bemba leaders within UNIP. Their aim – charged the *Congress Circular* – was to give birth to a new political organization under the presidency of Kapwepwe.⁸⁹ The rumoured tension between Kapwepwe and Kaunda and, more in general, Bemba hegemonic pretensions formed the kernel of ‘The Voice of Zambia Front’, a communiqué allegedly issued in the name of UNIP on the eve of the 1964 elections. The pamphlet – the author of which was in fact an ANC man, Dominic Mwansa – purported to be an appeal to the Bemba to support the ascent of Kapwepwe as a first step towards the attainment of a position of unassailable ethnic superiority.

All tribes shall be under one BIG TRIBE in our Zambia, that is Bemba Tribe. We shall have one vernacular language in our Zambia. BEMBA will be the MAIN LANGUAGE in our Zambia. All tribes shall be united and shall be called “The United Tribes of Zambia”. Every one shall speak Bemba. In every school of Zambia children shall be taught in Bemba, white or Black. The Bemba tribe shall be honoured for their bravery for bringing Freedom in Zambia. Vote KAPWEPWE, our first Prime Minister.⁹⁰

However, given the pervasiveness of nationalist discourse, anti-Bemba propaganda could hardly command the same prominence on the national stage as it did in the Southern and Central provinces. Its countrywide rendition was a bellicose form of nativism: the professed defence of the rights of ‘indigenous Northern Rhodesians’ against the onslaught of foreigners. Both because of

Namwala, 19 Sept. 1962, UNIPA, UNIP5/4/1/3; and ‘It’s a Copperbelt votes blitz’, *Times of Zambia*, 11 Dec. 1971.

⁸⁷ ‘ANC meeting held at Singani court on 9-1-64’, NAZ, SP 4/2/171.

⁸⁸ P.B. Hamane and P. Singoyi, ‘Report of our tour in Mumbwa’, n.p., n.d. [but late Feb. 1963], UNIPA, ANC 7/49.

⁸⁹ *Congress Circular*, 30 Sept. 1963.

⁹⁰ The full text of this rather clever example of *disinformatja* is to be found in UNIPA, UNIP 16/1/14; the attribution to Mwansa in: W.B. Sauti, ‘The truth about the “Voice of Zambia Front”’, n.p., 20 Jan. 1964, UNIPA, ANC 9/35. For the extensive ripples caused by the appearance of the ‘mysterious pamphlet’, see ‘UNIP witch-hunt for Zambia Front is on’, *Central African Mail*, 17 Jan. 1964.

Kaunda's origins and the privileged position they had historically occupied in Northern Rhodesia's political economy, Malawians or 'Nyasas' were the preferred target of the ANC. What may have begun as mere resentment at the alliance between Kamuzu Banda and Kaunda from the end of 1958, or as a cheap tactical ploy during the aborted Federal Review and Northern Rhodesian Constitutional conferences of December 1960–January 1961,⁹¹ soon became a major propaganda tool to which the party resorted with monotonous regularity throughout the period under study. The tone for many successive pronouncements was set by Nkumbula early in April 1961. In a speech entitled 'Invasion of Northern Rhodesia by Nyasaland Africans', he condemned Northern Rhodesia-based Nyasas for having 'aligned themselves with United National Independence Party, which is apparently a branch of the Malawi Congress. It is their imagination that if there was a Malawi Government in Nyasaland and another government in Northern Rhodesia led by their fellow country man [i.e. Kaunda], Nyasaland will gain control of Northern Rhodesia for its economic redemption and also to enable them to hold key positions in our industry and commerce which they now enjoy at the prejudice of the Rhodesian Africans'.⁹²

At about the same time, Katilungu sought to impress ANC supporters by reminding them of his vernacular nickname – 'Lesa wabufa' or 'jealous God' – seemingly bestowed upon him on account of his hostility to 'foreign natives meddling in our affairs'.⁹³ Undeterred by the inconsistency between its anti-Malawian stance and its coeval Katangese policy, the ANC continued to follow an openly chauvinistic course throughout 1962. Typical of the party's mood at the time was the press release approved by the National Assembly of March. Authored by Liso, the communiqué demanded the immediate expulsion from Northern Rhodesia of Yatuta Chisiza, the Malawi Congress Party's administrative secretary, guilty of having called upon 'Nyasas working in N. Rhodesia to rally behind UNIP which is led by his nephew Kenneth Kaunda'. Chisiza

'realises that Nyasaland is a poor country and is pulling wool over the eyes of true N. Rhodesia[ns], so that if Kaunda became the Prime Minister, Nyasaland shall be milking N. Rhodesia in the same way as she and S. Rhodesia are doing now [...].'⁹⁴

Even though the ANC's nativism spread beyond the borders of the Southern and Central provinces, it resonated particularly powerfully among the Bantu Botatwe, who, aided by the absence or insignificance of migration narratives in

⁹¹ Nkumbula to Markham, 6 Jan. 1959; and J. Michello to I. Macleod, n.p. [but London], 19 Dec. 1960, UNIPA, ANC 2/2.

⁹² H.M. Nkumbula, 'Speech delivered [...] at the Western province rally held at Mufulira on Sunday 9 April 1961', UNIPA, ANC 7/93.

⁹³ *Week by Week*, 20 May 1961.

⁹⁴ Minutes of the ANC National Assembly, 10 March 1962.

their traditional lore,⁹⁵ saw themselves, and were widely perceived, as the first occupants of Northern Rhodesian soil and the ultimate 'indigenous'. 'Please do not let us be trodden by foreigners' – pleaded a Mr. Ngewwa from Mazabuka – 'because this drives some of us mad – to think of being ruled by a foreigner in what we regard and know as our motherland'.⁹⁶ UNIP officials, who knew that many Southerners felt as strongly as Ngewwa, took the ANC's anti-Malawian propaganda seriously. National secretary Chona, for instance, thought it wise to reassure UNIP branch officials in Kalomo Rural district to the effect that Kaunda '[was] not Nyasalander'.

'If he was, how could he have been a secretary of ANC when it was still a strong organisation? Nyasalanders are not allowed to vote. If Mr. Kaunda is a Nyasalander, why is he being allowed to vote? Everyone should see that ANC is just foolish and deceiving our people and it is high time they woke up from sleep and leave the ANC led by drunkards and skirt-chasers, as well as liars'.⁹⁷

Chona's frustration at the Bantu Botatwe unshakable faith in Nkumbula and stubborn refusal to 'join UNIP like all other different tribes' was understandable.⁹⁸ He was, after all, the seniormost Tonga in UNIP. However, UNIP's repeated accusations of gullibility or ignorance ('if the people all over Northern Rhodesia have accepted UNIP there must be something in it which we do not know we Tonga people'⁹⁹) served merely to reinforce the Bantu Botatwe's convictions, rather than leading them to change alliances. By stereotyping and harassing the Tonga and other kindred groups, UNIP unwittingly strengthened the effects of the ANC's own ethnic propaganda and favoured the emergence of a distinctly insular mentality among ANC supporters in the Southern and Central provinces. Thus crystallized along ethnic lines, Bantu Botatwe support for the ANC would stand the test of time and lose nothing of its poignancy in post-colonial Zambia, whose rulers would have to contend with the continuing opposition of the country's richest agricultural areas and their willingness to rally behind most forms of anti-UNIP dissidence.

Political violence

The regionalization of the ANC influenced the pattern of inter-party warfare in the early 1960s. If UNIP was responsible for the bulk of political violence in the Copperbelt and other Bemba-speaking areas – a conclusion which the joint

⁹⁵ E. Colson, *The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia: Social and religious studies* (Manchester, 1962), 68, 98; Roberts, *History of Zambia*, 92.

⁹⁶ M.A. Ngewwa to J.E.M. Michello, Mazabuka, 11 June 1963, UNIPA, ANC 7/61.

⁹⁷ M.M. Chona to [S.B.D. Siamusonde], n.p. [but Lusaka], 10 July 1962, UNIPA, UNIP 5/4/1/2.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ M.M. Chona to Chief Simwatachela, n.p., 25 Nov. 1963, UNIPA, UNIP 5/4/1/27.

Whelan Commission of July-August 1963 very clearly refused to draw, but which numerous internal ANC records forcefully suggest – the ANC made sure that in its southern and central strongholds Kaunda's party was 'treated with the same medicine that [it] treat[ed] others with in other parts of the Territory'.¹⁰⁰ This writer's feeling – and that of a good number of people who knew him intimately¹⁰¹ – is that Nkumbula, as he once told the leader of the Jehovah's Witnesses in Northern Rhodesia, 'personally abhorred violence'.¹⁰² However, given the very deteriorated political context in which his party operated and UNIP's aggressive methods throughout much of the country, Nkumbula appears to have developed an awareness of violence's potential political usefulness or, at any rate, justifiability. In the early 1960s, despite being wont to appeal for tolerance and calm,¹⁰³ Nkumbula did not shy away from occasionally condoning – or indeed encouraging – the resort to retaliatory violence on the part of his followers.

'[Y]ou have been too submissive and patient for too long', he chided the delegates to the party's National Assembly of March 1962. From now onwards, 'if you are attacked you attack them too [...] remember our Policy is that if one Congress member is attacked in one District that means the Province and the whole of N. Rhodesia has been attacked'.¹⁰⁴

Such pronouncements – and Nkumbula's more general unwillingness unambiguously to condemn all forms of political violence – did little to curb the activities of those Bantu Botatwe officials who, going well beyond the letter of their national president's public instructions, viewed *preventive* violence as the best possible means to defend Congress' position in the Southern and Central provinces. In this latter interpretation, violence was more than an enforced response to UNIP intimidation; its principal function was to demarcate a political field and consolidate existing loyalties. In Choma and Namwala, for instance, Congress aggressive occupation of the territory made the staging of UNIP public meetings risky

¹⁰⁰ A. St. J. Sugg to DC (Namwala), n.p. [but Livingstone], 12 Oct. 1962, NAZ, SP 1/14/58.

¹⁰¹ See, e.g., interview with Bruce Munyama, Lusaka, 18 July 2005.

¹⁰² J.S. Mundell to H.M. Nkumbula, Kitwe, 21 Oct. 1963, UNIPA, ANC 9/38.

¹⁰³ See, e.g., K.D. Kaunda and H.M. Nkumbula, 'Joint press statement', n.p. [but Lusaka], 22 March 1963, UNIPA, UNIP 16/1/23.

¹⁰⁴ Minutes of the ANC National Assembly, 10 March 1962. Cf. M. Temple, 'Who wants violence', *Central African Mail*, 30 Oct. 1962.

'and not very profitable, i.e. because Congress has not yet lost its grip among the illiterate who make-up the majority, the enlightened ones will always fear to come into the open until the resistance of the masses has been broken'.¹⁰⁵

Limited in the scattered southern and central townships, police protection was virtually non-existent in the outlying rural areas, where UNIP activists fought a thankless, solitary battle against a belligerent enemy. Unlike in the Copperbelt – where large and murderous, but geographically and temporally limited, riots were the most visible manifestation of inter-party hostility – political violence in the Bantu Botatwe areas consisted of a myriad acts of daily intimidation. Some insights into the dynamics of Congress violence at the local level are provided by the detailed reports of Daniel Siamusonde, a UNIP branch (later constituency) secretary in Kalomo Rural, whose experience may be safely assumed to typify that of a good number of UNIP organizers in the Southern and Central provinces in the early 1960.

Right from the outset of his political career, Siamusonde was confronted with a barrage of increasingly truculent threats. No sooner had his Nkuntu Simwatachela branch of UNIP been formed than he was openly warned by ANC provincial general secretary Sichilaba to keep out of politics and discontinue the sale of UNIP membership cards in Kalomo Rural.¹⁰⁶ During a public meeting on 15 April 1962, the same Sichilaba and other ANC provincial leaders are said to have sought to impress upon their supporters in Kalomo that local 'UNIP leaders must be attacked or killed as dogs'.¹⁰⁷ Words finally gave way to action on 8 August, when Siamusonde, on his way back from the UNIP General Conference of Magoye, was beaten up in Kayuni Siamalamo's village by ANC militants. When he went to report the incident to the UNIP constituency headquarters in Kalomo, he got involved in a fight between supporters of the two parties in the township's beerhall and was yet once more cautioned to the effect that plans were afoot to dispatch the 'ANCO-Mobile Unit to graze [sic] down or to destroy [sic] [his] home or village'.¹⁰⁸ At the end of the same month, 'three headmen of chief Simwatachela' travelled to Nkuntu Simwatachela with the seeming purpose of assassinating Siamusonde. The latter being fortuitously absent, the ANC men confined themselves to threatening his family. Upon their departure, four frightened members of Siamusonde's minute local following

¹⁰⁵ UNIP (Choma-Namwala Region), Report to the eighth national council, Choma, 30 July 1962, UNIPA, UNIP 16/1/63.

¹⁰⁶ S.B.D. Siamusonde to M.M. Chona, Nkuntu Simwatachela's village, 13 August 1962, UNIPA, UNIP 5/4/1/2.

¹⁰⁷ [S.B.D. Siamusonde] to UNIP Regional Secretary (Livingstone), Nkuntu Simwatachela's village, 19 April 1962, UNIPA, UNIP 5/4/1/2.

¹⁰⁸ Siamusonde to Chona, 13 August 1962.

returned their UNIP membership cards.¹⁰⁹ Siamusonde himself resolved temporarily to leave Nkuntu Simwatachela to relocate his family to Siajumba, the village of his father-in-law, ‘where they shall find save or safe from bitterly struggle of ANCO’.¹¹⁰ The formation of the ANC-UNIP coalition government at the end of 1962 did not dispel the poisonous atmosphere that surrounded Kalomo Rural’s political life. In April 1963, UNIP sympathizers were still physically prevented from attending one of Siamusonde’s many aborted public rallies.¹¹¹ The following month, having been made to understand that Congress planned to destroy the future crops of UNIP supporters and that Daniel Munkombwe, the then provincial president of the ANC, had issued a renewed call for his murder, Siamusonde began to move around with his ‘axe and two clubs’ to ‘intimidate the hositel [sic] ignorant villagers’.¹¹²

Actively promoted (if not effectively co-ordinated) by provincial officials, Congress violence proved successful in preventing UNIP from making any substantial inroads into the Bantu Botatwe areas. To the extent that it reinforced the party’s ethnic propaganda, the ANC’s aggressive anti-UNIP campaign enjoyed a remarkable degree of popular support among the Bantu Botatwe. ANC southern organisers achieved this objective by presenting the adoption of violent means on their part as being inextricably bound up with the situation obtaining in the Copperbelt, where, as even some UNIP leaders reluctantly admitted, UNIP intimidation was frequently infused with ethnic overtones. Early in 1963, during a meeting called by the Plateau Tonga Native Authority with a view to bringing to an end the wave of political violence by which Monze district had recently been engulfed, the ANC representatives

‘told the Chiefs that their members were beating up UNIP members and particularly those from outside the Tonga area because UNIP members in towns beat up every Tonga man they find. He added that Tonga people who go to sell their fowls on the Copperbelt were beaten by UNIP members because all Tonga people were regarded as members of the African National Congress’.

Samson Mukando, the UNIP regional secretary in Monze-Gwembe, felt the allegation serious enough to warrant explicit mention in a circular addressed to

¹⁰⁹ S.B.D. Siamusonde to UNIP Regional Secretary (Kalomo-Livingstone), Nkuntu Simwatachela’s village, 1 Sept. 1962, UNIPA, UNIP 5/4/1/2.

¹¹⁰ S.B.D. Siamusonde to UNIP Regional Secretary (Kalomo-Livingstone), Nkuntu Simwatachela’s village, Kalomo, 7 Sept. 1962, UNIPA, UNIP 5/4/1/2.

¹¹¹ S.B.D. Siamusonde to UNIP Regional Secretary (Kalomo-Livingstone), Nkuntu Simwatachela’s village, 20 Apr. 1963, UNIPA, UNIP 5/4/1/27.

¹¹² S.B.D. Siamusonde to UNIP Regional and National Secretaries, Nkuntu Simwatachela’s village, 24 May 1963, UNIPA, UNIP 5/4/1/27.

all of his peers in the Copperbelt and the Central province.¹¹³ While refuting the charge in public, Chona privately admitted to Daniel Munkombwe that UNIP was

‘working hard to stop the violence against ANC on the Copperbelt. [...] if Tonga people in towns are being attacked, it will be impossible to UNIPify the Southern Province and [...] this, in turn, will or might lead to tribal warfare which we must fight against’.¹¹⁴

Mukando’s worried missive was echoed a few months later by A.H.S. Munkombwe, the acting secretary of the Kalomo-Livingstone region of UNIP, who related Congress’ current ‘roughness’ in his area to the recent Nchanga riots, when ‘everyone who spoke Tonga had to be beaten whether he was a member of the United National Independence Party’ or not. As a result of this,

organisers and members of the African National Congress have been instructed by top officials from Lusaka that they have to beat and kill anyone UNIP who does not speak Tonga. [...]. If this system of beating anyone who speaks a different language apart from Tonga and Lozi will not come to an end and attacking anyone who does not belong to the African National Congress the result will be some series of injuries and deaths to the organisers and members of the United National Independence Party.¹¹⁵

Once more, it is appropriate to stress that what we have been chiefly concerned with in the present section of this chapter are the origins of unhealthy political dynamics that would continue to haunt post-independence Zambia. Both because it was interwoven with the process of Bantu Botatwe ethnogenesis and because it formed such a central component of the ANC’s strategy in the Southern province, violence remained a distinctive feature of the region’s politics long after 1964, even though UNIP’s pervasive control of the state apparatus meant that ANC supporters now found themselves more frequently in the position of victims than perpetrators. While this metamorphosis was probably not sufficient to turn the Bantu Botatwe into a veritable ‘community of suffer-

¹¹³ S.C. Mukando to UNIP Regional Secretaries (Central and Western provinces), n.p. [but Monze (?)], n.d. [but April 1963 (?)], UNIPA, UNIP 16/1/14.

¹¹⁴ M.M. Chona to D. Munkombwe, Lusaka, 23 May 1963, UNIPA, ANC 9/25. But in the *Voice of UNIP* of June 1963, Chona advanced the counterclaim that the attacks against the Bantu Botatwe in the Copperbelt were in fact the work of hit squads of the ANC, the intention of which was ‘to say, “look how bad these UNIP people are. They attack you because of your tribe [...]”’

¹¹⁵ A.H.S. Munkombwe, ‘Report submitted to the National Council meeting on 3rd–5th August, 1963’, Livingstone, UNIPA, UNIP 1/2/1.

ing' – to use David Gordon's captivating expression¹¹⁶ – it most certainly contributed to entrench their hostility to UNIP and ensuing alienation from the national body politic.

Conclusion

By examining the ideology and activities of Harry Nkumbula and his ANC, this essay has attempted to move away from the traditional, UNIP-dominated, narrative of political change in late-colonial Zambia. The analysis of Nkumbula's career after the emergence of UNIP illuminates important – though hitherto neglected – traits of Zambian nationalist culture, and the article's central contention is that these latter have had a profound influence on the nature of post-colonial Zambian politics. While the ideological apparatus that would later lead to the inception of the one-party state manifested itself for the first time during the ANC-UNIP conflict of 1959-1964, when UNIP thinkers and activists denied Nkumbula the right to full political citizenship and posited an intellectual equivalence between party and national membership, the survival strategies to which the ANC and its leader were forced to resort as a result of UNIP's exclusionary nation-building paradigm and intolerance of dissent did little to broaden social consensus around democratic ideals in nationalist and independent Zambia.

¹¹⁶ D.M. Gordon, 'Beyond ethnicity: Narratives of war and exile in the Lunda Church', paper presented to the conference on 'Ethno-history and the construction of identity in twentieth-century Africa', Cambridge, 1 April 2006.

3

Rebellion or massacre? The UNIP-Lumpa conflict revisited

David M. Gordon

Introduction

The events behind the ‘Lumpa uprising’ are seemingly well known. In July 1964, while the United National Independence Party (UNIP) controlled the government but the colonial administration was still in charge of security, the interim administration sent in troops to resolve a violent conflict between UNIP cadres and the followers of Alice Mulenga Lenshina, who had formed the Lumpa Church in the mid-1950s. At the very least 1,000 people died as a consequence of troop action and Lumpa retaliatory attacks. In 1965, a Commission of Enquiry established the outlines of the conflict, the responsibilities of the various parties, and a diary of events from 26 June to 15 October 1964.¹

¹ *Report of the commission of enquiry into the Lumpa church* (Lusaka, 1965). The original security reports upon which the diary of events in the *Report* is based can be found, as ‘Diary of Events from 25 June to 15 October’, 16 Oct. 1964, in the National Archives of Zambia (NAZ), Lusaka, MHA 1/3/10. The MHA 1/3/10 Lenshina file is not yet catalogued. It was viewed with the permission of the director of the National Archives. The number of those killed due to the conflict is unclear. Based on hospital records, the *Report* cites 707 killed and 404 wounded during security operations in northern and eastern provinces (probably between June and September, 1964). The *Report* only gives a few approximate figures for the earlier period and none for the period before June 1963. It also does not include those who died after security operations and those who starved in the bush or during the march to the Congo. In my view, the *Report* also underestimates the number killed by UNIP cadres.



Photo 3 The remnants of Lenshina's Church at Zion, near Kasomo Village, Chinsali. Kenneth Kaunda ordered the destruction of the Church in 1970. Alice Lenshina is buried at the former altar of the church. Her gravestone repeats the words of the original foundation stone and reads: 'Alice Lenshina Mulenga Lubusha. She was born in 1924. She died for the first time on 25 October 1953. On the 26th she met with Jesus and was given the work. Father builds on the rock. On 7/12/1978 she received rest and returned to God, our father'.

The established and conventional history of the Lampa-UNIP conflict views it as the culmination of a Lampa rebellion against authority that began almost a decade earlier. At least since 1991, however, a new but still marginal version of events has surfaced. This version is based more on reconstructed oral testimony than on official documentation. It has emerged from the remnants of the banned Lampa Church, reconstituted as the Jerusalem Church after years of exile in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The new interpretation has joined longstanding opposition to Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP in the Chibemba-speaking heartland of the Northern Province districts of Chinsali and Kasama. In essence, the claim is that there was never an uprising against authority but a massacre by authority. Kenneth Kaunda provoked a war between local UNIP

branches and Lumpa churches, which allowed him to send in troops to kill church members and ban the church. In the 1970s, when Bemba-affiliated leaders like Simon Kapwepwe became aware of Kaunda's despotic nature, they repented and turned to Lenshina again. This version of events is espoused by the adherents of the Jerusalem Church, but has also entered the public realm, most notably in Kampamba Mulenga's book, *Blood on their hands*.²

The claim by the surviving members of the Lumpa Church that there was a massacre of Lumpa followers rather than a rebellion by Lumpa followers is clearly a partisan and partial rendering of the conflict. The Lumpa Church did rebel against established authority: through the 1950s and early 1960s, the Lumpa Church replaced European-established mission churches in Chinsali; they rebelled against the political authority of the colonial administration; they evaded Bemba chiefs and spurned the latter's claims to ancestral and religious authority; and, finally, by 1962 they had rejected the dominant nationalist movement in the Northern Province, UNIP. The Church offered an alternative corporate framework and even identity to Bemba ethnicity and Zambian nationalism.

Yet, when one examines the events of 1962-1964 closely, the label of 'rebellion' obfuscates more than it reveals. In many ways, this 'rebellion' was actually a war between local UNIP cadres and the Lumpa Church that culminated in the forced dispersal and occasional massacre of Lumpa followers by the colonial armed forces between July and October of 1964. In the established historiography, the events of 1962-4 almost seem to be a natural progression of the anti-establishment and rebellious nature of the Lumpa Church: the conflict was a result of the 'radical' or even 'fanatical' views of the Lumpa Church members. Instead, the origins of the conflict need to be seen as closely linked to the absolute, almost theocratic, commitment demanded by local cadres of the nationalist movement, UNIP, from 1961. To understand the conflict, we have to place UNIP actions alongside those of the Lumpa Church. Moreover, our understanding of the government and administration's responses needs to be contextualized and explained. The forced dispersals and massacres of 1964 were not the natural culmination of Lumpa rebellious ideology, but the result of ill-advised and in some cases badly executed policies, which left the impression that the colonial administration and armed forces were tools of UNIP rather than impartial peacekeepers. In many ways, this first failure of the state to remain independent of the party presaged the more complete integration of the state and party structures several years later.

A more nuanced interpretation of the events of 1962-4 challenges some of the central ideas of the established historiography of the Lumpa-UNIP conflict.

² Kampamba Mulenga, *Blood on their hands* (Lusaka, 1998).

In the most subtle study of the episode thus far, Andrew Roberts recognizes that the ‘total commitment’ to the cause of UNIP contributed to the conflict with the Lumpa Church.³ Yet for Roberts, in the end, the sense of persecution and millenarian radicalism that flourished in the independent Lumpa villages of Chinsali and Lundazi Districts almost forced the government of Kenneth Kaunda to act against the Church.⁴ Yet much remains unanswered: What and who determined the nature of the government’s and the administration’s response? Why was it necessary forcefully to disperse church settlements instead of disarming them? What was Kaunda’s role in making these decisions and what can be attributed to other UNIP cadres or the colonial administration? Roberts devotes less than three pages of his 56-page article to the final conflict of July to October 1964, when troops were sent in to disperse the villages. His information is entirely reliant on the Commission’s *Report* and assorted press reports. We are left with vast lacunae in our understanding of this conflict at the dawn of Zambian independence.

The following study has benefited from a far greater array of unpublished documentary and interview evidence than was available to earlier scholars. Over the last ten years, since the end of UNIP rule, there has been greater openness regarding the events of 1962-4. Members of the Lumpa Church and family of Lenshina talk openly about the ‘war’ and members of the post-UNIP government are happy to allow an alternate version of events to emerge. From January to July 2005, I conducted over 50 in-depth interviews with Lumpa and UNIP members who witnessed the events of 1963-4. In addition, we now have access to detailed documentation relating to those years, including several files released by the National Archives of Zambia and documents scattered in the files of the newly-opened UNIP archives. The National Archives of the United Kingdom have opened their files regarding the Lumpa conflict. We also have access to mission diaries that report on the conflict. No previous study has been able to consult such an array of evidence. We are now able to reconstruct the views, motivations, and agency of the parties to the conflict, beyond the simple chronology and description provided by the Commission’s *Report*.

Due to the density of the new evidence and the importance in our attempts to outline a fairly objective account of the events and their background, this study has restricted itself in several ways. The focus is on the events of 1962-4. The

³ A.D. Roberts, *The Lumpa church of Alice Lenshina* (Lusaka, 1970), 33-40. Roberts’s seminal article also appeared in: R.I. Rotberg and A.A. Mazrui, eds, *Protest and power in black Africa* (New York, 1970). Another relatively recent study, which also focuses on the political and class challenge of the Lumpa Church, is W.J. van Binsbergen, *Religious change in Zambia: Exploratory studies* (London and Boston, 1981), 267-316.

⁴ Roberts, *The Lumpa church*, 41-46.

study only considers Lumpa ideology and the Lumpa Church in the 1950s in passing.⁵ It only briefly describes the fate of the Church from 1965 to the present. The aim here is to use the substantial new documentary evidence accompanied with select interview evidence to throw light on the conflict of 1962-4 and its immediate aftermath. Many died and many others were exposed to death and tragedy: Even after 40 years, Zambians have yet to discuss this episode openly, shorn of prejudice and with reference to all the available evidence. I have attempted to be impartial, but invariably many will be upset by my rendering of this history; as in many cases of mass violence, there were more victims than perpetrators, and many unrecognized heroes.

The Lumpa-UNIP war

Popular African nationalism in northern Zambia grew out of the Lumpa Church movement. In 1953, the year that Alice Mulenga Lubusha 'died' and was resurrected as 'Regina' or 'Lenshina', the elite-led nationalist movement in the Chinsali region was little more than a group of schoolteachers protesting the onset of the Central African Federation and engaged in pranks directed against local celebrations of the coronation of Queen Elizabeth.⁶ Lenshina's church, with an estimated 60,000 followers by the end of 1955, was the most vocal group opposing colonial authority and white missionaries, especially the Catholics.⁷

⁵ The several studies of the Lumpa Church all focus on the 1950s and especially on Lumpa ideology. Most recently, see Hugo Hinfelaar, 'Women's revolt: The Lumpa Church of Lenshina Mulenga in the 1950s', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 21 (1991), 102-29. Another comprehensive account of Lumpa ideology in the 1950s and after is Jean Loup Calmettes 'The Lumpa sect, rural reconstruction, and conflict' (MA thesis, University of Wales, 1978). For a re-evaluation of aspects of Lumpa ideology, see D.M. Gordon, 'Beyond ethnicity: narratives of war and exile in the Lumpa Church', paper presented to the conference on 'Ethno-history and the construction of identity in twentieth-century Africa', University of Cambridge, 30 Mar.-1 Apr. 2006.

⁶ For activities against the coronation of Queen Elizabeth, see J.M. Sokoni, 'A novel without the last chapter', unpublished MS, n.d., NAZ, HM 74/PP/3/2. For details about the formation of the Chinsali Welfare Association and the Chinsali branch of the Northern Rhodesia African Congress, see Kapasa Makasa, *Zambia's march to political freedom* (Nairobi, 1981), 28-56; for Kenneth Kaunda's role in the organization, see his *Zambia shall be free* (London, 1962), 18-53.

⁷ Exact membership numbers are unclear. Colonial authorities estimated that 60,000 people had made a pilgrimage to visit Lenshina by the end of 1955; 'Report of the Lenshina movement', n.d. [1955-6(?)], NAZ, NP 3/12/3. The district commissioner (DC) of Chinsali estimated that 95% of all the residents of the district were supporters. DC's Report on Lenshina, 1956, NAZ, NP 3/12/3. By 1956, the movement had also spread to areas in the Eastern Province, especially Lundazi District, and had

The Lumpa Church allowed Africans to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. After Lenshina and her followers had built her Zion (or Sione) next to Kasomo Village, Chinsali District, in 1958, and after her beautiful hymns were heard across northern Zambia, heaven on earth was also a possibility. Only the infringement of colonial regulations enforced by Chiefs disturbed the utopian vision and reality: the need to pay tax, chiefs' control over land, and respect for mission churches and schooling.

For thousands of Zambians in the north, by the late 1950s the battle against the evil of 'Satani' became a battle against the evil of colonialism, against the Central African Federation and the 'Colour Bar'.⁸ Lenshina and her Lumpa deacons began to lose the exclusive control that they had enjoyed over the struggle against evil. Tactics changed: Where Lenshina had encouraged evasion and escape from evil, the nationalist movement confronted it directly. Organizations changed: the African National Congress (ANC), then the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC), and finally UNIP, took up the struggle against evil. Leadership changed from a semi-literate but inspiring woman to schooled men who could converse in the language and the tactics of the colonizer. By 1960-1961, during the anti-colonial *chachacha* revolt, violence against the objects of Lenshina's and the nationalists' wrath engulfed Chinsali District.

Colonial retaliation was ruthless: Chinsali was one of four districts highlighted in UNIP's well-known anti-colonial publication, *A grim peep into the north*, which revealed violent colonial abuses of civilians and UNIP activists. Mobile police platoons assaulted villagers suspected of sympathizing with UNIP rebels and UNIP rebels roamed the province, destroying bridges, colonial infrastructure, and assaulting those who worked with the colonial administration. Arson was a common tactic used by the security forces and UNIP. According to *A grim peep into the north*, 'thousands of houses and granaries have been set on fire by security forces. Practically all [UNIP] constituency Branch Offices have been burnt and destroyed at the order of DCs'.⁹ The colonial administration, while denying many of these allegations, admitted that the security forces had burned houses and granaries of UNIP supporters. They claimed, however, that most acts of arson were committed by UNIP against chiefs,

several branches on the Copperbelt and line of rail; Northern Rhodesian Political Intelligence Report, Feb.-Mar. 1956, NAZ, NP 3/12/3.

⁸ Many of the early local leaders of the ANC in Chinsali, such as Robert Kaunda, the brother of Kenneth Kaunda, and Sandy Rain, were active Lumpa adherents. The colonial authorities also perceived the Lumpa Church as an 'instrument for the expression of anti-government feeling'. Provincial Commissioner's 'Situation Report', n.d., NAZ, NP 3/12/3.

⁹ UNIP, *A grim peep into the north*, special issue of *The Voice of UNIP*, n.d. [Oct. 1961].

informers, and adherents of the Watchtower Church (Jehovah's Witnesses), which at that time refused to join any political party. 'These incidents of arson are petty in our eyes', the Northern Province's Provincial Commissioner (PC) wrote, 'they are NOT to the chap whose house is burnt'.¹⁰ Indeed, for UNIP supporters or colonial agents and informers, acts of arson were serious – sometimes lives were lost, but more often arson destroyed food stores, the results of months of labor, and left villagers destitute and hungry. Burning houses, granaries, and crops was the most effective way of ensuring that villagers toed the line, colonial or nationalist. By the end of 1961, as UNIP leadership reined in their supporters and the colonial administration doused the last fires of *chachacha*, all villagers were well versed in the tactics and uses of arson, a most effective way of spreading terror and demanding submission. Put a few match heads at the end of a burning cigarette and stuff this live fuse in the thatch roofing. A few minutes later, the hut would be up in flames, while the unknown perpetrators had long made their escape. Sometimes the doors would be barricaded, and the inhabitants would be fortunate to die of smoke inhalation before being consumed by flames.¹¹ It was a fearsome time, where millenarian prophecies of freedom and rebirth and apocalypse found voice.

From early 1961 to May 1962, Lenshina preached to her followers on the Copperbelt. During this period, conflict between UNIP and the Lumpa church in Northern Province began. In some cases, competition over grazing and land allocation – 'trivial matters', in the words one interviewee – lay behind the conflicts.¹² But there were broader, political motivations as well. After UNIP's disappointing performance in the 1962, 15-15-15 elections, local UNIP branches were determined to eradicate support for UNIP's main African rival, Harry Nkumbula's ANC, which showed signs of limited but growing support in the Northern Province.¹³ UNIP wanted to ensure undivided loyalty and perceived any organization, political or civilian, to be a threat. During 1961, there had already been conflict with Watchtower Church members who refused to join UNIP. By the end of 1962, the Church of Scotland complained that activists

¹⁰ PC's report on 'Review of the military situation – Northern Province as at 9 Sept. 1961'; for burning of Watchtower churches, see DC's report on 'Allegations in the "Voice of UNIP"', 28 Oct. 1961; for burning of chiefs' houses in Chinsali, see Report by DC (Chinsali), 1 Nov. 1961, NAZ, NP 3/12/9.

¹¹ The technique was described by informants of a colonial officer in Annexure to Chinsali Tour Report 16 of 1960, NAZ, NP 3/2/11.

¹² Interview with John Bwalya Mfula, Bright Village, 9 July 2005.

¹³ The ANC's Provincial Secretary General's report of 1962 claimed that support for the party was growing in the Northern Province and many held UNIP cards only for protection; United National Independence Party's Archives (UNIPA), Lusaka, ANC 2/10.

discouraged their congregations from attending church despite their open and acknowledged support for UNIP.¹⁴ The ANC complained of heightened intimidation in the form of 'beatings arson woundings and damage to property [...]. People are not at peace now, they so not sleep or move freely but live in fear, the demand for political identity [party cards] in the streets roads bus stops and terminals is extensively going on faster than one expects even worse than Copperbelt'.¹⁵ The number of UNIP branches in the Northern Province had more than doubled from 276 in July 1961 to 573 in September 1962.¹⁶ A shadowy group of radical UNIP youths who called themselves the 'Unity Front of Zambia' was active in the Chinsali and Kasama Districts, disciplining even those within the party who disagreed with more extreme tactics.¹⁷

In the midst of this political turbulence, Jameson Chapoloko, UNIP Regional Secretary in Mpika and future Member of Parliament for Chinsali, emerged as the local UNIP strongman. He attempted to assert UNIP authority over both the district administration and the villages. At the end of 1962, Chapoloko sent a letter to the DCs of Chinsali, Isoka, and Mpika Districts, which demanded:

1. An end to all unlawful mass arrests of leaders and our people.
2. That the die-hard imperialistic minded District Commissioners should take note of the political situation we are in now, and behave.
3. That the imperialistic tactics of dividing the African people into camps will never help these quisling Agents of the now defunct British Colonialism.¹⁸

In May 1963, when the DC of Chinsali, Priestley, complained to Chapoloko of numerous instances where UNIP members had demanded party cards from the public, Chapoloko advised the DC to ignore the law that disallowed UNIP members to demand cards, so as 'not to create a presidency [sic] here where chiefs and ordinary members of the state should consider themselves enemies of the Party leaders [...]'.¹⁹ Priestley persisted, and after instructions from Simon

¹⁴ Clerck to UNIP Regional Secretary, 3 Dec. 1962, UNIPA, UNIP 12/1/8. By contrast, the Mulanga Mission seems to have been on better terms with UNIP activists through 1963, following many violent confrontations in 1961-62. See entries in Mulanga mission diary for 2 Nov. 1962 and 10 Feb. 1963, White Fathers' Archives (WFA), Lusaka, 5/WF/MD/59.

¹⁵ Memorandum presented to the PC (Northern Province), 14 Oct. 1963, UNIPA, ANC 2/10.

¹⁶ Central Intelligence Committee, Monthly Report, Sept. 1962, National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK), Kew, DO 183/138

¹⁷ 'ANC warning to members of ANC and other peoples of goodwill', n.d. [end 1963], UNIPA, ANC 2/10.

¹⁸ Chapoloko to DCs (Chinsali, Isoka, and Mpika), 19 Dec. 1962, UNIPA, UNIP 5/1/2/1/4.

¹⁹ Chapoloko to Priestley, 22 June 1963; Priestley to Chapoloko, 21 May 1963; Manager (Mbesuma Ranch) to UNIP Regional Secretary, 18 May 1963, UNIPA, UNIP

Kapwepwe, Chapoloko acquiesced, claiming that party cards would no longer be demanded of the public.²⁰ There is however little indication that Chapoloko's acquiescence to the DC and the national UNIP leadership actually translated into orders to the UNIP militants and a suspension of the demands for party cards.

By the middle of 1963, conflict between UNIP and the Lampa Church intensified. Prior to 1963, Lampa members had agreed to purchase UNIP party cards, but relations soured – perhaps because UNIP insisted that Lumpas attend meetings on Sundays.²¹ Since the Lampa refused to buy party cards, UNIP burnt Lampa churches. At Kapimpi Village in Chinsali district, Lampa members allegedly set fire to several houses in retaliation for the burning of their churches. Lampa deacons told their congregations to burn their UNIP cards. On June 15, Simon Kapwepe mediated a meeting between 900 Chinsali's UNIP activists and 400 Lampa members. At the meeting, Lenshina allegedly agreed to discipline any member calling for or burning UNIP party cards. In exchange UNIP militants would not burn Lampa churches or insult Lampa members. Nevertheless, in Chinsali three Lampa Churches were destroyed by fire and 37 Lampa members were arrested and convicted of arson following burning of seven UNIP houses.²²

The destruction of party cards was a potent act of rebellion against UNIP. The burning of the colonial identity documents, the *fitupa*, had been one of the most significant acts of UNIP resistance. Instead of *fitupa* people had to buy UNIP party cards; instead of colonial poll tax, UNIP membership fees were paid. Party cards not only signified membership of a political party; they were an alternate form of identity that expressed and broadcast the authority of UNIP in place of the colonial administration. 'We paid membership fees – that was the tax that remained after the white left', according to Shame Mulenga, the treasurer of the UNIP branch in Bright Village, adjacent to Lenshina's Sione

5/1/2/1/4. For demanding of party cards, also see Mulanga Mission Diary, 26 Aug. 1963, WFA, Lusaka, 5/WF/MD/59.

²⁰ Priestley to Chapoloko, 18 June 1963; Chapoloko to Priestley, 29 June 1963, UNIPA 5/1/2/1/4

²¹ As claimed in the oral testimony of Jennifer Ngandu and many others. This accusation has become a type of church orthodoxy. Interviews with Jennifer Ngandu, Lusaka, 25 March 2005; Helena Mulenga, Leonard Mutonga, Lusaka, 12 March, 2005; Dixon Mulenga, Choshi, 3 July 2005; Felix Chimfwembwe Mumba, Choshi, 10 July 2005; Denise Chilufya, Choshi, 10 July 2005; Stephanie Nguni, Chiponya, 19 July 2005.

²² An account of the agreement is to be found in Chapoloko to 'Mama Mulenga', 29 June 1963, UNIPA, UNIP 5/1/2/1/4. The meeting and some of the preceding events are covered in the *report*, 11. For the meeting and arson, see Central Intelligence Committee, Monthly Reports, June 1963, NAUK, DO 183/138.

headquarters. ‘We had surrendered *fitupa* and in their place we got cards. Cards became *fitupa*’.²³ Burning this new form of identification was a radical rejection of UNIP authority. In their place, the Lumpa offered their own card, which they called ‘passports to heaven’.

The agreement to halt hostilities between the Lumpas and UNIP did not last. Only two weeks later, Chapoloko, in a letter to Lenshina, complained that she had reneged on her agreement and that her followers had torn and burnt UNIP party cards. One Lumpa deacon had allegedly said, ‘There must be a distinct line between Lumpa Church and UNIP and the two must never unite in anything’.²⁴ Chapoloko could not tolerate UNIP’s authority being flouted, especially in the build up to the 1964 elections, which would determine the shape of the first post-colonial government and his own political future. On the one hand, he wrote to the national leadership, complaining of continued violence by Lumpa members against UNIP. He presented himself as a moderate, appealed for peace, and negotiated another agreement with Lenshina:

In a desperate effort to try and make Lenshina see sense I have persuaded the District Commissioner Priestley to see if we can avoid blood-shed in the District [...]. A wave of violence is increasingly getting worse on side of Lenshina and her followers more than three houses have been set on fire and assault are many on our leaders in Branches. Even though I have appealed for peace and Bwana Milner has done so [...] I doubt if this will still hold water, because there is a limit to which a human can endure.²⁵

On the same day that the letter was written, however, the White Fathers at Mulanga, hardly friends with the Lumpa, reported that ‘bands of gangsters [...] required cards everywhere’.²⁶ It seems that while Chapoloko preached peace to the national UNIP leadership, he told local UNIP activists that the Lumpa Church was no more than a ploy by the outgoing colonial administration to divide and manipulate Africans, and encouraged them to eradicate the Lumpa Church:

At the transfer of power from a Colonialist to indigenous people the British Colonialist do not simply depart peacefully, they usually sow seeds of misunderstandings and these eggs of bitterness hatch immediately after they leave, they linger at one side of the border with a view to come back and pretend to create peace, be alert Comrade [...] Lenshina and her cult are a floating leave on an ocean through which

²³ Interview with Shame Mulenga, Bright Village, 9 July 2005.

²⁴ Chola to Lenshina Mulenga, 26 June 1963; Chapoloko to ‘Mama Mulenga’, 29 June 1963, UNIPA, UNIP 5/1/2/1/4.

²⁵ Chapoloko to M.M. Chona, Lusaka, 28 Aug. 1963, UNIPA, UNIP 16/6/145.

²⁶ Mulanga Mission Diary, 26 Aug. 1963.

the British Imperialists are holding their safety to the shores of Colonialism. Do not give them chance, let them be drown for ever [...].²⁷

On 5 September 1963, Kenneth Kaunda visited Lenshina and persuaded her to sign another truce. An agreement between the DC, Priestley, Chapoloko, and Lenshina was reached on 9 September 1963.²⁸

With the national leadership abdicating responsibility for the growing violence to Chapoloko's regional leadership and Chapoloko sending what can at best be interpreted as mixed signals to local militants, rumour, suspicion, violence, and terror spread. For UNIP activists, it became a known fact that Lenshina had had discussions with Roy Welensky when she visited Southern Rhodesia and that the Lumpa Church had become Welensky's political arm in the Northern Province. Some claimed that the Katangese had armed and trained the Lumpa.²⁹ Chapoloko complained to the provincial colonial administration that they were hampering the prosecution of Lumpa members and that 'Lenshina is in the pay of sinister interests in Salisbury'.³⁰ Despite the numerous allegations that Lenshina may have been paid by the Federal government, or allied with the ANC, there is no concrete documentary evidence that this in fact occurred. If it did, it was without the knowledge of most Lumpa members. There was almost certainly no Federal or Katangese role in the arming of Lumpa members or in their training.³¹

²⁷ Chapoloko to UNIP Constituency Secretaries (Mpichi Region), 29 Aug. 1963, UNIPA, UNIP 16/6/145.

²⁸ Agreement between Lenshina, Chapoloko and Priestely, n.d., UNIPA, UNIP 16/6/145. The agreement is reported in Mulanga Mission Diary, 9 Sept. 1963, WFA, 5/WF/MD/59 and Central Intelligence Committee, Monthly Reports, Sept. 1963, NAUK, DO 183/138.

²⁹ All ten UNIP activists interviewed in different villages in Chinsali District insisted on this fact. There is no other evidence for this claim. No Lumpa members indicated an alliance with Welensky or the ANC. There is no documentary evidence to support this claim, although a few Lumpa-ANC meetings probably took place, probably on matters of security. See for example, the letter written by Lenshina to the ANC cited in Mulenga, *Blood on their hands*, 49. I have been unable to find this letter in its cited location, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10. After 1964, certain members of the Lumpa Church had discussions with Moise Tshombe, which facilitated their move to the Congo. Interview with Dixon Mulenga, Choshi, 15 July 2005.

³⁰ DC (Isoka) to PC (Northern Province), 6 Oct. 1963, NAZ, NP 3/12/1.

³¹ Fergus Macpherson has claimed that the Lumpa Church was funded by Welensky and trained by Federal or Kantangan armed forces. The evidence he presents is an interview with Robert Kaunda, a one-time Lumpa member, but in the UNIP camp by the early 1960s. I have viewed the transcript of Macpherson's interview with Kaunda, in which the latter claims that Lenshina received 8,000 from Welensky which was paid through the Boma. The evidence of payments from Salisbury is still based on rumour and conjecture. Moreover, Robert Kaunda explicitly states that the

Lumpa members also found themselves in direct confrontation with most of the chiefs in Chinsali and Lundazi districts. In Chitimukulu's area all of the Lumpa churches had been burnt down, perhaps on the orders of Chitimukulu himself.³² Farther east in Lundazi District, in Chief Chikwa's area, UNIP members combined with the chief's *kapasus* to prevent Lumpa members from taking a buffalo that they had killed. Fights ensued over the next several days, resulting in a number of deaths.³³ According to the Lumpas, UNIP members and the henchmen of Chiefs Nkhweto and Nkula attacked them whenever they heard hymns that proclaimed that only God was the king of kings:

Subileni bonse, umwine ale isa	Believe, all of you, the owner is coming
Iseeni mumwimbile	Come together and praise
Tapali mfumu iyacila ine kamo ine neka	There is no king who surpasses me
Iseeni mumwimbile	Come together and praise
Uwashama eka, Uwashama eka	The unfortunate one
Ewuka filwa kupalama kwi sano	Who fails to come to the Kingdom of God
Nelyo wa filwa, iwe	When you have failed
Ukalola kwi	Where will you go? ³⁴

In December 1963, after several Lumpa were killed, allegedly on the orders of Chief Nkhweto, young Lumpa men desecrated the burial grounds of the Bemba chiefs at Shimwalule by cutting down the sacred *milemba* trees.³⁵

By November 1963, many Lumpa had begun to leave UNIP-dominated villages and build their own villages without the consent of surrounding chiefs. They claim that this occurred after attacks on their members as they made pilgrimages to Sione or went to the Boma to buy supplies. According to surviv-

Lumpa who prepared weapons were not from elsewhere. Fergus Macpherson and Julius Chabala's interview with Robert Kaunda, 26 Feb. 1969, Centre for the Study of Christianity in the Non-Western World (CSNWW), Edinburgh, 49, Macpherson Collection, Box 1.2.

³² Mulilansolo Mission Diary, 21 Aug. 1963, WFA, Calmettes Box 7. (The Mulilansolo diaries were not available at the WFA, but J.L. Calmettes had copied out all portions of the diary relevant to the Lumpa Church.) Intelligence reports claim that Chitimukulu 'may have ordered the burning of the churches.' Central Intelligence Committee, Monthly Reports, Sept. 1963, NAUK, DO 183/138.

³³ Interview with Alfred Mvula, Lusaka, 13 Mar. 2005; Telegram: Lusaka (Gov.) to Central Africa Office, 8 Oct. 1963, NAUK, DO 183/134; Central Intelligence Committee, Monthly Reports, Sept., 1963, NAUK, DO 183/138.

³⁴ This particular hymn is cited as a reason for the conflict by a number of Lumpa adherents. Interviews with Jennifer Ngandu and Stephanie Nguni.

³⁵ Interview with Dixon Mulenga, Choshi, 7 July 2005; Telegram: Lusaka (Gov.) to Central Africa Office, 28 Dec. 1963, NAUK, DO 183/134.

ing adherents, the move to establish new villages was on the orders of Lenshina who called a meeting and instructed her followers to form *misumba* [missions/capitals].³⁶ She gave each *musumba* 30 shillings so that they could establish shops and become self-reliant. Setting up separate *misumba*, however, perpetuated and heightened the tensions. Lampa members had to travel even farther since the *misumba* were far from the farms and they had to regularly return to their old villages to collect food. Several Lampa members claim that they were attacked and beaten during their travels.³⁷ Lampa church members were severed from their old communities. ‘Lampa members lived separately’, claimed the 1963 UNIP branch chairman in the UNIP stronghold of Matumbo Village, ‘so they did not regard others as related’.³⁸ Old ties between communities had ruptured and would never be restored. In their insulated and besieged villages, the Lampa formed their own communities and constructed their own versions of the war that had already beset them.

Around the middle of December 1963, several battles between UNIP and Lampa members broke out in Chinsali District. This was the most serious escalation of the conflict to date, with spears and guns used on both sides. In a letter to the national leadership, UNIP’s Regional Organizing Secretary claimed that Job Michello’s People’s Democratic Congress had instigated the conflict and called for the national leadership to act against the church.³⁹ The colonial authorities, however, thought that ‘UNIP have been the aggressors, but Lenshina have done more than just defend themselves [...].’ They identified Robert Kapasa Makasa, the UNIP election candidate for Chinsali, as one of the key instigators of the trouble.⁴⁰ At least 10 died and up to 100 were wounded.⁴¹ Another conflict between the villagers of Kalikiti and the Chilanga Lampa

³⁶ A chief’s capital is referred to as a *musumba*. This was also the term the missionaries adopted to describe their missions. In adopting this phrase to refer to her villages, I tend to think that Lenshina was adopting the vocabulary of the mission stations rather than directly confronting the chiefs. Clearly, the chiefs could have viewed this as further provocation.

³⁷ More than 20 Lampa members who witnessed events made these claims. The most instructive and detailed interviews include: Dixon Mulenga, 7 July 2005; Felix Chimfwembwe Mumba; Mercy Mfula, Choshi, 10 July 2005; Paison Nkonde, Kapiri Mposhi, 20 July 2005. Some documentary evidence substantiates their testimony of beatings and the burning of their churches. See for example attacks on Lampa reported in Mulanga Mission Diary, 13 June 1963, 28 July 1963, 26 Aug. 1963, 28 Aug. 1963.

³⁸ Interview with Sebastian Chewe Filamba, Matumbo Village, 18 July 2005.

³⁹ UNIP Regional Organizing Secretary to M.M. Chona, 24 Dec. 1963, UNIPA, UNIP 16/6/145. The *Report*, 12, does not provide or further clarify the background of the December incidents.

⁴⁰ Telegram: Lusaka (Gov.) to Central Africa Office, 28 Dec. 63, NAUK, DO 183/134.

⁴¹ *Report*, 12.

musumba led to at least two deaths; 220 terrified villagers took refuge at Mulanga mission.⁴² UNIP activists, now in control of the newly-established Rural Councils, seized on these incidents to further their campaign against the Lumpa.⁴³

Even given the establishment of independent, stockaded villages and occasional retaliatory attacks, the general demeanor of the Lumpa church prior to June 1964 was defensive, seeking to evade UNIP violence and isolate themselves – as they had with chiefs and colonial authorities. As evasion and isolation increased, Lumpa adherents became separated from sources of established authority; they were seldom heard by the administration and their views and ideas became insular, convinced of the righteousness of their suffering. UNIP, by contrast, with its similar millenarian ideas, had become more extroverted, attached to the administration and to the new government. Several articulate and literate spokespersons communicated in writing with national leadership and with the press. Through these contacts and this extroversion, UNIP developed a veneer of moderation and defined to the world the violent character of the Lumpa church.

Following the violence during December 1963, Kenneth Kaunda and Grey Zulu visited Chinsali in an effort to negotiate a truce. Although they instructed their own branches to be tolerant of the Lumpa, their efforts were directed at the Lumpa Church, which they viewed as truculent and antagonistic. Kaunda wanted the Lumpas to abandon their newly-established villages and return to their old villages.⁴⁴ At first Lenshina agreed – although the Lumpas still refused to return to their villages, perhaps because Lenshina did not want to disperse her followers, or perhaps because of the effort in building their new villages and planting their nearby fields, but most probably because Lumpa members were terrified of becoming vulnerable minorities in UNIP-dominated villages in the face of continued UNIP harassment. Despite the rulings of Kaunda, UNIP youth planned attacks on Lumpa villages and ‘young men were [...] pestering Lenshina people looking for UNIP cards and subscriptions’.⁴⁵ Indeed, by early 1964, UNIP was short of money; national headquarters pressured regional secretaries of the party to sell new sets of cards.⁴⁶ In fact, the Lumpa Secretary General at Sione, A.G.H. Kapelekasubila, wrote a letter to the Provincial

⁴² Mulanga Mission Diary, 16-29 Dec. 1963.

⁴³ For example, at a meeting of Chinsali’s Rural Council, they compiled a list of 25 violent acts in which the Lumpa church had been involved across the colony since 1955. Minutes of Chinsali Rural Council, 12-14 Dec. 1963, NAZ, NP 3/12/10.

⁴⁴ *Report*, 13.

⁴⁵ Mulilansolo Mission Diary, 28 Dec. 1963.

⁴⁶ Kapwepwe to UNIP Regional Secretaries, 17 March 1964, CSCNWW, Macpherson Collection, Box 9.

Commissioner complaining of several instances where church members had returned to their villages during May and June of 1964 and were attacked by UNIP.⁴⁷

The deadlock continued until June 26, 1964, when a new wave of violence between UNIP and Lampa provided the government with justification for a more forceful intervention. Based on the security forces reports, the Commission claims the conflict began with a fight between an uncle and a nephew. Lampa adherents from the youth's village, Kameko, attacked Kasanta Village. A police patrol then arrested some of the alleged perpetrators from Kameko Village and detained them at Chief Mubanga – only to be released when a large number of Lampa arrived at the Chief's village.⁴⁸ An armed police patrol then went to Kameko Village to arrest those involved. They were allegedly attacked by 200 Lampa. However, they sustained only minor wounds and killed five Lampa supporters and wounded another five.⁴⁹

The perspective on these events from Lampa villages is difficult to ascertain. Documentary evidence indicates that Lenshina and her deacons were most upset by the police attack on their supporters in Kameko Village. This incident, more than any other, convinced the church leaders that they needed to take decisive action to defend their church and their villages. For Lenshina and her deacons, it seemed that UNIP and the administration would now act in unison to crush her church. A UNIP spy who lived in Sione between August 1963 and July 1964 and was accepted as a Lampa member, testified that he had heard from both deacons and ordinary Lampa members that the day after the attack on Kameko, Lenshina had addressed a gathering in her courtyard:

She said that the Police had attacked her followers there and that the same thing would happen at other Lampa villages. She said that they should prepare themselves with spears and other weapons to fight against the government and that she would send messengers to her other villages to warn them and to instruct them also to prepare themselves. She said that men should arm themselves and leave the village if the Police came and then if Police attacked the village the men should attack them

⁴⁷ Since this letter was addressed to the Provincial Commissioner personally, and he was transferred and returned to England, it followed him to England and only appeared in the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) in the middle of August. The letter also claims that the designate Minister of State for Defence, L. Changufu, had 'talked with confidence that Mama Lenshina and some of her church elders would soon be in custody.' A.G.H. Kapelekasubila to PC (Northern province), 26 June 1964, NAUK, DO 183/135.

⁴⁸ *Report*, 20. Interview with the father of the boy reveals a slightly different and more detailed version with the uncle beating several boys before the Lumpas retaliated. Interview with Paison Nkonde. Cf. Mulenga, *Blood on their hands*, 51-2. Also see details recorded in Mulilansolo Mission Diary, 26 June 1964.

⁴⁹ *Report*, 20.

from where they were hiding in the bush. She said that if you are fighting the Police you see some of your friends fall down – do not be afraid, keep attacking as those people who fall down will not die.⁵⁰

A few weeks later, he heard that Lenshina conducted a ceremony where incisions were made on the forehead and arms into which medicine that would offer protection against bullets was applied. Deacons from other villages took back the medicines and letters containing instructions from Lenshina to their villages.⁵¹ A note in Chibemba, found in the ruins of a Lampa village, could have been one way that Lenshina's instructions were distributed from Sione to several prominent Lampa Villages:

1. The enemy is preparing to get hold of all deacons and Mama Lenshina and send them to Mwinilunga. This is the way they will do it.
2. They will come to the villages and ask for the deacons. Tell them that they went looking for work.
3. They may tell you to leave the village. Tell them that we will not return as we have suffered with them (UNIP) and now they hate us and have burnt our churches and tell us now that they will help rebuild them.
4. Give orders to the people, young and old, to stay in the cassava gardens with spears.⁵²

The Lampa Church was preparing for the final battle, for the crescendo of violence about to descend on their villages.

Apocalypse

At the beginning of July 1964, the then Prime Minister Kaunda coordinated another round of negotiations. For Kaunda the destruction of Lampa settlements and the return of the Lampa to their original villages were non-negotiable. On 13 July 1964, a statement that Kaunda made in Chinsali was published and made available to local government authorities: 'Lenshina Villages which are not authorized must be destroyed within a week'.⁵³ Despite the lack of legal

⁵⁰ Appendix C: Statement of Anderson Chintankwa taken on 22 Sept. 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Appendix B: Translation of Bemba Note, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.

⁵³ I have been unable to locate this statement in the archives, probably because before the *Preservation of Public Security Act* was promulgated fourteen days later, the government had no legal basis to make such an order. Evidence of it may have been removed from the files. However, the order was submitted to the Appeals Court as evidence in 'Mutambo and Five Others v The People', in *Zambia Law Report 1965* (Lusaka, 1972), 15-59, esp. 20, 43. In this case, the judge ruled that the order was legal since 'one could regard the document as a circular of advice put out by the administration for the information of the local people.' On 11 July, Chinsali DC

basis for this order, local government and police officers thought that after one week they were entitled and expected to use force to destroy the Lampa *misumba*. The decision to forcefully remove the Lampa made a peaceful resolution difficult; even moderate Lampa adherents now knew that the outgoing colonial administration would side with UNIP activists. They barricaded themselves against the impending violent onslaught and prayed that God give them strength in their battle. On 15 July, about 60 heavily armed soldiers tried to 'convince' Lampa members at Chilanga *musumba*, near the Catholic Mulanga Mission, to return to their original villages. They refused.⁵⁴ At Sione, Lenshina and her followers also refused, blaming UNIP for the violence.⁵⁵ Rumours of Lampa attacks spread. Hundreds of civilians from villages around Sione, fearing a Lampa attack, fled to the Chinsali Boma.⁵⁶ Fleeing villagers claimed that women and children from two villages had been forced into their huts and burnt alive.⁵⁷ Lampa members from Siachepa Village in Chinsali District attacked three UNIP strongholds and killed four UNIP members on July 24. Two days later air reconnaissance reported that up to 30 villages had been burnt in the same area.⁵⁸ About 25 miles north east of Chinsali Boma, in the remote Chapaula Village, Lumpas speared two policeman to death, including the first European policeman killed, Inspector Smith.⁵⁹ In retaliation, in an effort to recover what was probably his badly mutilated body, three Mobile Police Units attacked the village, resulting in the death of 24 Lumpas and 13 wounded.⁶⁰ At Chilanga *musumba*, Lampa members torched two villages and killed their inhabitants after being taunted and nearly executed by a band of UNIP youth. The next day, on July 27, the Lampa fought police forces who had been sent to arrest them

John Hannah informed the White Fathers at Mulanga that the government intended to threaten the Lumpas to make them go back to their original villagers. Mulanga Mission Diary, 11 July 1964.

⁵⁴ Mulanga Mission Diary, 13-16 July 1964.

⁵⁵ *Report*, 21.

⁵⁶ Message no. 7 from Bond Disops to Compol, 27 July 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.

⁵⁷ *Northern News*, 30 July 1964.

⁵⁸ Message no. 28 from Disops Chinsali to Compol, 27 July 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.

⁵⁹ Six men were tried and sentenced to hang for the death of Inspector Smith. Their failed attempt to appeal, which contains much detail about the killing of Inspector Smith, can be found in 'Mutambo and Five Others v The People', *Zambia Law Report* 1965, 15-59.

⁶⁰ Several interviewees claimed that Inspector Smith's body was mutilated. The documentary evidence does not state this explicitly, although it does demonstrate that the Lampa villagers resisted giving up the body. Message no. 28 from Disops Chinsali to Compol, 27 July 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10; Telegrams: Troops Lusaka to Ministry of Defence (MOD), 27 July 1964; Lusaka (Gov.) to CRO, 27 July 1964, both in NAUK, DO 183/135. The Commission's *report* only reports on 14 deaths and 15 wounded; *Report*, 22-23.

and destroy their settlement. They killed a second European policeman, Inspector Jordan.⁶¹



Photo 4 Zambian soldiers survey the dead followers of Alice Lenshina, Chinsali District, 1964.

By then the Central Security Council had met and decided on a sustained military operation against the Lampa. Two battalions of the Northern Rhodesian Regiment (NRR) were to go to Chinsali. On July 29, the *Preservation of Public Security Act* was gazetted and Governor Hone applied its provisions to the Northern Province and Lundazi District in the Eastern Province. The provisions of the act included the prohibition of assemblies and any gathering thought to incite or have potential to incite violence. The legal basis for banning church gatherings and forcefully ejecting Lampa members (and other opponents of UNIP) was thereby established.⁶² Kaunda went to Chinsali to meet with the Provincial Operations Committee. They decided on a military operation against

⁶¹ Details from an interview with a Lampa member who acknowledges the attacks on the two villages; interview with Felix Chimfwembe Mumba. For a UNIP perspective, see interview with Sebastian Chewe Filamba. The trial of youth involved in the Chilanga battle is reported in *Northern News*, 20 Oct. 1964, but no judgment is recorded. Trial records are unavailable.

⁶² *Preservation of Public Security Act*, Gazetted on 29 July 1964, Government Notice no. 375 of 1964, in NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.

Sione Village. Mobile police squads had proved ineffective in the face of the Lumpa, in part because they believed the Lumpa had powerful magic on their side (the Lumpa were not the only ones who believed in the efficacy of witchcraft!).⁶³ The decision to send in soldiers stemmed partly from the police failure. Two thousand soldiers were to be involved in the largest military operation ever on Zambian soil. The 1st NRR was instructed to prepare for battle.⁶⁴

At this point, it is worth reflecting on the course that the government and the administration had chosen – and the various motivations behind their decisions. They had decided to force the Lumpa to abandon their villages and ensure that they returned to their original village. This would destroy the unity of the church, which would be further undermined by the banning of church gatherings. Given the level of violence, something had to be done. Yet the decision to force the Lumpa from their villages instead of disarming them (and UNIP activists) and capturing and prosecuting those Lumpa and UNIP members guilty of violence was rejected in favour of the destruction of the church. The colonial administration justified this approach since the Lumpa villages were not allowed by their chiefs – although since the advent of the UNIP government and the rural councils, the chiefs' role in determining the legality of settlements was under question in any event. In fact, it seems that while most of the men on the ground supported such actions against the Lumpa, there was some disquiet in the administration about the degree of force used and the necessity of insisting on the disbandment of Lumpa villages.⁶⁵ The Commonwealth Relations Office refrained from sending a telegram praising the action of the new government: 'a very large part of the blame', wrote the officer responsible for the Northern Rhodesia Department, G.W. Jamieson, 'lay with the UNIP attitude that "We are the masters now"'.⁶⁶

The role that local UNIP branches played in fomenting the conflict during 1962-3 is well known and was accepted by the Commission of Enquiry. However, the position taken by the Commission's *Report* and subsequent accounts is that by 1964, UNIP cadres were under control and not responsible for further

⁶³ According to the Deputy Governor's office, 'at least one platoon ran away from the enemy through fear of witchcraft. If this fact were widely known it would have a very unsettling effect on the European community. It would, moreover, undermine Kaunda's prestige as the minister responsible for the police and armed services.' Molyneaux to Jamieson, 7 Sept. 1964, NAUK, DO 183/135.

⁶⁴ 'Diary of Events', 5, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10; *Report*, 23-24.

⁶⁵ There was discussion between the Governor's Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office over this matter: Jamieson to Thomas, 31 July 1964; Thomas to Jamieson, 8 Aug. 1964; Molyneaux, to Jamieson, 15 Aug. 1964; Jamieson to Molyneaux, 2 Sept. 1964, NAUK, DO 183/135.

⁶⁶ G.W. Jamieson, Handwritten comments on proposed guidance telegram, 24 Aug. 1964, NAUK, DO 183/135.

aggression. This study has already cited some evidence – such as the letter that A.G.H. Kapelekasubila sent to the Provincial Commissioner and mission diary entries – that suggest that UNIP cadres continued to harass the Lumpa well into 1964.⁶⁷ The Northern Rhodesia Intelligence Report of February 1964 reported that: ‘the continued persecution by lower UNIP formations of the Lenshina and Watch Tower religions in Northern, Eastern and Luapula Provinces has created for Government an unnecessary security problem’.⁶⁸ What also needs to be appreciated, however, is the role that UNIP activists played in pushing for more aggressive actions against the Lumpa. In this, we have to distinguish between the leadership of Kenneth Kaunda, on the one hand, and Simon Kapwepwe and such provincial activists as Jameson Chapoloko, Kapasa Makasa, and Victor Ngandu. Evidence suggests that these latter pushed for harsher measures against the Lumpa through Simon Kapwepwe. Within UNIP, during 1962-3, Kaunda faced a challenge from non-Bemba leaders from the south and west, including Sipalo and the Wina brothers. Kaunda came to increasingly rely on a cohort of radical Bemba politicians, many of whom were close to activists on the ground that favoured a harsh and repressive response toward the Lumpa. While evidence suggests that Kaunda attempted to promote reconciliation in his several visits to Chinsali, he agreed to more forceful action. In fact, many of them thought Kaunda’s approach to the Lumpa was far too generous and forgiving. One cabinet minister, probably Simon Kapwepwe, complained to Fergus Macpherson that, ‘this is Kenneth all over [...]. Some of us have said to him “this Lumpa thing should be smashed [...] [but] he’s too compassionate.”’⁶⁹ Politics within UNIP, and especially the influence of this radical Bemba faction, underlay the decision to demand the disbandment, indeed the crushing, of the Lumpa Church. The action was executed by colonial troops under colonial authority; and the colonial administration was in charge of security in this transitional period. Yet the influence of this UNIP Bemba faction was paramount in determining the nature of the government’s and administration’s response to the Lumpa. Within the UNIP government, it was not Kenneth Kaunda primarily, but rather Simon Kapwepwe and his supporters who were most influential in determining this course of action. However, it must also be pointed out that the colonial administration on the ground supported the UNIP government’s position, even while many in London remained skeptical.

By the end of July 1964, the Lumpa villagers of Sione had decided to defend their village and their magnificent church. ‘There will be no more talks’, a

⁶⁷ Kapelekasubila to PC; Mulilansolo Mission Diary, 28 Dec. 1963.

⁶⁸ Northern Rhodesian Monthly Intelligence Report, Feb. 1964, NAUK, DO 183/138.

⁶⁹ Macpherson implies that this was said to him by Kapwepwe, but does not state it explicitly. Fergus Macpherson’s interview with Grey Zulu, n.d. [1971(?)], CSCNWW, Macpherson Collection Box 1.2.

reporter who visited Sione and spoke to Lumpa deacons the day before the battle was told, ‘the Government and the police have come ready to kill us, and we are ready to die [...]. We are all happy to die for our God. It is not a bad thing to leave this earth.’⁷⁰ They were armed with spears, bows and arrows, and a few home-made guns. At 8h40 am on 30 July, on their approach, the NRR paused, to allow the DC to address the villagers, calling on them to lay down their arms and to surrender those who were considered the Lumpa leaders. The army was attacked on both flanks. The soldiers returned fire with rifles and three machine guns. They entered the village and the church, firing on all who resisted. According to official reports, seventy-five Lumpa members and one soldier were killed and around 110 Lumpa members and five soldiers wounded. The battle was over by 10h05, although subsequent ‘mopping up’ activities lasted until 15h30.

Mercy Mfula was 19 when she witnessed the attack on Sione. The soldiers arrived and demanded the surrender of Lenshina and several of the Church’s leaders. Then, after a short countdown:

We heard the sound of guns. We ran into houses to hide. Our friends were being shot. We heard others calling: ‘Come and see your friends are dead’. We ran up and down; we saw people shout, some dying. The guns the soldiers used started from ground level and then rose to treetops. Chickens died, goats died, and trees lost their leaves. We ran up and down. Old people were crying. There was confusion. We kept on saying, ‘God, what has happened?’

Mopping up operations lasted into the afternoon. Afterwards, the soldiers loaded survivors into trucks and took them to the Chinsali Boma:

As they brought us to the Boma, there was a large crowd holding branches which they were shaking and singing, ‘Well done Kaunda’. They were happy. They took us to a prison by the hill where they kept us. People came to tease us. ‘You Lumpa said guns would shoot water. Did you see water coming from the guns?’⁷¹

The only documentary evidence we have of the details of the Sione attack comes from an agreed-upon Provincial Operations Committee release and a timeline of events during the military operation.⁷² These releases have to be

⁷⁰ *Northern News*, 30 July 1964.

⁷¹ Interview with Mercy Mfula. A second eye-witness, the daughter of the prominent deacon, ‘Chonkela’, who was wanted and was shot by the police, offers similar testimony; interview with Denise Chilufya.

⁷² ‘Message from Chinsali’, 30 July 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10. The *Report* is similar to the ‘Message from Chinsali’ with a few details and names excluded; *Report*, 24. The timeline is in ‘Messages From Chinsali’, 30 July 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10, and demonstrates the rapidity of the operation, which is underemphasized in the agreed-upon ‘Message from Chinsali’ and *Report*. There is also ‘Testimony of John

examined as carefully as the oral evidence: In all of their correspondence, the operations committees were under instruction to emphasize the ferocity of the Lumpa and any firearms used by them.⁷³ For the Lumpa villagers, it was a few moments of bravery, confusion, death, and humiliation. The image presented by the Provincial Operations Committee in the agreed-upon release was one of law and order confronting savagery.

Elements of the first battalion NRR and the Police Mobile Unit today moved in on Sione Village, HQ of the fanatical Lenshina religious sect [...]. Some distance from the village the forces halted and Mr. John Hannah the DC addressed the adherents of the sect with a loud hailer he called upon them in the vernacular to lay down their arms come forward and surrender themselves. A time limit was set for them to do this and they failed to come forward. The forces then advanced in extended order and as they did so they were attacked on both flanks by frenzied villagers carrying bows and arrows, spears and an assortment of firearms. Troops beating off these attacks which were frenzied and pressed home with the utmost ferocity and disregard for personal safety were obliged to use three automatic weapons and it was only at a later stage when it became obvious to the Force Commander that resistance was weakening that he could safely give instructions that no more use was to be made of these arms [...] Throughout the whole operation constant appeals were made for the fanatics to see reasons but these had no effect and at all times the officers in charge kept the strictest control of the men's fire.⁷⁴

This version of events would appear again in the Commission of Enquiry's report, in a slightly toned-down version. Even to scholars somewhat sympathetic to the Lumpa Church, it would become the official, published, and established narration of events, the centerpiece of the so-called 'rebellion', when peasants armed with spears confronted soldiers armed with automatic weapons.

The extent of and intensity of resistance is difficult to gauge. Some Lumpa certainly attacked the troops, but faced with rifle and automatic gunfire, most experienced the 'battle' as a massacre. The above report emphasized the 'ferocity' of the 'fanatics'; that women, men, and children all attacked the security forces. Yet this is a partial description. The rapidity of the operation, which is not indicated in the agreed-upon release, belies the idea of sustained resistance by the Lumpas. Outside the village, where the army attacked at 8h40, fire from rifles and three automatic weapons lasted for approximately 15 minutes. According to a press report, 65 Lumpas were killed and 50 wounded in the first four minutes of fire.⁷⁵ They then advanced into the village, using machine guns for another five minutes. After occasional pauses to allow for Lumpa surrender,

Hannah', the DC, presumably testimony given to the commission. 'Testimony of John Hannah', n.d. [1964-5(?)], in the possession of John Hudson, Lusaka.

⁷³ Message from the Special Branch, 5 Aug. 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.

⁷⁴ 'Message from Chinsali'.

⁷⁵ *Rhodesia Herald*, 31 July 1964.

the troops resumed firing with single shot weapons.⁷⁶ This lasted for another 20 minutes. By 10h02, the army had occupied the church and cleared it with tear gas. Even if a few Lumpas still wielded spears in the church, the attack inside the church was experienced by most as a massacre. The physical evidence supports the oral testimony. One month later, the Special Branch offered a description of the Church, ‘with its walls and doors holed by bullets, and the floors blood stained [...].’⁷⁷ The entire operation lasted less than 90 minutes.⁷⁸ The army took 436 prisoners, mostly women.⁷⁹ Lenshina, however, escaped.

The image presented of the actions of the soldiers and police was always one of restraint, order, and discipline. Yet there is at least circumstantial evidence that the soldiers were not all disciplined and may have continued firing after ordered to stop. For many, it was the first time that they saw actions against such a committed foe. A combination of inexperience, revenge, and the knowledge that government favored a harsh response, may have contributed to unnecessary massacres. The Northern Rhodesian Department of the Commonwealth Relations Office heard of several cases when the ‘officers found it extremely difficult to get them [the soldiers] to stop firing and that consequently there were many more casualties than there should have been’.⁸⁰ This was probably only true in a few cases and the majority of African soldiers performed admirably – these few cases, however, could have done much damage. In the end, the Northern Rhodesian colonial administration defended the soldiers, claiming that: ‘for most it was a baptism of fire against a fanatical foe. Certainly their expenditure of ammunition was high; perhaps much higher than more experienced troops would have used; but conversely more experienced troops might have inflicted higher casualties’.⁸¹

As news reached the Lampa villages of the attack on Sione, most Lumpas abandoned their settlements and went into hiding in the bush.⁸² On the occasion that Lampa villagers resisted troops, they were described as ‘frenzied’ and ‘fanatical’. In Lundazi District, about 100 miles to the east of Chinsali, the Lampa reaction to the news of the attack on their prophet and their Church headquarters was rebellion. They attacked several villages, resulting in perhaps

⁷⁶ According to John Hannah, eight appeals for surrender were made. ‘Testimony of John Hannah’.

⁷⁷ Report by special branch on ‘Feelings of the followers of the Lampa church towards the church building at Sione’, 4 Sept. 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.

⁷⁸ Proops to Mainops, Sitrep messages from Chinsali, 30 July 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.

⁷⁹ ‘Testimony of John Hannah’.

⁸⁰ Jamieson to Molyneaux, 2 Sept. 1964.

⁸¹ Molyneaux to Jamieson, 7 Sept. 1964.

⁸² ‘Messages concerning Chinsali’, 2 Aug. 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.

150 deaths. In the most brazen attack, on the night of 3 August, about 200 Lumpa from Chipoma Village attacked the Lundazi Boma, seized arms and ammunition from the police station, nearly killed a detective, and did kill his wife and child, together with a number of women and adolescents in the police camp and an Indian trader, a total of 22 deaths and 28 injured.⁸³ This attack was seized upon as typical and made into a sign of the Lumpa ‘savagery’. The *Northern News* reported that ‘300 revenge-maddened Lumpa followers raged through the Lundazi District, sacking 18 villagers and killing at least 150 people’.⁸⁴ Although Kaunda advised against retaliation, he might have encouraged it by condemning the Lumpas for ‘bloodthirsty and ungodly brutalities. Lenshina and her followers stand condemned for their madness [...]. [She] taught her followers to do dirty things, to smear themselves in filth to make themselves bullet-proof [...]. Lenshina attackers went to villages while the men were away and locked the women and children in houses which they then set on fire. These are the actions of madmen. They roamed the country killing teachers and children. They stand condemned by their own activities, these mad people’.⁸⁵ He called for the capture of Lenshina, dead or alive.

UNIP and military retaliation in Lundazi District was ruthless. Kaunda told the Cabinet and Security Council that to prevent local retaliation the government had to take a firm stance against the Lumpa Church. He suggested a combination of ‘positive action’ and a ‘temporary banning of the church for a limited period of one month’.⁸⁶ The next day Governor Hone banned the church: Any person ‘managing or assisting [...] the Lumpa church or who acts as a member or attends any meeting of the Lumpa church’ would be found guilty of an offence and liable to conviction for up to seven years.⁸⁷ The ban was never rescinded. What had begun four days earlier as an operation to arrest the Lumpa involved in the Chinsali disturbances became an all-out assault on the Church. The 1st NRR was sent to Lundazi District and soldiers attacked Chipoma Village, thought responsible for the attack on the Lundazi Boma. They killed 81 people, at least 23 of whom were women.⁸⁸ A few prisoners were

⁸³ ‘Messages from Chinsali and Lundazi’ 4-5 Aug. 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10. Seven Lumpa members were sentenced to hang for the attack on Lundazi. Trial records are not available but some details are in *Northern News*, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10 Oct. 1964.

⁸⁴ *Northern News*, 4 Aug. 1964.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* These allegations are not substantiated in any of the official military or intelligence reports.

⁸⁶ Records of a meeting held at government house, 3 Aug. 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.

⁸⁷ Societies Ordinance, 3 Aug. 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.

⁸⁸ The commission reports 81 dead; military messages from the attack report 51 men and 23 women were dead at the time of the operation. *Report*, 26; ‘Messages from Chinsali and Lundazi’, 4 Aug. 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.

taken, but most fled. At Paison Village, 16 were killed and most fled, westward into the bush.⁸⁹ As the bodies piled up, the Office of Prime Minister gave permission to the Resident Magistrate to allow villagers to bury the dead without a coroner's investigation – although an effort was made to record their identity, age, and sex.⁹⁰ Following complaints of excessive violence used by the army, the Governor delayed an operation against Paishuko Village while the army discussed alternative tactics.⁹¹ When the military arrived, two days after the initial scheduled date, UNIP had already attacked the village. They found 46 dead inhabitants, 36 of whom were women and children. Many showed signs of being raped and tortured before being killed, with grain mortars and stakes thrust into their anuses or vaginas.⁹²

On 16 August 1964, a group of UNIP leaders, including Chapoloko, Sinagwe, the MP for Abercorn, Victor Ngandu, the parliamentary secretary, and Minister of Home Affairs, Simon Kapwepwe, addressed a crowd of frightened villagers at Mulanga Mission. Some were victims of Lampa violence; only a day before a small group of them had briefly returned to their villages to bury the dead. Kapwepwe asked the crowd, 'Who has inflicted all of this upon you?' He told them:

'Lenshina, and her adherents [...] People who eat their dung, washed their bodies with their own urine [...] change into a devil, even 5 times worse than a devil, they actually would be wild beasts. When you find a wild beast easting in your gardens or trying to kill you: What would you do? You would come together and start to follow it till it is dead. And even after death, you would break its legs, spit on it and roast it above the fire till nothing is left anymore. Our government is determined to destroy this wild beast'.⁹³

The same evening Kapwepwe returned to Lusaka to report to Kaunda.⁹⁴ The purge of the Lampa was underway and UNIP's victory over their most serious rival in northern Zambia assured.

⁸⁹ 'Messages from Chinsali and Lundazi', 4 Aug., 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.

⁹⁰ Acting registrar to resident magistrate (Lundazi), 4 Aug. 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10. A list of those buried in Lundazi can be found in the UNIP archives; UNIPA, UNIP 5/5/2/7/2.

⁹¹ Minute by Governor to permanent secretary (Office of Prime Minister), 11 Aug. 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.

⁹² John Hudson, *A time to mourn: A personal account of the 1964 church revolt* (Lusaka, 1999), 48-49; 'Messages from Chinsali and Lundazi', 8-9 Aug. 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.

⁹³ As reported in Mulanga Mission Diary, 15 Aug. 1964.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

The aftermath

In the weeks that followed the attack on Sione, operations were launched against Lumpa villages and roaming Lumpa refugees, leading to hundreds of deaths. Many Lumpa died from starvation after they had abandoned their villages and fled into the bush. For the military, first priority were the villages in Chinsali, Lundazi and Mpika Districts followed by Isoka, Chama, and Kasama Districts. Many of these villages, especially in Kasama District, coexisted peacefully with surrounding areas – yet the government approach was a comprehensive ban on the Lumpa Church and an insistence that the villages be abandoned. Despite some attempts to limit casualties after the Chipoma operation in Lundazi, strategies remained similar. A combination of soldiers and police marched to the settlements, demanded that the Lumpas capitulate and accept relocation to their old villages or to resettlement centers. Many Lumpa members had already fled into the bush, abandoning their villages. A few Lumpa adherents would respond with a show of force, with men in the front brandishing spears and goaded on from behind by women who sang Lumpa hymns; others agreed to negotiate and surrendered. If they refused to surrender, troops opened fire until they fled into the bush or surrendered. In general, resistance was greatest in the villages of Chinsali and Lundazi Districts, where the most vicious battles had been fought with UNIP and where the villages were most heavily fortified. In Kasama and Isoka Districts, by contrast, the Lumpa surrendered and were taken into detention without the use of force. Whether villages were abandoned or surrendered was negotiated or forced, the troops set out to destroy all physical remnants of the villages and churches. The last villages were destroyed in the week of 23 to 29 of August. The last military operations took place on 10 October 1964, when an encounter between the 2nd NRR and a group of roaming Lumpa led to death of 60 Lumpa and one soldier, and the arrest of 95 Lumpa.⁹⁵ The NRR had to expedite operations if they were to evacuate most of their forces by September 10, in time to prepare for the independence celebrations of October 24.⁹⁶

By the beginning of September, thousands of Lumpa were roaming in the bush or imprisoned in the ‘cages’ next to the District Offices. Lenshina had surrendered on 11 August 1964 in exchange for a guarantee of her personal safety

⁹⁵ Troops Lusaka to MOD, 17 Oct. 1964, NAUK, DO 183/135; *Report*, 35

⁹⁶ Telegram army HQ to permanent secretary (Office of the Prime Minister) and ‘all DIVOPS’, 21 Aug. 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.

that did not safeguard her from criminal prosecution.⁹⁷ While she never faced prosecution regarding the conflict of 1963-4, Lenshina would be detained for the next 11 years. Upon her capture, the government distributed a pamphlet, allegedly dictated by Lenshina, calling on her followers to surrender.⁹⁸ The task of resettlement and 'rehabilitation' now began. UNIP officials like Robert Kapasa Makasa, the newly-appointed Under-Minister for Northern Province, and Chinsali's member of parliament Jameson Chapoloko played a decisive role in the 'rehabilitation committees' which were set up. The emphasis would be on 'rehabilitating' the Lumpa rather than reconciliation.

Senior UNIP members and the departing colonial administration still favored the return of Lumpa members to their original villages and some effort was made in trying to persuade antagonistic villages to accept Lumpa. This option was unrealistic, however. Lumpa members were afraid and with good reason. Chiefs and UNIP activists did not favor reintegration of Lumpa members into their villages. At an emergency meeting held at Chinsali Boma on 26 August 1964, Chief Muyombe insisted that all Lumpa members should be arrested: the Government 'should not mix mad dogs with normal ones [...]' Even Chapoloko asked 'why those spear throwers who in a real sense are criminals should be called refugees'.⁹⁹ Most Lumpa remained hidden in the bush or detained in the 'cages' next to the district boma: In Chinsali alone 750 Lumpa members were kept in the Boma 'cage'.

By October 1964, the legal status of the Lumpas detained at the district 'cages' was thrown into doubt. Even under the *Preservation of Public Security Act*, it was illegal to detain someone for more than 28 days. This led to new legislation which allowed the government to establish prescribed areas where detention centers could be set up.¹⁰⁰ Following the failure of village reintegration, some UNIP members like Kapasa Makasa felt that the only way to 'break up the Lenshina cult' was to split its members into single family groups that would be settled in different parts of Zambia, far from their original villages. Makasa's suggestion was not acted upon in the short term (but would

⁹⁷ A.S. Bennet, 'Alice Lenshina Giving Herself Up', 13 Aug. 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10. The government guarantees to Lenshina are to be found in 'Letter to Alice Lenshina', 12 Aug. 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.

⁹⁸ 'Mwe Lukuta Lwakwa Lesa Umfweni Ifyo Ndesosa', NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.

⁹⁹ Minutes of an emergency meeting held at Chinsali rural Boma, 26-27 August, 1964, NAZ, NP 3/12/10.

¹⁰⁰ According to the *Preservation of Public Security Ordinance, Amendement no. 4*. Memorandum, Office of Magistrate, 12 Oct. 1964, NAZ, NP 3/12/10.

be several years later).¹⁰¹ Instead, the cabinet decided to establish two large detention centers near Mbala and Luwingu, in the north of the country, and Makali camp, north of Petauke in the Eastern Province. By March 1965, around 4,000 Lampa were detained at the Katito and Lunzuwa camps and several hundred more at Makali camp.¹⁰²

At the same time, Lampa who were not detained had made their way to the Congo. Through intermediaries, especially contacts with Congolese Prime Minister Moise Tshombe such as Bulala Wina, who in turn worked closely with Alfred Kapele, Lenshina's son-in-law, the Congolese government invited the Lampa to settle in Mokambo, near the Zambian border.¹⁰³ When Lenshina, then detained at Mumbwa, heard that her followers had been permitted to settle in the Congo, she instructed her followers who remained in the bush or in the camps to make their way to the Congo.¹⁰⁴ Lampa members at Katito and Lunzuwa camps informed the authorities that they were returning to their villagers or to relatives on the Copperbelt; however, their intention was to go the Congo.¹⁰⁵ By June 1965, the settlement at Mokambo had grown to about 1,000.¹⁰⁶ The Lampa intended to build a new Zion at Mokambo and from across northern Zambia they made their way to the Congo through Copperbelt safe-houses.¹⁰⁷ It seems that the Zambian authorities gave tacit approval to the movement of the Lampa to Mokambo: In December 1965, when the Zambian government feared a Lampa 'invasion' from the Congo, the Congolese under-

¹⁰¹ Makasa to Kaunda, 3 Feb. 1965, NAZ, NP 3/12/11. Kaunda disagreed with Makasa arguing that the Lampa would create problems across the country. Kaunda to Makasa, 4 May 1965, NAZ, NP 3/12/11.

¹⁰² K.P Gill, 'Memorandum containing proposals for the eventual resettlement of Lenshina present at Katito and Lunzuwa camps', Mar. 1965, NAZ, NP 3/12/11.

¹⁰³ Lampa leaders claim that Bulala Wina showed them where to settle and how to conduct themselves in the Congo. He was fluent in French and Swahili and was friendly with the Congolese authorities. Interviews with Dixon Mulenga, 15 July 2005; Lewis Mumba, Chiponya, 19 July 2005; Monica Nkamba, Chiponya, 19 July 2005.

¹⁰⁴ The police intercepted John Museba, who had been in Katanga, with a letter from Lenshina instructing her followers to go to Mokambo. Namulongo to district secretary (Chinsali), 29 Apr. 1965, NAZ, NP 3/12/11. Interview with Dixon Mulenga, 15 July 2005.

¹⁰⁵ Rehabilitation officer to permanent secretary (Office of the President), 31 May 1965, NAZ, NP 3/12/11. Interviews with David Mpuku, Choshi, 6 July 2005; Mercy Mfula; Aida Lukonde, Choshi, 10 July 2005; Monica Nkamba; Gabriel Chimfwembe, Kapiri Mposhi, 20 July 2005.

¹⁰⁶ Minutes of the 9th Meeting of central security council, 12 June 1965, NAZ NP, 3/12/11.

¹⁰⁷ Social welfare officer (Katito) to Makasa, 18 Feb. 1966; Zambia police telegram disops Chinsali to Provops Kasama and Mainops Lusaka, 1 Feb. 1965, NAZ, NP 3/12/11. Interview with Gabriel Chisanga, Choshi, 10 July 2005.

took to ensure that the Lumpa would not be allowed to return to Zambia and that they would continue to accept Lumpa refugees in the Congo.¹⁰⁸

By early 1966, the detention camps in Zambia had been closed and the settlement at Mokambo grew to between 15,000 and 20,000.¹⁰⁹ At first the Lumpa resided in one large village, but were soon allocated land to cultivate. Different villages or village sections were named after the *misumba* they had established in Zambia.¹¹⁰ Lenshina's daughter, Elizabeth Ngandu, and Elizabeth's husband, Alfred Kapele, joined a few other prominent deacons to lead the church. Far from disintegrating, exile strengthened the corporate nature of the church and solidified Lumpa identity.

On 24 October 1967, the anniversary of Zambian independence in 1964 – and a day after the alleged anniversary of Lenshina's resurrection in 1953 according to the Lumpa calendar – Alice Lenshina and her immediate family escaped from her detention camp in Kalabo in the west of Zambia and fled towards Angola. The Zambian government, fearing an invasion by the Lumpa at Mokambo, embarked on 'Operation Stallion' to recapture Lenshina and contain a potential Lumpa invasion from the Congo.¹¹¹ Angolan rebels captured Lenshina and handed her over to the Zambian government. The feared Lumpa invasion never materialized. However, Kaunda's government felt threatened by a pan-Bemba Lenshina-Kapwepwe alliance (however unlikely that alliance seemed). In an alarming report, Grey Zulu, the then Minister of Home Affairs, claimed that from 12,000 to 20,000 Lumpa at Mokambo were armed with 100 muzzle-loading guns and 12 automatic weapons. While he thought it unlikely that they would attack Zambia, he felt they were a threat as long as they remained at Mokambo.¹¹² Zambia formally requested that the Congo authorities force the Lumpa to return to Zambia or relocate them further in the interior, as

¹⁰⁸ Lusaka MOD to CRO, 22 Dec. 65, NAUK, DO 209/77.

¹⁰⁹ The closure of the camps is not documented in detail, but camp authorities declared their determination to close the camp by the end of March, 1966. Mulala to Permanent Secretary (Office of the President), 16 Feb. 1966, NAZ, NP 3/12/11. Several interviewees claim that teargas was fired into the camp and they were forced to leave. This probably is a referral to an attempt to close the camp in October 1965 with the use of the military, which resulted in many fleeing the camp. Interviews with Mercy Mfula; Aida Lukonde; and Monica Nkamba. 'Record of conversation with Mr. D.A. Penn on 1 November 1965', NAUK, DO 183/814.

¹¹⁰ Interviews with Paison Nkonde; Dixon Mulenga, 15 July 2005; and Elizabeth 'Lutanda' Ngandu, Lusaka 25 Mar. 2005.

¹¹¹ A.S. Masiye (Office of the President), 'Operation Stallion', 27 Oct. 1967, NAZ, FA 1/222.

¹¹² A.G. Zulu, 'Report to H.E. on ex-Lumpas at Mokambo', 20 Nov. 1967, NAZ, FA 1/222.

well as giving consideration to banning the church.¹¹³ In a letter to Mobutu, President Kaunda called for cooperation in ensuring repatriation and noted that the banning of the church was 'entirely your sovereign right which I note with favour'.¹¹⁴ A committee composed of Zambian and Congolese security agents collaborated to ensure repatriation. In Zambia, Kaunda offered amnesty to all Lumpa members but still insisted that all persons returning to Zambia 'refrain from engaging in any activity or practice which may be detrimental, or which has proved in the past to be detrimental, the peace, order, and government of Zambia'.¹¹⁵ Both the Zambian security services and Lumpa Church members interpreted Kaunda's orders as a ban on Lumpa worship and the singing of Lumpa hymns.

The Congolese government told the Lumpa that they either had to relocate to the interior of the Congo, away from the border with Zambia, or return to Zambia. For many Lumpa, who frequently crossed into Zambia undetected, the prospect of relocating far into the interior was uninviting. But they did not want to return to Zambia where their church was still banned and they could not pray. Alfred Kapele was most opposed to returning to Zambia and relocated with several thousand followers to Kanyama in the Congolese interior. The faction that remained at Mokambo was eventually forced back to Zambia in 1971 after a skirmish with Congolese authorities that resulted in the shooting of several Lumpa and the death of three.¹¹⁶

In 1971, when the Lumpa exiles returned to Zambia *en masse*, the Zambian police established detention or transit camps at Ndola, Kitwe, and Luanshya that accommodated between 8,000 and 10,000 Lumpa.¹¹⁷ A few weeks later, the Zambian authorities divided the Lumpa into small groups and sent them to villages across Northern and Eastern Provinces.¹¹⁸ The government hoped that this would finally destroy the unity of the Lumpa church. They were unsuccessful. Lumpa deacons collected people from the farthest reaches of Zambia and returned with them to urban or peri-urban areas, like Kapiri Mposhi, Mpika, Ndola Rural, and the outskirts of Lusaka, where the Lumpa settled and continued to organize and to pray.¹¹⁹ In 1978, soon after the death of Alice Lenshina on 7 December 1978, many of the Lumpa previously under the

¹¹³ Note B1.169/67, 'Note to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kinshasa,' NAZ FA 1/222.

¹¹⁴ Kaunda to Mobutu, 26 Mar. 1968, NAZ, FA 1/222.

¹¹⁵ Presidential decree on the Lumpas, May 1968, NAZ, FA 1/222.

¹¹⁶ Interviews with Dixon Mulenga, 15 July 2005; and Gabriel Chimfwembe. *Times of Zambia*, 30 Sept. 1971.

¹¹⁷ *Times of Zambia*, 6, 7, 10, 12 Oct. 1971.

¹¹⁸ *Times of Zambia*, 15, 22, 28 Oct. 1971.

¹¹⁹ Interviews with Dixon Mulenga, 15 July 2005; Paison Nkonde; and London Mutonga, Lusaka, 16 Feb. 2005.

direction of Alfred Kapele returned to Zambia and joined the urban congregations.¹²⁰ With Lenshina's apparent blessing, Obed Chileshe (Muchinga) organized these new arrivals and those who had returned in 1971 in a new church, the Jerusalem in Christ (later, New Jerusalem) Church. He also sought to gain legal recognition for the church and greater acceptance by introducing a more conventional liturgy that incorporated the Bible.

With the end of UNIP rule in 1991, the Lumpa formally re-constituted their movement in the Jerusalem, New Jerusalem, and Uluse Kamutola (Praise the Temple) Churches. Leadership disputes and diverse peregrinations led to several church bodies that claimed to be the true inheritors of the Lumpa Church. Alfred Kapele and Elizabeth Ngandu returned to Zambia with their group of loyal followers in 1993-4.¹²¹ Obed Chileshe died in 1992; his wife, Theresa Nkweto Chileshe, claimed to inherit the Jerusalem in Christ Church from him. Meanwhile, Jennifer Ngandu, another daughter of Lenshina, claimed to be the church overseer after Theresa Nkweto Chileshe allegedly took advantage of her office. By the mid-1990s there were at least three major churches: Theresa Nkweto Chileshe headed the Uluse Kamutola Church; Jennifer Ngandu led the Jerusalem Church; and Alfred Kapele and Elizabeth Ngandu organized their followers into the New Jerusalem Church. Since 2005, however, the majority of former Lumpa members agreed to join the Jerusalem Church under the joint direction of Lenshina's two daughters, Jennifer Ngandu and Elizabeth Ngandu. Several independent branches of the Uluse Kamutola Church remain.

The legacy of the church and the conflict between the church, UNIP, and the Zambian state is however much broader, more deeply and widely felt and experienced. Lumpa influences reverberate across the spectrum of Zambian Christian churches. The Manichean opposition of the good and faithful versus the evils of witchcraft, and the role that Christianity plays in combating evil, can be attributed to the spread of Lumpa Christian doctrines. Lumpa hymns and music have influenced United Church of Zambia and even Roman Catholic services. The social and ideological forces behind the Lumpa-UNIP war continue to be a feature of Zambian political life. Frederick Chiluba's declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation after the defeat of UNIP in the 1991 elections, the popularity of evangelical Christianity among Zambia's political class, and the wattle-and-daub churches that provide the most prominent organizational counter to political party structures in many of Zambia's villages, all demon-

¹²⁰ Note by Consul General, Lubumbashi, on security situation, 1978, UNIPA, UNIP 7/23/54. Lenshina died in her house in Kaunda square, Lusaka, where she was under restriction but no longer imprisoned.

¹²¹ Interview with Kristine Bowa, Kapiri Mposhi, 20 July 2005; *Times of Zambia*, 4 Feb. 1994.

strate that the politicization of religion and the theocratic nature of politics remain a feature of the Zambian socio-political landscape.

4

‘You can’t fight guns with knives’: National security and Zambian responses to UDI, 1965-1973¹

Andrew J. DeRoche

Introduction

What was the underlying principle motivating Zambian foreign relation during the First Republic? Studies by Elijah Mudenda and other participants tend to highlight such aspects of nationalist ideology as the struggle for racial equality.² Early scholars such as Tim Shaw emphasized economic factors and employed dependency theory to analyze events.³ In his insightful work Stephen Chan

¹ Most of the research for this chapter was conducted during a year in Zambia funded by a Fulbright grant from the United States government, for which I am very thankful. It would not have been such a productive experience without the assistance of Dr. Marja Hinseelaar and Dr. Giacomo Macola. Encouragement from friends and colleagues such as Gabriel Banda and Dr. Webby Kalikiti was also crucial to the process. Most important was the support from my wife, Heather Choonya.

² A fine example of this nationalist school is Elijah Mudenda, *Zambia: A generation of struggle* (Harare, 1999). Kenneth Kaunda’s memoirs have yet to be written, but he has offered some of his recollections in the Zambian *Sunday Post* column entitled ‘KK’s Diary’, which began appearing late in 2004. These columns heavily emphasize nationalism and race as the driving forces behind Zambia’s foreign policies. Kaunda also commented on some relevant issues in his *Kaunda on violence* (London, 1980). The most useful memoir in terms of relevant details remains Vernon Mwaanga, *An extraordinary life* (Lusaka, 1982), in which Mwaanga leans toward ideology as the key factor.

³ Timothy Shaw, *Dependence and underdevelopment: The development and foreign policies of Zambia* (Athens, 1976); and also Shaw’s contributions to Douglas Anglin

acknowledged the contributions of Shaw and the value of dependency theory, but also contended that an exclusive focus on economics only told part of the story. Chan argued that Kenneth Kaunda's foreign relations from 1965 to 1973 were complex: Both 'diplomatically active' and 'very pragmatic'. Chan correctly pointed out that single factors like economics or ideology do not sufficiently explain Zambian foreign relations. Furthermore, he criticized his academic predecessors for not using archival sources and called on future scholars to present the evidence 'properly'.⁴ The first attempt to answer Chan's call was completed by Douglas Anglin.⁵ Anglin's book does present original material, particularly from Canada, but was published long before the archives of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) were open.

My work here, which draws heavily on material from Zambian and American archives not utilized previously by other scholars, brings new evidence to light. Furthermore, my essay includes crucial examples from the entire span of the First Republic, whereas Anglin only covered 1965-66. More importantly,



Photo 5 Students of Evelyn Hone College in Lusaka protesting against minority rule and the government of Ian Smith in Rhodesia

and Timothy Shaw, *Zambia's foreign policy: Studies in diplomacy and dependence* (Boulder, 1979).

⁴ Stephen Chan, *Kaunda and Southern Africa: Image and reality in foreign policy* (London, 1992), 67-8, 117.

⁵ Douglas Anglin, *Zambian crisis behavior: Confronting Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 1965-1966* (Montreal, 1994).

my piece offers a more satisfying explanation than earlier authors for the underlying motives of the First Republic's foreign relations. As we trace some of the key Zambian reactions to Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) through the years, it becomes clearer that economics or ideology alone cannot explain the attitudes of Kaunda and other key figures. Both nationalist writers, who emphasize ideology, and dependency theorists, who emphasize economics, have made important contributions, but what we need to better understand Zambian foreign relations is an interpretive framework that can incorporate both factors (and others if need be). A more appropriate lens through which to view the stance of Kaunda and his colleagues is national security theory, which 'encompasses the decisions and actions deemed imperative to protect domestic core values from external threats'.⁶

All of the crucial components of Zambia's response to UDI – the call for military intervention and assistance, the search for economic support, and even opposition challenges to UNIP policies – can be logically explained through national security theory. In each case, the individuals involved believed that the policy they supported would help protect Zambia's national security as they defined it. Various officials advocated closer ties with the Eastern Bloc or China; some espoused stronger bonds to the United States and England, while yet others championed cooperation with the white rulers of Rhodesia and South Africa. At various points Kaunda himself trod each of these separate paths. There is a reasonable explanation for such disparate positions being taken by Zambians. Responding to the challenges of UDI during the First Republic, Zambian policymakers primarily sought to protect their country's national security.

Use of force

Kaunda and other top officials in the Zambian government made it very clear in the first two months after UDI that they wanted the British to intervene militarily to end the rebellion.⁷ The president explained his view to the National Assembly on 9 December 1965. He stated that 'the British Government should have moved in with a force possible to stop the rebellious Government in Rhodesia from continuing. It is most doubtful that the British Government would have met considerable resistance'. Kaunda then criticized the UK's ef-

⁶ See Melvyn Leffler, 'National security', in: Michael Hogan and Thomas Paterson, eds, *Explaining the history of American foreign relations* (Cambridge, 2004), 123-136, quotation on 123.

⁷ For an analysis of the British debate over using force see Carl Watts, 'Killing kith and kin: The viability of British military intervention in Rhodesia, 1964-5', *Twentieth Century British History*, 16 (2005), 382-415.

forts to negotiate with Ian Smith. He wondered: 'What manner of dealing with such a serious problem is this? Today, you brand someone as a rebel – a chap who has committed treason – and tomorrow, you declare publicly you will embrace him. A rebel, according to us here, is arrested, tried by a military court and shot dead'.⁸

Kaunda sent his Vice President, Reuben Kamanga, to a special meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in Nigeria a few weeks later to present Zambia's case. Kamanga distributed a memo that criticized economic sanctions, because they would end the rebellion too slowly. Zambian leaders firmly believed that 'force by Britain alone can ultimately be used at minimum cost'.⁹ In a lengthy speech, Kamanga elaborated on the justifications for a British intervention. He pointed out that force had been used in British Guiana, Cyprus, and Kenya. 'Rebels are rebels', he added, 'wherever they are, even in Rhodesia, and if their existence threatens the peace and progress of societies elsewhere, they must be brought down'.¹⁰

The British had promised to send troops if law and order broke down, and according to Kamanga that is exactly what had happened in Rhodesia. Why did the British refuse to keep their word? Zambia's Vice President suggested that racism was a factor. If blacks had risen up against the whites in Salisbury, British troops would have come to their rescue. He argued, 'as long as it is white citizens threatening violence and carrying it out, it matters little'. Kamanga then sketched a picture of what would result from ongoing British refusal to intervene. First of all, it would bring 'untold hardship to the innocent millions, white and black, in Rhodesia'. It would also be costly for the Zambian people, and President Kaunda and his colleagues reserved the right 'to call upon any other friendly nation or group of nations to our aid'.¹¹

Zambian leaders, of course, opted to seek such support because UDI was not crushed quickly. Instead of capturing Smith and ending the revolt, the UK sent a squadron of ten Javelin jets to protect Zambian airspace.¹² Foreign Minister

⁸ Kenneth Kaunda, in: *Zambia Hansard No. 5: Official verbatim report of the debates of the second session of the first national assembly 7th December – 16th December 1965*, 94-95.

⁹ 'Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, Lagos, 1966: Zambia's views on the Rhodesian situation', secret memorandum, 11 Jan. 1966, United National Independence Party's Archives (UNIPA), Lusaka, UNIP, Box 140, File 5. My research at the UNIP archives was facilitated by Andrew Nyambe, Wilson Nyirenda, and Petwell Munshya, who were always friendly and helpful.

¹⁰ Speech by Reuben Kamanga at the Emergency Commonwealth Conference on Rhodesia, Lagos, Jan. 1966, UNIPA, UNIP, Box 140, File 5.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Thanks to Dr. Jan-Bart Gewald for encouraging me to examine the issues surrounding the Javelin jets more carefully.

Simon Kapwepwe expressed concern about what he saw as an attempt by British Prime Minister Harold Wilson to take control of Zambia's airfields and thus prohibit other nations from sending planes. Kapwepwe had accurately interpreted Wilson's motives, and the Javelin pilots had neither the capability nor intention to attack Rhodesia.¹³ To add insult to injury, the British personnel stationed in Livingstone frequently fraternized with Smith's forces across the Zambezi.¹⁴ In at least two instances, moreover, RAF technicians defected from their base in Ndola.¹⁵ A pilot may also have deserted, but the evidence is inconclusive.¹⁶ Whether or not any British pilots actually joined the Rhodesians, there is no doubt that many of them were reluctant to fight their 'kith and kin'. President Kaunda described the British as 'clearly not serious in their defense role'.¹⁷

Zambian views regarding the British willingness to use force went from bad to worse. In 1969 when the British threatened to intervene in the Caribbean to prevent Anguilla's secession from Nevis and St. Kitts, Foreign Minister Elijah Mudenda blasted them for considering such a move while refusing it in Rhodesia. It must have been because the rebels in the Caribbean were black, but

¹³ The decision to accept the offer of Javelins is thoroughly analyzed in: Anglin, *Zambian crisis behavior*, 135-139. Anglin discusses British motives and makes a strong case that this policy was much more beneficial to the British than the Zambians. The Javelins departed in August 1966. Their nine-month stay cost the British \$7.4 million.

¹⁴ The contact between RAF pilots and their Rhodesian counterparts is described by Ian Smith, *The great betrayal: The memoirs of Africa's most controversial leader* (London, 1997), 111-112, 119-120.

¹⁵ Douglas Anglin referred to the uproar that resulted whenever members of the RAF 'defected to Rhodesia', citing the *Daily Telegraph*, 24 Jan. 1966, and *Zambia News*, 22 May 1966. See Anglin, *Zambian crisis behavior*, 139. Anglin elaborated on these incidents in an email to the author on 12 Mar. 2006. In January 1966 three RAF technicians went AWOL from Ndola and were thought to have crossed into Rhodesia. In May 1966, two more technicians defected on the eve of returning home, crossed into Rhodesia on a freight train, and became firemen with Rhodesia Railways in Bulawayo.

¹⁶ Kaunda and some of his top advisors insist that a pilot did defect. See 'KK's Diary', *Sunday Post*, 4 Dec. 2005; Mudenda, *Zambia*, 49. Kaunda also referred to pilots joining forces with the rebels in a lecture at the University of Zambia on 24 Nov. 2005. In a 22 July 2005 interview with the author, Grey Zulu recalled that, after one week in Zambia, a RAF pilot not only defected, but also took his plane with him. On the other hand, Ian Smith mentions no defections in his memoirs. Historian Richard Wood informed me in an email on 1 Mar. 2006 that he is 'pretty sure' that no RAF pilots defected, and is certain that none did while stationed in Zambia. Regarding pilot desertions, Anglin emailed me on 12 Mar. 2006 that he has 'no proof one way or the other.'

¹⁷ Kenneth Kaunda to Jimmy Carter, 15 Feb. 1980, UNIPA, UNIP, Box 79, File 19.

those in Rhodesia were white, he reasoned, and then exclaimed: 'Prime Minister Harold Wilson is a ruthless racialist'.¹⁸ For Mudenda, Kapwepwe, Kamanga, and Kaunda, the British failure to use military force to crush UDI and their subsequent deployment of the relatively worthless Javelin squadron posed grave threats to Zambia's national security.

International assistance?

During the first year of independence Kaunda's government remained completely dependent on Rhodesia for energy and trade. Zambia got all of its coal from the Wankie mines and all of its oil from a pipeline through Rhodesia. The Kariba power station, located on the southern side of the river, provided seventy percent of Zambia's electricity. All of the copper exports and ninety-five percent of imports crossed the Victoria Falls Bridge via Rhodesia Railways.¹⁹ In the immediate aftermath of UDI, the British announced their intention to enforce sanctions against Rhodesia. Kaunda pledged to participate fully in the effort to end Smith's rebellion, which in turn meant Zambia was vulnerable to retaliation. Most importantly, if an oil embargo was imposed on Smith's regime, he could terminate the flow of oil and coal into Zambia, which would paralyze the mines. This was not only a major concern for Kaunda's government, but also for the United States, who depended heavily on Zambian copper. Lyndon Johnson administration officials, such as Undersecretary of State George Ball, worked with their British counterparts to organize an airlift to maintain access to Zambian copper.²⁰

Kaunda expressed his gratitude to Johnson for the American efforts to plan the airlift.²¹ Though thankful for US help on the airlift, Kaunda was becoming increasingly concerned that British leadership of the western response was not strong enough to guarantee his nation's security. Zambia's Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Vernon Mwaanga, proposed that a senior minister visit Moscow to discuss the 'role the Soviet Union is going to play in assisting Zambia during

¹⁸ Elijah Mudenda, in: *Zambia Hansard No. 17: Official verbatim report of the debates of the first session of the second national assembly 21st January – 23rd April 1969*, 2033.

¹⁹ Robert Good, *U.D.I.: The international politics of the Rhodesian rebellion* (Princeton, 1973). Good was the first US ambassador to Zambia, and his book remains very useful.

²⁰ The American response to UDI and concern for copper is thoroughly analyzed in: Andrew J. DeRoche, *Black, white, and chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953-1998* (Trenton, 2001), 112-127.

²¹ Kenneth Kaunda to Lyndon Johnson, 15 Dec. 1965, Lyndon Johnson Library (LJL), Austin, Special Head of State Correspondence, National Security File, Box 61.

the crucial period that lies ahead'.²² Kaunda approved the suggestion, and also decided to send a delegation simultaneously to Washington.²³

Arthur Wina, Minister of Finance, and Elijah Mudenda, then Minister of Agriculture, led the delegation to Moscow. Ambassador Mwaanga arranged a meeting at the Kremlin with Head of State Nikolai Podgorny. Mwaanga had high hopes that the Soviets 'would see this as a clear case requiring urgent assistance'.²⁴ Mudenda was also hopeful, but that soon changed. Upon arrival in the Soviet Union he started to be discouraged, first by the brutal cold and second by his host's attempt to warm him with cognac (he was a teetotaler like Kaunda). The meeting with Podgorny was no better. Mudenda and Wina explained that Zambia desperately needed fuel and trucks, but 'no positive response was forthcoming. It became clear that they were not willing to help'. Soviet reasoning escaped Mudenda, who later recalled: 'I don't know whether I understood those people'.²⁵ The Russian Bear's behavior bewildered Mwaanga as well, who discovered soon thereafter that the USSR had been purchasing Rhodesian tobacco for several years.²⁶

Zambia's delegation to the USA was led by Foreign Minister Simon Kapwepwe and Mines Minister Grey Zulu. Zulu has pointed out the humor in Kaunda's choices, as Zulu and Kapwepwe had a reputation of favoring the Eastern Bloc but went to the Washington, while Wina and Mudenda supposedly leaned towards the West and found themselves in Moscow. The Soviets had evidently not gotten the joke, or at least not thought that it was funny, and the Americans' response was not much better.²⁷ On 22 December Kapwepwe talked with Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams, who reiterated the American intention to assist with the airlift and repair the highway to Tanzania, earlier proposals which had already been accepted. Kapwepwe summed up his meeting with Williams by saying 'we were treated like fools'. A few days later he met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, a session he deemed 'not fruitful at all'. Back in Zambia on New Year's Day, he gloomily assessed the mission to

²² Vernon Mwaanga to Permanent Secretary (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 10 Dec. 1965, National Archives of Zambia (NAZ), Lusaka, FA 1/98.

²³ The decision to send the missions and the missions themselves are insightfully analyzed in Anglin, *Zambian crisis behavior*, 147-51.

²⁴ Mwaanga, *An extraordinary life*, 110. Preparations described in Mwaanga to Permanent Secretary (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 31 Dec. 1965, NAZ, FA 1/98.

²⁵ Mudenda, *Zambia*, 50-51; interview with Elijah Mudenda, Lusaka, 13 July 2005.

²⁶ Vernon Mwaanga to Permanent Secretary (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 7 Apr. 1966, NAZ, FA 1/98.

²⁷ Interview with Grey Zulu, 18 July 2005, Lusaka. Zulu did characterize the discussions as good and found Americans generally friendly.

the USA as 'the most hopeless of all trips I made to any government in the world'.²⁸



Photo 6 American President Lyndon Johnson meets with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda in the Oval Office on 2 December 1964. Zambian officials seated next to Kaunda are Peter Matoka and Valentine Musokanya. Standing in the background is G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

American participation in the airlift, which was obviously much less than Kapwepwe had hoped for, began in early January 1966. By the end of April the American planes had provided over 3.6 million gallons of fuel to keep the Copperbelt running. Kaunda thanked Johnson for 'this great contribution to the Zambian economy', and would later characterize the airlift as 'helpful'.²⁹ The fact remains, however, that Kaunda did not think that sanctions would end the

²⁸ Goodwin Mwanguwa, *The Kapwepwe diaries* (Lusaka, 1986), 61-62. And yet Williams was supportive of African aspirations and had once been punched by a white Rhodesian at the Lusaka airport. See Thomas Noer, *Soapy: A biography of G. Mennen Williams* (Ann Arbor, 2005), 241.

²⁹ Kenneth Kaunda to Lyndon Johnson, 26 Jan. 1966, L JL, Special Head of State Correspondence, National Security File, Box 61; interview with Kenneth Kaunda, Boulder, 10 Apr. 2003.

crisis. Participating in the sanctions, moreover, severely strained Zambia's transportation system, and repairing the Great North Road was not enough to ease the burden. In August 1966 during a visit to Moscow by Kapwepwe and Kamanga, the Soviets agreed to provide cultural and educational support, a helpful gesture but not sufficient to solve the problems caused by UDI.³⁰ National security remained a serious concern.

August of 1966 also saw the departure from Zambia of the RAF Javelin squadron. Zambia had not been satisfied with British efforts to prevent bombing raids by the Rhodesian airforce. Grey Zulu suggested that Zambian commercial pilots be trained to fly fighters, but the British commander predicted that it would take over ten years before Zambians would be ready. Italy provided a helping hand, and their trainers produced Zambian fighter pilots in less than three years. Italy delivered planes, which were eventually replaced by 'other models of military aircraft supplied by Yugoslavia'.³¹

The Zambian president wanted a new railroad running to Dar es Salaam, but the British, American, and Soviet governments refused to fund the project.³² Kaunda consulted with Julius Nyerere and decided to request help from the People's Republic of China (PRC), whose leaders had provided crucial support and even offered military assistance in the early 1960s.³³ In July 1967 he spent five days in China, and the government there agreed to build the railroad. On 5 September 1967 officials from Zambia, Tanzania, and the PRC signed a formal plan for construction in Peking.³⁴ During a banquet in Peking, Kaunda had praised the Chinese for their successful testing of a hydrogen bomb. At a press conference upon his return to Lusaka, he elaborated on the topic. In his view, there should be no monopoly on atomic weapons. The more nations that had

³⁰ Goodwill mission to the USSR (15-31 Aug.) discussed in a confidential report from Ambassador Hosea Soko to Foreign Minister Simon Kapwepwe, NAZ, FA 1/98.

³¹ Interview with Grey Zulu, 18 July 2005; Kaunda to Carter. Zambia purchased Soviet MIG fighters in 1980, an action which drew criticism from Carter that in turn resulted in Kaunda's lengthy letter of 15 February.

³² Gabriel Banda, *Zambia against apartheid: A case on apartheid – caused debt* (Lusaka, 2000), 15.

³³ Zambia gratefully accepted non-military aid from the PRC in the early 1960s but decided weapons were unnecessary as independence neared, according to Vernon Mwaanga in an interview with the author, 7 Dec. 2005, Lusaka. Mwelwa Musambachime, history professor and former ambassador to the United Nations, also emphasized the significance of this early aid from the PRC in his comments after the author's Fulbright lecture on 'Zambia and the Big Powers, 1965-1970', University of Zambia, 30 Nov. 2005.

³⁴ Bertha Zimba Osei-Hwedie and Kwaku Osei-Hwedie, *Tanzania-Zambia Railroad: An analysis of Zambia's decision making in transportation* (Lawrenceville, 1990), 53.

them, the less likely it was that anyone would use them. He did not include South Africa as one of the nations that should possess such weapons, however, because in his view it was likely that they would use them for further racial oppression.³⁵

On the other hand, Zambian leaders believed that they themselves were leaders of a progressive nation state who could be trusted with the newest technology, so Kaunda pursued it. He made two written requests to President Johnson in September 1967. First he asked for the USA to construct a factory in Zambia that would produce anti-aircraft weapons. In the second letter he expanded his wish list to include ballistic missiles and even 'missiles with nuclear warheads'. The American ambassador in Lusaka, Robert Good, informed Kaunda that nuclear weapons were 'simply not on'.³⁶ Johnson in fact denied the requests for military assistance entirely but pledged to keep Zambia's security needs under review.³⁷ In January 1968 Kaunda sent Foreign Minister Reuben Kamanga to Washington to ask in person for weapons. Dean Rusk discussed the issues thoroughly with Kamanga, but at the end of the day offered nothing.³⁸

Zambia's opposition to nuclear monopolies soon strained relations with the USA and the USSR, specifically regarding a non-proliferation treaty that the rival superpowers presented to the UN General Assembly in June.³⁹ Zambia's ambassador to the Soviet Union, Hosea Soko, had weighed in strongly against the treaty. He correctly contended that South Africa was working to develop atomic weapons and thus concluded that 'the nuclear bomb may ensure our very survival'.⁴⁰ Vernon Mwaanga, then Zambia's Permanent Representative to the UN, also opposed the treaty. In particular he did not like the idea of the USA

³⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 22 and 29 June 1967. Kaunda would later expound on this argument in *Kaunda on violence*, 70-71.

³⁶ Confidential telegram from US Embassy in Lusaka to the Secretary of State, 3 Oct. 1967, L JL, Special Head of State Correspondence, National Security File, Box 61.

³⁷ Kaunda to Johnson, 27 Sept. 1967, L JL, Special head of state correspondence, National security file, Box 61; Kaunda to Carter.

³⁸ State Department memo of conversation between Rusk and Kamanga, 18 Jan. 1968, National Archives II, College Park, Box 2847, Record Group 59; Kamanga's visit is also discussed in Kaunda to Carter.

³⁹ For background on the treaty see Dimitris Bourantonis, 'The negotiation of the non-proliferation treaty, 1965-1968: A note', *International history review*, 19 (1997), 347-357.

⁴⁰ Hosea Soko to Reuben Kamanga, Monthly Report for February 1968, NAZ, FA 1/98. Soko had been Zambia's first ambassador to the USA and served on the Zambian delegation to the UN in 1967 and 1968, so his view was certainly one that must be taken seriously. He also later served as Zambia's High Commissioner in Kenya, in 1968-69.

and Soviet Union deciding the issue for the whole world. He met with Kaunda in Kenya for special consultations before the vote, and they agreed that the treaty was flawed.⁴¹ Zambia was one of only four (with Tanzania, Cuba, Albania) in the General Assembly to vote no, resisting diplomatic pressure from the Americans and Soviets.⁴²

Zambia's opposition to the treaty, Kaunda's request for weapons, and Soko's dire warning about needing nuclear weapons to survive reflected the profound impact that UDI had on Zambia in the context of the Cold War. For one thing, these three examples all represented a complete about-face from the very strong stance against the spread of nuclear weapons that Zambia had taken through 1966. In the early 1960s leaders of the crusade for nuclear disarmament such as Michael Scott and Bill Sutherland worked closely with Kaunda, considering him a pacifist with good Ghandian credentials.⁴³ In June 1965 Zambia actively sponsored UN resolutions banning all nuclear testing and calling for a world disarmament conference.⁴⁴ In September 1965 Kapwepwe told the UN general assembly that 'Zambia also believes it is a matter of urgency that the United Nations should consider the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons'.⁴⁵ In November Zambia voted in favor of a resolution to consider just such a treaty. A year later Zambia's permanent representative in New York gave an eloquent statement in favor of the treaty, and added that his country actually wanted a 'complete ban on nuclear weapons'.⁴⁶ At the UN in mid-November of 1966 Kaunda declared that Zambia was not satisfied

⁴¹ Mwaanga, *An extraordinary life*, 126-127, 185. In an interview with the author in Lusaka on 7 Dec. 2005, Mwaanga reiterated his explanation of the 'no' vote, insisting that it was not because Zambia was considering nukes, but rather because the USA and USSR were not allowing any debate or amendments to the treaty.

⁴² The vote and subsequent disappointment with the treaty, leading up to India's 1974 nuclear test, are discussed in William Epstein, *The last chance: Nuclear proliferation and arms control* (New York, 1976), 228-229.

⁴³ The activists' high hopes for Kaunda in 1962 is discussed in Lawrence Wittner, *The struggle against the bomb Volume Two. Resisting the bomb: A history of the world nuclear disarmament movement, 1954-1970* (Stanford, 1997), 269-270. For Sutherland's recollections of his work and interviews with Kaunda see 'Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia, and the riddles of violence and Nonviolence' in: Bill Sutherland and Matt Meyer, *Guns and Gandhi in Africa: Pan african insights on nonviolence, armed struggle and liberation in Africa* (Trenton, 2000), 95-113.

⁴⁴ Background Paper, 'Disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons', NAZ, FA 1/141.

⁴⁵ Kapwepwe address to the UN general assembly, 27 Sept. 1965, NAZ, FA 1/57.

⁴⁶ Joseph Mwemba's statement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, 1 Nov. 1966, NAZ, FA 1/141.

with the ‘progress being made in the field of control of proliferation of nuclear weapons’.⁴⁷

Why had Zambia gone from making such statements and casting such votes in 1965 and 1966 to asking for weapons and opposing the treaty in 1967 and 1968? The Central Intelligence Agency speculated at the time that the vote reflected Chinese influence over Kaunda.⁴⁸ It is more likely that the explanation boils down to rising concerns for national security as the UDI crisis escalated. The war for Zimbabwe began, attacks from Angola and Portugal increased, and fears regarding South Africa multiplied. Kaunda’s single most important foreign relations advisor, Mark Chona, later explained the situation.

We had information that the South Africans were working with Israeli technicians and using German technology to develop atomic weapons. We had that info and knew it was credible. There is no doubt that we did think of how to respond [...]. We did consider all options. The nuclear response was not excluded [...]. If South Africa was developing these weapons, then what should the rest of the region do – just accept it? You can’t fight guns with knives [...]. It was not ridiculous. The situation was real and considering that option was logical. It is not surprising that KK would consider nuclear weapons.⁴⁹

During the difficult days following UDI Zambian officials frantically pursued a wide range of projects to improve the nation’s security situation, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In Chona’s view this was a logical choice given the fact that South Africa was pursuing nukes as well. From the Zambian perspective Chona’s analysis makes sense. After all, against whom would Pretoria have used nuclear missiles in the late 1960s if not Lusaka? They obviously would not have used them against white ruled Rhodesia, Angola, or Mozambique. Malawi was cooperating and Namibia was still under their control. Zambia was the most logical target. Knowing that South Africa could soon have nuclear weapons, it was reasonable for Zambian officials to feel threatened.

While Kaunda never succeeded in getting nuclear weapons (unlike South Africa), other projects proved more successful. In addition to the tremendous support from the PRC, Zambia benefited from the benevolence of the Italians and the Yugoslavians. For example, Kaunda wanted an oil pipeline stretching from Ndola to Dar es Salaam. Andrew Sardanis, one of Kaunda’s key economic advisors, initially recommended accepting a bid by the colorful British tycoon

⁴⁷ Kenneth Kaunda’s address to the UN general assembly, 15 Nov. 1966, NAZ, FA 1/141.

⁴⁸ Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Troubles ahead for Zambia’, 18 June 1968, LIL, National Security File, Country File – Africa Upper Volta to Zambia, Box 102.

⁴⁹ Interview with Mark Chona, Lusaka, 24 Dec. 2005.

Tiny Rowland.⁵⁰ A few months later Sardanis infuriated Rowland by instead signing a contract with Snam Progetti, a subsidiary of the Italian state oil company. The Italians completed the project four months ahead of schedule, and Kaunda and Nyerere officially opened the pipeline in September 1968.⁵¹ At least one key component of national security – a reliable oil supply – had been solidified.

Opposition critiques

From 1965 to 1969, Zambia's responses to UDI included advocating a military intervention by the UK, participating in the economic sanctions against Rhodesia, and seeking succor from nations around the globe for defense and transportation. During those four years, opposition members of the National Assembly criticized all of these policies and contended that they endangered national security. Harry Nkumbula, National President of the African National Congress (ANC) and the MP for Monze, responded to Kaunda's December 1965 call for British intervention by warning: 'If a war was staged here and the British troops started fighting Smith, we will be the people who will suffer most [...] it is a very unwise policy to quarrel with your neighbors'.⁵² In August 1966 Edward Mungoni Liso (ANC – Namwala) opined: 'Britain has plainly said that she will not fight Rhodesia, but we go on crying like babies [...]. We are just disgracing ourselves'.⁵³

During the mid-1966 debates, several MPs expressed concern that their country was going it alone in opposing UDI. Cecil Burney (Ind. – Ndola) worried that in the stand against Smith 'no one else is taking an open-ended risk [...] at this stage in our development we cannot afford to, either'. Nkumbula chimed in, arguing that Zambia was 'the only country in the world that has thrown its strength in the liberation movement of the Rhodesian Africans'. He

⁵⁰ Andrew Sardanis to Kenneth Kaunda, 17 Jan. 1966, NAZ, HM 84/Indeco/1.

⁵¹ Andrew Sardanis, *Africa another side of the coin: Northern Rhodesia's final years and Zambia's nationhood* (London, 2003), 204. Sardanis' book is invaluable regarding economic issues.

⁵² Harry Nkumbula's speech was part of a very interesting debate on 'UDI Rhodesia', in: *Zambia Hansard No. 5: Official verbatim report of the debates of the second session (Resumed) of the first national assembly 7th December – 16th December 1965*, 233.

⁵³ *Zambia Hansard No. 7: Official verbatim report of the debates of the third session (Resumed) of the first national assembly 20th July – 23rd September 1966*, 639.

feared that 'in the shortest possible time Zambia would be left alone in the struggle'. In conclusion he asked, 'Who is going to pay? Zambians again!'⁵⁴

Members of the opposition also criticized some of the government's strategies regarding Zambia's defenses and transportation. In December 1965 Liso doubted the wisdom of simultaneously sending missions to the USA and the USSR, because 'America will not work for the same purpose as Russia at the same time in one place'.⁵⁵ In 1966 Burney questioned the feasibility of the proposed railroad to Tanzania. A year later, his colleague Richard Farmer (Ind. – Copperbelt Central) ridiculed the railroad as 'a wanton extravagance and waste of public money'.⁵⁶ Farmer, Liso, and their colleagues did not believe that the foreign relations of the Zambian government were improving the country's national security.

In December 1967 Hugh Mitchley (Ind. – Midlands) lamented UNIP's cessation of commercial flights from Lusaka to Salisbury, and hoped that another carrier such as Air Congo would service the route. Mitchley, one of the first whites to become a Zambian citizen, would be the only white still serving in parliament at the end of the decade.⁵⁷ During October 1968 debates, Nkumbula derided the frequent overseas trips by government ministers as expensive and bad for Zambia's reputation. Samuel Malcomson (Ind. – Copperbelt South) speculated that the National Assembly was adjourning because Vice President Kapwepwe was visiting schoolchildren in Canada, and condemned the adjournment as unnecessary and inefficient. He hoped, however, that Kapwepwe had 'a begging bowl tucked under his toga', and would return with 'a few million Canadian dollars'.⁵⁸

Perhaps the harshest criticism of Zambia's policies toward Rhodesia came from Nkumbula in October 1967, when he accused the Kaunda Government of being hypocritical. He pointed to the case of Alice Lenshina, describing her as 'a religious woman', and 'the poor woman suffering'. She and her followers in the Lumpa Church were being punished for wanting to practice their faith, and over 10,000 of them were refugees who had 'run away from the terror of our

⁵⁴ *Zambia Hansard No. 7*, 150, 600. For examples of Burney's defense of federation and critical appraisal of the speaking abilities of representatives of UNIP in the early 1960s see Elijah Mudenda, *Zambia: A generation of struggle*, 14.

⁵⁵ *Zambia Hansard No. 5*, 228.

⁵⁶ *Zambia Hansard No. 10: Official verbatim report of the debates of the fourth session of the first national assembly 3rd May – 14th July 1967*, 596.

⁵⁷ For a profile of Mitchley see *Times of Zambia*, 18 Jan. 1969, 6. A lawyer and polo player, he later published a book of poetry entitled *Brief for the plaintiff* (New York, 1983).

⁵⁸ *Zambia Hansard No. 16: Official verbatim report of the debates of the fifth session of the first national assembly 2nd October – 2nd November 1968*, 665.

government'. Zambian officials loudly criticized the oppression in Rhodesia, but in Nkumbula's view they were oppressing their own people. He emphasized that Zambia's first priority at Independence should have been assuring that all Zambian's were free. Harry hammered home his accusation of hypocrisy by saying that before someone can 'teach people how to cook, one must be able to cook well for himself'.⁵⁹ Opposition MPs excoriated UNIP policies on the grounds that they were undermining Zambia's national security by weakening the country's economy, constitution, and international reputation.

Into the 1970s

In spite of such criticism, the Kaunda government continued its policy of combating racial injustice in the neighboring countries. The situation in Rhodesia would soon get worse, and Zambia would need more external support just to stay afloat. The chances of receiving major assistance from the USA decreased drastically, though, with the November 1968 election of Richard Nixon. Prospects would have been much better for Zambia if Hubert Humphrey had won, but that was not to be.⁶⁰ Tricky Dick's 'jackassery' left little room for Africa in general, and virtually none for Zambia.⁶¹ The Nixon administration refused to accommodate Kaunda's request for a meeting in October 1970 when the Zambian leader was in the USA addressing the United Nations. Kaunda was furious about what he characterized as Nixon's 'discourtesy to Africa'. He commented to a group of African delegations in New York that the American president 'did not want to see our ugly faces'.⁶² Nixon's indifference toward southern Africa also opened the door for Senator Harry Byrd Jr. to blast a gaping hole in the economic sanctions, with his 1971 amendment that allowed

⁵⁹ *Zambia Hansard No. 11: Official verbatim report of the debates of the fourth session of the first national assembly 17th October – 20th October 1967*, 21-22. On the Lenshina episode, see D.M. Gordon, 'Rebellion or massacre? The UNIP-Lumpa conflict revisited', in this volume.

⁶⁰ See the conclusion of Andrew J. DeRoche, 'Kenneth Kaunda and the Johnson Administration', paper presented at the meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Lyndon Johnson Library, Austin, 25 June 2004. It is available on the internet. My contention that Humphrey would have developed closer ties with Zambia is based in part on his meeting with Kaunda in Jan. 1968. For details see 'Record of the discussion held between His Excellency the President of Zambia and the Honourable Vice President of the United States of America, Mr. Hubert Humphrey, on the 5th January, 1968, at State House', NAZ, FA 1/105.

⁶¹ Nixon himself fittingly coined the term 'jackassery' in a 26 June 1972 attempt to find out from Bob Haldeman how the efforts to cover up his involvement in Watergate were going. The conversation is cited in: Stanley Kutler, *Abuse of power: The new Nixon tapes* (New York, 1998), 71.

⁶² *Times of Zambia*, 21 Oct. 1970.

American companies to resume importing Rhodesian chrome.⁶³ This turn of events dismayed Zambian officials, and at the time they correctly noted a ‘softening of American attitudes toward’ the white regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia.⁶⁴

During the tragic year 1968, the odds of Zambia getting significant support from the Soviet Union also worsened. In November the ambassador in Moscow, Paul Lusaka, reported: ‘the relations between the two countries could NOT be called cordial. As a matter of fact they might be described as cool’.⁶⁵ He believed that the Soviet frostiness reflected two recent events: 1) Zambia’s criticism of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia; and 2) Zambia’s vote against the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Grey Zulu, who became Minister of Defense in 1970, attributed Soviet ambivalence to another factor as well: ‘they considered us a stooge of the UK’.⁶⁶ President Kaunda placed the blame on the Russians and stated that he ‘feared their behavior’. He complained of Soviet interference in Zambia’s internal affairs, most notably their ‘covert dealings with Mr. Kapwepwe who subsequently broke away from UNIP’.⁶⁷

As relations with the Americans and the Soviets declined, the significance of Chinese friendship increased. In January 1969, Philemon Ngoma took up the post in Peking as Zambia’s first ambassador to China. Foreign Minister Elijah Mudenda characterized the move as ‘a further strengthening of relations between Red China and Zambia’.⁶⁸ When Ngoma departed from Lusaka, the *Times of Zambia* hoped he would inform PRC officials that Zambians appreciated ‘the humanistic approach of the Chinese in helping others without expecting anything in return’.⁶⁹ On May Day the Zambian ambassador met Mao Zedong, who shocked Ngoma by stating in English: ‘we thank you for establishing excellent relations with us’. Ngoma heaped his highest praise on the

⁶³ For a thorough discussion of Nixon and the Byrd Amendment see DeRoche, *Black, white, and chrome*, 143-194.

⁶⁴ ‘What is Uncle Sam up to?’, Occasional Paper No. 71/15, along with cover letter from Kaunda to the Vice President and all members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 21 Oct. 1971, UNIPA, UNIP, Box 142, File 28. Kaunda asked his colleagues to study the paper, which had been prepared by one of his research officers, to gain some useful background.

⁶⁵ ‘Report for the period ending 8th November, 1968’, Paul Lusaka to Reuben Kamanga, 8 Nov. 1968, NAZ, FA 1/279.

⁶⁶ Interview with Grey Zulu, Lusaka, 22 July 2005.

⁶⁷ ‘Record of meeting between His Excellency the President and Messrs. J. Jardim and J. Desousa’, 11 Sept. 1973, UNIPA, UNIP, Box 143, File 40. Jardim and Desousa were from Mozambique and serving as intermediaries between Kaunda and Prime Minister Caetano.

⁶⁸ *Times of Zambia*, 25 Jan. 1969.

⁶⁹ ‘Opinion’, *Times of Zambia*, 25 Jan. 1969.

‘brilliant and intelligent’ Chou En-Lai for demonstrating incredible knowledge of world affairs.⁷⁰

While hosting a Chinese delegation in November 1969, Kaunda thanked them for their help on the railroad, stating that: ‘a friend in need is a friend indeed’. He praised the PRC for not interfering in Zambia’s internal affairs and promised to advocate China’s admission to the UN.⁷¹ Elijah Mudenda first visited Peking in 1965, and as foreign minister in the early 1970s he dealt regularly with the Chinese and enjoyed the experience.⁷² In July 1970 he led a Zambian delegation for additional talks in Peking regarding the railroad. He was greeted by Chairman Mao and met at length with Chou En-Lai, who impressed him as ‘very brilliant’. The sessions were fruitful and a groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of Tazara took place in Zambia in October. When asked later why the Chinese had been so helpful to Zambia over the years, Mudenda simply replied, ‘I think the Chinese are very human’.⁷³

Why did the PRC emerge as Zambia’s strongest ally among the superpowers? Was it, as Mudenda proposes, because they were more humane than the others? They certainly treated Zambian officials with more respect and dignity than other foreign powers did. From a *real politik* perspective, perhaps the PRC saw in Zambia an opportunity to construct a sphere of influence in an area which the USA and the USSR neglected. Building Tazara boosted China’s image and leverage in the Non-Aligned movement.⁷⁴ It begs the question – which came first, Zambia’s firm commitment to non-alignment, or Zambia’s friendship with the PRC? Along these lines, Zambia’s desire to practice independent diplomacy tilted it naturally toward China rather than the USA or the USSR. Zambia for its part desired assistance for development to bolster its national security. The PRC responded very favorably and Zambia appreciated the help.

Race also possibly played a role, as both the USSR and the USA were governed by mostly white Euro-males. Both nations were perceived as imperialists, were in the developed world, and showed little interest in Africa. The Chinese were people of color, and the PRC was a developing country not seen

⁷⁰ Philemon Ngoma, *A walk into the past* (Lusaka, 1988), 88-89. Ngoma’s book discusses his time in China in great detail, and also briefly covers his subsequent tenure as ambassador to Italy.

⁷¹ Chinese Embassy News Bulletin, 1 December 1969, UNIPA, UNIP, Box 141, File 14.

⁷² For details on Mudenda’s 1965 visit see ‘Report on goodwill mission to PRC’, NAZ, FA 1/1/94.

⁷³ Interview with Elijah Mudenda, Lusaka 20 July 2005.

⁷⁴ This point of view was seconded by Vernon Mwaanga in the cited interview with the author.

by Zambia as imperialist. But at the same time, perhaps there was a more ominous side to all of this. The PRC exemplified a one-party state run by a tightly disciplined central government that allowed no dissent or opposition. As UNIP consolidated its control, the PRC would have been a very fitting model. (To be fair on this point, however, the administrations of Brezhnev and Nixon were also good models for a strong central government that quelled any dissent.)

What is our answer, then? Ultimately we may never know *why* the PRC and Zambia became such close friends, but national security theory offers perhaps the most convincing explanation. Zambia's relations with China and the other big powers from 1965 to 1973 represent a very ambitious approach to foreign affairs that reflected concerns for development, independence, non-alignment, political stability, and racial equality. All of these goals can be construed as part of the overarching aim, which was to strengthen Zambian national security.

Additional assistance?

There was no end in sight for the Rhodesian crisis in early 1973, and Ian Smith exacerbated the problem by closing the borders with Zambia on 9 January. Three weeks later he offered to re-open them, but Kaunda refused. Why exactly he decided to do so at that point is unclear. Stephen Chan has suggested that perhaps it reflected Kaunda's fondness for drama. Chan based his speculation on an interview with a former top advisor who said the president 'cannot work without a crisis'.⁷⁵ Alternatively, Kaunda's opting to take a stand over the border issue may have been an effort to justify controversial internal measures as Zambia moved into the era of the one-party state. Kaunda's intransigence after Smith's border closing may also have been calculated to generate international sympathy for Zambia's financial plight. The writing was already on the wall indicating that Zambia would require considerable economic assistance, and blaming a new crisis on Smith could justify renewed requests for aid.⁷⁶

In the aftermath of the closing, Mark Chona and Lishomwa Lishomwa embarked on a two-month world tour to seek additional support from 18 countries. They started in the USA, where they met with Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom and representatives from the Agency for International Develop-

⁷⁵ Chan, *Kaunda and Southern Africa*, 67-68, 145-46. Chan did not identify the former advisor.

⁷⁶ Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank, visited Zambia in November of 1972 and the background documents prepared for Zambian officials before his visit make it clear that financial problems were already present long before the border closing. For example, see 'Brief for the Hon. Minister R.C Kamanga in relation to the visit of Mr. Robert McNamara', UNIPA, UNIP, Box 143, File 34.

ment. Zambia wanted money, trucks, and locomotives. The American officials admitted that 'the United States did not know much about Zambia's needs'. Economic relations were negligible, in part because there was 'no resident AID staff in Zambia'. These facts demonstrated the very low priority that the Nixon administration placed on southern Africa. The Zambian delegation did subsequently secure a loan from the Export/Import Bank for locomotives.⁷⁷ This period marked the beginning of a rapid escalation in Zambia's borrowing from international financial agencies.⁷⁸

In Washington, Chona and Lishomwa talked only with mid-level bureaucrats and received lukewarm support in the form of loans. Similarly in Moscow they met with a mid-level official, Deputy Foreign Minister Kozrev, but the results were even worse. They requested cargo aircraft, trucks, and money. The response from Kozrev was 'generally cold'. In a jab at Kaunda for not being enough of a socialist, the Soviet official 'wondered why the Zambian government does not seek assistance from the 49% shareholders in the mining companies and other industries'. The British only offered a loan to purchase some trucks. This greatly disappointed Chona and Lishomwa, who suggested that in the future Kaunda's government 'make no unilateral approach to Her Majesty's Government for any assistance'.⁷⁹

Not surprisingly, the reception was much warmer in China, where they had a three-hour meeting with Premier Chou En Lai. The Chinese showed 'tremendous understanding' of Zambia's needs and offered 'full support', specifically to see that Tazara was speedily completed. Several other nations also responded favorably, most notably Rumania, Sweden, West Germany, and Japan.⁸⁰ As the First Republic drew to a close the Chona and Lishomwa mission sought support

⁷⁷ Report by M.C. Chona and L.M. Lishomwa on International Assistance to Zambia, 1 May 1973, UNIPA, UNIP, Box 85, File 26. Lishomwa Lishomwa was Kaunda's special assistant for economics and has been described as a 'first class economic advisor'; ardanis, *Africa: Another side of the coin*, 273.

⁷⁸ Kaunda slightly exaggerated Zambia's pre-1973 economic self-sufficiency in his 'My experience with debt', *Sunday Post*, 10 July 2005. He stated that Zambia's first borrowing from the IMF came only after the border closing. That was technically true regarding the IMF, but there had been nine loans totaling \$112 million from the World Bank before 1973. These are detailed thoroughly in the 'Brief for his Honor the Vice President and the Hon. Minister of Finance on the occasion of the visit to Zambia by Mr. McNamara, President of the World Bank', UNIPA, UNIP, Box 143, File 34.

⁷⁹ Report by Chona and Lishomwa. The criticism by the Soviets that Kaunda's policies were more capitalist than socialist was also made by scholars such as Shaw. He contended that the increased borrowing allowed the ruling elites to continue controlling the Zambian economy without taxing themselves. See Shaw, *Dependency and underdevelopment*, 44.

⁸⁰ Report by Chona and Lishomwa.

from governments spanning the entire spectrum of global politics, once again demonstrating that national security was the highest priority for Zambian foreign relations.

Conclusions

Leffler defined national security as the 'protection of core values from external threats'. He characterized core values as 'the objectives that merge ideological precepts and cultural symbols like democracy, self-determination, and race consciousness with concrete interests like access to markets and raw materials and the defense of territory'.⁸¹ Applying this interpretation of national security theory allows us to understand Zambian foreign relations during the First Republic more clearly. First and foremost, the general decision by Kaunda and his colleagues to aggressively oppose Rhodesia's UDI constituted the defense of Zambian core values as they perceived them – i.e., the fight for racial equality. Rather than only a policy based on principle, Zambia's response to Smith's rebellion represented an effort to defend the security of the type of nation which the UNIP government wanted to create.

Moreover, all of the specific examples considered in this essay fit within the framework of national security. Kaunda believed that British military intervention in Rhodesia could end the crisis quickly, thereby protecting Zambia's ideology and territory. When this option was ruled out and a long and costly struggle loomed, he and his top advisors such as Kapwepwe and Kamanga sought support worldwide. Security concerns dictated that assistance could come from virtually anywhere (e.g. Yugoslavia or Italy) and include virtually anything (even nuclear weapons). Opposition MPs criticized many aspects of Kaunda's diplomacy as harmful to the country's economy or reputation. The reaffirmation of the PRC as Zambia's best friend in the early 1970s reflected the need to defend core values, as did the Chona and Lishomwa mission as the First Republic drew to a close.

Zambian policymakers in the first years after independence conducted foreign relations with creativity and flexibility in order to defend national security. They achieved some admirable successes, to be sure, and their country celebrated its tenth birthday with high hopes for a bright future. As Zambia approaches its fiftieth birthday, however, the security of the nation in its most basic form is in peril. Poverty and disease threaten the core values, even the very existence, of the people of Zambia. Once again the leaders must make national security the top priority; but, the enemies are no longer UDI or apartheid, they are illness and hunger. As their predecessors fought racism,

⁸¹ Leffler, 'National security', 124, 126-27.

Zambians in the twenty-first century must battle HIV/AIDS. They must again call upon the world for support in the form of training and antiretroviral drugs. As Mark Chona said, 'you can't fight guns with knives'.

5

Enemies within? Opposition to the Zambian one-party state, 1972–1980

Miles Larmer

Introduction

With the establishment of Zambia's 'one-party participatory democracy' in December 1972, political opposition disappeared from public view into a shadowy world of rumour, paranoia, detention and denunciation. This chapter explores the trajectories of leaders, members and sympathisers of the United Progressive Party (UPP), following its breakaway from the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) in August 1971, its banning in February 1972 and the subsequent declaration of the UNIP one-party state. It surveys the varying political ideas and tactical approaches of former UPP leaders and activists and the ways in which these differences reflected the heterogeneous basis of the UPP itself. Whilst some sought to further their political objectives within UNIP, others maintained underground opposition, particularly on the Zambian Copperbelt. In the late 1970s, UPP activists were divided over the return of their leader, Simon Kapwepwe, to UNIP. Debates subsequently took place regarding the former party's relationship with leaders of the trade union movement; whilst Kapwepwe identified the increasingly oppositional Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) as an important ally in defeating UNIP, others found ZCTU National Chairman Frederick Chiluba to be an unreliable partner, unprepared to make the sacrifices necessary to overthrow the one-party state.



Photo 7 UNIP supporters protesting against the formation of the UPP. The placards read: 'UNIP Amozone army and the powerful youth brigade will fight UPP to the last man'; 'Dr. K.D. Kaunda is a God given leader away with Kapwepwe'; 'Kapwepwe and his fellow henchmen should be arrested now'.

The chapter also explores the changing political perspectives of Kapwepwe, primarily through interviews with many of his leading supporters in the UPP. Perceived in the 1960s as a militant anti-western and pro-Chinese nationalist, Kapwepwe's leadership of the UPP rested in practice on a political ambiguity that generated support from conservative small businessmen, socialist students, and peasants in Northern Province, for whom his attraction was primarily as an ethnic Bemba aristocrat. In the late 1970s, he appears not only to have accepted the ideas of right-wing business-oriented critics of UNIP's state-led nationalism, but also the initiation of a project to remove Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda from power that culminated, after Kapwepwe's death, in the coup plot of 1980. The chapter reveals new evidence regarding the political ideas and practical actions behind the coup attempt, based on interviews with some of the participants.

In demonstrating the range of political ideas and tactics adopted by the opponents of UNIP, the chapter aims to illustrate major themes informing political contestation and debate in post-colonial Zambia. It also seeks to show that political opposition during Zambia's First and Second Republics was of a greater range and extent than has hitherto been understood. There was, however, no natural unity amongst UNIP's opponents. Just as Zambia's first ruling party was itself an uneasy nationalist coalition whose political, economic and ethno-regional divisions were expressed as both overt schisms and covert conflicts, so those who lost out in this conflict and sought to oppose UNIP were themselves driven by conflicting visions of the Zambia they would wish to see. This served to limit the labour movement's overt support for the coup attempt of 1980. In such faultlines can also be seen the roots of subsequent divisions in the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) government in the mid-1990s, that were only briefly masked during its successful campaign for political liberalisation of 1990-91.

Reinterpreting the First Republic

In the years after Independence in 1964, historical research played an important role in the self-conscious construction of a Zambian identity, shaped around a nationalist meta-narrative of injustice, exploitation and struggle, culminating in the achievement of self-rule under the ruling United National Independence Party and its leader, President Kenneth Kaunda.¹ Kaunda's own writings, and those published by the Foundation that bore his name, utilised a particular interpretation of pre-colonial and colonial history to support UNIP's approach to post-colonial governance.² In 'Humanism', for example, Kaunda claimed that the enduring importance of chiefly authority was representative of an authentically African model of consensual and communitarian decision-making that made competing political parties not only inappropriate, but also potentially destabilising bases for tribally-based conflict. The logical conclusion of such arguments was the declaration of a one-party state in 1972, presented as the

¹ See for example, R. Hall, *Zambia, 1890-1964: The colonial period* (London 1965, 1976); D.C. Mulford, *Zambia: The politics of independence, 1957-1964* (Oxford, 1967); A.D. Roberts, *A history of Zambia* (London, 1976); H.S. Meebelo, *Reaction to colonialism: A prelude to the politics of independence in Northern Zambia, 1893-1939* (Manchester, 1971).

² K.D. Kaunda, *Humanism in Zambia and a guide to its implementation* (Lusaka, 1968); and *Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to its implementation Part II* (Lusaka, 1974); H.S. Meebelo, *African Proletarians and Colonial Capitalism* (Lusaka, 1986).




Figure 1

Following the establishment of the UPP in August 1971, the *Times of Zambia* provides its view of events in September 1971

ultimate expression of popular will, but in fact UNIP's only response to rising political opposition and its failure to meet popular expectations of social and economic change.

In seeking to contribute to the construction of a unified Zambian nation, the post-colonial historical project glossed over the grossly uneven nature of Zambia's liberation struggle. This unevenness left a profound legacy for political conflict that is only now being fully comprehended. Whilst northern Zambia, the Copperbelt, and to a lesser extent the Kabwe area, were in 1961-2 consumed in the direct action of *chachacha*, other parts of Northern Rhodesia were largely untouched by the struggle on the ground. In Southern and parts of Central Province, ethnic differences and the significant development of African commercial farming generated a different, more conservative nationalist tradition that was subsequently rendered illegitimate by the UNIP-dominated nationalist historiicity, but which is evidently worthy of historical attention.³ Such differences, themselves reflective of Zambia's pre-colonial and colonial economic, social and environmental history, were neglected and in some respects wished away by politicians and academics, who confidently expected such variation to be ironed out by post-Independence state formation and the social and economic development that the state was expected to achieve. The demonstrable persistence of these divisions in Zambian politics, economy and culture behoves observers to take them seriously.

The largely unproblematic dominance of UNIP rule during the First Republic remains part of a historiographical 'common sense' that is only now beginning to be challenged. The undoubtedly effectiveness of UNIP's first government in delivering the first stage of development, in the form of schools, hospitals and other social infrastructure, is widely assumed to have met the expectations of the Zambian people for post-colonial change. Where it is accepted that such efforts fell short of popular expectations, these tend to be dismissed as unrealistic, given the limited capacity of post-colonial states. More germane to historical analysis is that such expectations, rooted in the promises made by nationalist politicians seeking to mobilise anti-colonial activity in the early 1960s, shaped the hostile response of sections of Zambian society to the post-colonial state and led, in some degree, to the social and ethno-regional conflict that presaged the declaration of the one-party state in 1972. Many Zambians were not only dissatisfied with the extent of this delivery, but sought to act on it politically in ways which profoundly disturbed the apparently dominant ruling

³ See G. Macola, 'Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, UNIP and the roots of authoritarianism in nationalist Zambia', in this volume.

party.⁴ There was, evidently, no clear relationship between the state's developmental achievements and electoral support for UNIP which, in 1968, declined substantially, despite UNIP's utilisation of state resources to reinforce its advantage in inter-party violence, a neglected aspect of Zambian political culture that continues to affect electoral outcomes. Macola's recent study of such discontent in the Luapula Province has reinforced Bates' pioneering work which pointed to the extent of early regional disaffection with the capacity of the centralised state to deliver on such expectations.⁵ Contrary to the positive portrayal of the First Republic in much of the earlier literature, it is now evident that the divisions and problems experienced by Zambia during its Second Republic had their origins in the significant social, ethnic and regional conflicts experienced in the supposed honeymoon period of the late 1960s.

Towards the UPP, 1967–1971

The formal establishment of the United Progressive Party in August 1971 was the culmination of five years' intense competition for control of UNIP. As UNIP failed to meet the expectations of many Zambians for post-colonial economic and social change, this discontent was expressed in part through demands made on senior UNIP politicians to deliver both state resources to their provincial bases and the appointment of political allies to positions in the growing state-parastatal bureaucracy. At the 1967 UNIP Mulungushi Conference, an effective alliance of Bemba-speaking (with origins in Northern and Copperbelt Provinces) and Tonga (Southern Province) politicians defeated those from Eastern (primarily Nyanja-speaking) and Barotseland (later Western) Provinces. Simon Kapwepwe was elected UNIP (and, consequently, Zambia's) Vice President, defeating the incumbent Reuben Kamanga. Although President Kenneth Kaunda sought to paper over the party's divisions with the use of 'tribal balancing' in appointments to senior positions, this tended in practice to reinforce the ethnic basis of intra-UNIP competition.⁶ However, the grouping that subse-

⁴ The UNIP archives, opened in 2004, provide significant evidence to this effect. See G. Macola, "It means as if we are excluded from the good freedom": Thwarted expectations of independence in the Luapula Province of Zambia, 1964–1966', *Journal of African History*, 47 (2006); M. Larmer, "A little bit like a volcano": The United Progressive Party and resistance to one-party rule in Zambia, 1964–1980', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 39 (2006).

⁵ Macola, "It means as if we are excluded from the good freedom"; R.H. Bates, *Rural responses to industrialisation: A study of village Zambia* (New Haven and London, 1976).

⁶ W. Tordoff, ed., *Politics in Zambia* (Manchester, 1974), 29; interview with Sikota Wina, Lusaka, 7 Apr. 2006. Wina was Minister of Local Government in the first UNIP government and later Minister of Information in 1969–73, remaining a mem-

quently established the UPP did not see themselves simply as an ethnic or linguistic construct. They were also representative of those who saw themselves as Zambia's 'freedom fighters', who believed that they were being marginalised in the post-colonial state in favour of more educated Zambians (including Bemba speakers) who, in their view, had not been willing to sacrifice their education and employment prospects for the liberation of Zambia.⁷ Variegated and contradictory postcolonial discontents found temporary common cause against a ruling party perceived to be excluding these constituencies from post-colonial advancement on a variety of ethnic, regional, and class grounds that were nevertheless experienced by Kapwepwe's supporters as a singular sense of injustice.

Eastern Province politicians successfully re-established their influence in the ruling party by about 1969; Kaunda's decision to ethnically balance the Central Committee was perceived by Bembas as unfairly marginalising their disproportionately high membership in the party. From this time, many UNIP members with origins on the Copperbelt and Northern Province believed they were systematically discriminated against in appointments to positions in the government, party and growing state-dominated economy. Secret meetings to organise what was initially a faction within UNIP began at this time.⁸ In August 1969, Kapwepwe quit as Zambian Vice President after threats of a vote of no-confidence led by Eastern leaders. Although Kapwepwe was publicly persuaded by Kaunda to stay on for another year, his authority was not recognised by his opponents. UNIP introduced a new Party Constitution in November 1970, giving each Province equal representation in the General Conference, further marginalising the representation of the large Bemba-speaking membership and increasing the potential for a breakaway party.⁹

Kapwepwe was however reluctant to leave UNIP. Whilst some respondents claim that his friendship with Kaunda made it difficult for him to challenge the UNIP leader, others argue that he had properly gauged the extent of repression

ber of UNIP's Central Committee until 1976. He was subsequently Chairman of the Zambia Publishing Company until 1979. In the 1980s, Wina was an internal critic of the UNIP leadership, calling for a return to multi-party rule in 1990.

⁷ For a fuller explanation of the creation of the UPP, see Larmer, "A little bit like a volcano".

⁸ For example, interview with Stanley Sinkamba, Kitwe, 25 Apr. 2005. A hospital medical assistant in Mufulira, Sinkamba was detained for his activities as a UNIP youth in 1959-61. Later UNIP Regional Secretary in Mufulira, Sinkamba was removed from his post in 1969 and was a hotel manager when he was detained in 1971-3. Sinkamba was MMD Constituency Chairman in Kamfinsa, Kitwe, in 1991.

⁹ C. Gertzel, C. Baylies and M. Szeftel, 'Introduction: The making of the one-party state', in C. Gertzel, ed., *The dynamics of the one-party state in Zambia*, (Manchester, 1984), 14.

that a breakaway party would face and therefore urged adequate preparation before such an action was taken. This preparation took place during 1971, in secret meetings to mobilise support for the new party amongst Copperbelt union activists, Bemba chiefs and headmen and others in all parts of Zambia.¹⁰

Kapwepwe had long had a reputation as a fiery militant nationalist with pro-Chinese sympathies. However, his closest supporters, for example Jonas Mukumbi, found that, by the time of the UPP at least, Kapwepwe had adopted a more ambiguous philosophy:

He called himself an African socialist. He was interested in sharing the national cake. First of all, create the national cake. Then the lion's share should [...] go to the majority of the people. That's what he saw as African socialism. Create the wealth, but also share it out. It shouldn't be in the hands of a few people [...]. So, an African business entrepreneur was welcome, and encouraged. But whatever he produced goes to the national wealth. And the national wealth must be shared amongst the people.¹¹

It was precisely this ambiguity in message which enabled Kapwepwe to appeal both to radical leftist students at the University of Zambia (UNZA) like Jonas Mukumbi himself, and to conservative business figures in Lusaka and the Copperbelt.¹²

The UPP was publicly launched in August 1971. Kapwepwe, flanked by supporters from all parts of Zambia, declared that 'Independence is good, but is meaningless and useless if it does not bring fruits to the masses'.¹³ He criticised financial indiscipline in Government and declared that UNIP was undemocratic and stagnant. UNIP's response was decisive: In September, all senior UPP leaders (except Kapwepwe) in Lusaka, the Copperbelt and Northern Province were arrested and detained. Kaunda claimed they had been engaged in military training abroad and subsequently alleged that the UPP was receiving support from Zambia's neighbouring enemies, Rhodesia, South Africa, and Portuguese-

¹⁰ Interview with Lasford Nkonde, Lusaka, 13 Apr. 2005. Nkonde, a veteran of the nationalist movement, was present at the founding congress of UNIP in 1959 and was detained by the colonial authorities during the *chachacha* in 1961. Nkonde was active in the union movement in Kabwe until 1969, when he was briefly transferred to the Ministry of Local Government. Detained in 1971-72, Nkonde worked as a driver and bodyguard for Kapwepwe in the 1970s, before being briefly re-arrested in 1978.

¹¹ Interview with Jonas Mukumbi, Kitwe, 7 Aug. 2005. A Copperbelt UNIP Youth leader in the 1960s, Mukumbi studied at the University of Zambia from 1970 and was part of the student leadership expelled the following year. He finally obtained a law degree from UNZA in the late 1970s, and today practices as a lawyer in Kitwe.

¹² Larmer, "A little bit like a volcano".

¹³ *Times of Zambia* (TZ), 23 Aug. 1971.

ruled Mozambique and Angola.¹⁴ The UPP was denied permits to hold public meetings, and instead campaigned by word of mouth, organising secret house meetings at night. Despite this, Kapwepwe won the Mufulira West by-election of December 1971. From the founding of the UPP, violent clashes took place between UNIP and UPP supporters, particularly on the Copperbelt. Meanwhile, state and parastatal employees suspected of being members of the UPP were sacked. Businessmen identified as UPP supporters had their businesses attacked and their operating licences revoked. Kapwepwe returned to Parliament in January 1972 as the UPP's sole MP. Days later, he was violently attacked in Lusaka.¹⁵ On 4 February, the UPP was banned and 123 leaders, including Kapwepwe, were detained. Kaunda claimed that the party was 'bent on violence and destruction'.¹⁶ Weeks later, Kaunda confirmed widespread rumours that Zambia would shortly become a one-party state.¹⁷

After the UPP: Underground opposition to the one-party state, 1973-75

Following the ban of the UPP and the detention of Kapwepwe, its younger leaders initially attempted to establish an alternative party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Although positioned as a direct replacement for the UPP, the DPP had a distinct alternative identity, rooted in the radical student movement that had, in May 1971, confronted Kaunda over his approach to South Africa. The exposure of the President's correspondence with South African Prime Minister Vorster was a severe embarrassment to Kaunda, at a time when students were violently beaten by police for demonstrating against French arms sales to South Africa in ostensible support of UNIP's declared policy of isolating Apartheid. A group of ten former UNZA student leaders, including Faustino Lombe and Boniface Kawimbe, had previously taken up the administration of the UPP following the detention of party leaders in September 1971.¹⁸ Lombe was now the President of the DPP, and the new organisation issued leaflets criticising what it saw as UNIP's accommodation with international capital.¹⁹

¹⁴ *TZ*, 1 Sept. 1971.

¹⁵ *TZ*, 13-15 Jan. 1972.

¹⁶ *TZ*, 4 Feb. 1972.

¹⁷ *TZ*, 26 Feb. 1972.

¹⁸ *TZ*, 24 Sept. 1972.

¹⁹ Interview with Faustino Lombe, Lusaka, 11 Dec. 2003. Lombe trained and worked as a teacher in Ndola. Denied a UNIP appointment in 1970, he worked for the UPP before his detention in 1972-3. Resident in Mufulira and a leading organiser of the underground UPP, Lombe was detained under Presidential Order in 1978-81 and then again from 1981 to 1987. Following his release, he lived in exile in Canada.

The DPP also highlighted the contrast between the low wages of most workers and the high salaries of senior politicians.²⁰

The DPP leaders were themselves detained in mid-1972. A second post-UPP party, the United People's Party, was briefly established by UPP leaders Justin Chimba and Musonda Chambeshi following their release from detention in September 1972. Although it was also quickly banned, its pamphlets showed a distinct ideological direction that was at odds with the radical position of the DPP.²¹ For example, Chimba criticised Zambia's increasing economic links with China, symbolised by the proposed construction of the TAZARA railway.²² These contradictory political positions were also noted by UPP detainees, such as Davies Mwaba:

[...] there were tensions, even in detention. The students would say, 'Is this what we're here for, this type of leadership?' Pointing at [the older leaders] Chapolokos, Chambeshis and that, they couldn't get on. 'What is the economic policy?' They wouldn't understand what the students were talking about. It was terrible. 'What does UPP stand for?' One would say 'The UPP stands for respect for traditional leaders'. 'What?! We are detained for that sort rubbish?' So there were continuous tensions between the members.²³

Differences over tactics and perspectives were also influenced by the economic and social position of the different factions. Many student activists had been prepared to sacrifice their future livelihoods to the political cause, but were persuaded by their elders to return to their studies. However, they remained under close scrutiny during their remaining years at UNZA, which was not a centre for further student unrest until 1975. Meanwhile, relatively wealthy and influential UPP sympathisers remained within UNIP, generally not publicly expressing their criticisms of the ruling party. It is widely suggested that Kapwepwe directed them to stay in UNIP, on the basis that it was preferable for as yet unidentified UPP sympathisers to remain at large rather than

²⁰ A.B. Mwansa to 'All Zambian youths', 19 Mar. 1972, United National Independence Party's Archives (UNIPA), Lusaka, ANC 7/113. Mwansa was the DPP's Vice National Secretary for Youth.

²¹ See for example, J.M. Chimba, 'How long is this country going to be ruled by political maniacs?', United Peoples' Party circular no. 3, 14 Oct. 1972, UNIPA, ANC 9/15.

²² J.M. Chimba, United Peoples' Party circular no. 2, 13 Oct. 1972, UNIPA, ANC 7/113.

²³ Interview with Davies Mwaba, Lusaka, 6 Dec. 2003. A UNIP and union organiser in the early 1960s, Mwaba trained as a doctor in Italy from 1963. Returning to Zambia in 1970, he worked at the University Teaching Hospital, before being detained in 1972-3 for his participation in UPP. He continues to work as a doctor in Lusaka.

suffer the repression that the party's public members experienced.²⁴ Most UPP supporters lost employment as a result of their political activity and continued to suffer intelligence surveillance and police harassment throughout the 1970s.²⁵ In 1974, many former UPP members received state compensation for their detention and torture. Most were represented in court by Kapwepwe's lawyer, Pierce Annfield, who would play an increasingly important role in his political circle.²⁶

It is noteworthy that many of those business figures who shared Kapwepwe's critique of UNIP's economic management had significantly more to lose than many UPP activists in both Northern Province and amongst the student group. It appears that, at this time, they were more interested in retaining their comparative wealth and influence, hoping to gain in the long run by promoting a more liberal economic policy within UNIP. Amongst their number were Emmanuel Kasonde, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, and Valentine Musakanya, who was removed from his position as Governor of the Bank of Zambia in 1972. Musakanya was a major secret financier of the UPP who continued to support many party activists throughout the 1970s, for example paying Jonas Mukumbi's university fees.²⁷

UNIP had survived, but the ruling party never fully recovered from the traumatic conflict which destroyed much of its support in what had been its strongest base since the nationalist struggle. Throughout the 1970s, the party in the Copperbelt and Northern Provinces was riven by suspicion and accusation. Senior UNIP officials suggested the party's weakness in these areas resulted from the continuing organisation of the UPP in secret underground form.²⁸ Those Bemba-speaking leaders who had remained loyal to the ruling party, for

²⁴ This is confirmed by virtually all interviewees, who point to examples of the assistance they subsequently received from prominent business figures with UPP sympathies. See, in particular, interview with John Chisata, Mufulira, 26-27 Nov. 2003. Chisata was a mineworker and President of the African Mineworkers' Union in 1962-4. Elected MP for Mufulira in 1964, Chisata served as a Deputy Minister in UNIP Governments until 1969. An outspoken parliamentary critic of UNIP, Chisata was detained in 1971-2. Chisata became a businessman in Mufulira, from where he organised the underground UPP before his second detention in 1978-81. See also interview with Davies Mwaba.

²⁵ Interview with Lasford Nkonde; and Larmer, "A little bit like a volcano".

²⁶ One of those represented by Annfield was Dennis Sikazwe, who received K6,500 in compensation; interview with Dennis Sikazwe, Lusaka, 26 Apr. 2005. Sikazwe studied teacher training at UNZA from 1969 before his expulsion in 1971. Detained in 1972-3, he later moved to Luanshya, where he ran Adult Education services for Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines until 1993.

²⁷ Interview with Jonas Mukumbi. Musakanya is identified as an important supporter of the UPP by a number of interviewees.

²⁸ Larmer, "A little bit like a volcano".

example Andrew Mutemba and Minister for Home Affairs Lewis Changufu, were suspected of being secret supporters of Kapwepwe, an experience that, in Changufu's view, served to alienate him from the party leadership and its ruthless use of the state intelligence services for the preservation of the Presidency rather than for the good of the nation.²⁹

Debates and tactics, 1975-77

During the mid-1970s, the majority of former UPP detainees did not re-involve themselves in organised politics. A significant number rejoined UNIP and, from their perspective, argued for what they believed were progressive policies within the sole legal party, albeit often surrounded by the suspicion of other UNIP members.³⁰ However, a significant number remained outside UNIP and maintained contact with Kapwepwe. In the Copperbelt town of Mufulira, in particular, John Chisata, Faustino Lombe and others committed themselves to the organisation of an underground UPP. Because of constant surveillance from state intelligence, they were unable to hold formal political meetings.³¹ Instead, they would use Church gatherings, weddings and funerals, and cultural events as venues for organisation.³² In this way, significant UPP cells were maintained in each Copperbelt town. Presidential elections, in which (under the One-Party State constitution) the electorate voted 'Yes' or 'No' for the single Presidential candidate, were targeted by UPP activists, who sought to encourage as high as

²⁹ Interview with Lewis Changufu, Lusaka, 12 Apr. 2006. Changufu was Minister of Home Affairs at the time of the initial UPP detentions, serving in this role from 1969-1973. He subsequently went into private business.

³⁰ For example, interview with Marcellino Bwembya, Chingola, 23 Apr. 2005. Mayor of Chingola in 1964-68, Bwembya was Assistant Minister for North-Western Province and then District Governor for Mwinilunga to 1970. Detained in 1971-72, Bwembya rejoined UNIP and served on the Chingola Council. Bwembya joined the MMD in 1990 and was again Mayor of Chingola from 1994 to 1998.

³¹ Examples of such Zambian intelligence surveillance can be found in intercepted form in the South African Foreign Affairs' Archives (SAFA), Pretoria. See, e.g., Directorate General Military Intelligence to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 11 Apr. 1974, SAFA 1/157/1, vol. 44, which provides transcripts of intercepted Zambian intelligence reports describing Kapwepwe's address to former UPP members at Chisata's farm in Mokambo.

³² Interview with Boniface Kawimbe, Lusaka, 1 May 2005. One of the student activists expelled from UNZA in 1971, Kawimbe organised the DPP before being detained in 1972-3. Completing his medical studies in 1978, Kawimbe then studied surgery in the United States in 1979-86. Active in the MMD, he served as an MP and as Minister for Health from 1999 to 2001. He was National Chairman of the MMD from 2002-05. See also interview with John Chisata.

possible a 'No' vote.³³ Kapwepwe would periodically travel to meet this group from his home in Chinsali, whilst former UPP leaders, including Chisata, Chimba, Chambeshi, Peter Chanda and Robinson Puta, would travel to Chinsali every two months, to pay respects and discuss the future of the party with him.³⁴ There was an ongoing debate amongst former UPP supporters regarding both the political positions they should adopt and the tactics they should use.

As Zambia entered a period of dramatic and prolonged economic decline in the mid-1970s, Kapwepwe's earlier warnings regarding UNIP's unsustainable economic policies seemed to be proven in practice. If the policies of the legal UPP had been politically ambiguous, there was now a more coherent critique of both economic nationalisation and the Government's focus on regional liberation movements, which former UPP supporters believed led to the neglect of Zambia's domestic problems. This analysis was supported by Zambia's small business-oriented elite, many of whom occupied positions in the state and/or parastatal senior management. In the 1970s, this group became increasingly critical of UNIP's model of state economic intervention and its inability to arrest sharp economic decline. This criticism was most visibly expressed by the 1977 report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on the Economy, chaired by Minister of Finance, John Mwanakatwe. The Committee, whose members included such prominent politicians as Alexander Chikwanda and Arthur Wina, recommended reductions of public spending and the removal of subsidies on basic foodstuffs. Other prominent business-oriented and politically influential figures were increasingly prepared to criticise economic policy and call for reform. Amongst their number was Elias Chipimo, Chairman of Standard Bank, who in September 1976 launched a public attack on the political 'indoctrination' that he claimed would result from a new education policy.³⁵ Andrew Kashita, former Managing Director of the parastatal holding corporation, INDECO, and Minister of Mines from 1973 to 1975, was close friends with Musakanya and leading lawyer Edward Shamwana. With them, Kashita opposed the practical impact of the one-party state on Zambia's society and economy.

At the same time, the growing criticism of economic policies by the trade union movement, following the election to the ZCTU leadership of Newstead Zimba (in 1971) and Frederick Chiluba (1974), led the former UPP leadership to identify, perhaps belatedly, the potential of organised labour to effectively challenge UNIP position. Jonas Mukumbi claims that, soon after his release from detention in 1974, the former UPP approached Chiluba, offering to help

³³ Interview with Faustino Lombe.

³⁴ Interviews with John Chisata and Lasford Nkonde.

³⁵ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 5 Sept. 1976.

prepare his public statements and provide support for him.³⁶ He claims that Kapwepwe secretly met Chiluba at Chambeshi's farm in Mkushi as early as 1975:

So we took Mr Chiluba to the farm, to meet Mr Kapwepwe. He was very happy to see him, at night. And then he said 'OK comrades, I'm going to have a discussion with Mr Chiluba, two of us'. Off they went in the night, on the farm. I think they were there for almost two hours. When they came back, Chiluba was crying, he was in tears. What they discussed, I don't know. But after that, he [Chiluba] was fiery [in his public statements]. And we kept on going to Chinsali to see the old man [Kapwepwe] [...] he kept on saying, 'Even if I'm not there [...] we do it through the labour movement'.³⁷

Kapwepwe reportedly urged Chiluba never to accept an appointment from Kaunda to government or any other institution, an advice that Chiluba appeared to take on board, thus enhancing his reputation as one of the few national leaders untainted by close association with UNIP.³⁸ However, it is difficult to know the extent to which Chiluba's increasing political profile in the late 1970s was a result of his covert association with Kapwepwe and the UPP. As is further explored below, the extent to which this represented a genuine partnership, or simply a marriage of convenience amongst UNIP's enemies, remains open to interpretation.

Meanwhile, some former UPP leaders, particularly Justin Chimba and Peter Chanda, sought to persuade Kapwepwe to lead his supporters back into UNIP. This argument met fierce opposition from some of the UPP's younger members, particularly from the former UNZA student group. Chimba and Chanda's desire to rejoin the ruling party seems to have been based less on a tactical argument and more on their own parlous economic position.³⁹ Significant opposition to this decision was expressed at a gathering of about forty UPP activists held on a farm near Lusaka, in a meeting apparently held with the tacit permission of the government.⁴⁰

Financial overtures were made to former UPP supporters, many of whom had been prevented from obtaining gainful employment, to return to UNIP.⁴¹

³⁶ Interview with Jonas Mukumbi.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Interview with Lasford Nkonde.

³⁹ Interview with Stanley Sinkamba.

⁴⁰ Interview with Faustino Lombe.

⁴¹ Alfred Kaniki: 'At local level, poverty was commanding the people to join UNIP. It's not that they liked UNIP even at all.' Interview with Alfred Kaniki, Kitwe, 5 Aug. 2005. Kaniki was a winding engine driver in Nkana mine in the late 1960s. A strong UNIP supporter, Kaniki became UPP Chairman in Chamboli mine township before his detention in 1971-72. Dismissed from mine employment, Kaniki worked informally for Kapwepwe in Chinsali from 1974-8.

The ruling party, irretrievably weakened in the UPP's core areas, made frequent overtures to the UPP leaders. Lewis Changufu, who, as Minister of Home Affairs, had played a leading role in the detention and release of the UPP detainees in 1971-73, was amongst those who now successfully persuaded Kapwepwe to lead his supporters back into UNIP in September 1977.⁴² Many younger UPP supporters strongly opposed the decision, refusing to rejoin.⁴³ Kapwepwe, however, appears to have been convinced that it was possible for him to offer opposition to Kaunda within UNIP structures that, if not directly successful, would at least provide a challenge to his hegemony over Zambian political life.

The return to UNIP, 1977-78

Many UNIP leaders remained (rightly) suspicious of the extent to which the UPP's prodigal sons had repented. The election of Musonda Chambeshi as a UNIP MP in Luanshya in January 1978 was marred by accusations that he and former UPP supporters were organising secretly to undermine UNIP.⁴⁴ For their part, UPP activists discussed the potential for ousting Kaunda by a direct challenge for the Presidential candidature of UNIP. In August 1978, Kapwepwe publicly announced that he would challenge Kaunda for the leadership of UNIP at the conference due to be held at Mulungushi that November. In putting forward his candidature, Kapwepwe declared that he would make government and administration more efficient, make appointments on merit and encourage private investors. He would act against corruption and put national interests before international commitments.⁴⁵ If the UPP's 1971 manifesto had been carefully balanced to appeal to both right and left, here was a clear rightward shift appealing to those discontented with both UNIP's statist orientation and with Kaunda's support to the regional liberation movements. The latter was widely regarded as being at the price of national development, for example in the economically damaging closure of the Rhodesian railway trading route since 1973, a policy Kapwepwe specifically pledged to reverse.⁴⁶

There were (and remain) significant divisions amongst former UPP activists regarding the decision to stand against Kaunda, coupled with criticism of

⁴² Interview with Lewis Changufu; *TZ*, 10 Sept. 1977.

⁴³ Dennis Sikazwe claims some younger UPP activists were not consulted on the decision to rejoin UNIP, which he describes as 'stupid'; interview.

⁴⁴ *TZ*, 24 and 27 Jan. 1978.

⁴⁵ *TZ*, 2 Aug. 1978.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

Kapwepwe's unnecessarily secretive leadership style.⁴⁷ Whilst Stanley Sinkamba claims that Kapwepwe could have won an open contest for the UNIP leadership, he believes that some way would have been found of removing him.⁴⁸ Others, like Lasford Nkonde, believed it was important to offer some form of public challenge to Kaunda, even if it had no chance of succeeding.⁴⁹ Lewis Changufu, previously a loyal UNIP leader, personally supported Kapwepwe's challenge to Kaunda. He also believes Kapwepwe had sufficient support amongst those present at Mulungushi to win an open election against Kaunda.⁵⁰

The UNIP leadership was apparently sufficiently concerned about these challenges to Kaunda (not only from Kapwepwe, but also from former African National Congress leader, Harry Nkumbula, and businessman Robert Chiluwe) to change the party constitution in September, banning those who had been UNIP members for less than five years from standing for the leadership.⁵¹ In addition, state forces were mobilised to physically prevent Kapwepwe and his supporters from attending the Mulungushi conference. Goodwin Mumba:

[...] on the day that the Conference was opening, the gates were closed to the two leaders [Kapwepwe and Nkumbula]. I was with Kapwepwe at that time. So we were turned back at the gate. So we went over to some farm outside Kabwe. So we were just there waiting. And as we were there waiting, waiting for the ex-UPP cadres, because they were all UNIP, to come over, and take Kapwepwe physically, with force, through the gate.⁵²

Many of these cadres were stopped by armed police in Kabwe town. The vast majority of Kapwepwe's open supporters were prevented from attending the Conference, where Kaunda was endorsed as UNIP's candidate for the Presidency by popular acclaim.

Nevertheless, the UNIP leadership was profoundly disturbed by the challenge.⁵³ During the conference, a fire at a Chililabombwe nightclub was

⁴⁷ Boniface Kawimbe claims that the UPP student group were often 'kept in the dark' by Kapwepwe, to a degree not warranted despite the difficult political situation: Interview.

⁴⁸ Interview with Stanley Sinkamba.

⁴⁹ Interview with Lasford Nkonde.

⁵⁰ Interview with Lewis Changufu.

⁵¹ TZ, 2 Sept. 1978.

⁵² Interview with Goodwin Mumba, 10, 15 Aug. 2005. The son of a successful grocer, Mumba received a scholarship to study economics in the United States in 1961-65. A journalist on the *Times of Zambia* until 1969, Mumba was Managing Director of the Zambia National Building Society until 1975. An independent businessman in the late 1970s, Mumba was convicted of treason and imprisoned between 1981 and 1990.

⁵³ Interview with Sikota Wina.

reported to have been caused by a petrol bomb.⁵⁴ John Chisata, Faustino Lombe and the leadership of the Mufulira UPP group were detained on suspicion of involvement in the 'bombing'.⁵⁵ No evidence was ever presented to the detainees, whilst in detention or in court, of their involvement in the incident; although the detainees were violently tortured, they were not interrogated about the fire itself.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, Kapwepwe and Nkumbula took their appeal against their exclusion from the Mulungushi elections to the courts, the case running into November before it was thrown out.⁵⁷ The Supreme Court upheld the court's decision in July 1979. Meanwhile, Kapwepwe was himself arrested, appearing in court on charges including managing a banned party and possession of seditious material, an unlicensed firearm and pornography.⁵⁸ During this period, in April 1979, Justin Chimba and Peter Chanda were appointed as Political Secretaries, the first significant former UPP leaders to accept such positions.⁵⁹ Their decision caused significant bitterness amongst some of their former comrades.

The 1980 coup attempt

In October 1980, Zambia's first attempted coup was pre-empted, days before its implementation, by the arrest of the coup plotters and their armed supporters on a farm in Chilanga, south of Lusaka.⁶⁰ Dozens of leading Zambians were detained and, after a lengthy legal process that was completed only in January 1983, some were convicted of treason for attempting to overthrow the government. The coup plot, initiated by businessmen, including Valentine Musakanya, and lawyers Edward Shamwana and Pierce Annfield, was supported by prominent Zairean dissidents led by Deogratias Symba. Symba worked with the French-speaking Annfield and his legal colleague Mundia Sikatana to bring fifty to sixty men (some Katangese, some Zambian ethnic Lundas) from North-

⁵⁴ *TZ*, 11 Sept. 1978.

⁵⁵ *TZ*, 17, 19 Sept. 1978.

⁵⁶ Interview with Eric Bwalya, 1 Dec. 2003. Born in Chinsali, Bwalya worked in Mufulira as a medical assistant and served as UNIP District Chairman for a decade to 1968. He took over retail outlets in 1968 and was appointed to the full-time position of Regional Youth Secretary, then detained in 1971-3 for his involvement in UPP. Losing his retail licences whilst in detention, Bwalya was an underground UPP activist in Mufulira. He was detained in 1978 and severely tortured, before being released in 1981. He later served as MMD Mayor for Mufulira.

⁵⁷ *TZ*, 27 Sept., 17 Nov. 1978.

⁵⁸ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 23 Dec. 1978.

⁵⁹ *TZ*, 7 Apr. 1979.

⁶⁰ *TZ*, 17-24 Oct. 1980.

Western Province to the Chilanga farm recently purchased by Annfield. Another 140 Katangese were kept in reserve on a farm near Kalulushi on the Copper-belt.⁶¹ Symba, however, warned the plotters that the military lead had to be taken by Zambian, not Zairean, military forces, if it was to be perceived as an internal Zambian initiative and not the overthrow of the government by hostile outside forces.⁶² Army Brigadier Godfrey Miyanda, as well as bringing in sections of the Zambian Army to the coup attempt, worked with army head of logistics Patrick Mkandawire to smuggle weapons to the Chilanga farm.⁶³

To my knowledge (and despite the significant circumstantial evidence), Kapwepwe has not previously been publicly linked to the initiation of the 1980 coup attempt, even by the UNIP government. Since he was already dead by the time the coup plot was uncovered, and since evidence of his involvement is largely provided by the plotters themselves, it must be treated with caution. Certainly, respondents confirm that, following the defeat of his Supreme Court appeal in mid-1979, a frustrated Kapwepwe believed it was necessary to seek other ways to achieve political change.⁶⁴ At this time, Musakanya and Annfield appear to have played a pivotal role in persuading Kapwepwe and others of the need to achieve political change by more direct means.

Many former UPP supporters, for example Jonas Mukumbi, are however convinced that Kapwepwe would never have endorsed any sort of violent action to remove Kaunda:

[...] he was against violence. He said violence is counter-productive. He said we need to fight peacefully, so we establish a government peacefully, and we govern this country in the interests of the people. [...]. In any case, if violence comes, even the ordinary people will die. He was against, but there were forces on him.⁶⁵

One of the coup plotters, Deogratias Symba, claims that he met Kapwepwe before his death in January 1980, and that Kapwepwe effectively endorsed the project.⁶⁶ Symba is supported in this claim by another of the coup leaders,

⁶¹ Interview with Goodwin Mumba.

⁶² Interview with Deogratias Symba, Kitwe, 4 Aug. 2005. Symba, a Congolese from Katanga, was the political leader of the *Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo*, which launched the 1977 and 1978 (Shaba I and II) invasions of Zaire. Symba was convicted of treason for his role in the Zambian coup plot and released in 1990. Working as a journalist in the United States in the 1990s, Symba was involved in the overthrow of Zairean President Mobutu in 1997. He is currently active in Congolese politics.

⁶³ Interview with Deogratias Symba; TZ, 27 Apr. 1982.

⁶⁴ Interviews with Alfred Kaniki and Jonas Mukumbi.

⁶⁵ Interview with Jonas Mukumbi.

⁶⁶ Interview with Deogratias Symba.

Goodwin Mumba.⁶⁷ The most likely conclusion is that Kapwepwe was convinced by Musakanya and others that Kaunda would be removed *peacefully*, primarily by the pressure of a general strike that, by halting the generation of foreign exchange earnings from Zambia's copper mines, would bring the government to its knees. Subsequent military action would be secondary to this. Kaunda would be abducted and persuaded to abdicate, thereby avoiding bloodshed.

The effectiveness and peaceful nature of the project, in the eyes of those involved, hinged therefore on the UPP's ties with the labour movement. Three months before his death, Stanley Sinkamba reports Kapwepwe telling him, “the only one who can defeat Kaunda is Chiluba. If we used Chiluba, Kaunda will fall [...] we can use this fool [...] He has got the workers. And if the workers revolt, then Kaunda will go this time. Because he's very unpopular. If only the workers turn against Kaunda, then he's gone.”⁶⁸ One of the coup plotters, Goodwin Mumba, describes meetings with the ZCTU leaders:

So he asked me, ‘OK, can you go and call Chiluba and his friends?’ That's how I left, went and called Chiluba [and ZCTU Deputy National Chairman Chitalu] Sampa [...] So the two of them came and joined us two days later. And had a discussion of how to topple Kaunda [...] they said, first, they would call for a general strike in the country, country-wide. If Kaunda doesn't succumb to that, then, in the process, the army should be asked to take over [...] So, now, which military personnel would do this? You'd have to be very careful to pick [...] We've got to consult our friends, and that is Musakanya, and those in private business [...] So, Musakanya, Annfield and Shamwana met at Shamwana's office. And Kapwepwe. We told them what we had discussed with the trade unions, and that we were in agreement. And soon we were going to see some action, so don't be surprised.⁶⁹

Kapwepwe was to be kept out of direct involvement in the plot; plans were made to take him to in France during the run-up to the attempt to take power. Annfield had close connections in France with former white Zambians who he had known in Chingola; these were, according to Symba and Mumba, the main funders of the coup attempt.⁷⁰

However, in the midst of preparations for his removal from the country in January 1980, Kapwepwe died. An entire chapter could be devoted to theories explaining the cause of Kapwepwe's death, which are instructive not because of their literal truth, but because of the way the discourses surrounding his demise

⁶⁷ Interview with Goodwin Mumba.

⁶⁸ Interview with Stanley Sinkamba.

⁶⁹ Interview with Goodwin Mumba.

⁷⁰ Interviews with Deogratias Symba and Goodwin Mumba. Little is known about these benefactors, who dealt primarily with the late Pierce Annfield. Neither Symba nor Mumba denies the possibility that these contacts may have not been the original source of the funds used to finance the coup attempt.

express grievances and perspectives on the wider political situation in Zambia. Most former UPP supporters are convinced that he was murdered by the state, whether through a gradual process of poisoning, or specifically at a secret State House meeting days before his death.⁷¹ Even those who believe his death was the result of natural causes assign some blame to the harassment and intimidation he was subjected to in the period before his death.⁷²

Whatever the cause, there was certainly widespread anger, expressed in particular at Kapwepwe's funeral, during which President Kaunda was prevented from speaking at the grave and nearly physically attacked by Kapwepwe's followers.⁷³ At the funeral, covert discussions with Chitalu Sampa revealed that the ZCTU leaders had retreated from direct involvement in the plan to remove Kaunda.⁷⁴ This might have acted as a deterrent to the coup plot, but in fact the loss of their leader accelerated the efforts of his lieutenants to remove Kaunda. For Mukumbi, Kapwepwe had been a restraint on Musakanya: '[...] after he died, there was nobody to stop them [...] Mr Musakanya was militant [...]. And by that coup, Musakanya fell in the trap of Kaunda'.⁷⁵ The other plotters resolved to go ahead with the attempt to seize power. Discussions took place at Lusaka's Flying Club involving Musakanya, Shamwana, Miyanda, Annfield and Lt Gen Christopher Kabwe, head of the Zambian Air Force. Kabwe was to organise the diversion of Kaunda's plane to a base where he would be persuaded to publicly step down. It was now envisaged that Shamwana, a widely respected legal figure who Kaunda was about to appoint Chief Justice, would head the subsequent interim government.⁷⁶

Following the funeral, Musakanya and Mumba travelled to Paris to collect \$2 million raised for the plot by Annfield's French connections. Concerned that they would be discovered bringing the funds into the country, Musakanya asked Andrew Sardanis, an old business contact and personal friend then in London, to take the dollars in exchange for Kwacha he had in a Zambian bank account. However, Mumba claims Musakanya drunkenly revealed what the funds were

⁷¹ Jonas Mukumbi is representative of the former category, whilst Josiah Chisala is convinced of the latter case; interview with Josiah Chisala, Lusaka, 15 Aug. 2005. Chisala trained as a clerk in the early 1960s, working for the colonial administration and then, from 1962, at UNIP headquarters. Chisala studied Business Administration in the UK in 1967-69. He then worked for various state-owned corporations until his detention in 1971-72. Unable to secure skilled employment, he worked as a painter at Maamba Colliery and later formed his own construction company. He was an MMD MP from 1993 to 2001.

⁷² Davies Mwaba, amongst others.

⁷³ Interview with Lasford Nkonde.

⁷⁴ Interview with Goodwin Mumba.

⁷⁵ Interview with Jonas Mukumbi.

⁷⁶ Interview with Sikota Wina. See also *TZ*, 24 June 1982.

to be used for to Sardanis, who then (according to Mumba) revealed the plot to Kaunda.⁷⁷

As plans for the coup were put into practice, there was increasing tension between the UNIP government and many of the elite business group. The achievement of Zimbabwean independence in April 1980 appeared to remove much of the external threat against Zambia, thereby providing space for increased criticism of UNIP. Three days after Zimbabwe officially came into being, Elias Chipimo suggested that one-party states in the 'third world' should introduce flexible arrangements to enable the change of leaders; otherwise, he asserted, there was a danger of encouraging coups d'état.⁷⁸ In response, Kaunda accused Chipimo of participating in plot to overthrow his government, naming Musakanya, Andrew Kashita and even John Mwanakatwe as part of a group meeting at the Lusaka Flying Club to remove him from power.⁷⁹ Chipimo was forced to resign as Chairman of Standard Bank. It is striking in retrospect that, in the midst of Kaunda's public identification of some of the coup plotters and even the location of their main activities, the plot nevertheless went ahead.

The military capacity for the coup attempt was provided in the first instance by Katangese military forces. Following the defeat of the Shaba I (1977) and Shaba II (1978) invasions of Zaire by the Angolan-based forces of the *Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo* (FLNC), the loss of political support from the Angolan government led some FLNC leaders, resident in Zambia after their retreat from Zaire, to seek an alternative route to oust Zairean President Mobutu.⁸⁰ Deogratias Symba, the political head of the FLNC and at that time resident in Kitwe, was in contact with FLNC soldiers living inconspicuously amongst their Lunda kin in the Mwinilunga area.⁸¹ Symba met Kapwepwe, Annfield and Musakanya and agreed to recruit former FLNC fighters to support the coup attempt. Once Kapwepwe was in power, Zambia would provide a rear base for a renewed FLNC attack against Mobutu.⁸²

Plans were well advanced when the plot was publicly revealed and arrests made. Mumba claims they planned to seize power on 17 October; the day before, government forces launched a dawn raid on the Chilanga farm, killing one and wounding four.⁸³ In May 1981, 13 people (four of them Zaireans) were publicly charged with involvement in the October 1980 coup attempt.⁸⁴

⁷⁷ Interview with Goodwin Mumba.

⁷⁸ *TZ*, 21 Apr. 1981.

⁷⁹ *TZ*, 23 Apr. 1980.

⁸⁰ *TZ*, 16 Apr. 1982; see also *Africa Confidential*, 22, 24, 25 Nov. 1981.

⁸¹ Interviews with Deogratias Symba.

⁸² Interview with Goodwin Mumba.

⁸³ *TZ*, 23 Apr. 1981.

⁸⁴ *TZ*, 29 May 1981.

Christopher Kabwe gave evidence against his co-plotters in exchange for his release.⁸⁵ Four of the plotters, including Musakanya, were acquitted in August 1982, partly because evidence extracted during interrogation was ruled inadmissible by the use of torture.⁸⁶ Seven of the accused (including Shamwana and Symba) were found guilty in January 1983 and sentenced to death. They were subsequently pardoned by Kaunda in 1990.

In the aftermath of the arrests, a major conflict did take place between the UNIP government and the trade union movement, centred on the proposed 'decentralisation' of local government in the Copperbelt's mine townships. In January 1981, 17 leaders of the ZCTU and the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia (MUZ) were expelled from UNIP; Kaunda publicly stated that "it is now clear that the present MUZ is operating as cover for the UPP."⁸⁷ This prompted the first national mineworkers' strike for 15 years, an event subsequently linked by a UNIP Central Committee statement to the October 1980 coup plot.⁸⁸ Further suggestions of a link between the industrial disputes and the coup attempt were denied by the ZCTU leadership, which demanded that the government substantiate such claims.⁸⁹ Observers could be forgiven for assuming this was simply a characteristic attempt by UNIP to de-legitimise its enemies, but as the evidence above suggests, there were indeed significant links between the post-UPP leadership group that initiated the coup attempt and the ZCTU leadership. The reasons for the ZCTU leaders' reluctance to organise mass action in support of the coup attempt remain to be discovered. For Mumba, this was evidence of Chiluba's cowardice and duplicity; it could, however, equally be concluded that Chiluba believed the plot was hasty and ill-conceived, and chose instead to bide his time until a more effective challenge to UNIP could be mounted.

South African connections, 1980-81

It remains unclear whether the initial funding for the coup attempt originated in South Africa. Given Kaunda's propensity for accusing his opponents of external support, it seems certain that if any definitive evidence of such support had been available to the Zambian authorities, it would have been highlighted at the trial. Witnesses did testify that Pierce Annfield received a shipment of guns from South Africa with the connivance of companies owned by Shamwana and

⁸⁵ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 16 Aug. 1981.

⁸⁶ For details of Musakanya's legal defence and the wider coup trial, see the memoirs of his lawyer John Mwanakatwe, *Teacher, politician, lawyer: My autobiography* (Lusaka, 2003), 313-50.

⁸⁷ *TZ*, 12 Jan 1981.

⁸⁸ *TZ*, 22 Jan 1981.

⁸⁹ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 24 May 1981.

Mumba.⁹⁰ However, it is clear that the vast majority of guns in the possession of the plotters were obtained from the Zambian Army.

In the wake of the arrests, South African diplomats' secret correspondence suggests no prior knowledge of the coup attempt, but rather the fear that the major Western powers would suspect them of involvement. Feedback from their diplomatic counterparts indicated that the intelligence services of the United States, the United Kingdom and France did not believe South Africa was involved.⁹¹ There is no indication of South African involvement at the top level of government, but it has not yet been possible to rule out the involvement of elements of South African intelligence operatives, in a form that enabled politicians to deny any prior knowledge of such activities.

During this period, some former UPP activists did make contact with South African authorities, seeking to mobilise outside support for opposition within Zambia. Elias Kaenga, one of those detained for the Chililabombwe fire, visited the South African Diplomatic Mission in Salisbury in March 1980. Kaenga claimed that, with the death of Kapwepwe, he was now accepted as the leader of the UPP.⁹² Kaenga was in 'Rhodesia-Zimbabwe' at a time when, South Africa believed, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation under the Muzorewa government was conducting operations "aimed at contributing to the general unrest in Zambia".⁹³ He claimed that he was building a resistance movement against Kaunda with support amongst the security forces and the mineworkers, which would eventually overthrow Kaunda. Kaenga sought South African support for the printing of propaganda and the payment of organisers' expenses. Kaenga made a 'favourable impression' on the Diplomatic Representative, but it is not known if any support was provided. After the coup attempt, in October 1981, Chama Chakomboka, a UPP activist in the Copperbelt and previously an important liaison between Kapwepwe and Chiluba, turned up at the South African embassy in Belgium, conveying information about and requesting assistance for a plan to create an ethnically-based federation of states com-

⁹⁰ Witness Statements of Enos Sibanda (1 Apr. 1981), Jennifer Corlett (22 Jun. 1981), M.F. Solanki (23 Jun. 1981), Birger Carr (3 Jun. 1981): In possession of Musakanya family.

⁹¹ See 'Zambia assessment', SA Embassy Paris to Pretoria, 7 Nov. 1980; Washington to Pretoria, 6 Nov. 1980; London to Pretoria, 7 Nov. 1980; Bonn to Pretoria, 7 Nov. 1980, all in SAFA 1/157/1, vol. 48.

⁹² 'Zambie: optrede deur opposisie van President Kaunda', South African Diplomatic Mission Salisbury to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 3 Mar. 1980, SAFA 1/157/3, vol. 18.

⁹³ 'Attempted overthrow of President Kaunda of Zambia', Minister of Foreign Affairs R.F. Botha to unknown, 2 Dec. 1980, SAFA 1/157/1, vol. 40.

prising Zambia, Zaire and Angola.⁹⁴ The South African authorities were understandably sceptical about such proposals and characteristically cautious about all such approaches, believing they might be a Zambian Government entrapment exercise enabling it to expose South African support to dissidents.⁹⁵

Whilst it cannot be proven whether South Africa funded the original coup plot, there is little doubt of that country's involvement in an unsuccessful attempt to free the plotters and fly them out of the country in 1981. Pierce Annfield, having fled to South Africa to escape arrest, appears to have initiated contact with South African intelligence agents. Meanwhile, Faustino Lombe was freed in March 1981, after being held for 2½ years after the Chililabombwe fire. Having been held in the same prison as Musakanya and Shamwana, Lombe agreed to help organise military forces to spring the plotters from detention.⁹⁶ Initial contacts were made with senior officers in the Zambia Air Force and in May one of the defence lawyers, Geoffrey Haamaundu, flew to Pretoria to meet with Annfield and, it appears, a number of South African military intelligence agents.⁹⁷ Lombe argues that the involvement of South African military intelligence took place without the knowledge of the South African Government.⁹⁸ Unnerved by the victory of radical African nationalism in the Zimbabwean elections and the coming to power of President Mugabe, the hitherto cautious line regarding the unseating of Kaunda appears to have been abandoned by the most right-wing elements of the South African military establishment, who feared the expansion of the front line states' support for South African nationalist movements.⁹⁹ Whereas Haamaundu's statement suggests that the rescue attempt would be completed by the escape of the plotters from Zambia, Lombe's understanding was that the rescue would be followed by a renewed attempt to remove Kaunda from power.¹⁰⁰ In late May, Haamaundu travelled to Geneva to collect South African money to fund the operation. Lombe subsequently

⁹⁴ 'Mr C. Chakomboka, Zambian political refugee: Request for South African military assistance', Ambassador O.F. De V Booyens to Director General Foreign Affairs, 25 Nov. 1981, SAFA 1/157/3, vol. 20.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ Interview with Faustino Lombe, Lusaka, 28 July 2005.

⁹⁷ The evidence for these events is provided in a confessional letter written by Haamaundu to Kaunda from Solwezi Prison on 20 Sept. 1981: 'My full disclosure on the rescue operation' (SAFA 1/157/1, Annexure, 1981-84). Whilst seeking to exonerate himself as much as possible, Haamaundu provides a detailed and persuasive record of the events of the rescue attempt which, Lombe believes, is generally accurate: Interview. See also TZ, 16 Nov. 1982.

⁹⁸ Interview with Faustino Lombe, 28 July 2005.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

travelled to South Africa to confirm various details of the plan.¹⁰¹ However, following numerous delays and a final agreement to implement the rescue operation in late June, ten men involved in the attempt, including Lombe and Haamaundu, were themselves detained.¹⁰²

Towards the MMD, 1980–1991

Following Kapwepwe's death and the failure of the coup attempt, most UPP members remained outside active politics. A younger generation of activists, including John Sakulanda and Chisanga Nkaka-Puta (the son of UPP leader Robinson Puta) were detained for organising a 'UPP' on the Copperbelt in the mid-1980s.¹⁰³ Sinkamba and others subsequently met regularly with Chiluba, whose own brief period in detention after mineworkers struck in 1981 left him more cautious about directly opposing the one-party state. During the early 1980s, Chiluba was periodically taken to Mkushi to meet Musonda Chambeshi in great secrecy. Chambeshi, the most senior former UPP leader then still alive and at liberty, seems to have regarded Chiluba as lacking in bravery and unworthy of Kapwepwe's legacy, despite obvious attempts by Chiluba and his supporters to position himself as his political successor.¹⁰⁴

With the re-emergence of active political opposition in 1990, many former UPP supporters joined the MMD, initially as a pro-democracy movement and later as a political party. However, Chambeshi and Elias Kaenga warned that Chiluba could not be trusted, and instead played a leading role in the small

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 30 Aug. 1981.

¹⁰³ Interview with John Sakulanda, Lusaka, 9 Apr. 2005. Sakulanda's father was a north-westerner detained in 1976-79 for alleged sympathies with the rebel Adamson Mushala. Sakulanda sought to organise a new UPP on the Copperbelt and made links with the Angolan rebel group UNITA. Sakulanda was detained for 12 months in 1987-8. He is now a Human Rights Commissioner.

¹⁰⁴ Interviews with Jonas Mukumbi and Stanley Sinkamba. It is widely believed that, on his deathbed, Kapwepwe handed Chiluba his walking stick, representing a symbolic statement of succession of leadership to the younger man. This story is vehemently denied by Chiluba's opponents (see, e.g. interview with Goodwin Mumba) and supported by his allies. See, for example, interview with Daniel Kapapa, Kasama, 19-22 Apr. 2005. Kapapa, the son of a successful businessman, was an unusual Northern Province supporter of the ANC, before becoming an important leader of the UPP in Kasama in 1971. In the 1980s, Kapapa's close relationship to the Bemba senior Chief Chitimikulu enabled him to join UNIP and be elected as an MP in 1989. He joined the MMD on its inception and was elected MMD MP for Kasama. An important ally of Chiluba in the Northern Province, he was the MMD's Provincial Chairman and Minister for Northern Province until 2001.

National Democratic Alliance (NADA), together with Lasford Nkonde.¹⁰⁵ Jonas Mukumbi, who had been a close ally of Chiluba's during the 1980s, supported his candidacy for the MMD leadership in 1991, but later became disillusioned by the marginalisation of UPP supporters in the MMD administration and what they saw as a betrayal of the UPP.¹⁰⁶ However, the very ambiguity of the UPP's own political position makes it impossible to summarise their specific disagreements with the MMD politics – rather, criticism focuses on the lack of principled leadership by Chiluba and his acolytes in the MMD government, in comparison to the sacrifices made by UPP leaders in the 'national interest'.¹⁰⁷

Many UPP supporters did take up local positions in the MMD: Stanley Sinkamba became MMD Constituency Chairman in Kamnfinsa, Kitwe, whilst Josiah Chisala formed a local branch in Kabwata, Lusaka.¹⁰⁸ Daniel Kapapa, MMD MP for Kasama and a key Chiluba loyalist, was Deputy Minister for Northern Province in the 1990s. Boniface Kawimbe was the only significant UPP figure to reach senior office under the MMD, serving as Minister of Health from 1999-2001. After Chiluba left office, Kawimbe was National Chairman of MMD until 2005.¹⁰⁹ He, Faustino Lombe and other former UPP leaders remain influential figures in the contemporary politics of Northern Province.

Conclusion

By its very nature, opposition to an authoritarian one-party state, as well as the study of it, is an activity prone to disinformation, rumour, accusation and counter-accusation. Little written evidence exists to support the claims made by oral sources and much of the evidence presented in this chapter invites further questions that are yet unanswered. Insight into the evolving political philosophy of Simon Kapwepwe is largely dependent on the perspectives of his lieutenants, rather than the direct views of the man himself. The specific relationship between Kapwepwe and Chiluba is largely interpreted in relation to the latter's subsequent actions as President of Zambia and his ongoing trial on corruption charges. A complete understanding of the role of elements of South Africa's defence and intelligence forces in Zambian opposition during the 1970s and 1980s will require access to as yet inaccessible military files.

Nevertheless, sufficient evidence is presented here to show that the leaders and activists of the UPP refused to accept that the declaration of the one-party

¹⁰⁵ Interviews with Jonas Mukumbi and Lasford Nkonde.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Jonas Mukumbi.

¹⁰⁷ See for example interviews with Faustino Lombe (28 July 2005), John Sakulanda, and Lasford Nkonde.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Stanley Sinkamba.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Boniface Kawimbe.

state would necessarily mean the end of opposition to UNIP. In the limited public and private spaces available to them, they met to organise informal forms of opposition and to discuss the most effective ways to remove UNIP and/or President Kaunda from power. Whilst some former activists believed this would best be achieved by finding ways to work within the ruling party, others were convinced such an approach effectively represented the tacit acceptance of the one-party state and instead advocated continued underground opposition. Beyond the removal of Kaunda, there was also little unanimity regarding the policies that a 'UPP' government would pursue in power. Former UNZA students initially supported economic and social policies to the left of Kaunda's moderate African socialism, whilst business-oriented UPP supporters such as Valentine Musakanya were consistently opposed to significant state intervention in the economy. Kapwepwe, viewed by all his supporters as an advocate of principled policies, appears in fact to have moved steadily rightwards; once a radical nationalist influenced by Maoism in the 1960s, the political ambiguity of his UPP leadership gave way by the end of the decade to the influence of pro-market thinkers. At the same time, Kapwepwe's refusal to countenance non-democratic forms of opposition to the repressive tactics of the one-party state seems to have at least weakened, if not fallen away entirely.

In many respects, such debates and divisions pre-figure the problems that beset the MMD as it grappled with the transition from opposition movement to ruling political party. The initial disquiet regarding the election of Chiluba as MMD leader and Zambian President strengthened rapidly until the breakaway of the National Party in 1993. Further divisions occurred in 1996 over Chiluba's use of constitutional manipulation to prevent Kaunda from standing for the Presidency, remarkably similar to the latter's manipulation of the UNIP constitution in 1978. With the defeat of Chiluba's 'Third Term' campaign in 2001, former UPP activists played an important role in securing votes for his chosen successor, Levy Mwanawasa, in the Copperbelt and Northern Provinces, which remain strategic areas for any political party seeking to govern Zambia. Most are now disillusioned with the failure of Mwanawasa's government to deliver developmental resources and governmental positions to these areas. In the run-up to the 2006 elections, former UPP leaders are again aiming to reclaim the contested legacy of Kapwepwe, in the hopes that this will gain them political power. Some are members of the new National Democratic Front, whilst others will mobilise support for Michael Sata's Patriotic Front, whose new National Chairman is former ZCTU Deputy National Chairman Chitalu Sampa; both the NDF and the PF are seeking their support primarily in the UPP's former strongholds.¹¹⁰ Others are seeking to build support for new and existing political

¹¹⁰ Interview with Josiah Chisala; and *The Post*, 11 Mar. and 12 June 2006.

platforms based on a conscious appeal to the memory of forgotten ‘freedom fighters’, an ambiguous term that at times encompasses those who fought against colonialism and those who were detained for their opposition to the one-party state.¹¹¹ In a radically altered political context, the debates over tactics and political ideas that informed the underground opposition of the 1970s are being re-enacted in new forms in contemporary Zambian political discourse.

¹¹¹ Amongst a number of recent events, the payment of compensation to former political prisoners (*Saturday Post*, 4 Feb. 2006), the reaction of former UPP detainees to Kenneth Kaunda’s announcement that he would publish his memoirs (*TZ*, 21 Mar. 2006), plans by the ‘Zambia freedom fighters and heroes trust’ to establish a heroes park (*The Post*, 11 Apr. 2006) are indications that, in the context of an impending election, political parties are seeking to attract support by associating themselves with the memory of Zambia’s ‘freedom fighters’.

PART II:

THE PUBLIC ROLE OF
RELIGION



Photo 8 President Kenneth Kaunda, during the later years of his rule, serving tea to a Catholic nun.

6

Legitimizing powers: The political role of the Roman Catholic church, 1972-1991

Marja Hinfelaar

In which year would you place the following quotation: '[...] I wish to reaffirm Zambia's commitment to Christianity [...] The Party and the government were committed to make Zambia a Christian country'? Not in 1991, the year in which Chiluba declared Zambia a Christian Nation. In fact, these were the words used by Andrew Mutemba, a member of the Central Committee (CC) of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), in a speech on behalf of President Kaunda in the year 1975.¹

Scholars of recent Zambian politics have not always resisted the lure of the simplistic binary between Kaunda's socialism and Chiluba's Christianity.² This paper argues instead that a history of Zambia's First and Second Republics cannot be deemed to be complete without a comprehensive description of religious beliefs and institutions.³ The secular, socialist rhetoric utilized in political circles in Zambia in the 1970s and 1980s complied with modernist expectations

¹ A. Mutemba, speech delivered on the occasion of Fr. Mung'andu's installation as bishop of Livingstone, *National Mirror (NM)*, Apr. 1975.

² Others, like Phiri, create an opposition between Kaunda's adherence to Eastern religions and Chiluba's Christianity, see I.A. Phiri, 'President Frederick J.T. Chiluba of Zambia: The Christian Nation and democracy', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 33 (2003), 401-28.

³ A similar situation exists in South Africa, where the works on missionaries and religion, of which there are many, are not integrated into mainstream history. See R. Elphick and R. Davenport, 'Introduction', in: Id., eds, *Christianity in South Africa: A political, social and cultural history* (Oxford and Cape Town, 1997), 2.

to the effect that religious institutions and beliefs would slowly retreat with the demise of colonialism: ‘Christian doctrine was regarded as irrelevant by those who espoused new political ideologies, some based on Marxist Socialism and some on a simplified vision of African “authenticity”’.⁴ Kaunda formulated his own philosophy, ‘Humanism’, which, according to Vaughan, was a mixture of ‘Fabian socialism, nineteenth-century liberalism, Christian morality and idealisation of the communal values of Zambia’s pre-capitalist past’.⁵ But when, in the 1990s, the question was posed of the extent to which humanist ideology had actually shaped Zambian society, it was convincingly concluded that ‘the structural features which [...] characterised the politics of the First Republic (1964-1972), and the “one-party participatory democracy” of the Second Republic, had nothing to do with “Humanism” or socialism, except when represented rhetorically by the leadership’.⁶ Indeed, what is most striking about Kaunda’s rhetoric is its opportunistic pliability. Attending to the expectations of his own constituents, he never ignored their religiosity.

[Christianity] played a large part in conferring legitimacy on Zambia’s first government, and Kaunda clearly used this to this end. He made great play of the fact that his father was a pioneer missionary and often referred to his Christian roots. He used Christian rhetoric to project an image of compassion, uprightness and integrity, and made political capital from his image as a Christian gentleman.⁷

Studies of the public role of religion in Zambia have largely concentrated on the history of Christianity in the Third Republic, when political expressions of religious beliefs became more apparent. But Christianity was firmly embedded in Zambian society at the time of Independence, and its mission-educated leaders fully understood the importance of the consent and blessings of the churches.⁸

One important reason why Christianity never left the public sphere after Independence was the growing authoritarianism of the Zambian political system. As elsewhere in Africa, the ‘outlawing of potential opposition groups and organizations, or their incorporation into the government system’, meant ‘it was not unusual for Christian churches to be left virtually the only formal organi-

⁴ J. McCracken, ‘Church and state in Malawi: The role of the Scottish presbyterian Missions 1875-1965’, in: R. B. Hansen and M. Twaddle, eds, *Christian missionaries and the state in the third world* (London and Ohio, 2002), 176.

⁵ M. Vaughan ‘Exploitation and neglect: Rural producers and the state in Malawi and Zambia’, in: D. Birmingham and P.M. Martin, eds, *History of central Africa: The contemporary years since 1960* (London 1998), 178.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ P. Gifford, *African Christianity: Its public role* (London, 1998), 191.

⁸ G. ter Haar, *Spirit of Africa: The healing ministry of Archbishop Milingo* (London, 1992), 201.

zation with the capacity to mobilize large sections of the population without recourse to government resources or control'.⁹ In this paper I will study the role of the Roman Catholic Church within the context of the Zambian one-party state, with special reference to the activities of its two prominent archbishops, Elias Mutale and Emmanuel Milingo. I will also show that the development of relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the state was shaped by two particular episodes: The amendment of the Abortion Act in 1972 and UNIP's attempt at introducing Scientific Socialism in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Most church leader eagerly supported the independent state, with the result that 'they were inclined to downplay the Church's role as the conscience of the Nation'.¹⁰ Instead, church leaders were bent on forging a new status in society for the institution they represented. Except for some minor clashes with local UNIP officials, clergy were generally attributed high respect, as could be witnessed during events of national importance, when 'representatives of both realms, spiritual and temporal, would sit side by side in the official celebration, always accompanied by a thanksgiving service'.¹¹

The church's quest for status was mirrored by UNIP's desire to involve the church in national affairs. This ideological penchant expressed itself in the tendency to promote clergy to high public office. As shown by the following examples, this was true of both Catholics and Protestants: Rev. Jalabafwa Chipeso, of the United Church of Zambia (UCZ), became Lusaka Rural District Governor; Rev. Merfyn Temple, also of the UCZ, worked in the Land Resettlement Office, while his colleague, Rev. Mwape, sat on the National Commission on One-Party State in 1972; Archbishop Emmanuel Milingo (member of Cultural and Social Sub-Committee of the UNIP's CC and of the Mufulira Disaster Fund Committee of 1973); Archbishop Mutale (member of the Rural Development Sub-Committee of the UNIP's CC and of the National Sub-Commission on the One-Party State in 1972); Fr. C.I. Riordan (member of the Electoral Commission in the first one-party elections of 1973); Fr. S. Mwansa (District Governor of Kaputa District); Fr. Protea Mwela (MP, Kawambwa). At the local level, meanwhile, clergy were encouraged to become members of Village Productivity Committees and other UNIP-initiated projects. Having control over 610 primary schools and 32 secondary schools, many hospitals and clinics, and the capacity to kick-start numerous development projects, it is easy

⁹ M. Green, *Priests, witches and power: Popular Christianity after mission in Southern Tanzania* (Cambridge, 2003), 8.

¹⁰ H. Hinfelaar, *Bemba-speaking women of Zambia in a century of religious change* (Leiden, 1994), 154. As a result, Hinfelaar argues, the churches chose to ignore such blatant injustices as Lenshina's detention without trial and the harassment of the 'Watchtowers'.

¹¹ Ter Haar, *Spirit of Africa*, 202.

to see why the Catholic Church was regarded by UNIP as an important 'partner in development'.

Kaunda also engaged a number of clergymen as his personal advisors, not the least prominent of whom was the Jesuit, Fr. Patrick Walsh. Other church leaders, including religious sisters, were invited to working lunches or suppers at State House on a regular basis. Additionally, Kaunda was always represented at major church events, such as the installations of bishops or the celebrations of jubilees. At a church congress held in the remote Malole mission in 1972 one would find such diverse group of guests as Kenneth Kaunda, Paramount Chief Chitimukulu and the Apostolic Nuncio, the Vatican's ambassador. On this particular occasion, Kaunda's speech included words he would repeat many times in future: 'we have allowed the Church and Judiciary to act as a mirror to the nation so that the Government and the Party might see what sins they are committing'.¹² Some years earlier, Rev. Colin Morris, another influential advisor of Kaunda, had already defined the watchdog role of religious leader vis-à-vis the state: 'Though we submit ourselves gladly to the authority of our lawful rulers, we must remain ever vigilant, to ensure that the State does not overstep the bounds of its God-given functions [...] It is our prophetic task to draw this attention to the State to the manner of God's dealing with us all [...]'.¹³

It was in this context of close church-state interdependence that two Zambian priests were appointed to the Catholic hierarchy within a short period of time. Emmanuel Milingo, ordained in 1958, became Archbishop of Lusaka in 1969, following a demand to 'localise' the church with a view to meeting the challenge of becoming a 'truly Zambian Church'.¹⁴ Elias Mutale, ordained in 1964, was raised to Bishop in Mansa Diocese in 1971, before being appointed Archbishop of Kasama Archdiocese in 1973.¹⁵

The fact that they were indigenous bishops enabled them to participate in the new political era.¹⁶ But while both men occupied similar positions, they held divergent views on and towards state authority. Archbishop Mutale's insistence on etiquette shows keen awareness of his newly obtained status. In 1971, for instance, he saw fit to remind a regional UNIP official that '[...] normally the mention of the Archbishop should come immediately after that of the highest civil authority in the Province'.¹⁷ Despite the fact that Mutale came from a

¹² *NM*, Nov. 1972.

¹³ *Times of Zambia (TZ)*, 24 Oct. 1969.

¹⁴ Emmanuel Milingo was born on 13 June 1930 in a village near Chipata.

¹⁵ Elias Mutale was born on 21 November 1929 in Luwingu District.

¹⁶ J. Haynes, *Religion and politics in Africa* (Nairobi and London 1996), 64.

¹⁷ E. Mutale to Permanent Secretary (Northern Province), Kasama, 5 Aug. 1971, Kasama Archdiocese Archives (KAA), Box R01.09 (Relations with Local Government).

commoner background, he closely associated himself with Bemba royalty. At his consecration ceremony as Archbishop, the royal drummers of Chief Makasa were summoned, while the White Fathers handed him the relics of Bishop 'Moto Moto' Dupont. Mutale proudly announced himself as the successor of 'Moto Moto', who in 1898 appeared to have briefly succeeded the Bemba Chief, Mwamba Chipoya.¹⁸ The Bemba chiefs acknowledged his standing and on several occasions Mutale was asked to intervene in succession disputes. As a prominent religious leader he was invited to major Bemba ceremonies to bless the occasion.¹⁹ Considering his aspirations, it is not surprising that Mutale felt honoured to serve on the One-Party Commission in 1972.

Archbishop Milingo, on the other hand, strongly associated himself with the 'grass-roots', which, as we will see in the course of the paper, informed his opinions. He saw no conflict of interest between his religious position and his public role, as 'he ascribed full responsibility to the national leaders of both Church and state to safeguard the fundamental rights of all the people in their country individually'.²⁰ His particular behaviour and outspokenness earned him animosity from the ruling class, with the exception of President Kaunda. Milingo's standing in society as an Archbishop granted him direct access to Kaunda, but their relationship was anything but formal. In 1973, when Milingo came under pressure from church authorities because of his healing activities, Kaunda invited him to stay with his family at Mfuwe lodge. Kaunda, it appeared, strongly believed in Milingo's healing capacities, which he publicly defended until the late 1970s. Until his departure in 1982, Milingo always believed Kaunda to be a man of integrity, untainted by the corrupt people surrounding him.²¹

The explanation for the two bishops' ability to play a prominent political role in Zambia must be sought in the fact that in the African public's perception, a 'religious leader not only commands a degree of secular influence but is also perceived of being endowed with power stemming directly from the spirit world'.²² These alleged spiritual powers raised high expectations within society.

¹⁸ See M. Hinfelaar, 'Remembering Bishop Joseph Dupont (1850-1930) in present-day Zambia', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 33 (2003), 365-76. E. Mutale to Paramount Chief Mutale Chitapankwa II Chitimukulu, Kasama 20 Feb. 1985: 'Because as a Father, the successor of Motomoto ... I related to the Bemba's chiefdom' (translated from Bemba), KAA Box R01.08 Relations with Traditional Rulers/Authorities.

¹⁹ On the occasion of the burial of Chitimukulu in 1980, the installation of Chief Mpepo as Chief Nkolemfumu, and so on, KAA Box R01.08.

²⁰ Ter Haar, *Spirit of Africa*, 205.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 199-200, 209.

²² S. Ellis and G. ter Haar, *Worlds of power: Religious thought and political practice in Africa* (New York 2004), 88. For this reason 'the influence wielded by a popular

Bishops were construed as the guardians of the nation's morality and so positioned as to legitimize, or reject, political processes. This is aptly brought out by the response of UNIP's opponents to Archbishop Mutale's appointment to the National Commission on the One-Party State in 1972. United Progressive Party (UPP) detainee John Chisata insisted that: 'Exergerated [sic] nationalism has parted us from our religious traditions. We have also parted with our moral and administrative traditions [...] [I] trust that Your Grace will not forget to work for the good of people as you have always done'.²³ Another political prisoner, Faustinus Lombe, wrote: 'The whole country is looking up to you, to defend your recommendations from these scrupulous, selfish, desperate political malcontents who will stop at nothing even if it means crucifying the masses'.²⁴ Archbishop Mutale was accused by a group of 'concerned Catholics' in a number of letters of legitimizing an undemocratic exercise: 'Is the President giving you a duty to which he does not expect you to contribute? In this Commission what would one contribute when a decision has been made?'.²⁵ And more heatedly: 'you have sanctioned this evils going in UNIP and which will continue until God redeems us'.²⁶ Mutale responded to his critiques with a religious defence: 'it is by divine Providence that the Commission was set up to save our Nation'.²⁷ However, in a personal letter to Kenneth Kaunda, Mutale expressed his concern for the treatment of UPP detainees, explaining that 'it is completely wrong for us Christians to sit and watch a situation where we are doubtful of the Government's attitude in the exercise of its duty of carrying our justice [...].'²⁸

Archbishop Mutale was genuinely convinced of the relevance of the One-Party Commission and thought his findings would be implemented. Recommendations by the Commission included a limit to the President's tenure of office, a restriction of presidential powers, a review of the one-party state after 10 years and the lifting of the state of emergency that had been in place since

religious leader in Africa is different in many respects from that exercised by any other leader emerging from the non-state sector'.

²³ J. Chisata to E. Mutale, Kabwe, 14 July 1972 (signed 'Your Child in Christ'), KAA, Box H01.02, National Commission on One Party Democracy 1972.

²⁴ F. Lombe to E. Mutale, Kabwe, 14 (month illegible) 1972, KAA, Box H01.02.

²⁵ Mwango Kandella (for 'Concerned Catholics') to E. Mutale, n.p., n.d., KAA, Box H01.02.

²⁶ C.F. Kambiti (for 'Concerned Catholics'), Lusaka, 16 Mar. 1972, KAA, Box H01.02. The group of concerned Catholics most probably included prominent politicians like Emmanuel Kasonde and Valentine Musakanya.

²⁷ E. Mutale to 'Dear Friend', Mansa, 5 Mar. 1972, KAA, Box H01.02.

²⁸ Kaunda's response was that 'he did not like detaining people at all' and promised to review the detention orders; E. Mutale to K.D. Kaunda, n.p., 7 Mar. 1972, K.D. Kaunda to E. Mutale, Lusaka, 11 Mar. 1972, KAA Box H01.02.

the Lenshina troubles of 1964.²⁹ With the benefit of hindsight, and given that the commission's advices were studiously ignored when the one-party legislation was finally formulated and approved by parliament, it is easy to call Archbishop Mutale politically naïve.

An important consequence of the introduction of the one-party state and the consequent clampdown on all opposition movements in the country was the need for an independent voice. One important reason why the Catholic Church could fulfil this task was its ownership of independent media. This autonomy gained more urgency as a result of the nationalisation of the daily newspapers, which thereafter became the mouthpiece of the government. In 1972, the three major church bodies, the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ), the Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ) and the Zambian Episcopal Conference (ZEC), had launched the monthly newspaper, *National Mirror*. It is therefore not surprising that Sikota Wina, the then Minister of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism, should here emphasized that 'it was agreed that the Churches' superior network of information and distribution should be put at the disposal at the government'.³⁰

The first public confrontation between the Catholic Church and the government came as a result of the enactment of the Termination of Pregnancy Act of 1972 and serves as an example of how a traditional, moral stand of the Catholic Church was translated into an act of subservience to the state. The Catholic leaders, who fervently opposed abortion, accused government of hastily rushing the act through parliament without showing any willingness to initiate a public debate. In their representation, the ZEC stated: 'we hope that Christians of other Churches and indeed all those who treasure the African traditional respect for human life will consider [these words of objection] with the seriousness this grave problem demands in modern times'.³¹ The Catholic Women's League complained of a deliberate parliamentary delay in dealing with inheritance and succession issues (eventually enacted in 1989) and called the amended abortion act the law of *balumendo* (boys) and *apamwamba* (elite). Milingo's frequent emotional outbursts on this matter became embarrassing as he confused 'antenatal' with 'anti-natal'. He even forced Kaunda to personally visit him at his residence to discuss the matter.

After having received an official representation from the Catholic Church, Kaunda consulted the Speaker of Parliament, Robinson Nabulyato. Nabulyato stated that the act 'has nothing to do with any doctor terminating any pregnancy

²⁹ H. Hinfelaar, *History of the Catholic Church 1895-1995* (Lusaka, 2004), 232.

³⁰ *NM*, Jan. 1972.

³¹ M.C.M. O'Riordan to A.M. Milner, Lusaka 12 Aug. 1972, National Archives of Zambia (NAZ), Lusaka, HM79/PP/1, Nabulyato Papers.

[...] the Bill is based on the already existing ambiguous law which required 'tidying up' and therefore suggested that the Catholic representation must have had a hidden agenda:

I want, Sir, to state that there could be a political motive behind the representation from Catholic Fathers aiming at causing unnecessary confusion just because they know *we are all Christians* [my emphasis]; but in this case, Sir, our duty is to the State and the welfare of its inhabitants [...] Further, Sir, I am also entitled to suspect some alliance with various political factions who might have expressed support to out-bursts of Catholic Church leaders on this issue for different motives which converged on what amounts to damaging effects to the State or even to you, personally, Sir.³²

Following Nabulyato's advice, and having 'carefully considered the representations from the Catholic Fathers', Kaunda signed the Bill in October 1972.³³ At this stage the Catholic Church's hierarchy reprimanded Milingo for his 'undiplomatic approach'.³⁴ Having failed to mobilize the nation against the proposed legislative change, the Catholic Church backtracked and began to treat the abortion issue as a mere matter of personal conscience. The pastoral letter that followed the enactment was directed towards the Catholic community in Zambia 'to remind [them] of the unchanging doctrine of the Catholic Church on abortion'.³⁵

The second confrontation ensued from UNIP's attempt to introduce Scientific Socialism and resulted in the first large-scale ecumenical cooperation in state affairs. In 1976 the churches learnt about the imminent introduction of a syllabus for 'political education' in primary and secondary schools. It was rumoured to include the discussion of 'the missionaries and the Church as forerunners of imperialism and colonialism in Zambia'.³⁶ In fact, with the establishment of UNIP's Research Bureau in 1974, Dr. Henry Meebelo and others planned to introduce political education in schools with a view to instructing children in different types of socialism, comparing Ujamaa with Maoism and Marxist-Leninism.³⁷ A group of selected teachers was trained at the President Citizenship College for this purpose, preparing them to disseminate their knowledge at the various teacher-training colleges. The churches complained that

³² R.M. Nabulyato to K.D. Kaunda, Lusaka, 24 Aug. 1972, United National Independence Party's Archives, Lusaka, UNIP 16/3/24.

³³ K.D. Kaunda to R. Nabulyato, 5 Oct. 1972, NAZ, HM79/PP/1.

³⁴ Ter Haar, *Spirit of Africa*, 12.

³⁵ *Guidelines on abortion*, Pastoral Letter, 26 Jan. 1972.

³⁶ J.C. McKenna, *Finding a social voice: The church and marxism in Africa* (New York, 1997), 195.

³⁷ *Africa Confidential*, 12 May 1980.

religious education was left out of the draft statement on educational reforms.³⁸ In 1978, UNIP initiated the Union of Working Class, one of whose purposes was to acquaint the youth with scientific socialism or, in the words of its leader, Njekwa Anamela, 'to arm the working class youths with revolutionary theory founded on the basis of scientific socialism'.³⁹

UNIP's flirtation with scientific socialism has yet to receive detailed academic scrutiny, but it must surely be placed within the context of the strengthening of political and economic ties with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Given the severe economic decline the country was experiencing, UNIP might have been looking for a model that could provide them with a quick remedy. Kaunda himself once remarked that 'scientific socialism might well have matched the scientific and technological achievements of capitalism [...] look at the USSR's accomplishments in the relatively short period since 1917'.⁴⁰ Some contemporary observers, on the other hand, interpreted the proposed ideological shift as being designed merely to serve the imperative of political survival: 'in the absence of practical policies, because of UNIP's paralysis, it is clearly designed (like the less explicit Humanism ethos) as a political cohesive'.⁴¹

In 1979, as a response to these events, the three main church bodies, ZEC (which included archbishops Milingo and Mutale), CCZ and EFZ published a statement entitled 'Marxism, Humanism and Christianity: A letter from the leaders of the Christian Churches in Zambia to all their members about Scientific Socialism'. The church leaders stated they did not dismiss socialism as such, but were forced 'to reject those forms of socialism which did not respect the dignity and religious dimension of man and which, therefore, can never lead to real humanism. Scientific Socialism is one of these'.⁴² One could easily accuse the churches of overreacting – as a number of commentators did⁴³ – as it was never likely that UNIP would have gone as far as suppressing religious expression or become a totalitarian Marxist state. The churches' strong reaction, however, must be viewed as a response to the increasingly repressive nature of UNIP's regime. They were concerned with UNIP's move from a so-called 'participatory democracy' to a state run by a vanguard party 'that claims to

³⁸ NM, Aug. 1976.

³⁹ NM, Feb. 1979.

⁴⁰ McKenna, *Finding a social voice*, 200.

⁴¹ *Africa Confidential*, 12 May 1980.

⁴² J. Komakoma (ed.) *The social teaching of the Catholic bishops and other Christian leaders in Zambia: Major pastoral letters and statements 1953-2001* (Ndola 2003), 111.

⁴³ Reuben Kamanga, then chairman of the political and legal sub-committee of UNIP's CC, called the pastoral letter 'alarmist and ill intentioned', *Daily Mail*, 28 May 1982.

know what is good for the people and proceed to give it to them whether they like it or not'. The churches' call was therefore meant to protect 'our present liberties'.⁴⁴ It also coincided with UNIP's plans to introduce a restrictive Press Bill, which was seen as a direct threat to the church media. The frustration of church leaders, moreover, was compounded by the fact that they felt sidelined by Kaunda, who had abolished his meetings with religious leaders at State House. As Rev. John Mambo observed at the time: 'the church in Zambia has long been left because there is no longer a religious advisor to the President [...]'⁴⁵ Kaunda's earlier Christian advisors, in fact, had been replaced by Indian 'guru', Dr. M.A. Ranganathan, in 1976. Archbishop Milingo, however, blamed Zambians for this development stating that 'if Christians failed to uplift the poor, one could hardly complain if communists came and took their place'.⁴⁶

Faced with such a powerful lobby, Zambian political leaders put up a strong defence, elaborated in a series of articles and debates in national newspapers.⁴⁷ When Mainza Chona, the then Prime Minister and a staunch Catholic, was asked why Scientific Socialism should be introduced, he replied: 'This is like asking why we should have Christianity in the country. It is the way to heaven'.⁴⁸ He commented that the only difference between Christianity and Scientific Socialism was the 'denial of the existence of God'.⁴⁹ While accusing the church of being used as 'an instrument for reaction',⁵⁰ it was obvious that the Party felt threatened by the antagonism this debate had created, and a series of meetings ensued. On 18-19 March 1982, a two-day seminar was organised at Mulungushi Hall entitled 'Humanism for religious leaders in Zambia'. Addressing 200 church leaders, President Kaunda insisted that Scientific Socialism was not going to replace religious education at primary and secondary schools and that the Party had yet to decide whether or not it would follow the 'Marxist ideology'.⁵¹ Plainly, UNIP was not prepared fully to alienate the churches; many more meetings followed suit.⁵² During an encounter with the National Council of Catholic Women, the director of UNIP's Research Bureau sought to defend the party's ideological stance by pointing out that the teaching of the syllabus

⁴⁴ Komakoma, *The social teaching of the Catholic bishops*, 132.

⁴⁵ *Daily Mail*, 27 May 1982.

⁴⁶ Ter Haar, *Spirit of Africa*, 208.

⁴⁷ Some of the headlines read: 'Should churches be involved in politics?' *TZ*, 10 June 1979; 'Marxism panic: Scientific socialism won't ban religion, vows Chona', *NM*, Feb. 1979; 'Nkhomwa explodes myth on Marxism' *NM*, July 1979.

⁴⁸ *NM*, Feb. 1979.

⁴⁹ *TZ*, 17 Sept., 1979.

⁵⁰ *TZ*, 25 Sept. 1979.

⁵¹ *TZ*, 19 Mar. 1982.

⁵² For instance, Fr. P. Lwaminda and Fr. R. Cremmins met with the UNIP's Research Bureau in Aug. and Oct. 1982.

was not presently well coordinated and, as a result, one would find teachers denying the existence of God.⁵³ From the early stages, the trade unions stepped into the debate and used it as a means to voice their discontent with the government. Frederick Chiluba, the prominent leader of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), signalled its opposition to Scientific Socialism by making it a point of 'going to church almost every day'.⁵⁴ As Hayes rightly points out, this coalition *in extremis* between the labour movement and mainstream churches was to have profound effects over the next decade.⁵⁵

Kenneth Kaunda played a large role in appeasing the churches. In a public speech in 1980, amidst the Scientific Socialism controversy, he stressed the importance of cooperation between the churches and the state, stating that 'it was never true that the missionary offered us the Bible with his left hand while he used his right hand to steal freedom and resources from us'.⁵⁶ He repeatedly praised the missionaries, stating that 'in the missionary days the sight of one missionary in the remotest village, was the strongest hope for good health, education and an approaching bright future for men and women' and that 'without missionaries we could not have waged the liberation struggle of our country'.⁵⁷ He called the church one of the five special pillars of the nation, along with the press, judiciary, the legislature and the executive, and hoped that it would remain 'as unshaken and firmly in position as it was during the liberation struggle and through the first and second republics'.⁵⁸ By 1982, and despite the party's earlier commitment to the teaching of Marxism-Leninism at university level, Scientific Socialism seemed to have been 'shelved'.⁵⁹

Having won the battle against the introduction of Scientific Socialism, the churches continued to assess Zambian public affairs. In 1982 the Catholic Church published a pamphlet entitled 'Christian reflection and talks about Justice and its alleged abuses in the Party and Government,' followed in 1984

⁵³ Notes on address to the National Council of Catholic Women Annual General Meeting at Natural Resources Development College, Lusaka, Saturday 14th of August 1982, by Mr. K. Nsingi, Director of the Research Bureau and Principal Advisor to the Secretary General of UNIP at Freedom House, KAA, R01.00, Church and State Controversies.

⁵⁴ *Africa Confidential*, 12 May 1980.

⁵⁵ Hayes suggests that the reason why trade unions resisted a socialist state was their fear of a complete erosion of their bargaining powers, real wage levels and ability to protest; Hayes, *Religion and politics in Africa*, 97.

⁵⁶ *Daily Mail*, 5 May 1980.

⁵⁷ *Daily Mail*, 5 May 1980, and *NM*, 20 Apr.-3 May, 1984.

⁵⁸ Gifford, *African Christianity*, 194.

⁵⁹ *NM*, 29 Oct. 1989. The issue briefly raised its head again in 1989, when it was said by ZEC and EFZ that UNIP had introduced a political education syllabus at schools which included Scientific Socialism

by a new pastoral letter on state-church relationships. Co-published by the CCZ and EFZ and entitled 'Christian Liberation, Justice and Development', the letter openly charged that 'in some instances the State [was] becoming an instrument of oppression'.⁶⁰

Whilst the debate was raging on between the churches and government, Archbishop Milingo had become a thorn in the flesh of the state. As a result of his outspokenness, charisma and well-known healing powers, Milingo became increasingly popular with Catholics and non-Catholics alike. Ter Haar observes that with the death of Simon Kapwepwe in 1980, 'the mantle of charismatic leadership was on Milingo's shoulders', as his popular healing sessions of personal ills were taken as a critique of those who had created conditions for the suffering of the poor. He used the independent church media to declare that 'the nation is facing shameless corruption among some of our public servants [...] the Zambian people are particularly disturbed by the decline in honesty in some of their leaders [...] the inordinate desire for personal enrichment by wrong means [...]'⁶¹ His attacks were not only directed at political leaders, but showed his exasperation with Zambia's 'effortless' society: 'there are no people with the guts to pinpoint the corruption and injustice in society. This country has no heroes [...] but idlers and people who were satisfied with so little'.⁶² It was rumoured that Milingo's widespread popularity and the challenge it posed to political leaders prompted Kaunda not to intervene when the Archbishop was controversially recalled to Rome in 1982. This perception was fed by the fact that Kaunda distanced himself from the controversy, whilst previously he had always lent Milingo his support.⁶³ Milingo's absence neither lessened his popularity nor weakened the idea that he could be a political rival; rumours persisted well into the 1990s that the Archbishop would make a comeback to Zambia and enter politics.⁶⁴

Archbishop Mutale, on the other hand, remained a UNIP party member and, on 11 November 1983, readily accepted the appointment as advisor to the Social and Cultural Sub-Committee of the party's CC to replace Archbishop Milingo.⁶⁵

⁶⁰ NM, 2 – 15 Dec. 1983.

⁶¹ NM, Nov. 1978.

⁶² NM, April 23-May 1, 1980.

⁶³ Kaunda denies this, stating that he did not want to intervene in what appeared to be an internal church matter, TZ 22 Sept. 1982; ter Haar, *Spirit of Africa*, 200, 216.

⁶⁴ It was suggested that Milingo would become a MP under Chiluba's regime; NM, 3 Feb. 1992. Even as recently as 2006, the ruling MMD wondered whether Milingo was planning a comeback.

⁶⁵ K.D. Kaunda to E. Mutale, Lusaka, 11 Nov. 1983; reply by E. Mutale to K.D. Kaunda, n.p., 16 Nov. 1983, KAA, Box H01.01, Sub-committee for culture, ideological documents UNIP.

Mutale was also appointed as the Apostolic Administrator of Lusaka amidst protests from the newly established Christian Action Group and the parishioners. The internal strife in the Roman Catholic Church that followed Milingo's recall to Rome was manipulated by the state-owned newspapers, which published a series of letters and statements of priests exposing racism within the Church. A very bitter exchange followed between Archbishop Mutale and the *Times of Zambia* concerning the authenticity of the letters. The *Times of Zambia* eventually admitted to having published forged letters, but said they were merely acting as the 'conveyor belt' and defending 'democratic principles'. In the ensuing pastoral statement Mutale spat back at this statement by asking 'who has ever seen a conveyor belt that spits venom as it carries its load along?'.⁶⁶

From the mid 1980s, the Archbishop became increasingly outspoken and began to have 'doubts about the veracity of this whole experiment [of the one-party ideology and participatory democracy]'.⁶⁷ His anti-UNIP consciousness was undoubtedly heightened by the newly introduced Justice and Peace movement.⁶⁸ Mutale headed the newly introduced Department of Social Education and Research at the Catholic Secretariat, which organised seminars nationwide in order to 'animate the response of the church to Scientific Socialism'.⁶⁹ Justice and Peace became an intrinsic part of the Department of Social Education; it dealt with 'the removal of injustices', including: Nepotism, corruption, misuse of funds, grabbing of deceased's property by relatives, inefficiency, low wages and high cost of living.⁷⁰ The movement's messages were relayed through magazines like *Icengelo*, a publication of the Franciscan Mission Press, which had started out as a quiet, traditional Catholic paper in 1970, but which, from 1981 onwards, took the Justice and Peace issues aboard. As Fr. Umberto Davoli, the former director of Mission Press and editor of *Icengelo*, explained: 'the needs of the time suggested and requested that as a Christian magazine the publication should undertake new and more demanding tasks, seen as an essential part of evangelisation and the Christian message of liberation of the "total man"'. In the late 1980s, the monthly magazine had a circulation of 69,000 copies and, as a result, had Frederick Chiluba begging for space.⁷¹ Such

⁶⁶ Joe Komakoma, 'Ruminations', *The Post*, 16 Jan. 2003.

⁶⁷ Hinfelaar, *History of the Catholic church*, 351.

⁶⁸ The justice and peace movement was instituted in 1967 in Rome 'to encourage social justice among the nations' and gained momentum with the appointment of Pope John Paul II in 1979.

⁶⁹ Catholic newsletter, *Impact* no. 99, 1983.

⁷⁰ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 21 Sept. 1986.

⁷¹ U. Davoli, 'Our Catholic press and the promotion of justice and democracy in Zambia', paper presented to a series of seminars on the 'history of the catholic church in

magazines and newspapers as *Icengelo*, *Workers' Challenge*,⁷² and the already mentioned *National Mirror* played an important role in articulating opposition to UNIP.⁷³ Their idiom became more and more confrontational, as did their deeds. The successful action of *Icengelo* against the forced eviction of the people from MacKenzie compound in the Copperbelt was one such example. Despite the increasing incidence of intimidation, the churches felt sufficiently powerful to continue their attacks.⁷⁴

Considering his profile and association with these outspoken publications, it is not surprising that Archbishop Mutale's death in a car crash in Lusaka in February 1989 was viewed as suspicious and rumoured to be a plot carried out at Kaunda's instigation.⁷⁵ In August 1989 Kaunda appeared on national television, expressing his suspicion that the Catholic Church was fuelling these accusations to undermine his authority. To ease the tension, and also in the belief that Kaunda was innocent of the charge, Bishop de Jong, in his capacity as ZEC chairperson, refuted Kaunda's allegations and called the death of Mutale 'a tragic accident'.⁷⁶ Despite this statement, rumours still persist.

The *Daily Mail*'s prediction in 1982 that 'many people would not shed a tear if the Party and its Government scrapped religion off the syllabus of our schools' is, with the benefit of hindsight, a serious miscalculation of people's convictions.⁷⁷ One important reason why the churches successfully challenged the government over the introduction of Scientific Socialism was the fact that they were able to give expression to the public's dissatisfaction with UNIP's authoritarianism. The persistent rumours about Kaunda's role in the removal of Milingo and the death of Archbishop Mutale, reminiscent of stories surrounding Kapwepwe's death, prove that in Zambian society religious leaders are more

Zambia', Lusaka, 9 Feb. 2002. Davoli explains that *Icengelo* had allied itself with the workers and the trade unions after being the victim of intimidation from the state.

⁷² A publication of the Kitwe Pastoral Centre for the young Christian worker of the Copperbelt, *Workers' Challenge* came out from 1982 to 1994. Its editor was Fr. Joe Komakoma; McKenna, *Finding a Social Voice*, 205.

⁷³ Gifford, *African Christianity*, 193.

⁷⁴ Davoli received numerous letters with threats and accusations of being puppets of some foreign imperialist power. He once had to appear before a committee headed by General Chinkuli, then Minister of Home Affairs. Davoli, 'Our Catholic press'.

⁷⁵ Hinfelaar, *History of the Catholic Church*, 395; Gifford, *African Christianity*, 193. M. Drevensek and U. Davoli, 'The struggle of a free press', *The Challenge*, 7, 2 (2005), 10: '[...] Archbishop Mutale had warned M[ission] Press editors not to move around at night time, and to be extra careful at crossroads due to rumours of assassination plans. Bells rang aloud in the Friar's ears when the same Archbishop died in a dubious accident a couple of months later [...]'.

⁷⁶ Hinfelaar, *History of the Catholic Church*, 395.

⁷⁷ *Daily Mail*, 24 May 1982.

often than not viewed as being in direct competition with the nation's political leaders. Because of this, the government sought explicitly to minimize the potential for open confrontation: Practically, by incorporating church leaders in government positions and national events; rhetorically, by praising the churches' past and present activities in public speeches. This call for cooperation was not left unanswered by Zambian church leaders, partly as a result of personal ambition and partly because of the expectations of a society by whom the Christian churches were viewed as indispensable moral forces. As demonstrated by the Scientific Socialism debacle, Kaunda was more attuned to the significance of the churches' public role than many academic observers have been.

Towards a history of the Charismatic churches in post-colonial Zambia

Austin M. Cheyeka

Introduction

Most scholars of new Christian movements suggest that Charismatic Christianity is rapidly becoming a dominant expression of the Christian religious heritage in sub-Saharan African countries.¹ This article aims to stimulate scholarship on the development of the Charismatic movement in Zambia and is organised around two particular issues, namely, the reasons that are contributing to the growth of Charismatic churches and the moot question of their leaders' involvement in the political affairs of the country.

This chapter is based on the assumption that the period from the 1970s to the present forms a distinct phase in Zambia's religious history. The central theme of the period is the widespread formation of Charismatic churches or 'born-again' churches, as they are popularly known in Zambia, and the breakdown, to some degree, of the Christian and religious unity. My study is designed to contribute to a better understanding of the development of the Charismatic movement in Zambia. Essentially I will be historicising the 'born-again' discourse in the country.

¹ See, e.g., Paul Gifford, 'Some recent developments in African Christianity', *African Affairs*, 93 (1994), 513-34; Gerrie ter Haar, *Halfway to paradise: African Christians in Europe* (Cardiff, 1998), and Stephen Ellis and Gerrie ter Haar, *Worlds of power: Religious thought and political practice in Africa* (New York, 2004).



Photo 9 Zambian President Frederick Chiluba, self-declared exponent of the Christian Nation.

While there is a wealth of scholarly literature on the major mainline or classical churches in Zambia,² there has hardly been a satisfactory historical treatment of the Charismatic movement. To be sure, one is able to find some scattered data about Charismatic churches in a number of seminal works on politics and religion in Zambia from the 1990s. But anyone interested in the historical development of these new churches will search the relevant literature in vain. The pioneering works of Paul Gifford have become classics on the

² See, e.g., Gerdien Verstraelen-Gilhuis, *From Dutch mission church to Reformed Church in Zambia* (Franeker, 1982); John Weller and Jane Linden, *Mainstream Christianity to 1980 in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe* (Gweru, 1984); Brian Garvey, *Bembaland Church: Religious and social change in South Central Africa, 1891-1964* (Leiden, 1994); Edward Murphy, ed., *A History of the Jesuits in Zambia: A mission becomes a province* (Nairobi, 2003) and Hugo Hinfelaar, *The history of the Catholic Church in Zambia* (Lusaka, 2005).

subject, but concern themselves with 'Africa', rather than Zambia in particular.³ On the other hand, most of the country-specific articles and dissertations that have appeared in the last decade or so have adopted a narrow 'presentist' perspective and taken their cue almost solely from the declaration of Zambia as a 'Christian Nation' by President Frederick Chiluba in 1991.⁴ As a result, this declaration itself has been taken as the principal reason for the proliferation of Charismatic churches in the country. Instead, as Stephen Ellis and Gerrie ter Haar have recently pointed out, 'Africa has a long history of dynamic religious movements, many of which have had a great impact on government. Insofar as commentators have attempted to advance explanations for Africa's religious revival, they have made little allowance for this element of historical depth'.⁵ Though this article does not claim to present a comprehensive picture, it does attempt to offer a historically informed analysis of the Charismatic movement and churches that will indeed enrich the existing data on religion and politics in Zambia.

The Charismatic movement: A new player on the religious scene

According to the 2000 nation-wide census, Protestants account for about 65 percent of the Zambian population, followed by Catholics with 22 percent. Thus 87 percent of the population in 2000 was Christian. It is incontestable that

³ Paul Gifford, 'Introduction: democratisation and the churches', in: Id., *ed.*, *The Christian churches and the democratisation of Africa* (Leiden, 1995); *African Christianity: Its public role* (London, 1996); 'Christian fundamentalism, state and politics in Black Africa', in: David Westerlund, *ed.*, *Questioning the secular state: The worldwide resurgence of religion in politics* (London, 1996).

⁴ Clement Mweemba, 'Church and state in Zambia', MA thesis, University of Leeds, 1994; Jerome Lafurge, *Presidential power and Christian churches in Zambia: Between mutual seduction and rivalry?*, Working Papers of the French Institute for Research in Africa (Paris, 1996); Ferdinand W. B. Akuffo, 'Tele-evangelism in Zambia', *Zango – Journal of Contemporary Issues*, 21 (1997); Peter Henriot, 'Zambia: political, economic and social challenges in a "Christian Nation"', in Leny Lagerwerf (ed.) *Reconstruction: The WCC Assembly Harare 1998 and the churches in Southern Africa* (Zoetermeer, 1998); Austin M. Cheyeka, 'The proclamation of Zambia as a "Christian Nation": The Islamic dimension', *African Christian Studies*, 14 (1998) and 'Ten years of Chiluba: a stock-taking of the concept "Zambia a Christian Nation"', *African Ecclesial Review*, 44 (2002); Austin M. Cheyeka 'The declaration of Zambia as a "Christian Nation" by President Frederick Chiluba', MA thesis, University of Birmingham, 1995, and 'Church, state and political ethics in a post-colonial state: The case of Zambia', PhD thesis, University of Malawi, 2002, and Isabel A. Phiri, 'President Frederick J.T. Chiluba of Zambia: The Christian nation and democracy', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 33 (2003).

⁵ Ellis and ter Haar, *Worlds of power*, 178.

alongside the various denominations in Christianity and the major world faiths, specifically Islam, Zambia has witnessed a rapid growth of charismatic Christianity. Although numerically they are still relatively few, the followers of Charismatic churches add to the variety of organised Christian churches, thereby contributing a vibrant dimension to Zambia's Christianity.⁶

Zambia's Christianity has been described in terms of the three 'mother bodies' which are deemed to represent ordinary Christians in public matters of the country.⁷ Sometimes referred to as 'umbrella bodies', these are the Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC), the Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ) and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ). The Zambia Episcopal Conference was officially instituted in 1963 at the Dominican Convent in Lusaka and is the main administrative body of all Roman Catholic dioceses. The CCZ was established in 1945. It acts as the link between the World Council of Churches and the various churches and organisations under its umbrella. The core member churches of CCZ are the Reformed Church in Zambia, Anglican Church, Salvation Army, Lutheran Church, United Church of Zambia (UCZ) and African Methodist Episcopal Church. On 8 April 1964, the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia was formed as a coordinating agency for the numerous Evangelical local churches, denominations, missions and para-church organisations which were scattered throughout the country.

The 1980s witnessed a significant growth of Charismatic churches in the country, sixteen of which joined the EFZ at the turn of the 21st century.⁸ On 12 November 2001, the Independent Churches Organisation of Zambia (ICOZ) was officially launched as an umbrella body of Charismatic churches. It is presided over by Reverend David Masupa. It is worth pointing out that these churches or ministries form a rich variety of Christianity. Speaking on Radio Phoenix on 30 November 2001, a representative of ICOZ said that the organisation had between 800 and 1000 registered member churches. Thus another umbrella body was instituted to bring together small Charismatic or 'born-again' churches. It is now reasonable to speak of four, and no longer three, 'church mother bodies' in Zambia.

⁶ Charismatics were counted as Protestants in the 2000 census, which they are indeed, but there has not been a specific census to determine the number of Protestants who belong to Charismatic churches.

⁷ Gifford, *African Christianity*, 188.

⁸ According to the 1998 'Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia Handbook'.

The origins and meaning of the Charismatic movement

The term ‘Charismatic’ derives from the Greek word *charis*, which means supernatural gifts of the spirit – gifts that are most often considered as being those listed in 1 Corinthians 12–14 (Love, Wisdom, Knowledge, Faith, Power of Healing, Power to perform miracles, Power to proclaim God’s message, Ability to tell the difference between gifts that come from the Spirit and those that do not, Ability to speak in strange tongues and the Ability to explain what is said). So, a Charismatic Christian may be one who has received the baptism of the Holy Spirit, evidenced by the ability to speak in tongues (*glossolalia*, which is abnormal utterance under religious emotion), but has chosen to stay within his/her own church of mainline denomination, or alternatively has found fellowship in non-denominational Charismatic groupings, which may or may not transform into full-fledged churches.⁹ Charismatics who left their denominations in the formative years, 1960s-1970s, have been referred to as ‘the restoration movement’, while those who remained in their denominations have generally been known as ‘the renewal movement’. From the 1980s, Charismatics have emphasised signs and wonders. Some Charismatics, especially the member of the so-called ‘Third Wave’, have come to highlight the role of healing and exorcism in a particularly explicit and visible way. These have received enthusiastic acceptance, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America, but they have also come under critical questioning.¹⁰ According to Cor Jonker:

The stress on personal conversion, on being ‘born-again’, and the idea that sinful behaviour is the cause of personal suffering and low social position marks this movement as politically conservative in Western terminology, even though they stand for changes in life style which are quite radical in the African context.¹¹

The Charismatic movement can be usefully placed in a world-wide context of Christian revivals, such as the 1734 Great Awakening, the Holiness Revival of 1859, the 1906 Pentecostal Revival and many others. The Charismatic Revival of 1960 in the United States of America was a response to the wave of secularisation that characterised the late 1950s and the 1960s. The revival

⁹ I am here drawing on Samuel Berberian, *Two decades of renewal: A study of the Charismatic renewal movement in Latin America, 1960–1990* (Guatemala City, 1980), 38.

¹⁰ Veli-Matti Karkkainen, ‘Mission, spirit and eschatology: An outline of a Pentecostal-Charismatic theology of mission’, *Mission Studies*, 15 (1999), 78.

¹¹ Cor Jonker, ‘The politics of the therapeutic Ngoma: The Zionist Churches in urban Zambia’, in: Rijk van Dijk, Ria Reis and Marja Spiereburg, eds, *The quest for fruition through Ngoma: The political aspects of healing in Southern Africa* (Oxford, 2000), 127.

started as a renewal movement in the large mainline churches of America.¹² It is especially linked to Rev. Dennis Bennett, pastor of St. Mark's Episcopal Church in Van Nuys, California. The growth of the movement is said to owe much to the activities of men like T. L. Osborn and Oral Roberts, and such organisations as the Full Gospel Business Men's Fellowship, founded by Demos Shakarian.¹³ Not all Christians, including Charismatics themselves, are familiar with the term 'Charismatic movement' and its origins. Much confusion exists as to what exactly the term refers. Charismatic churches in Zambia call themselves 'Pentecostal'. In fact, the only Zambian Charismatic church with the adjective 'Charismatic' is Calvary Charismatic Centre in Lusaka.

Introduction of the Charismatic movement in Zambia

How did the Charismatic movement enter Africa is still a matter of debate. Matthew Ojo, scholar of the Charismatic movement in Nigeria, believes that the movement came to Africa via Nigeria. He explains that the movement surfaced in January 1970, when some members of the Christian Union in the country's premier university, the University of Ibadan, proclaimed to their fellow students that they had been baptised in the Holy Spirit and were speaking in tongues. This, according to Ojo, began a substantial Christian awakening in Africa.¹⁴ He argues that by the mid-1980s, the growth of the Charismatic movement across Africa had been greatly helped by Nigerians as they interacted with other Africans in some of the regional and international activities of the Student Christian Movement, Christian Union and Scripture Union.¹⁵ Ojo also argues that although the Charismatic movement drew its initial inspiration from external models, it eventually became a vehicle for the expression of indigenous spirituality, as shown by its strong emphasis on healing, wealth and power.¹⁶

When exactly did the Charismatic movement emerge in Zambia is not precisely known. However, it is incontestable that the seed of the movement was sown in as early as 1967 in Kitwe, where Billy Graham, an American Pente-

¹² See e.g., Klaus Fiedler, *The story of the faith missions* (Oxford, 1994); David E. Harrell, *All things are possible* (Bloomington, 1975); Richard Quebedeaux, *The new charismatics II* (New York, 1983) and Russell P. Spittler, ed., *Perspectives on the new Pentecostalism* (Grand Rapids, 1976).

¹³ H.I. Lerdele, *Treasures old and new: Interpretations of 'Spirit-Baptism' in the Charismatic Renewal Movement* (Peabody, 1988), 38.

¹⁴ Mathew A. Ojo 'The dynamics of indigenous Charismatic missionary enterprise in West Africa', unpublished paper, 1988, 4.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁶ Mathew A. Ojo, 'The contextualisation and significance of the Charismatic movement in independent Nigeria', *Africa*, 58 (1988), 175-190.

costal Televangelist, staged the '7-day Crusade', which attracted as many as 28,000 people.¹⁷ From that time, Zambian Charismatics adopted practices which would characterise the movement in the 1990s. Even a cursory observation reveals that the Charismatic movement in Zambia has gone through identifiable phases, each of which marked by a specific discourse within the context of an unchanged exegesis. The 'born-again' followers discern the following phases:

- 1960-1970: Jesus is Lord and Saviour. We belong to Jesus. I am a believer.
- 1970-1980: *Ninsanga*¹⁸ (I have found Christ). I am saved. I am a child of God. God is my father.
- 1980-1990: I am 'born-again'. I am a child of God. I belong to Jesus.
- 1990-2000: I am anointed. I am delivered. I have been blessed. I have been ministered to. I am 'born-again'. He (Jesus) has released the finances. I have prospered. I am a man of God. I am a child of God.¹⁹

We can point out that between 1960 and 1970, the Scripture Union laid a definite foundation for the Charismatic movement in Zambia. This foundation was strengthened by Billy Graham's visit in 1967. Starting as a seaside mission to children in 1867 in England, the Scripture Union came to Zambia in 1963. The Union first arrived and preached on the Copperbelt before spreading to the rest of the country. Three leading Charismatic leaders, Rev. Dr. Dan Pule, founder of DUNAMIS Ministries, Bishop Joshua Banda, of Northmead Assemblies of God, and Pastor Dr. Nevers Mumba, of Victory Bible Church and

¹⁷ David Barrett, ed., *World Christian encyclopedia: A comparative study of churches and religions in the modern world, AD 1900 – 2000* (Nairobi, Oxford and New York, 1982), 765.

¹⁸ This is a word from *icibemba*, a language widely spoken in Zambia. The word literally means 'I have found'.

¹⁹ During my research I interviewed several Christians from Charismatic and other churches. Most of them, especially the older ones, were able to describe the 'born-again' discourse in the phases I have constructed and presented. Some of my informants vividly remembered the 1980s, when Reinhard Bonnke would come to Zambia with white T-shirts on which was written 'I Belong to Jesus.' To construct the above chronology, I have also used personal observations stemming from my secondary school days, when the Scripture Union was at its height in Zambia. From 1976 to 1980 *Ninsanga* was the vogue in my former school among Scripture Union members. These 'born-again' went to the extent of 'isolating' themselves. They dined on separate tables and called one another 'brother'. One of their number, Kamulile Phiri is now the owner of Isakar Love Centre Church. In the 1960s, I was told, Zambians were influenced by rock gospel. One song my informers remembered was 'I am a believer' by The Monkees.

Ministries, are products of the Scripture Union meetings while at Hillcrest Technical Secondary School.²⁰

The period from 1970 to 1980 was a decade of Christian growth in the country. By 1980, Zambian Christians constituted 72% of the country's population. It was a much higher percentage than that of sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, for which the average was 53%.²¹ A number of Charismatic churches, ministries or fellowships were formed during this period. For example, Bread of Life Church International traces its beginnings to 21 September 1975, when it began to hold services at Emmasdale Primary School. On 25 June 1978 the fellowship became a church under the name of Emmasdale Baptist Church, Lusaka; it had 28 members. On 13 September 1992 the church changed the name to Bread of Life Church International. In 1980, Joseph B. Lilema and Gideon Tembo founded Word of Life Church. This was after Lilema left the Apostolic Faith Mission on 16 December 1978. On 2 November 1980, Pastor Dr Nevers Mumba founded what eventually became known as the Victory Bible Church.²² He embarked on what he called 'Zambia Shall be Saved' crusades.

Through the Archbishop of Lusaka, Emmanuel Milingo, the Charismatic movement also influenced Roman Catholicism. Many Zambians suggest that their society has been subject to a considerable spiritual revival since the early or mid-1970s, a phenomenon that they themselves ascribe to – or associate closely with – poverty.²³ When Archbishop Milingo discovered his charismatic gift of healing, his clientele consisted mainly of people, especially women, who had become convinced of being possessed by the evil spirits.²⁴ Milingo did not start a separate church, but in 1978 initiated a prayer group called 'Divine Providence Community'. Father Mbilima Chonde, who had been a parish priest of St. Mary's parish in Kabwe, later transformed the Divine Providence Community (DPC) into a Ministry/church when he left the priesthood. The DPC is still active and draws its adherents from both members of Milingo's original praying group and other disaffected Catholics.

It was during this period that the Charismatic movement began to face opposition from established churches, which feared its spread and which began presenting themselves as 'national churches'. The UCZ was in the forefront of a

²⁰ This information is derived from participatory observation and watching Dan Pule's television programmes, both on ZNBC television and Trinity Broadcasting Network – Zambia.

²¹ Reinhart Henkel, *Christian missions in Africa: A social geographical study of their activities in Zambia* (Berlin, 1989), 46.

²² 'Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia Handbook', 8.

²³ Gerrie ter Haar, *Spirit of Africa: The healing ministry of Archbishop Milingo of Zambia* (London, 1992), 223.

²⁴ Gerrie ter Haar, *Spirit of Africa*, 223-224.

campaign intended to persuade the state to stop registering 'born-again' churches.²⁵ Generally, the arguments against the Charismatic Christians in this decade centred on their claim of baptism in the Holy Spirit, the gift of speaking in tongues and their belief in God's miracles.

Between 1980 and 1990 the Charismatic movement grew rapidly. The founding of new churches and organisations went hand in hand with successive open-air evangelising campaigns or crusades. Many Zambians 'gave their lives to Jesus' at many of these crusades, which were mostly staged by such international Pentecostal or Charismatic evangelists as Reinhard Bonnke. Bonnke's crusades were dubbed 'Christ for all Nations' (CfAN). Zambians played the role of organising and publicising the crusades, securing space and permission from the police, interpreting, and so on. The best remembered crusades are those held by Bonnke at Matero Stadium, Lusaka, from 10 to 25 August 1985. It is worth pointing out that it was Bonnke who sponsored Nevers Mumba's studies at a Bible College in Dallas, Texas; Bonnke had been greatly impressed by Mumba's oratory and interpreting skills.²⁶

International crusades encouraged local Zambian pastors in the Charismatic movement to begin open-air evangelising. They bought public address systems or hired the equipment from the Zambia Information Services. But open-air evangelising needed livening up, and so gospel music accompanied by guitars, drums, pianos and other modern instruments was introduced during crusades and, later, ordinary worship. One band, with no prior affiliation to a church, ministry or fellowship, transformed itself into a church known as Jesus Army Church. It had started out as a gospel band called 'Singing Evangelical Jesus Army'. It was founded by Flemings M'tonga in 1986. M'tonga was a member of the Catholic church in Mtendere, Lusaka. In 1981 he had 'given his life to the Lord' at Libala Secondary School during one of Bonnke's crusades.²⁷

From the 1980s, the messages of the Charismatic movement shifted from personal evangelism and baptism of the Holy Spirit to miracles, healing, and prosperity. To a large extent, these changes reflected socio-economic changes in the broader society.²⁸ In the 1980s, food and other basic needs became very expensive due to high inflation rates. Inefficiency, corruption and mismanagement of the resources of the country worsened this situation. In this context of daily struggles for survival, many people began to construct their lives around the discourse of miracles, healing and prosperity.

²⁵ See Austin M. Cheyeka, 'The impact of the Charismatic churches on mainline churches in Zambia', *Journal of Humanities* (Lusaka), forthcoming.

²⁶ Gifford, *African Christianity*, 233.

²⁷ 'Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia Handbook', 15-16.

²⁸ For a useful parallel, see Mathew A. Ojo, 'Deeper Life Bible Church of Nigeria', in Paul Gifford, ed., *New dimensions in African Christianity* (Nairobi, 1992), 115.

The Charismatic movement in Zambia is largely concentrated along the line of rail, from Livingstone to Mufulira. Its spread has not been even. The most fertile grounds seem to be the heavily urbanised areas, although it is by no means a shanty or slum phenomenon, for it is largely patronised by the working and middle classes. Pastor Nevers Mumba, no doubt the first recognised national exponent of the Charismatic movement and the 'born-again' consciousness, identified the potential of a revival on the Copperbelt and gave impetus to the movement there. In the mid 1980s, however, it began to spread to the midlands: Kapiri Mposhi, Kabwe, Lusaka and their outlying areas. By 1988 the arguments against the Charismatic movement became less centered on their claims in the Holy Spirit and more concerned with the question of whether Charismatic Christians should leave or stay in their own churches, a discussion which is still alive in the UCZ. Those who elected to remain in the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches called themselves the 'Charismatic Renewal Movement'.

A major development during the last decade of the twentieth century was the rise of vast conventions, conferences, and crusades of several days' duration, which were now entirely organised by Zambians themselves. Alongside mass conversions went the contestation of the spiritual hegemony of the post-classical churches; Charismatics now claimed the land and the right to evangelise their own people. Whereas for a long time ZNBC television had been dominated by such foreign Pentecostal televangelists as Jimmy Swaggart, Ernest Angley, and many more, Zambian Charismatic televangelists rose to the challenge of evangelising through the electronic media. Some local pastors openly expressed the view that Zambians must be evangelised by local Zambian pastors. Pastor Mumba argued:

Zambians, the blacksmiths themselves, must do the evangelisation of Zambia. We are not copycats of whites. I know I am dealing with sensitive issues here, but we must be original. We must rediscover our identity. If we do not learn to be original we shall surrender ourselves to others. Yes! I am rebelling. Yes, Zambia must be evangelised by the blacksmiths.²⁹

On 9 August 1998, Trinity Broadcasting Network (TBN) – Zambia was officially launched by President Frederick Chiluba. Although the television network is owned by Pentecostals in the United States of America, Rev. Dan Pule of DUNAMIS Ministry is the Chairman or Chief Executive Officer of the network in Zambia. His televangelising comes through TBN – Zambia as well as ZNBC television channels.

²⁹ Pastor Mumba on ZNBC television during one of his 'Zambia Shall Be Saved' crusades, 24 Sept. 1995.

Reasons for the growth of the Charismatic movement

Different scholars, depending on their academic disciplines, have advanced different explanations for the growth of the Charismatic movement in Africa. Fiedler divides the interpretations of the phenomenal growth of the Charismatic movement into non-religious interpretations, religious interpretations (his preferred model) and socio-cultural interpretations.³⁰ In what follows, I am going to unpack the salient features of these interpretations, giving my own perception of each of them.

In a nutshell, Gifford's thesis is that the Charismatic movement is the work of Western rightwing, capitalist or neo-colonialist, forces encroaching on an unsuspecting Africa.³¹ To some extent this is true in the Zambian context. It is undeniable that the owners of Zambian Charismatic churches are heavily influenced by the US fundamentalist televangelists and to a large extent mimic them. It is also true that there are some US fundamentalist churches, such as the Potters House of T.D. Jakes and Joyce Meyer's Ministry of Joyce Meyer, that have offices in Zambia to facilitate their evangelisation programmes. Conversely, however, hundreds of Charismatic churches have been founded by local Zambians without any connection with the US fundamentalists.

What can be observed in Zambia is that Charismatic crusades, conferences, seminars and meetings are sources of great spiritual inspiration for many thousands of Christians. They have brought about a spiritual awakening of many people and have no doubt challenged the mainline churches to intensify their evangelistic and missionary concerns. It is also my observation that the names of religious groupings and churches in the Charismatic movement suggest the continuing significance of the perennial quest for deeper Christian life. Names like Deeper Life Bible Church, Bread of Life Church International, New Life Christian Centre, Firm Foundation Centre, Full Gospel Ministry, Healing Word Ministries, Christian Faith in Christ Church, True Way Salvation Church attest to my observation. As noted by ter Haar, the name of a Church reveals much about its original vision.³² And I might add that due to fierce competition in the Charismatic fraternity, it is important for a founder to look for a most appealing name, such as Reaching Higher Ministries, Christ is the Answer Ministries or Last Call Centre. But the most appealing qualification – and one that is usually added to the Churches' names – is undoubtedly 'International', an adjective that expresses and reinforces the Zambians' cosmopolitan aspirations.

³⁰ Klaus Fiedler, 'The Charismatic and Pentecostal movement in cultural perspective', *Religion in Malawi*, 9 (1999), 35.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Ter Haar, *Halfway to Paradise*, 95.

Far from being solely the product of outside propaganda, or being instigated by alien forces to serve their own game of religious, political and economic domination, Charismatic Christianity has found a home in Zambia because it fits the African world-view. Ter Haar states:

Charismatic churches derive specific features from African culture. These include the use of prayers and consultations often through visions and prophecy, the following of ritual practices often linked with prayer and fasting, the importance of reading from the Bible, and the importance of the ritual use of water, such as through baptism by immersion.³³

This is why ter Haar suggests that 'it is more accurate to refer to it [Charismatic movement] as the outcome of a creative process of independent church formation which fits with traditional social patterns and is considered by believers to be the result of the guidance of the Holy Spirit'.³⁴

Most of the people who become Charismatic Christians used to take for granted the central propositions of the belief system of their original classical churches. Why do people switch churches and religious alliances is a complex issue. There is a feeling that the Charismatic movement is much more prohibiting in many aspects of human behaviour than most mainline churches. Some Charismatics also told me that they believe that nobody has infallible, unambiguous or privileged access to the divine truth, which comes to all people when they open up to the Holy Spirit.³⁵

On the issue of the socio-cultural aspects of the Charismatic movement, notably its urban connotations, Ojo contends:

The Charismatic organisations are finding ways of giving ultimate meaning to city life by transforming the problems of the cities into bases for their sustenance. Thus, in the areas of healing and miracles, the Charismatic organisations often promise success in any undertaking – in securing employment or accommodation in the banishment of fear, among other things. The restlessness accompanying city life and the need to find 'salvation' out of its tensions invariably swell the congregations at the programmes put on by the Charismatic organisations. Moreover, city life offers all the vital contrast between good and evil, which the organisations use as illustrations to keep their message in focus.³⁶

Scholars of various ideological backgrounds have advanced sociological, economic and political explanations of the new religious phenomena. A frequent

³³ *Ibid.*, 94.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 96.

³⁵ I had the opportunity of talking to 25 Charismatic Christians, some of whom are my colleagues and students. Special thanks to Precious Mweemba of Bread of Life Church International.

³⁶ Ojo, 'The contextualisation', 183.

paradigm is the deprivation model, which states that when a group in society is economically disadvantaged, it turns to a new religious movement.³⁷ Such scholars seem to be saying that Charismatic Christianity is growing among the poor people of the world.

In his book *The Rise of the Charismatic Movement*, Rev. Abamfo O. Atienmo postulates that severe economic and political upheaval contributed to the rise and growth of the Charismatic movement. Atienmo said that in a society which is fast jettisoning all her sense of communal belonging, and in which the individual finds himself/herself swamped up by the sophisticated systems and structures of a 'civilised society', the deep sense of Christian fellowship that is found among Charismatics can be a powerful incentive to joining Charismatic churches.³⁸ Atienmo's study was based on Ghana, but his findings can be applied to Zambia in a similar fashion.

Religion and religious movements neither originate nor survive in a social vacuum, and economic factors are seldom irrelevant to their emergence and subsequent development. The prosperity message – a message that states that Jesus came to banish poverty so that if people believe in him He shall bless them with riches – has inspired many people. Indeed, Charismatic churches have provided a response to the problems of modern urban society in Africa, where it is difficult to obtain or complete education, find paid employment and pay for health services. Founding a church is not a lucrative business, but it does bring the founder an income, which can increase substantially as the church and the popularity of the founder grows.

It is important to point out, as ter Haar does, that throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Zambians suffered from moral and spiritual degradation. Many people felt weighed down by the burdens of life and sought an explanation in the metaphysical sphere by attributing their problems to the workings of evil spirits.³⁹ The ravages of the Structural Adjustment Programme have further contributed to the proliferation of Charismatic churches. Then came the HIV/AIDS crisis, which has led some people to become 'born-again' as a way of protecting themselves from the disease. Many of these new converts are attracted by what they deem to be the Charismatic churches' strict and conservative ethic.

Most of the names of these churches are so designed as to appeal to those in distress or afflicted by poverty and AIDS. Here are some examples: My God is Able Ministries (founded in 1995), Hope for Africa Ministries (1994), Lusaka

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Abamfo O. Atienmo, *The rise of the Charismatic movement in the mainline churches in Ghana* (Accra, 1993), 24-42.

³⁹ Ter Haar, *Spirit of Africa*, 223.

Back to God Intercessory Ministries (1994), Jesus Cares Ministries (1996), Miracle Family Church (1999), Flames of Hope Ministries (1998), Power of Christ Ministries (1991), Better Life Christian Church (1997), Jesus Cares Ministries (1996), Come to Jesus Church and Ministries (1995), New Life Bible Church (1998), Holy Life Ministries and Church (1996) Jesus is the Way and the Truth and the Life Ministry (1997). The list is endless.

By way of conclusion, we can support Jonker, who argues that 'various segments of [a] population may have diverse motives for joining religious movements, depending on social class, the political context of the movement and changing social relations in general'.⁴⁰ No doubt, the coming to power of a 'born-again' president, Frederick Chiluba, also advanced the cause of the Charismatic churches.

The current status of the Charismatic churches and their influence on Zambian politics

In the 1990s, some Charismatic church leaders abandoned their erstwhile apolitical stance and became more involved in Zambian political affairs. In the turbulent and dramatic days of late 1989, all churches in Zambia were widely seen as having played an important role in the overthrow of UNIP and Kaunda. The churches' stand against political excesses and misuse of power was hailed as a significant factor in undermining the credibility of the UNIP regime. The actions of the churches were valiant demonstrations of the popular demand for fundamental rights to freedom of expression and for liberation from the oppressive structures that had for so long characterised Kaunda's rule. Thus, churches received widespread acknowledgement and approbation in the country.

When it became clear that Chiluba would be the next President of the Republic of Zambia, major Charismatic leaders publicly supported him.⁴¹ Many of them landed ministerial jobs in the MMD government. For example, Pastor Dan Pule, Reverend Peter Chintala, Reverend Stan Kristafor, Reverend Anosh Chipawa and Bishop Kaunda Lembalemba. Having supported a Charismatic

⁴⁰ Jonker, 'The politics of the therapeutic Ngoma', 127.

⁴¹ This is not peculiar to Zambia alone. What might be peculiar is the extent to which American Pentecostals and Charismatic individuals have unwittingly inspired Zambian Charismatic Christians. Nevers Mumba, who studied in the USA, seemed to have based his Christian Coalition on a US model. The example of Jerry Falwell, founder of Moral Majority, and his campaign for Ronald Reagan in 1984 had inspired him. Pat Robertson's run for the USA presidency in 1988 has equally been inspirational. The support for Chiluba came from Pastor Dan Pule (see *Times of Zambia*, 17 Oct. 1990), Pastor Mumba, Bishop Joe Imakando and others.

Christian for the highest office in the land, influential Charismatic leaders, especially Pastor Nevers Mumba and Bishop Joe Imakando, further persuaded President Chiluba to declare Zambia a 'Christian Nation'. They, with others, also persuaded him to create a Ministry of Christian Affairs (later Religious Affairs Desk).

In 1991 Chiluba declared Zambia a Christian Nation, seemingly out of a feeling that he was leading the 'deliverance' of his people. This was reinforced by his conviction that he had a special destiny in Zambia. The Deputy Minister for Religious Affairs later acknowledged that 'the Declaration of Zambia as a "Christian Nation" has contributed to the increase in the number of churches'.⁴² Overall, most charismatic leaders looked for some kind of benefit from Chiluba's 'Christian Nation'. The Director of Charity Christian Ministries in Luanshya wrote a lengthy letter in the *Times of Zambia* of 14 January 1995 to ask Chiluba to help her financially to begin a television programme to evangelize Zambia. State House became something of a pilgrimage centre for charismatic Christians, who, among the other things, came to pray for the President, to lay their hands on him and to have fellowship (to pray with him as a fellow Charismatic). This necessitated Godfrey Miyanda, Minister without Portfolio, to regulate these visits. On 4 January 1992, he wrote a letter to EFZ, ZEC and CCZ entitled 'Circular No. 1: Presidential Appointments for Religious Affairs'; point number two read:

It has become necessary for us to address an issue of great concern to the Christian community and the government. The influx of Christians to government house in order to pray for the President has raised many questions. Whilst it is of great importance to pray or advise the President, it must be borne in mind that he has numerous national responsibilities to attend to. Surely there must be some kind of coordination in the visits by Christians to State House to accord respect to the Office of the President.

This circular created tensions with Bishop John Mambo of the Church of God, Reformed Church of Zambia's moderator, Rev. Fauston Sakala, and Pastor Sexton Chiluba of Healing Word Ministries. Mambo argued: 'President Chiluba and his fellow leaders should bear in mind that there is no wise person in the country who should claim that he defeated the previous UNIP government. It is God who came to the rescue of the oppressed Zambian people'.⁴³ Sakala had this to say: 'The new arrangement is not acceptable to us because any church leader in this country has the right to see the President directly on any urgent problem'.⁴⁴ Paradoxically, the MMD government was now accused of 'not

⁴² ZNBC 'Issues', 14 June 1991.

⁴³ *National Mirror*, 1 June 1992.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

cooperating with the church and [...] ignoring the power of God. Politicians are trying to solve things without turning to God for guidance. If this state of things is not changed immediately, it will contradict President Chiluba's declaration of Zambia as a Christian state'.⁴⁵

The hope that President Chiluba would co-opt some of the high profile 'men of God' into his government is worth examining further. Pastors assumed that their prayers and supplications had influenced God to act in favour of the MMD during the 1991 elections and, as a result, some kind of theocracy was proposed. A spokesperson for the David Livingstone Memorial Presbyterian Church of Southern Africa said: 'Zambia can only be a Christian nation if religious leaders take up active positions in the running of the country's affairs. The Presbyterian Church wants to show the world that Zambia is for sure a Christian nation and in practical terms, the solution is to have church leaders elected to decision making bodies of the government'.⁴⁶ Bishop Mambo endorsed this suggestion, and added that it would be useful for the EFZ, CCZ and ZEC to nominate a clergy man or woman who would in turn be nominated by the President as Member of Parliament. According to Mambo's plan, this same clergy man or woman would serve as the chaplain to the State House and adviser to the President.⁴⁷ Again, from Livingstone came the voice of Pastor Kabilo, of Livingstone Future Hope Church, who said: 'government should among other things see to it that church leaders are seconded [i.e. nominated] to Parliament specially to represent the Church'.⁴⁸ During the first five years of MMD's rule, 1991-1996, Mambo insisted on the idea of having a 'Christian National Assembly'. To him 'no pagans' deserved to be voted for or nominated as Members of Parliament. He believed that churches must run the affairs of the country, and he made his motives public when he said: 'although I am not ready for a political position, I would not hesitate to go for one when need arose'.⁴⁹ From among other things, Mambo drew inspiration from the British House of Lords, in which the Archbishop of Canterbury holds a seat.⁵⁰

Why have Charismatic leaders become involved in Zambian politics? Paul Gifford argues that 'their precise forms of political involvement are yet to become clear but the "Muslim threat" seems likely to be the most potent. Fundamentalists want political and economic liberalism, and are opposed to communism (or pseudo philosophies within Africa, such as Zambian Humanism which

⁴⁵ *National Mirror*, 22 June 1992.

⁴⁶ *National Mirror*, 29 June-5 July 1992.

⁴⁷ *National Mirror*, 3 Feb. 1992.

⁴⁸ *National Mirror*, 3-9 Aug. 1992.

⁴⁹ *National Mirror*, 18-24 Dec. 1994; 27 Aug.- 2 Sept. 1995.

⁵⁰ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 19 Feb. 1995.

in their eclecticism draw on the ideas of Communism).⁵¹ Pastor Nevers Mumba was the principal exponent of the ‘Muslim threat’ factor. Nine months before the Presidential and Parliamentary elections of 1991, Pastor Mumba preached ‘the conspiracy by some Muslims to take over some African countries including Zambia’.⁵²

As everywhere else in Africa, Zambian Charismatic leaders

refuse to challenge government authorities on their record, or to engage in any social analysis of political structures. Because it diverts attention from their deficiencies, governments use this Christianity for the support it offers them in their attempts to stay in power.⁵³

Indeed, there are several examples in Zambia to illustrate that the avowed non-political stance of Charismatic churches coincides, on closer inspection, with one of unquestioning support for the state, provided there is the freedom to evangelise. Pastor Mwewa of Reach Out Bible Ministries, for example, argued on the main news on ZNBC television on the evening of 22 November 1996 that ‘leadership is God given. The church in Zambia is going to recognize a God fearing government and, as church, whether Pentecostal or not, we will support President Chiluba’.⁵⁴ In any case, Chiluba himself had made it clear that ‘God never creates presidents, but only men and women whom he appoints and removes’

This type of support emerged most clearly in 2001, during the debate and popular protests that accompanied Chiluba’s attempt to bend the Zambian constitution with a view to securing the right to run for a third consecutive presidential term.⁵⁵ Most Charismatic churches came out in favour of Chiluba, while mainstream churches actively opposed the unconstitutional move. Pauline theology provided the basis for the view that secular power is derivative of divine power and that secular rulers are thus representatives of supernatural authority. Charismatic churches interpret Romans 13:1-2 in a literal and narrow manner. The two verses are words of Paul the Apostle to the Romans: ‘Everyone must obey the state authorities, because no authority exists without God’s permission, and the existing authorities have been put there by God. Whoever

⁵¹ Gifford, ‘Christian fundamentalism’, 204.

⁵² Cheyeka, ‘The proclamation of Zambia as a “Christian Nation”’, 57.

⁵³ Gifford, ‘Christian fundamentalism’, 204.

⁵⁴ Addressing Ernest Angley’s congregation in the Grace Cathedral, Akron, Ohio, USA. The event was shown on ZNBC television on 8 Sept. 1996 during the ‘Ernest Angley Hour’.

⁵⁵ For details, see Austin Cheyeka, ‘Challenging the state: Catholic clergymen as political actors in Zambia, 1991-2002’, *Zango – Journal of Contemporary Issues*, 24 (2002-3), 3-54.

opposes the existing authority opposes what God has ordered: Anyone who does so will bring judgement on himself'. Scholars of scripture argue that Paul was aware of the fact that Christians perceived themselves as citizens of another world and that they were enjoying a new freedom in Christ. As such, it is argued, he knew that these Christians would begin to question civil authority, especially because the latter was in the hands of non-Christians. He therefore wanted to remove such potential attitude and save Christians from uncalled for persecution. Charismatics in Zambia seem not to understand the context of Paul's statement. Thus Pastor Charles Mwape of Ransom Church of God appealed to all pastors in the country to rally behind the President so that Christian morals in the country may be upheld. While the debate was going on, the police ensured that there was no 'illegal' (against the third term) protest. Chiluba remained silent, but promised to comment on the matter once the debate had been exhausted. In the meantime, he unleashed the public electronic and print media, the police, secret police, party cadres, the police service, Christian Charismatic churches, chiefs and some 'NGOs' to ensure the triumph of the 'third term' plan.

On 28 February 2001, ninety-two pastors, deacons and elders from the Assemblies of God, New Hope Church, Church of Christ and Church of God from the Copperbelt went to give their support for the third term campaign at State House. During the ZNBC television news, they told Chiluba they were behind his leadership and that he had been chosen and anointed to be president. Rev. Nelson Mwelwa of the Assemblies of God said:

We cannot rule out God's role in any national debate and as the nation debates the third term, we have to support the man who has been anointed as our leader. We are undaunted, we are principled and we stand to support you. We identify ourselves with you as our President because we know you have been called by God. When God calls a person, he calls them by name. So, have no fear because God will protect you as He promised.⁵⁶

And Pastor Tumelo Kunda of New Hope Church argued: 'God raised you [Chiluba] when the nation was collapsing spiritually and economically. Things were now looking up'. A pastor Abel Chomba argued: 'We do not see the next leader yet and therefore we will support you and pray for you because you are the one in authority. God has not revealed to us who will be the next President after you'. When Chiluba spoke, he condemned the Oasis Forum⁵⁷ in the following terms:

⁵⁶ ZNBC television news, 28 Feb. 2001.

⁵⁷ This was a coalition that championed the anti-third term protest. The coalition comprised the three Church 'mother bodies' (ECZ, EFZ and CCZ), plus the mother body of Non Governmental Organisations, the Non Governmental Organisations

That the Christian Church must be yoked with unbelievers to make decisions is quite something. When the Church is meeting with unbelievers to make a decision in the name of God, it becomes dangerous. The act of the Declaration drew us into a covenant. I cannot see nothing but peace, progress, development in the country. My Lord and my God is my only judge. We should continue to be on our knees to seek the will of God.

Not taking religious motivation at face value, Chishimba Nkoshwa, a University of Zambia lecturer, responded thus to the pastors' support of Chiluba's third term:

He [Chiluba] has failed to win support from the mainstream, long established churches. Now he has to count on the backing of some non-discrete, hysterical self-proclaimed bishops, pastors and reverends of small, kindergarten-like churches, who are actually beneficiaries of the Presidential slush funds. When bishops, pastors and reverends of mainstream churches spoke the same language the MMD leaders used in 1990/91 and sat at the same table with them that was a holy alliance. However, now that what the same men and women of God are saying is congruent with what LAZ, NGOs, UPND and other opposition parties are espousing, they are accused of yoking themselves to unbelievers.⁵⁸

After the failure of the third term bid, Reverend Masupa, chairman of ICOZ, declared ICOZ's support for Mr Levy Mwanawasa, of the MMD, as the only credible presidential candidate in the 2001 election. Rev. Masupa has since remained loyal to the new powers, dismissing arguments for a constituent assembly to adopt the next republican constitution and denouncing any church that disagrees with the state president.

Conclusion

This narrative has showed that the Charismatic churches are growing and that this growth in postcolonial Zambia is a consequence of many factors, including the poor economic climate and the HIV/AIDS crisis in the country. Into the void created by rapid social change and economic decline have flowed Charismatic Christianity and its stress on the role of the Holy Spirit in providing such gifts as prophecy, healing, prosperity and speaking in tongues. The article has also tried to analyse the positioning of charismatic politicians in the public domain. One point that has come out of this analysis is that during President Chiluba's tenure of office, some Charismatics became highly politicised and have remained so even after his departure. Their uncritical loyalty to government

Co-ordinating Committee, and the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ). For more details, see J. Gould, 'Subsidiary sovereignty and the constitution of political space in Zambia', in this volume.

⁵⁸ *The Post*, 27 Mar. 2001.

authority has led to a break in the traditional church cooperation which always took a critical stand in public affairs

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8

Islam in post-colonial Zambia

Felix J. Phiri

Introduction

The revival of a more fervent practice of Islam among already existing Muslims and the ever-increasing number of indigenous converts to Islam in Zambia can be better understood against the background of local Muslim associations. The current efflorescence in Islam has not been solely enhanced by the *da'wa* activities (diffusion of Islamic literature, classes for Islamic religious instructions both for children and adults, i.e. the *madrasas*, invitation of non-Muslims to enter the fold of Islam, etc.) of the Muslims themselves. If the efforts that the Muslims have so far deployed to bring about religious change in favour of Islam seem to yield some fruits, it is also because of several other factors within the history of Zambia that have facilitated the organization of the Muslims into socially and politically viable entities. The organization of the Muslim community into government-recognised and socially engaged local associations has helped Islam to find a voice in the public sphere and encouraged an ever-growing number of Zambians, most of whom come from a Christian background, to overcome their prejudices and to see in Islam a possible religious alternative to both Christianity and Traditional Religions. The main objective of this paper is to offer an analysis of some of the salient socio-political elements of Zambia's post-colonial history that have favoured the resurgence and the propagation of Islam, chiefly through local Muslim associations.

Long considered to be a religion exclusively for the Indians, *charichi wa ci Mwenye* (the Indian church)¹ and the Yao, the initial physiognomy of the Mus-

¹ A.F. Mulla, 'Islamization of Africa: the case of the Tumbuka of Zambia', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 9 (1988), 171.

lim community has changed remarkably over the past three and half decades and has come to include an ever-increasing number of autochthonous converts and migrant communities from other countries, especially from West Africa and Somalia. Apart from unpublished statistics of the National Census, giving any estimate of the Muslim population, and indeed of any other religion in Zambia, is bold speculation. As Mahdi desperately pointed out: 'Any study of religious affiliation in Zambia must necessarily start with a blank as far as the number and composition of particular adherents are concerned'.² Nonetheless, it is possible to establish reasonably satisfactory estimates either with the help of surveys conducted by the Central Statistics Office or through reliable informants.

Already in the 1960s, Mahmud was advancing the figure of 'no less' than 50,000 Muslims in Zambia.³ According to the National Census of 1980, there were 15,000 Sunni Muslims, out of a total population of 5,679,808 in Zambia.⁴ At about the same time, Mahdi's unnamed informal sources pegged their estimates at no more than 30,000, still twice the official findings.⁵ The National Census of 2000 pegged the Muslim population in Zambia at 41,932 out of a total population of 9.4 million inhabitants.⁶ Mr Gool Muhammad Gool, an Indian Muslim and a resident of Lusaka since 1938, estimates the number of Muslims in Zambia to be around 300,000, a figure equally suggested by Mr Gulham Hussein Patel, founder of the Islamic Education Trust of Zambia (IETZ), who has also been in Zambia for nearly sixty years.⁷ My own observations during fieldwork would seem to lend credit to the figures advanced by Mr Gool and Mr Patel.

The question of Islam in Zambia has been scantily documented. Nonetheless, the meagre material that exists does provide an idea of some aspects of the

² A.A. Mahdi, 'Secular education of Muslim children in Zambia', *Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 3 (1981), 86. Exceptionally, the Jehovah's witnesses seem to provide reliable and verifiable statistics revised every ten years. The Catholic baptism records, by their nature, do not account for post-baptismal changes in religious affiliation.

³ B. Mahmud, *Islam in Africa* (Lahore, 1964), 321.

⁴ The Shia community was deemed negligible and no mention of the Ahmadiyya was made.

⁵ Mahdi cited in Mulla, 'Islamization of Africa', 167.

⁶ The results of the National Census have the merit of relying on a systematic and methodological exercise. The results of the 2000 National Census concerning the question of religious affiliation were left out of the official document published two years later but can still be accessed through the census database at the Central Statistics Office.

⁷ Unlike the Seventh Day Adventists or the Jehovah's Witnesses, both of which have their Headquarters in Lusaka, Zambian Muslims are not administratively centralized. This accounts for the fact that the Muslim community has been unable to come up with reliable estimates of their numbers.

Islamic presence in the country. The occasional paper composed by Stephenson (he opened a Boma at Ndola in 1904) offers interesting insights into the pre-colonial activities and the organization of the Chiwala Muslim community, one of the oldest in Zambia.⁸ Mahdi's article on secular education of Muslim children in Zambia also gives interesting statistical information, as well as elaborating on the origins and some characteristics of the Muslim community.⁹ Constantin's study of the Muslim communities of East Africa, in which Zambia was accorded a chapter, is also useful.¹⁰ Cheyeka's two articles on the declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation offer an interesting analysis of the Islamic background to the question.¹¹ The article of Fakir Mulla, one of the key Asian contributors to the expansion of Islam in Lundazi district, in the Eastern Province of Zambia, gives interesting information on the Tumbuka.¹² The study carried out on behalf of the Islamic Council of Zambia by a group of Zambian Muslims is a valuable source of information on the process of structural organization of Islam in Zambia.¹³ In May 1989, Clive Dillon-Malone compiled a four-page report on Islam in Zambia for the Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC), tracing its historical development chiefly through the formation of local associations. Mention must be made also of the unpublished survey on Islam in Eastern Province by Benjamin Phiri.¹⁴

Insofar as particular ethnic groups could be associated with Islam, material pertaining to their history provides valuable information for the general reconstruction of the reality of Islam in Zambia. Thus, for the reconstruction of the identity and the history of Muslim coastal traders (Arab and Swahili) who traded with the indigenous people as early as the eighteenth century and eventually settled in some parts of the country, Livingstone's Journals and the letters of travellers like Gamitto give sparse information out of which emerges an instructive account of their historical presence in the country. Similarly, considering that the early Swahili shared not only in the culture of the Arabs but also in their religion, specific studies of Swahili presence in certain parts of Zambia, by Langworthy, Wright and Lary, have been another source of valuable

⁸ J.E. Stephenson, *Muhammedan early days in the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia*, National Archives of Zambia Occasional Paper 1 (Lusaka, 1972).

⁹ Mahdi, 'Secular education of Muslim children in Zambia'.

¹⁰ F. Constantin, *Les Communautés Musulmanes d'Afrique Orientale* (Pau, 1983), 105-136.

¹¹ A. Cheyeka, 'The proclamation of Zambia as a "Christian Nation": The Islamic dimension', *African Christian Studies*, 14 (1998) 'The Islamic Presence in Zambia', Brendan Carmody, ed., *Religion and education in Zambia* (Ndola, 2004), 132-142.

¹² Mulla, 'Islamization of Africa'.

¹³ Research Committee of Islamic Council of Zambia, 'History of Islamic administration in Zambia', (Lusaka, n.d.).

¹⁴ B. Phiri, 'A survey of Islam in the Eastern Province of Zambia' (Chipata, 1989).

information.¹⁵ Historical accounts dealing mainly with the northern and eastern parts of the country equally give valuable information about the interaction of coastal traders, missionaries, and early colonialists with the indigenous population. The general history of the Indians of Zambia received full scholarly attention from the Dotsons.¹⁶ Their comprehensive study covered both Northern and Southern Rhodesia as well Nyasaland (present day Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi, respectively). Together with Phiri's studies, these works provide interesting historical material on the Indian community in Zambia.¹⁷ Although Muslims among the early Indian settlers were proportionally fewer than the Hindus, general accounts of the Indians' coming to Zambia and their activities in the country are a valuable contribution to the reconstruction of the Asian Muslim identity.

The overall paucity of published and unpublished material directly related to Islam in Zambia has been largely compensated by information gathered by the author during successive periods of fieldwork (January and February 2003; January to October 2004; March and April 2005).¹⁸ The Registrar of Societies, central to the legal recognition of all the associations in the country, proved a valuable source of information. The two hundred files on registered Muslim and Hindu associations, under one and the same rubric, contain information about the evolution of each association over the past years, through annual reports, conflict reports, applications for amendments, change of name of associations, affiliation with other associations, renewal of the committee members, nationalities of the committee members, objectives of the association, copies of their constitutions, number of members, etc. About 140 of the files pertain to Muslim associations.¹⁹ Thanks to respondents identified through resourceful informants and media material, 'snow-ball sampling' and systematic targeting of potential

¹⁵ Langworthy, H.W., 'Swahili influence in the area between lake Malawi and the Luangwa River', *African Historical Studies*, IV (1971), 575-602; M. Wright and P. Lary, 'Swahili settlements in Northern Zambia and Malawi', *African Historical Studies*, 43 (1971), 547-573.

¹⁶ F. and L. Dotson, *The Indian minority of Zambia, Rhodesia, and Malawi*, (New Haven, 1968).

¹⁷ B.J. Phiri, *A History of the Indians in the Eastern Province of Zambia*, (Lusaka, 2000); B.J. Phiri, *Zambians of Indian Origin: A History of their Struggle for Survival in a New Homeland*, Occasional Paper of the Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society, 12, (Cape Town, 2001).

¹⁸ These form the basis of F.J. Phiri, 'Local Muslim associations as a contemporary way of Islamization in Zambia', PhD thesis, University of London, 2006.

¹⁹ The task of accounting for the exact number of existing Muslim associations is rendered elusive by the constant mutation and the ephemeral existence of some associations. Such changes at times happen without due notification of the Registrar of Societies.

interviewees (*mwalimus*, chairpersons of local Muslim associations and other knowledgeable personalities within the neighbourhood of any existing mosque) was made possible.

Socio-political elements relevant to understanding the development of Islam in post-colonial Zambia

Different socio-political factors help contextualise the relative expansion of Islam during the post-colonial period. The accentuated urbanization and the heightened influx of the rural population into towns lead to a sharp diversification of the population, not only on the cultural level but also on the religious level. The degrading conditions of social services called for the participation of non-governmental institutions. Religious organizations were solicited to make their contribution to the development of the country. Thus, Islam became a visible presence, not only through the construction of mosques, but also, and more especially, through its remarkable intervention in the social sector.

In terms of political and economic relationships with the Muslim world, Zambia evolved in the same way as other sub-Saharan countries, which had remained attracted to the West in the years following their independence and only progressively came to include the Arab and Asian Muslim world in their foreign policy. At the time of Zambia's independence in 1964, most of the Arab and Asian countries were hardly two decades old as sovereign modern states. But the oil boom of the 1970s profoundly transformed the geopolitical landscape of the Arab world and its African policy.

Zambia's relationship with the Muslim world can be subdivided into two main phases, each of which corresponding to the different policies adopted by the country's two first republican presidents, Kenneth Kaunda and Frederick Chiluba. Kaunda represents the period when Zambia's relationship with the Arab world was growing in strength and intensity.²⁰ In an article written for his *Sunday Post* column, Kaunda re-examined, not without regretting some incidents, his friendship with the former Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein.²¹ His article gave one major insight into Afro-Arab relationships. In a statement made 'off the cuff' at the 1979 Non-Aligned summit in Cuba, he remonstrated with his Arab counterparts about their tendency to deposit 'petrol-dollars' in American or European banks, instead of reinvesting them in their own countries or in Africa. His statement provoked a reaction of disapproval from the Kuwaiti

²⁰ In 1982, Kaunda was offered a Qur'an by the IETZ and, on that occasion, he is reported to have 'urged Muslim youth in Zambia to continue preaching the message of love as they were not only serving the country but mankind as a whole'; *Times of Zambia*, 12 Apr. 1982.

²¹ *Sunday Post*, 26 Sept. 2004.

prime minister and earned him a 'come and see for yourself' invitation from Saddam Hussein, an invitation which marked the beginning of a long friendship between the two men. Kaunda's passing comment was representative of how the rich Arab world was perceived by developing countries in Africa, that is, as potential donors or investors injudiciously placing their resources in the West.

Although mainly of a political and economic nature, growing relationships between Zambia and the Arab world from ca. 1980 were not without religious significance. Some Muslim leaders from oil-rich countries seized on their economic influence to contribute to the propagation of Islam in Africa. The *Jami'at ad-da'wa al-islamiyya* (association for the call to Islam) and *Kulliyat ad-da'wa al-islamiyya* (faculty of the call to Islam), founded in 1971 and 1974, respectively, in collaboration with Libyan universities offering courses of Islamic law, history and Arabic language, have been instrumental to the Libyan project of Arabization and Islamization in sub-Saharan Africa.²² Some African leaders converted to Islam following their intensified interaction with the Arabo-Muslim world. For instance, after six years of being in power, President Bongo of Gabon converted to Islam in 1973 and changed his given name, Albert Bernard, to Omar. In 1980 the president of Benin, Kérékou, also converted to Islam.

The second phase in Zambia's relationship with Muslim countries, which coincided with the Chiluba era, was marked by an attitude of caution, if not outright rejection, towards such ambivalent contacts as had taken place in the past decade or so. Kaunda's *policy of reproachment* towards the Muslim world was perceived with some misgiving by sectors of the Zambian society marked by the growing influence of American-inspired evangelical movements. Goodwin Mwangilwa, director of Multi-media Zambia, a Catholic-Protestant-owned Christian communications organization, reacted to Kaunda's invitation to Christian churches in Zambia to work together with other faiths like Islam by calling upon Christians to accept Muslims with caution.²³ Although Islam was not explicitly targeted, the abrupt closure of the Iranian embassy in Lusaka and the severing of diplomatic relations with Iraq by the Chiluba regime manifestly indicated an attempt, on the part of government, to fend off growing Islamic influence in Zambia.

The declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation, made on 30 December 1991 by Chiluba, was not only controversial in its own terms, but had also discon-

²² The project received unreserved ideological backing from Gadaffi himself through his *Third Universal Theory* and his *Green Book*. See H. Mattes, 'La da'wa Libyenne entre le Coran et le Livre Vert', in R. Otayek (ed.), *Le Radicalisme Islamique au Sud du Sahara, Da'wa, Arabisation et Critique de l'Occident* (Paris, 1993), 38.

²³ *National Mirror*, 17 Nov. – 30 Nov. 1985.

certing implications for religious freedom.²⁴ As to why Chiluba made such a declaration, no real substantive explanation has been given, least of all by its author. As Banda deplores: ‘Unfortunately, after making the [...] declaration at an inauspicious ceremony, Chiluba has failed to give form and substance to the declaration [...], other than forcing it into law when it was included in the Preamble to the 1996 Constitution’.²⁵

Remarkably, the declaration provoked relatively measured reactions from non-Christians, as a whole, and from the Muslim community, in particular.²⁶ Critics of the declaration, Christians and non-Christians alike, feared it would inaugurate an era of religious intolerance and inequality. ‘The declaration of Zambia as a “Christian nation” and its inclusion in the Constitution makes Christianity a privileged religion, a privilege not enjoyed by other religions such as Muslim [sic] Hinduism and African Traditional Religions’.²⁷ Cheyeka’s analysis of the events leading to the declaration and of the declaration itself suggests that shielding the nation against the growing influence of Islam – an influence encouraged by the policies of the previous regime – was among the major motivations for it. ‘By 1991 Islam in Zambia had become a real threat to the long established religion of Christianity. The Charismatic took the lead in expressing the threat of Islam by going as far as asking the state to declare Zambia a Christian Nation’.²⁸

This controversial declaration, which has kept the Zambian society on its toes to date, as attested by the debate surrounding the redrafting of the country’s constitution in 2005-06, was not free from an element of political instrumentality on the part of the newly-elected government, independent of the Muslim question. It gave it an ideology around which to rally the majority of the

²⁴ Alick Banda briefly discusses the controversy by highlighting the immediate questions provoked by the declaration. Was the declaration Chiluba’s personal faith conviction that was being extended to the nation?, he wondered in *Church-state relations in Zambia: A policy proposal* (Berlin, 2003), 99.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ The Muslim response to the declaration was rather cautious. It was not until September 1998 that the Islamic Council of Zambia officially endorsed the declaration (*Times of Zambia*, 19 Sept. 1998). Sheikh Zumani, Chizola, Rafiq Ahmad alludes to Indian Muslim ‘anger’ directed against the declaration: ‘A Third Letter to the Republican President of Zambia from Chinunda Muslim Association’ (Minga Islamic Society of Zambia 1994), 2. Most likely such sentiments were privately expressed, without them reaching the public media.

²⁷ Banda, *Church-State Relations in Zambia*, 100.

²⁸ Cheyeka, ‘The Islamic presence in Zambia’, 133. Cheyeka develops his arguments not only by examining the political circumstances surrounding the declaration, but also by having recourse to theories that explain the motivation of fundamentalist churches to combat through politics what they see as the threat of Islam.

Zambians and also strengthened the country's ties with the United States through the proliferating American-inspired evangelical movements. However, for want of concrete form and content, the declaration has not thus far ushered in the feared discrimination against non-Christian religions in Zambia. In fact, the formulation of the declaration in the preamble of the 1996 Constitution guarantees religious freedom for all: 'Declare the Republic a Christian nation while upholding the right of every person to enjoy that person's freedom of conscience or religion'.²⁹ The debate continues just the same.

Under the rule of President Mwanawasa, Zambia's relationships with Muslim countries continued along much the same lines as those set out by his predecessor. Either by way of pre-empting possible dangers of terrorism in Zambia or as a way of identifying with the international discourse on the fight against terrorism, Mwanawasa time and again vowed zero tolerance against perpetrators of religious violence. The administrative glitch that shook *Fa'iz al-Abrar* of Chaisa, north of Lusaka, in 2003, immediately sparked off allegations of links with *al-Qa'ida*.³⁰ By 2003, the Trust had assembled nearly four hundred boys aged between four and twenty years, mainly from the Luapula, Northern and Eastern provinces, with the aim of offering them free education, mainly Islamic.³¹ 'A school aide, Musa Mazombora [...] was sent to get young boys from Northern, Eastern and Luapula provinces so that they could be enrolled at the school'.³² Although the children were being taught secular subjects such as English, Zambian Languages, Social Studies and Mathematics, there was also a great emphasis on Qur'anic studies – a fact ignored by most of the parents who had sent their children to this school. After completing their studies, most of the pupils returned to their villages, where they became potential agents of Islamization as *mwalimus* of local mosques.

When president Mwanawasa responded favourably to the invitation offered him by the Makeni Islamic Society Trust (MIST) to attend the '*id al-fitr*' of February 2003, he made a speech in which he exhorted the Muslim community to participate actively in national development. His gesture was widely ac-

²⁹ The Zambian Constitutional Amendment Act of May 28, 1996, § 5.

³⁰ Following allegations of abuse of the children, the school was raided by government officials and accused of being a potential breeding ground for future terrorists. As a result, stricter control was imposed on all the other Muslim boarding schools in the country. Although the maltreatment of the children could be attested to by some people who worked for the school, no evidence of connection with any terrorist network was found.

³¹ *Times of Zambia*, These figures were revealed during the raids on the Chaisa and Nachiteta Centres. The Makeni Centre, which was not directly involved in the scandal, had about the same number of boys as Nachiteta.

³² *Ibid.*

claimed by the Muslim community as a sign of official recognition and appreciation of its contribution to the country's development. Although the president unwarily invited the Muslims to be politically involved in the current affairs of the country during his visit in Makeni, the Muslim community has thus far judiciously refrained from attracting unnecessary political attention and has privileged social engagement over direct political involvement. An attempt to form and register an Islamic political party was rejected by the Chiluba government in the early-1990s.³³ In fact, the attempt to form a political party was initially attributed to Muslim youth in general.³⁴ Upon realizing that the move was actually spearheaded by a Zambian who had converted to Shia Islam, Iran became suspected of interfering with the nation's political affairs.

The gateways of Islam into Zambia and its development in the post-colonial period

Since the 1970s, a socially engaged Muslim community, rendered more conspicuous by the construction of mosques, schools (religious and secular), orphanages, Islamic development projects and the propagation of Islamic literature, has emerged in Zambia, indicating both the resurgence of pre-existing Muslim communities and its expansion through new converts. Muslim traders from *Mpoane* (Swahili: *Pwani* – coast) and their indigenous allies (Yao) had penetrated the heartlands of south-central Africa at the beginning of the nineteenth century.³⁵ Their activities have left traces in the accounts of early missionaries, explorers and colonialists, who had encountered some of them in the northern and western parts of Zambia. The same coastal traders are known to have extended their sphere of influence to present-day Zimbabwe, Congo D.R. and Angola.³⁶ Their presence in Zambia has been prolonged until today by remnant communities of their earlier settlements in places like Chiwala (17 km east of Ndola), Kabuta and Nsumbu (60 km and 100 km from Mporokoso, respectively) and Karonga (50 km west of Petauke), each of which has become a conglomerate of small villages counting approximately seventy families each on average. Although coastal traders easily intermarried with indigenous women right from the

³³ The founder of the party was Mr. Abdulaziz, born Jacob Mulenga Khosa, in chief Nkula's area of Chinsali, to a Jehovah's Witness father and a Catholic mother. Abdulaziz, who had converted to Islam in 1981, was also the director of an ephemeral Islamic Research Centre in Mufulira. *Times of Zambia*, 9 May 1993, 5 June 1993.

³⁴ Cheyeka, 'The Islamic presence', 134.

³⁵ Insoll suggests possible earlier dates for the contact of coastal traders with the interior of southern Africa, supported by archaeological facts; T. Insoll, *The archaeology of Islam in sub-saharan Africa*. (Cambridge and New York, 2003), 263.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

beginning, their communities have significantly preserved their religious and cultural identity.

This first wave of Muslim settlers in Zambia was succeeded by the arrival of Asians, mainly Indians from the western part of the sub-continent, at the beginning of the twentieth century.³⁷ The coming of the Asians to central and southern Africa was directly related to the European colonial expansion in Africa. The British colonial experience in India and the effects of capitalism in the colonies encouraged the enlistment of Indians either as civil servants or as indentured plantation labourers, especially in South Africa.³⁸ More Asians followed in the footsteps of these early settlers and contributed to the formation of trading communities that have continued to flourish and to play a dominant role in the economy of the region to date.³⁹

Chipata and Livingstone, the two colonial administrative headquarters prior to the unification of North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia in 1911, were the main points of entry for early Asian settlers, who comprised both Muslims and Hindus. Progressively, the distinction between Muslims and Hindus became polarized between the two towns, with Asian Muslims dominating the whole of the Eastern Province, while their Hindu counterparts dominated Southern Province and enjoyed a comfortable majority in the towns along the line of rail and in the Copperbelt. This settlement pattern was motivated by cultural and religious affinity. The Asians became more numerous and their influence more profound than that of earlier Muslim coastal traders, due to their close association with the European colonial powers and the marginalization of coastal influences after the abolition of the slave-trade.

With the advent of the Europeans and the Asians, the Yao, as most other autochthonous ethnic groups, became a source of cheap labour for the mining and agricultural industry, as well as for the Asians (as domestic servants or as assistant shopkeepers). The Yao of Mozambique and southern Malawi had converted *en masse* to Islam towards the end of the nineteenth century and had served as middlemen and porters for the coastal traders.⁴⁰ They did not find

³⁷ Dotsots, *The Indian minority of Zambia*. E.C. Mandivenga, 'Islam in Zimbabwe: A study of religious developments from the 16th to the 20th century', PhD thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1986; Mulla, 'Islamization of Africa'.

³⁸ E. Moosa, 'Worlds "apart": Tabl gh Jam 'at in South Africa under apartheid, 1963-1993', in M.K. Masud, ed., *Travellers in faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama'at as a transnational Islamic movement for faith renewal* (Leiden, 2000), 207.

³⁹ B. J. Phiri, 'Zambians of Indian Origin.'

⁴⁰ E.A. Alpers, 'Towards a history of the expansion of Islam in Africa', in T.O. Ranger and I.N. Kimambo (eds.), *The historical study of African religion* (London, 1972), 182; G. Shepperson, 'The Jumbe of Nkhota Kota and some aspects of the history of Islam in British Central Africa', in: I.M. Lewis (ed.), *Islam in Tropical Africa* (Oxford, 1969), 194.

permanent communities in Zambia until the colonial era. Their identification with Islam, and the practice of traditions related to Islam such as *jando* (male circumcision) and the use of religious terminologies (*swalat* for *salat*, *twalika* for *tariqa*), survived long years of isolation.⁴¹

Within the past three and half decades communities of indigenous converts have emerged partly as a result of the *da'wa* efforts of the pre-existing Muslim communities and partly because of other *da'wa* movements from abroad, such as the *Tablighi Jama'at*, and other brands of Islam such as the *Ahmadiyya* and the *Shia*. Muslim migrants from West Africa usually identify themselves with particular mosques that they frequent for religious purposes as much as for business networking. In the eighties migrant communities of West Africans – mainly Senegalese and Malians – and Somalis were chiefly concentrated on the Copperbelt. Following the collapse of the Copperbelt's economic strength in the 1990s and the closure of some mines, some of them moved to Lusaka, where they frequented mainly the Kuomboka Mosque, near Chawama township.

Up until twenty years ago, Islam was almost an unknown religious phenomenon in the Western and North-Western Provinces. In accord with the colonial government, Lozi chiefs forbade the settlement of Asian traders on their land. Up to today, in spite of the economic growth resulting from the relative political stability of Angola and the proximity of Namibia and Botswana, no Asians have directly ventured to expand their business into the Western Province. Islam has been slow to penetrate the North-Western and Luapula Provinces, chiefly because the two regions have had little contact with major agents of Islamization, the Yao and the Asians. Apart from the ancient Muslim communities of Kabuta and Nsumbu, in the area between Mporokoso and Mpulungu, and the constantly changing communities of the Somali transporters along the Great-North Road, the Northern Province has equally come to know an upsurge in Islamic practice only within the past two decades.⁴² The current influx of refugees from Congo D.R. has brought with it Muslims refugees, some of whom are to be found in the Munkonge refugee camp, 60km south-west of Mporokoso, and other temporary refugee settlements around Kaputa. The fishing industry and the cross-

⁴¹ Insoll, *The archaeology of Islam*, 394. A. Thorold, 'Metamorphoses of the Yao Muslims', in L. Brenner (ed.), *Muslim identity and social change in sub-saharan Africa* (London, 1993), 83.

⁴² The Great North Road (also known as Hell Run in the 1970s because of its bad state) was the main artery for the transportation of imported goods before the construction of the Tanzania Zambia Mafuta oil pipeline (TAZAMA) in 1968 and the Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) in 1975. Remarkably, a lot of Somalis were employed as drivers for the transportation of crude oil from Dar-es-Salaam to Ndola. Up to date haulage has retained its significance as the major employment generating activity among the Somalis of Zambia.

border business in Mpulungu, on the south-eastern shores of Lake Tanganyika, have regularly attracted businessmen from eastern Congo and southwestern Tanzania as well as a few Somalis and Sudanese involved in retailing business. It is not unusual to hear Swahili spoken in the streets of Mpulungu.

The Southern and the Central Provinces have had a significant Muslim presence boosted mainly by the Yao.⁴³ Choma, Monze and Mazabuka comprise about three quarters of the Muslims in the Southern Province. Most of them have been self-employed tailors or traders, while others worked on commercial farms or were engaged in fishing activities along the Kafue River and in Namwala district. With the growth of the towns, they have become more concentrated in townships, known locally as 'compounds'. A number of retirees from the mine towns of the Copperbelt later joined these communities, by ethnic affinity. The Asian factor, though not as important as in Lusaka and the Eastern Province, has also made a substantial contribution to the development of Islam in these regions.

Although Sunni Islam accounts for nearly 98% percent of the total Muslim population in Zambia, the Ahmadiyya and the Shi'a Muslim communities, have also succeeded in introducing their forms of Islam into the country. The Ahmadiyya community was introduced into the country in the late sixties through Pakistani expatriates. Until the end of the last century, the constantly changing small community, residing mainly in Lusaka, did very little to propagate Islam among the indigenous people. The daring character of a missionary-in-charge sent to Zambia in 2000 saw the foundation of 9 new Ahmadiyya mosques in Petauke district, a Sunni dominated area, in less than two years.⁴⁴ All the activities are locally organized through the Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission in Zambia whose leader is directly answerable to the Ahmadiyya headquarters in London. Shi'a Islam, like the Ahmadiyya, was also introduced into the country through immigrant families, chiefly from Iran. Before its closure in 1992, the Iranian embassy indirectly sustained the religious activities of the Shi'a community through the Islamic Centre of Zambia, the only Shi'a association in the country which was also seen as the cultural wing of the embassy. The Shi'a community has managed to gain a few followers among indigenous people mainly through such activities as ritual prayers, thematic discussions, library services, etc., organised at its centre opposite the University of Zambia.

⁴³ Observation made during fieldwork.

⁴⁴ The term missionary, employed by the ahmadis themselves, designates a person in charge of a specific geographical territory. The Ahmadiyya is an overtly missionary oriented community with an elaborate hierarchical organization.

The earlier Muslim communities founded by the coastal traders, the Asians and the African migrant communities were only incidentally interested in the communal practice of Islam, let alone in its propagation among the indigenous people. Various factors account for the transformation of Islam, a faith community that was on the verge of becoming religiously dormant, into an active vector of remarkable social and religious change in post-colonial Zambia. One of the most important factors in the expansion of Islam in Zambia has been the proliferation of local Muslim associations. Since the 1970s, around 150 associations have been created and registered with the Registrar of Societies to spearhead the organization of various activities within the Muslim community.⁴⁵ Although the organization of the community into associations run by chairmen, secretaries and treasurers, often with little formal religious qualification, does not reflect traditional Islamic religious leadership, it has proved extremely efficacious in conferring formal political recognition to the activities of the Muslim communities and, by the same token, has largely facilitated the practical organization of religious leadership.⁴⁶ Thanks to this state-regulated form of organization, the Muslims have been able to train and support the work of the *imams*, officially apply for land and build mosques, schools, and run projects for orphans. In the same way, they have also been able to apply for monetary foreign aid and to give a concrete Muslim response to social and moral problems

But if Muslim associations have been an important agent of Islamization, their existence itself is closely related to the dire economic condition of Zambia throughout much of its post-colonial history. Overwhelmed by ever-increasing economic challenges, successive Zambian governments have appealed to faith communities to make their contribution to the country's development, mainly in the health, education and social sectors. As all other faith communities, the Muslims' response to socio-economic needs has seen the construction of relatively high standard private schools, such as LICEF (Lusaka Islamic Cultural and Education Fundation), Makeni and *Dar ul-'Ulumu*, in Lusaka, IWCTZ (Islamic Welfare Centre Trust Zambia), in Lundazi, Chingololo, in Chipata, and Anusa, in Petauke. The MIST's investment in the health sector through its private clinic in Makeni has had a great impact, especially among the poor families from the neighbouring townships of Kanyama, John Leing and

⁴⁵ Only one existed before then, the Chipata Muslim Association, founded in 1948. In fact, such associations are not peculiar to the Muslim community in Zambia. All the other faith communities in the country – Catholics, Protestants, Evangelicals, Independent Churches, etc – are equally obliged by law to register their various formal groupings with the Registrar of Societies as associations.

⁴⁶ Associations as discussed in this paper are more a necessity of modern nation-states than of the *ummah*, the Islamic world, as a religious entity.

Chawama that cannot afford general costs exacted by other private clinics. *Dar er-Rahman* (House of Mercy), one of the success stories of the LMWT (Lusaka Muslim Women Trust), is a project that was launched in 2001 with the idea of providing home-based-care to old people in the various townships of Lusaka. The following year, doors were opened to orphans and vulnerable children. Although the majority of the children are Muslims, the orphanage is also open to non-Muslim orphaned children. ZICEDA (Zambia Islamic Child Care Education and Da wa Association) runs a similar home-based-care program for the vulnerable, especially those affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Besides running an orphanage for boys in Chipata township, AMA (Africa Muslim Agency), a Kuwait-based Islamic NGO, supports development projects mainly through the sinking of boreholes. Such projects have rendered visible the intervention of the Muslim community in socio-economic matters and have indirectly attracted new converts.

But the exacerbating living conditions and widespread poverty levels both in the urban and rural areas have impacted on the Zambians' religious choices in more direct ways, too. The legitimate religious and pious practice of *zakat* and *sadaqa* has often been tainted by its ambiguous application in certain circumstances and its misinterpretation on the side of the beneficiaries and the non-Muslim faith communities. Being one of the most affluent communities, Asian Muslims easily find themselves with material resources coming from the mandatory *zakat* contributions made by the local community, as well as by Muslims abroad, for the benefit of the needy Muslims (*zakat*) or any needy person regardless of their religion (*sadaqa*). When needy indigenous Muslim are offered assistance of any kind by their Asian coreligionists, some non-Muslims who would happily welcome such an assistance feel segregated against and may eventually enter the fold of Islam with the hope of benefiting from such generosity. Such a practice contributed substantially to the exceptional success of Islam in rural Lundazi and Petauke districts.

Although nearly all contemporary Muslim associations are male-dominated Muslim women have also tried to forge their own identity through collective activities. In 2004 there was only one association that had both male and female membership at the executive level, the ZICEDA, and only one formally registered association that was exclusively feminine in membership, the LMWT. Women's efforts to participate, on a higher level, in male dominated associations often meet with discouragement and have been at times branded un-Islamic. But, as remarked by Rahman, 'a woman may engage in her normal activities inside or outside the house as required by her circumstances in the Muslim society, provided she observes the *hijab* commandment and does not freely mix and intermingle with other people except when it is necessitated by

circumstances or by the requirements of her work.⁴⁷ Thus, more and more women have come out to create space for themselves so as to contribute not only to the promotion of Islam but also to the development of society at large, be it among themselves (LMWT) or in collaboration with men (ZICEDA). In general, women residing in a particular circumscription covered by one or the other local Muslim association would be considered *de facto* members of that association. But, since most of the collective activities organized by such associations are often male-centred, female membership, though taken for granted, is rarely given due consideration. Thus, in Lusaka, women from neighbouring townships would regularly meet among themselves on a rotating basis irrespective of the association they are supposed to belong to. The majority of the women participate actively in regular activities, such as Islamic days and women's *madrasa*, without necessarily being affiliated to the association organizing such activities.⁴⁸ The women *madrasas*, held twice a week in the mosque, have the same significance as the *nadw t* in Clark's study of the Islah Charitable Society in Yemen, where, she notes, '[*nadw t*] play an important role in the creation of networks of trust and solidarity and, potentially, an Islamist worldview, because they are held on a regular, often weekly, basis and many of them bring together a greater number of different social networks'.⁴⁹

To stress the role of Muslim associations and, more in general, of socio-economic factors in the propagation of Islam in post-colonial Zambia is not akin to downplaying the religious appeal that Islam has genuinely exerted on the new converts. Undeniably, spiritual motivations have played a significant role in the conversion of Zambians to Islam. Previous affiliations to other faith communities underline the awareness of spiritual quests probably not fully addressed in the other religions. Successive religious affiliations cannot be reduced solely to material motivations. In fact, in some cases, overt material enticement may provoke derision and scorn. The material lure as an initial motivation for conversion has often been purified and has given way to long-term spiritual aspirations and religious convictions. After all, even the most spiritually motivated conversion needs a concrete material context within which to thrive.

⁴⁷ A. Rahman (ur), *Role of Muslim woman in society* (London, 1986), 361.

⁴⁸ Islamic days, to be distinguished from *ta'lim* or women madrasa (Islamic classes offered on weekly basis for elderly Muslims), were introduced by LMWT as a way of bringing together the Muslim women of Lusaka at least once every two months. These seminar-like sessions, animated mostly by male scholars, were at first ill-judged and considered inappropriate for Muslim women by the male critics.

⁴⁹ J.A. Clark, *Islam, charity and activism: Middle-class networks and social welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2004), 132.

External influence on the development of Islam in Zambia

The lead taken by Muslim associations in organizing the Muslim community of Zambia has to be evaluated against the background of Islamic networks outside the country, such as the *Tablighi Jama‘at*, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission, the Africa Muslim Agency (AMA), Iran (through a network of Islamic university graduates, particularly from Razavi University) and Islamic universities in Arab and Asian countries, which have helped to give a more global orientation to local Islam. Muslim networks outside the country have been able to exert influence on the development of Islam in Zambia through close collaboration with local associations and the endowment of spiritual and material resources to local Muslims. In spite of their modest character, projects and modes of existence adopted by the emerging Zambian Muslim communities largely share in the pre-occupations and aspirations of their coreligionists in other parts of the world.

The Tabligh Jam‘at

A practice within Sunni Islam inspired by the *Deobandi* school of thought that invites Muslims to take an active part in Islamic propagation through a Sufi inspired method, the *Tabligh Jam‘at* (TJ) has played an important role in the re-awakening of a particular form of religious piety meant to be the authentic basis of an Islamic society.⁵⁰ ‘The immediate concern of [TJ] is not the capture of state power and the establishment of an Islamic state, but rather, the moral reform of individuals, often described as making Muslims true Muslims’.⁵¹ In the words of Simons: ‘[TJ is] a missionary organization that focuses (almost) entirely on reshaping of individual lives, on cultivating personal piety and right conduct’.⁵² Its transnational missionary zeal has brought its members into contact with the most remote corners of the world, where it has made a remarkable impact on the local practice of Islam.⁵³

The *da‘wa* enterprise of TJ has seen the feet of its members literally tread the soils of different parts of Zambia. The benefit of their contact with the local communities has been more spiritual than material. Although local Muslim

⁵⁰ See the book compiled by S.A. Kayum, *The Jamaat Tableegh and the deobandis: A critical analysis of their beliefs, books and dawah* (Ahya Multi-Media, 2001). This can be consulted on <http://www.ahya.org.tjonline/index/html> (accessed on 1 Sept. 2006).

⁵¹ Y. Sikand, *The origins and development of the Tablighi Jama‘at (1920-2000): A cross-country comparative study* (Hyderabad, 2002), 2.

⁵² T.W. Simons, *Islam in a globalizing world* (Stanford, 2003), 57.

⁵³ For more information on the impact of TJ in different parts of the world, especially the west, see Moosa, ‘Worlds “apart”’.

associations hold the key to understanding the current revival of Islam in Zambia and its propagation, TJ has had the merit of enhancing the religious enthusiasm that has seen the re-emergence of Islamic religious practice in Zambia. Certainly, TJ-inspired religious practices such as *ziy ra* (Muslims visiting Muslims), *ta'l m* (teaching one another matters of religion at the mosque and in homes) and *jam 'at* (going away from home for a given number of days in a group, practicing and propagating Islam) have given a solid spiritual content to the day-to-day religious practice of the local Muslim communities, in addition to the other regular Islamic practices.⁵⁴

The role played by the Asians, particularly Indians, in the formal organization and material support of the emerging Muslim community in Zambia has had much to do with the success of the type of Islamic practice promulgated by TJ. As noted by Moosa concerning the influence of TJ in South Africa: 'The common group identity and ethnicity which a section of the converts to [TJ] share with the geographical roots of the movement, namely India, provide a natural religious "home" in a "symbolic" diaspora'.⁵⁵ No wonder, then, that TJ has elected Burma Mosque in Lusaka as its headquarters in Zambia. Vigil is held at Burma Mosque on Thursdays and it is from here that groups are dispatched for *jam 'at* within the country.⁵⁶

TJ's influence on the local Muslims does not limit itself to the changes it has helped to bring about within the local Muslim community; it has also rendered it possible for autochthonous Muslims to identify with Muslims beyond their borders and to have a sense of belonging to the transnational *ummah*. Unfortunately, due to lack of material means, the desire to travel far and wide for the sake of religion – like the need to go on pilgrimage to Mecca – remains a dream for the majority of poor Zambian Muslims. Nonetheless, the visiting coreligionists bring with them enticing stories of how Islam is practiced in their part of the world or in the regions they have visited.

The Africa Muslim Agency

The Africa Muslim Agency (AMA) is a Kuwait-based non-governmental organization that has been operational in forty African countries since its foundation in 1981. The main objective underlying its foundation was the strengthening of cultural and human relationships between African countries and Arab states, mainly in the domain of social and economic development. Its major area of

⁵⁴ According to Moosa, followers of TJ 'experience a new kind of religiosity in *Tabl gh work*'; *ibid.*, 212.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 210.

⁵⁶ Ishmail Nadat to author, 12 Apr. 2005. Ismail was once chairman of the Lusaka Muslim Society and was personally an adept of TJ.

operation is the building and running of schools and health centres, especially in rural areas. It has also been involved with providing potable water through the digging and sinking of boreholes. AMA has also consecrated a lot of its resources to the building and running of orphanages, professional and vocational training centres and food relief projects in times of famine.⁵⁷

In line with its declared objectives of 2004, the major recent realization of AMA in Zambia has been the orphanage in Chipata compound, sheltering around 50 male orphans, 88 others being sponsored whilst living with relatives or adopted families. The orphanage, situated within the same compound as the Tauba Masjid served both as residence as well as a school for the orphans. The Agency affirmed having sponsored 4 Zambian students to Kuwait for studies, presumably Islamic. In order to lessen the costs of running the orphanage and to raise funds for other projects, the agency had a farm project in Makeni, about 15km farther beyond the head office. The farm specialized mainly in poultry. The project to put up a clinic within the farm had not taken off, whilst the proposed community school was modestly making its way forward. In 2004 there was only one teacher teaching 25 pupils in the first four primary school grades. Another clinic was envisaged to be set up in Chipata compound, in the same area where the orphanage was, but due to shortage of personnel, this seemed to be taking longer than foreseen. AMA also organized a vocational training centre for women within the same locality.

The Agency has consecrated a major part of its resources to the supply of potable water. Up to 150 wells had been dug both in towns and in the rural areas to alleviate the problem of water supply. In times of food crisis, as was the case in 2002-2003, when many parts of the country were stricken by drought, AMA distributed rice, to the benefit of 10,850 individuals in the Eastern Province. The general official scope of AMA Zambia Office, was inscribed in the statement it made about its future projects: 'AMA has plans to expand the area of its projects and programs to cover all the regions of the country. It also looks forward to increase its cooperation with government agencies and NGOs in Zambia for better performance and fair distribution'.⁵⁸

AMA built more mosques throughout the country than any other local Muslim association. In Chipata district alone, AMA built about a third of eleven existing mosques and yet there was no official acknowledgement, neither in the general outline of its objectives nor in its report of 2004, of this remarkable realization. This makes it difficult to gauge AMA's religious contribution to the propagation of Islam in Zambia, not least because the Kuwaitis limit themselves

⁵⁷ See profile of AMA in <http://www.friendsofgovi.org.uk/links.html> (accessed on 8 Feb. 2005).

⁵⁸ Report of AMA programs in Zambia, 2003, 2.

to supplying the funds without directly getting involved in fieldwork. The projects are usually run by Sudanese or North Africans. Nonetheless, in the minds of local people, these realizations are not attributed to the NGO aspect of the AMA, but are hailed as Arab Muslim projects and have therefore played an important role not only in building places of worship but also in providing a concrete demonstration of Islamic social engagement. Some of the Islamic literature circulated among the potential converts originated from Kuwait or was published by AMA national offices in the neighbouring countries of Zimbabwe and Malawi.

AMA's direct support of the needs of the local Muslim community through the construction of mosques and propagation of Islamic literature has created an international link between Zambian Muslims and the Arab world. The young Zambians who benefited from the scholarships offered by the AMA to study in Kuwait were exposed to an Arab type of Islam, somewhat different from the Asian and the Yao-dominated one they had always known at home. The late Chief Mshawa, who had played a key role in allowing AMA to construct mosques in Nkhande, Nthera, Mgombe and Chinunda, north of Chipata, was rewarded with a visit to Kuwait in 2002. As AMA realized its religious projects by proxy, it has not been able to do more than give material assistance to the communities that asked for it. Hence, if not taken over by other associations, most of the mosques it built gradually fell into disuse due to lack of regular follow-up. Plans to build a local religious institute in Chipata that would eventually supply the mosque-based-communities with the necessary personnel were underway in 2004.⁵⁹

Foreign Islamic institutions

Literacy occupies an important place in the transmission of Islamic knowledge and in the formation of the Muslim community. Islamic institutions abroad play an important role in the relationship between local and global Islam. On the one hand, as converging points for international Muslim students, they are a significant representation of the global aspect of Islam, an international outlet for sub-Saharan scholars. On the other hand, through international students returning to their homelands after their graduation and through the sponsorship of other Islamic institutions abroad, these institutions have spread their influence far and wide. For instance: 'Nigerian students in Islamic countries sometimes

⁵⁹ Interview with Mutualika Banda, 20 Sept. 2004. Banda is the *mwalimu* of Ndembela mosque, off Musolo Road, in Chipata. He was one of the three AMA-sponsored *mwalimus* in the district. In a meeting held in September 2004 with the visiting AMA Kuwaiti officials, the need for such an institution was felt and promises were made for the realization of the project in the near future.

changed their religious perceptions of Islam, and when they returned home they were dismayed by the lack of orthodoxy in the Islam of their own communities'.⁶⁰

Well before the nineties scores of young Zambians benefited from scholarships, mainly for religious studies, offered through such local Muslim associations as the Lundazi IWCTZ and MIST in Makeni and some embassies of Arab countries. The Shia community, through its Islamic Centre of Zambia, has granted similar opportunities for young converts to do studies in institutions of higher learning in Iran, probably with the support of the Iranian Ministry of Education and the *munazzama al-'ilm isl mi*, known for its attribution of bursaries or financial aid to secondary school establishments in Africa.⁶¹ The major destinations for such students were Islamic universities in Pakistan, the Al-Azhar University in Egypt, Medina Islamic University in Saudi Arabia and the African Islamic University in Sudan. The variety of the universities attended by young Zambian Muslim scholars has produced a diversified academic formation whose impact on the future of Islam in Zambia is still fully to be appreciated.

Most of the graduates of these universities came back to the country and, in spite of the limited outlets for their religious careers, they have started contributing substantially to the development of Islam in Zambia. The majority of them have been absorbed as members of staff at MIST. Some of them are involved in the organization of radio programs such as *Focus on Islam* in connection with the Zambia National Broadcasting Cooperation (ZNBC), while others have been enrolled as teachers in local Islamic institutions such as the *Jami'a Islamiyya* in Thorn Park, Lusaka. Scores of other graduates have gone to look for job opportunities in South Africa.⁶² The development of Islam in South Africa has in various ways started to exert some influence on Islam in Zambia.⁶³

⁶⁰ C. Steed and D. Westerlund, 'Nigeria', in: D. Westerlund and I. Svanberg, eds, *Islam outside the Arab world* (Richmond, 1999), 63.

⁶¹ Mattes, 'La da'wa Libyenne', 37.

⁶² Due to political and socio-economical tribulations engendered by apartheid the Muslim community of South Africa was late in forming its own religious leaders. Young Muslim graduates from such institutions as Lundazi Islamic Welfare Trust and Mahadur-Rashidu were, in this respect, providential.

⁶³ Currently South Africa boasts of better higher institutes of Islamic education than any other country in the region. Controversial figures such as Daudi Timangale Mbewwa pride themselves on having been introduced to Comparative *Da'wa* in South Africa. Most of the regionally produced Islamic literature stems at present from South Africa. In his article 'Islamic "Jihad" on Africa exposed', Remmy Kabali dwelt on allegations that the Muslims from more than 80 countries who assembled in Tripoli at the beginning of Oct. 1995 were planning to embark on a revolutionary Islamization of Africa and to use South Africa as their springboard. A similar

The comparative *da‘wa* approach, locally championed by South African trained individuals like Daudi Mbewwa of Lundazi, owes its origin to South African scholars such as Ahmed Dedaat.

The preceding paragraphs on the relation between local and global Islam help to identify some key influences on contemporary Muslim identity in Zambia. They show that the coming of Islam into the country and its later development have been the results of both endogenous and exogamous factors. Diversity within the Zambian Muslim community makes it difficult to isolate a clearly defined form of ‘local Islam’. Even Zambian-born Asians still maintain strong cultural ties with their countries of origin. In spite of having been in the country for so long and having married local women, the Yao still identify with Malawi and Mozambique and claim to practice a kind of Islam that distinguishes itself, albeit secondarily, from that practised by their Asian and Somali coreligionists. Whilst bringing with them certain traits of their Christian or traditional religious background, more recent Zambian converts add another element of diversity to the already existing Muslim communities.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the most significant moment in the development of Islam in Zambia has coincided with the country’s post-colonial period. Firstly, the communal practice of Islam in community mosques, encouraged by visiting members of the TJ, exposed the lost sense of collective religiosity. In spite of having existed for decades prior to that, the early settler Muslim communities – the Indians and the Yao – were only incidentally preoccupied with the collective practice of Islam. Their main reasons for coming to Zambia were economic and had very little to do with the propagation of Islam. Secondly, the possibility to form government-recognized associations proved instrumental in providing organizational structures through which the needs of the community, ranging from social to religious, could be satisfied. And this took place in a context of profound economic crisis that created space for religious intervention. The call upon faith communities to supplement government efforts to solve socio-economic problems has cleared the way for Muslims to give social expression to their religious endeavour.

gathering was alleged to have taken place in Abuja in 1989. *Times of Zambia*, 16 Dec. 1995.

PART III:

**THE ECONOMY AND THE
STATE**



Photo 10 Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda addressing the party faithful

9

‘The devil you know’: The impact of the Mulungushi economic reforms on retail trade in rural Zambia, with special reference to Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, 1968-80

Hugh Macmillan

A personal introduction

I have been aware for a long time of the disintegration of old-established rural trading networks that resulted from the Mulungushi Economic Reforms, which were announced by President Kenneth Kaunda in April 1968. I saw some of the consequences of the reforms when, travelling between Lusaka and Livingstone in January 1969, I passed many locked and shuttered Indian shops in the small towns such as Mazabuka, Monze, Pemba and Kalomo, though probably not in Choma, which was one of the ten towns in Zambia which were exempted from the new trade licensing arrangements that came into effect on the first day of that year. I passed similarly locked and shuttered shops in the small towns of Malawi in the same year. Both Zambia and Malawi were following the example of Kenya’s Trade Licensing Act, which was passed in 1967. This excluded ‘resident expatriates’ – a euphemism for Indian traders who had retained British or Indian citizenship – from rural areas, and confined them to the centres of large towns.

I became more acutely aware of the commercial ‘vacuum’ that had then been created, and never really filled, in the Western Province, formerly Barotseland,

during a visit that I made in January 1984 to Senanga West.¹ I discovered that retail trade and distribution, and the buying of produce, had virtually ceased in the area. At Mutomena, about half way between the Angolan border and the Zambezi, we met a man with an ox-drawn sledge who was making a six-day trek to Sioma in the hope of buying maize meal. Things were not much better along the main Senanga-Sesheke road. We came across a NIEC shop, which had only one commodity for sale, salt, of which it had received a truckload some time previously.

An old and wise schoolteacher at Sipuma on the Angolan border road assured me that things had not always been as bad as this. In a mini-lecture on postcolonial economic decline and rural underdevelopment, he recalled the days of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, which had made the road to facilitate the recruitment of labour for the South African gold mines, and of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, which had run well-stocked stores in remote places, including several on the west bank of the Zambezi in the Kalabo, Senanga and Sesheke districts.² I also heard of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn at about this time from Simon Zukas, who became chairman of Zambesi Ranching and Cropping in 1983. He explained that this was a surviving investment of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, whose retail trading business had been taken over by the Industrial Development Corporation (Indeco) in consequence of the Mulungushi Reforms in 1968-9. I had myself encountered a part of the Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn trading network when, as a seventeen-year old youth, I visited Balovale, now Zambezi, in the North-Western Province, in 1962-3. I was then impressed, as other visitors were, by A.F. Serrano's remarkably well-stocked shop. I have a vague recollection of meeting Serrano himself, but it was nearly forty years later that I discovered that this was a subsidiary of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn.

I acquired some knowledge of retail trade in the eastern half of Zambia when I was working on a dissertation on the history of the African Lakes Corporation in the late 1960s, but I only came back to the subject in the mid-1990s when Simon Zukas, and other members of the Council for Zambia Jewry, invited me to take over a history project which they had started. In the course of research for a book, which appeared in 1999 as *Zion in Africa: The Jews of Zambia*, I encountered the fascinating story of the Susman brothers. I also met David Susman and Edwin Wulfsohn and began to think that it would be interesting to work on the history of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn. Somewhat to my surprise,

¹ Anthony Martin uses the word 'vacuum' in this context in *Minding their own business: Zambia's struggle against western control* (Harmondsworth, 1975, first published 1972).

² Interview with Mr. Sakwale, Sipuma, Jan. 1984.

my repeated enquiries to David Susman about family and business records resulted in an invitation from him, and his partners, Edwin Wulfsohn, John Rabb and Simon Zukas, to write a history of the business. I began work on this in April 2001 and the resulting book, *An African Trading Empire: The Story of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, 1901–2005*, was published in May 2005. The book includes a brief account of the effects of the Mulungushi Economic Reforms on the retail-trading network, though this was a subject about which the family and company archives, as well as the Zambian National Archives, appeared to be reticent. I had to rely largely on oral sources as I had not then discovered, and have still not discovered, any documents relating to the negotiations about the takeover of the stores network, though I did find information on the terms of the deal that was eventually done.³

The purpose of this paper is to look in more detail than was possible in *An African Trading Empire* at the background to the Mulungushi Economic Reforms and to the decisions that were then made about retail trade. The starting point of the paper is Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, but the central thesis of this essay has a wider application. I suggest that the dismantling of established trading networks, including those of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, which was strongest in the Western and Southern Provinces, though it also had a presence in the North-Western, Luapula and Northern provinces; of CBC (Zambia) Ltd, which was more thinly spread all over the country; and of family-based Indian trading networks, which were strongest in the Eastern, Central and Southern Provinces of the country, all contributed significantly to the economic decline of rural Zambia from the late 1960s onwards. This made it more difficult for these areas to withstand the pressures that were an inevitable consequence of the oil price crisis and the downturn in the global economy that began in 1973 and hit Zambia forcefully in 1975. The same argument may apply to other sectors of the economy including the copper mines. The loss of management skills, and international links, made it more difficult for Zambia as a whole to respond to

³ There are no papers relating to these negotiations in the Susman or Wulfsohn papers, though there are references to the conclusion of the negotiations and the terms of the takeover, and subsequent payments, in the minutes of Stores Holdings Ltd, Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn Ltd, and Concorde Investments Ltd. There appear to be no relevant Indeco papers in the Zambian National Archives, nor do the copies of personal papers deposited in the archives by Andrew Sardanis shed any light on these negotiations. It is possible that there are references to these negotiations, or to the local impact of the reforms, in documents relating to the implementation of the Economic Reforms in the Barotse and North Western Provinces, but I did not see them in 2001, and recent enquiries on my behalf by Marja Hinfelaar suggest that, if they exist, they have not yet been catalogued.

the recession of the mid 1970s, which was to last much longer in tropical Africa than in most other parts of the world.⁴

The Mulungushi economic reforms

In introducing the Mulungushi Economic Reforms, President Kenneth Kaunda distinguished between 'State Enterprise; Zambian Private Enterprise; Foreign Controlled Enterprise; and Resident Expatriate Enterprise'. He chose to deal with the last of these first:

Economic activity in Zambia is dominated by European and Asian business communities whose members have been residents of this country for many years. Since Independence my Ministers and I have been making repeated appeals to members of these communities, calling upon them to identify with the nation and urging them to Zambianise their businesses as soon as possible. I am very pleased to say that many of them have responded to our pleas by taking up Zambian nationality and by making sincere efforts to train Zambians to skilled and executive positions. There is, however, an appreciably large number of others who have chosen to remain outside the national family. They have kept only one foot in Zambia in order to take advantage of the economic boom created by the Transitional and the First National Development Plans. The other foot they have kept outside Zambia in South Africa, Britain, Europe, India, or wherever they come from, ready to jump when they have made enough money, or when they think that the country no longer suits them. I am afraid the period of grace is over. These people must now make a final choice. We do not wish to keep them here against their will. We are a proud nation. At the same time it is not fair that we should allow them to make off with the jam and the butter and leave crumbs of dry bread for our people.⁵

He went on to outline the steps that he intended to take in order to place 'resident expatriate businesses' on the same restricted basis as foreign businesses in terms of their access to credit from Zambian banks and other financial institutions. He stated that these businesses would not be allowed to operate outside the centres of ten named towns, Chingola, Mufulira, Kitwe, Luanshya, Ndola, Kabwe, Lusaka, Mazabuka, Choma and Livingstone, and that no new

⁴ The impact on rural livelihoods of the undermining of 'resident expatriate' trading networks in Zambia and Malawi is a sadly neglected topic. It is remarkable for example that Megan Vaughan, in her chapter, 'Exploitation and neglect: rural producers and the state in Malawi and Zambia', in: David Birmingham and Phyllis Martin, eds, *History of central Africa: The contemporary years since 1960* (Harlow, 1997), makes no reference at all to this topic.

⁵ K.D. Kaunda, 'Zambia Towards Economic Independence', in: B. de Gaay Fortman, ed., *After Mulungushi: The economics of Zambian humanism* (Nairobi, 1969), 50-51.

licences would be issued for such businesses within the centres of the ten towns.⁶

It is clear that the latter sections of Kaunda's speech were primarily aimed at Indian traders in rural areas. He then turned his attention to the listing of the twenty-six companies that he was 'inviting' to 'offer' fifty-one per cent of their shares to the state. Many of the firms listed were the Zambian branches of British or Southern African multi-nationals, which were involved in the supply of building materials and timber, in transport, and manufacturing. There were, however, some that were engaged in retail trade.

Now that I have confined the field of retail trading in many areas and the expansion of retail trading in all places to Zambians, I want to have a retail State organisation operating alongside them so that we have some measure of control over their activities and a check on retail price inflation. For this reason I am asking certain large retail groups to offer at least 51 per cent of their shares to Government. These are CBC stores and shops, O.K. Bazaars, Standard Trading, Solanki Brothers Ltd, and Mwaiseni Stores Ltd. When the state has taken control of these businesses we shall find ways of rationalising their activities so that we will save wasteful duplication where possible.⁷

Earlier in his speech he had claimed that while he was encouraging Zambian private enterprise and creating space for the emergence of Zambian entrepreneurs through the removal of 'resident expatriate' or foreign competition, he was not encouraging the development of Zambian capitalists. He said in a sentence that was italicised for emphasis: '*I do not want to create capitalism here*'.⁸ When Zambian private companies reached a certain size, they would be expected to offer their shares for sale to the public through a stock exchange, and when public companies reached a certain unspecified size, they would be expected to offer themselves for state participation. He singled out Andrew Sardanis's Mwaiseni Stores as an example of a Zambian-owned company that had reached the latter stage and was offering a share of itself to the state. Sardanis was a Greek Cypriot trader who had been in competition in a small way with Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn and CBC in the North-Western

⁶ *Ibid.*, 51-3.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 62-3. The number of companies listed for takeover is often put as twenty-five. That is as a result of confusion between the number listed and the number actually taken over by Indeco. Two companies listed were not taken over by Indeco. Standard Trading Ltd was taken over by CBC Ltd and Solanki Bros. Ltd declined the invitation to offer its shares to Indeco. Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn was not originally listed, but its subsidiary, Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn (Stores) Ltd, which was held through Stores Holdings Ltd, was compelled to offer itself for takeover. As a result twenty-five companies were eventually taken over.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 59. He had on the previous page of his speech said: 'But, for goodness sake, I do not want to create Zambian capitalism here.'

Province. He had thrown in his lot with UNIP and had become chairman of Indeco and was soon to acquire another hat as permanent secretary of the ministry of commerce and industry. Kaunda also indicated that another unnamed company had agreed to offer shares to the state. It soon became known that this company was CBC (Zambia) Ltd and that the initiative for the takeover of this company had come from its British parent company, Booker Brothers, McConnell Ltd.⁹

President Kaunda's perspective on the implementation of the Mulungushi reforms

Rather less than eighteen months later, while announcing the Matero Reforms, which included the fifty-one per cent takeover of the mining companies, President Kaunda gave a progress report on the Mulungushi reforms and their impact on retail trade.

I am pleased to report that the operation has gone off very well indeed. As from the beginning of the year an increasingly large number of shops has changed hands and, despite the prediction of the Jonases [sic but 'Jonahs'], not a single area of the country has suffered from lack of goods. Despite the predictions of those who do not wish the country to succeed there have been no shortages of goods. In general I am very pleased that the operation has gone so smoothly and, indeed, I am extremely pleased with the results. Out of the 850 or so shops previously owned by expatriates outside the prescribed areas already 300 have changed hands [...].

Of course there are many shops that still remain closed today, and there are others that have been granted wholesale licences or licences to sell prescribed goods. I am not perturbed by the number of shops that are still closed. I did not expect that on 31st December, 1968, all shops outside the prescribed areas would be closed by their expatriate owners, in order to open again on 2nd January, 1969, by their new Zambian owners. Such miracles do not happen.

What has been achieved in the very short time of six months is formidable and I know that time is on our side. The longer the shops remain closed the cheaper they will eventually sell.¹⁰

Noting that there were too many expatriate-owned shops with wholesale licences outside the prescribed areas, he announced that as from 1 January 1970 these would be confined to the ten urban centres and to the provincial capitals.¹¹ He then listed the four state trading businesses, the Consumer Buying Corpo-

⁹ *Ibid.*, 63. It has to be said that the stock exchange did not take off at this stage. A stock exchange was founded, or re-founded, with the move towards privatisation in the mid 1990s.

¹⁰ K.D. Kaunda, *Towards complete economic independence: Address by His Excellency the President Dr K.D. Kaunda to the UNIP National Council Held at Matero Hall, Lusaka, 11 August, 1969* (Lusaka, 1969), 8-9.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 9.

ration of Zambia Ltd (previously CBC (Zambia) Ltd and later known as ZCBC Ltd), Mwaiseni Stores Ltd., ZOK Ltd., and the Zambesi Trading Company, which had come into existence as a result of the reforms. Zambesi Trading was a newcomer to the list. Kaunda explained that this was the former Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn. He commended 'this organisation for voluntarily coming forward and offering 51 per cent of its shares to INDECO'.¹²

Just over a year later, in November 1970, Kaunda announced a further twist in the screw in so far as 'resident expatriate' traders were concerned.

Despite prophesies [*sic*] of doom, despite threats of cancellations of orders, despite fears that the country would run out of supplies, we forged ahead with the reforms. And we have been very successful. Not a single one of these ills happened and instead we have built up a very efficient Zambian business nucleus in the trading field. As I said, I want this nucleus to grow and therefore, as from the 1st January 1972, no expatriate, under any circumstances, will be allowed to obtain a retail trading licence. Comrades, as from the 1st January 1972 all retail trade throughout Zambia will be done by Zambians, i.e. Co-operatives, State companies, and Zambian public and private companies.¹³

He went on to announce that this would apply also to wholesale trade, and that expatriates would no longer be allowed to trade in a list of ten specified commodities that had previously been exempted.¹⁴ Six months later he made one more public comment on the impact of the Economic Reforms on the retail sector, showing for the first time a hint of disappointment at the failure of Zambian businessmen, or women, to fill the 'vacuum' that he had created on their behalf, as well as some frustration at the demand of traders that the state should provide them with capital.

I have heard of the gaps that have been created as a result of giving Zambians priority access to certain business opportunities. There are districts and towns in the country where even after three years of Economic Reforms very few local people have taken initiative, individually, in partnerships, or as co-operative societies, to organise themselves and take over or set up small-scale businesses.¹⁵

¹² *Ibid.*, 14.

¹³ 'Take Up The Challenge...' *Speeches Made by His Excellency the President Dr K.D. Kaunda to the United National Independence Party National Council, Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka, 7-10 November 1970* (Lusaka, 1970), Closing speech, 10 Nov. 1970, 59.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 60.

¹⁵ K.D. Kaunda, *A path for the future: Address by His Excellency the President Dr K.D. Kaunda, as Secretary-General of the United National Independence Party on the Occasion of the Opening of the Sixth General Conference of the United National Independence Party, Mulungushi Hall, 8th May 1971* (Lusaka, 1971), 33.

Economic nationalism and the rationale behind Mulungushi and Matero

Kaunda's Mulungushi and Matero speeches seem now to present a strange amalgam of economic nationalism, naivete, complacency and disingenuousness. The drive towards economic nationalism and economic independence was a direct response to Southern Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and the failure of the United Kingdom to mount an adequate response to it. It has also to be seen in the context of the increasing tension between Kaunda and his vice-president, Simon Kapwepwe, and of competition between them for the leadership of UNIP. Similar measures were, of course, being adopted in other countries such as Kenya, Malawi, and in Tanzania, where the Arusha Declaration of 1967 involved a more radical attack on foreign-controlled businesses.

The main contemporary justification for the retail trading reforms was the argument that indigenous Zambian shopkeepers found it difficult to compete with networks such as those of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn and CBC, or with Indian networks, which sometimes had their own lines of credit and sources of supply. Underlying the Mulungushi Reforms was the view that as rural shops were small, retail trade was 'easy', and if this sector were left to Zambian businessmen, entrepreneurs would emerge from it. Kaunda claimed, incorrectly, that the colonial authorities, wishing to encourage class divisions, had excluded white and Indian businesses from the urban townships or 'compounds', and allowed the emergence of African entrepreneurs there. He also claimed that the exclusion of 'resident expatriate' traders from rural areas would have similar results. This argument was fallacious, and was used simultaneously in apartheid South Africa to justify the exclusion of 'white' traders from the Bantustans – a move that, in an area like the Transkei, had similarly depressing consequences for retail trade and production.

A business like Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn was only profitable because it was highly efficient, and had mastered the logistics of supply by truck and boat in difficult terrain. It had exceptional links with Woolworths in South Africa and Marks & Spencer in the United Kingdom, allied chain stores that were at the cutting edge of retailing in those countries, and was using merchandising systems that were a slimmed-down version of the ones that they used. CBC was probably not as efficient or as profitable as Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, but it had done more to train Zambian managers, and was also part of an international network. The Zambian traders who did survive as village shopkeepers and hawkers in remote rural areas had not only a dependent, but also, to some extent, a symbiotic relationship with the larger trading networks, which did a

large wholesale trade, and also bought produce, sometimes using independent Zambian traders as buying agents.¹⁶

The government's initial strategy may have been to target Indian traders. The 'large' retail sector only came into the reforms as an after-thought and as a result of an initiative from Bookers. It then decided that it would be useful to have a state shops sector to provide services to the hopefully emergent Zambian retailers. It was, however, economically naive to think that there was a fixed fund of credit and that denying access to it to 'resident expatriate' businesses would result in more credit being available to Zambian traders. In reality banks and wholesalers were reluctant to lend to untried traders with minimal security, and the post-Mulungushi denial of credit to 'resident expatriates' simply had the effect of creating a credit squeeze, which was soon felt in rural areas. It was equally naive to think that removing 'resident expatriate' businesses would, through the creation of a commercial 'vacuum', automatically benefit existing Zambian traders, and that it was possible to encourage free enterprise, and entrepreneurs, without encouraging capitalists, or capitalism. The only paragraph on retail and wholesale trade in Kaunda's philosophical treatise, *Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to its Implementation Part II*, gave instructions to District Governors on how to ensure that private businesses in their districts did not grow beyond 'the bounds of a small family business', and how to avoid the emergence of 'local over-mighty commercial barons'.¹⁷

Kaunda's argument that the time had come for 'resident expatriate' businessmen to decide whether or not they wanted to throw in their lot with the Nation can only be described as disingenuous. While some Indians had been able to choose between British, Indian or Zambian citizenship at independence, very few Indian, or other expatriates, had been able to get Zambian citizenship since independence. A large number of Indians applied for citizenship immediately before and after the Mulungushi speech, but few if any of them obtained it. There was, in reality, no 'choice'.¹⁸ Kaunda's argument that the prevailing boom in the country was the result of the development plans was also disingenuous. The main cause of the boom was the high price of copper, which was the result of the Vietnam War. Zambian revenues had also benefited from the end of

¹⁶ See, for example, Macmillan, *An African trading empire*, 205.

¹⁷ K.D. Kaunda, *Humanism in Zambia and a guide to its implementation Part II* (Lusaka, 1974), 59.

¹⁸ Abe Galaun stated in December 1968 that people who had applied for citizenship before the announcement of the Mulungushi reforms had not yet received responses to their applications – he had previously stated that there had been no grants of citizenship since 1966. Abe Galaun, presidential address to annual general meeting of ZINCOM, 17 Dec. 1968, copy in Galaun papers, by courtesy of the late Vera Galaun.

transfer payments to Southern Rhodesia and of royalty payments to the British South Africa Company, but no one, except Kaunda, seriously suggested that the boom had anything to do with economic planning.¹⁹

His response to the closure of rural shops was dangerously complacent. If, as he suggested in August 1969, only 300 out of 850 shops outside the prescribed areas had been transferred to Zambian owners, then 550 had either remained closed or had found a way of remaining open under 'resident expatriate' ownership – some certainly did this by obtaining wholesale licences. Of the 300 shops that were transferred about 200 must have belonged to Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn and CBC. Only 100 can have been transferred to smaller businesses or individual traders. B.J. Phiri provides an example from the Eastern Province, where there were 176 'resident expatriate' shops scheduled for take over by Zambian citizens or companies in October 1968. In Katete District only nine out of thirty-seven shops had been transferred by May 1969 while twenty-eight remained closed.²⁰ It is likely, therefore, that more than 120 shops remained closed in the province as a whole, and this was a pattern that was replicated in several other provinces. Kaunda's suggestion that the longer the shops remained closed, the cheaper they would eventually become, showed a complete misunderstanding of the value of these shops, which were usually built of Kimberley brick with corrugated iron roofs. Their value did not lie in their buildings, but in the knowledge, experience, creditworthiness, and commercial links of their proprietors.

The Mulungushi Reforms appear to have been influenced by a number of misconceptions and prejudices that were widespread amongst economists and had colonial roots. A prejudice against rural traders had been a feature of the provincial administration, some of whose members combined anti-Semitic and anti-Indian attitudes with a snobbish approach to commerce. While postcolonial economists may not have been as racially or socially prejudiced as colonial civil servants, they laboured under a similar misconception – that agriculture and industry were productive, while commerce was not. There was widespread ignorance of the links between retail trade in rural areas and agricultural pro-

¹⁹ Not even Michael Faber suggested that the boom was the result of the plans, though he did, in his chapter on 'The manufacturing sector' in: Charles Elliott, ed., *Constraints on Zambia's economic development* (Nairobi, 1971), suggest that the growth in manufacturing could be attributed, among many other factors, including copper prices, to changes in industrial policy and a change in the role and chairmanship of Indeco.

²⁰ B.J. Phiri, *A history of Indians in the Eastern Province of Zambia* (Lusaka, 2000), 58-9. It is not clear whether the nine shops that were transferred in Katete district would or would not have included the three shops in the district, which, according to the *Zambia Government Gazette*, 1968, belonged to CBC Ltd.

duction. Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn had had to create a market for goods by providing a market for produce. They had been prepared to buy almost anything saleable from local producers in order to build a market, and had at one time or another been the main buyers in Barotseland and the North-Western Province, and major buyers in the Southern Province, of cattle, hides, cassava, maize, rice, millet, beans, beeswax, ivory, and other products.²¹ Kaunda demonstrated this denial of the productivity of commerce in his Matero speech when he appealed to 'resident expatriates' to enter into joint ventures with Zambians in the agricultural, industrial 'and other productive business fields'. He asked them to 'forget the distribution field and assist the national effort by engaging in direct production'.²²

It is surprising that Kaunda's speeches, which were largely drafted by Andrew Sardanis, should have underestimated the contribution made by efficient retail traders to the rural economy. Sardanis himself seems to have concluded that the role of the rural trader as produce buyer was no longer important. This may have been true of his own small chain of shops, but Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, which had lost its role as cattle buyer to the Cold Storage Commission/Board, and as maize trader to the cooperatives, continued to be involved in the purchase of other kinds of produce. Sardanis himself was clearly drawn towards urban trade. He had opened a shop in Chingola in 1957, and his company, Mwaiseni, opened a large shop in Lusaka's Cairo Road soon after its takeover by Indeco.²³

Sardanis had the benefit not only of his own experience, but also of advice from a distinguished academic economist, Michael Faber, later director of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, who had worked on the Transitional National Development Plan. He was involved in the planning, though not the implementation of the Mulungushi Reforms, and provided the blueprint for the Matero Reforms. Sardanis also had the assistance of a young Cambridge University graduate in economics, Andrew Turnbull, who was later to become Secretary to the Cabinet and head of the civil service in the United Kingdom, but there is no evidence that either of these experts had much knowledge or understanding of rural trade.

Contemporary commentary by academics and others

It is probably not insignificant that a collection of essays by economists, *Constraints on the Economic Development of Zambia*, which was published at this time, had virtually nothing to say about retail trade. In his chapter on 'The

²¹ Macmillan, *An African trading empire*, *passim*, esp. chapters 11 and 14.

²² Kaunda, *Towards complete independence*, 12.

²³ Interview with Andrew Sardanis, reported in *An African trading empire*, 254.

manufacturing sector', Faber referred to the nervousness in the business community that had followed the 'Mulungushi Declaration', and acknowledged that this had resulted in some falling off of investment in stocks, particularly by Indian traders. He thought that this was not a bad thing as the economy was over-heated and the level of imports was rising too strongly at the time.²⁴

The best contemporary account of the background to – and implementation of – the Mulungushi Reforms comes from Anthony Martin's book, *Minding Their Own Business, Zambia's struggle against Western control*, which was written in the middle months of 1971 and first published in 1972. Martin was a journalist and the editor of a short-lived monthly review, *Business and Economy of Central and East Africa*, which was published in Lusaka from 1967 to 1968. He was close to Andrew Sardanis and was a good friend of Faber. He also records that Turnbull read and commented on several drafts of the book. Martin had a somewhat rose-tinted view of Indeco, and of Sardanis, whom the press had dubbed 'Mr Fifty-One Per Cent', but his book is well informed about the reforms, and also contains some contemporary criticisms of them. It places them in the context of the debate about 'state capitalism' and socialism – a word that is conspicuously absent from Kaunda's Mulungushi and Matero speeches. Martin's summary of the impact of the Mulungushi Reforms on retail trade reflects Indeco's view that the only victims of the reforms were 'a few hundred Indian shopkeepers'; their customers were not given much consideration. He wrote:

The Government thus abandoned its previous policy of assisting emerging Zambian businessmen by loans and other means to compete with established commerce, which was overwhelmingly non-African, and instead set out to eliminate the competition in selected areas and create a vacuum in which Zambians could hardly fail to make faster progress. The chief losers under the new policy were a few hundred Indian shopkeepers who dominated the rural and peri-urban retail trade in certain parts of the country, particularly the Eastern, Central and Copperbelt provinces.²⁵

In what is clearly an attempt to provide a balanced assessment, a hard-hitting reference to the destruction of 'established sectors of economic life', which I have italicised below, is sandwiched between two passages that suggest that the Reforms did not go far enough.

To many attracted by the moral force and intellectual consistency of socialism on the model offered by Nyerere, the Zambian compromise would seem half-hearted and feeble. For these purists Kaunda would be '51% socialist', a patronizing term of semi-affectionate reproach. *Regarded as a hard-nosed programme for maximising G.N.P., on the other hand, Mulungushi fell equally short of the theoretical ideal. It set out to destroy large sectors of established economic life (such as the Indian-*

²⁴ Faber, 'The manufacturing sector', 194.

²⁵ Martin, *Minding their own business*.

owned retail trade) for the sake of hypothetical entrepreneurs who had failed to make the grade in free competition, and in general it tended to weaken such competitive forces as there were in the economy in pursuit of notional advantages which were mainly of the ideological variety. For others on the left wing the very term ‘state capitalism’ was one of abuse, implying (if it implied anything) that the privileges formerly enjoyed by the private capitalist exploiters would now be transferred to a new and even more reprehensible class of black bourgeois bureaucratic exploiters.²⁶

A later view – Andrew Sardanis’s *Another Side of the Coin*

Thirty-five years later Andrew Sardanis provided his own account of these events in his memoir, *Africa: Another Side of the Coin*. He makes a number of points about the Mulungushi Reforms, which both echo and confirm the views of Martin, but he also adds one or two of his own. His views can be summarised as follows: that the reforms were an example of economic nationalism rather than African socialism; that they were aimed at ‘reserving areas of business to Zambians and devising methods to assist them to grow without insurmountable competitive pressures from expatriate businessmen who had superior resources and expertise’; that they were part of a response to UDI, to the business community’s ridiculing of Zambia’s attempts to reduce dependence on the south, and its failure to promote Zambianisation of managerial posts; that they were a response to the tension and competition between Kaunda and Kapwepwe who was largely responsible for insisting on the fifty-one per cent takeovers; and that Bookers was ‘entirely responsible for the inclusion of the retail sector in the reforms’.²⁷

Sardanis describes how he was called to State House during the preparation of the Mulungushi Reforms in the early months of 1968 to meet Kaunda and Michael Caine, a director of Bookers. He found that a deal had already been done under which Bookers would sell fifty-one per cent of its trading business to Indeco and retain the management. Sardanis notes that Bookers had experience in Guyana, where it had played a part in the political demise of the radical nationalist Cheddi Jagan and the victory of Forbes Burnham, who led Guyana to independence in 1966. Bookers, under the leadership of Sir Jock Campbell (who became Lord Campbell of Eskan in 1966), had done well out of the nationalisation of its sugar interests in Guyana and had been able to reinvest the

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 119-20.

²⁷ Andrew Sardanis, *Africa: Another side of the coin. Northern Rhodesia’s final years and Zambia’s nationhood* (London, 2003), 213-14.

proceeds in the United Kingdom. The company clearly intended to do the same thing with its retail trading interests in Zambia and Malawi.²⁸

Sardanis does not, however, recall the links between Bookers and his economic advisor, Michael Faber. In 1963, Faber had written a paper for Campbell, who was also chairman of the Africa Bureau, a left-of-centre pressure group, entitled 'Corporate Policy on the Copperbelt'. This was a response to a paper by an American professor, Alvin Wolfe, who had suggested that the break-up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the independence of Zambia and other countries in the region, would increase the power of 'supra-national' mining companies with interlocking interests and directorates, such as Anglo American, Rhodesian Selection Trust, and Union Minière. Faber had suggested that the opposite was the case. He argued that 'Very Big Business is Timid' and would be anxious to come to terms with new African nationalist governments. He suggested, furthermore, that 'as well as paying higher taxes and higher royalties, the companies may find themselves threatened into giving some part of their shares to local governments and may even decide that it is to their advantage to encourage the local taking up of share issues'.²⁹ It appears that Bookers, following Faber's analysis, chose to pre-empt 'threatening' moves or invitations by the government, and offered itself for takeover. Faber does not now recall any contact between himself, Campbell or Caine in the months leading up to the Mulungushi Reforms, though he does recall his association and friendship with them.³⁰

There are one or two other points of interest that emerge from Sardanis's account. One is his extraordinary retrospective justification for the exclusion of 'resident expatriate' businesses from urban townships and rural areas. Echoing Kaunda's Mulungushi speech, which he had drafted, he claimed:

During the colonial era, only blacks were permitted to run business in the African townships. Similarly, in the rural areas there was little competition from whites or Indians, except maybe in the Eastern Province where Indian communities were well established over a couple of generations. Starting from the premiss that in these areas there were many successful Zambian businesses, in trading, contracting, and

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 214. I have added the references to Sir Jock Campbell and Forbes Burnham which are implied, but not stated, in Sardanis' account.

²⁹ Michael Faber, 'Corporate policy on the Copperbelt' [1963] in *id.* and J. G. Potter, *Towards economic independence: Papers on the nationalisation of the copper industry in Zambia* (Cambridge, 1971), 39. I have changed the order in which the two quoted sentences appear. Faber maintained a link with the Africa Bureau, publishing a pamphlet under its imprint, *Zambia: The moulding of a nation* (London, 1968), which went to press in June 1968, but made only a passing reference to the Mulungushi Reforms, suggesting that Zambian rather than government control was the aim, and stating that President Kaunda had no intention of taking over the mines.

³⁰ Michael Faber, email to the author, 28 Feb. 2006.

transport, the Mulungushi Reforms attempted to extend similar conditions for Zambians to most parts of the country.³¹

These assertions are historically incorrect. On the Copperbelt all the big trading companies with shops in the first-class trading areas in the centre of towns, such as Kitwe, also had shops in the townships. Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn had attempted to penetrate the Copperbelt market in the early 1950s, but had withdrawn because its expertise lay with rural trade, but Werners, an associated butchery business, ran shops in second-class trading areas and townships on the Copperbelt. During the depression of the late 1950s some of its butcheries were sub-divided with groceries, which were run by Kaldis and Company, a Greek trader. In the Copperbelt towns, with the exceptions of Luanshya and Ndola, Indian traders were excluded from the centres of the towns, as was also the case in Lusaka, until the late 1950s. Indian traders may have also been excluded from the townships, but 'resident expatriate' businesses were not. The confusion of both Kaunda and Sardanis on this point may stem from the equation in their minds between 'Indian trader' and 'resident expatriate trader'.³²

It is also absurd for Sardanis, whose own business experience lay in the North Western Province, where he had been in competition with both Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn and CBC, as well as with independent white traders, such as B. P. Rudge in Balovale, to suggest that African traders only experienced real competition from whites or Indians in the Eastern Province. Some Zambian businessmen did emerge in urban townships and rural areas, but they did not do so because they were operating in a commercial 'vacuum'. Emergent traders invariably had a close relationship with 'expatriate' businesses.

Sardanis's book does shed some useful light on the process of granting licences in terms of the Mulungushi Reforms. Sardanis, as permanent secretary in the ministry of commerce and industry, entrusted the drafting of the new Trade Licensing Act, and the licensing regulations that were issued in terms of the act, to John Finch, a former member of the provincial administration.³³ President Kaunda then asked the district development committees to 'assist' the licensing authorities to implement the new measures. These were political committees and were chaired by the district governors whom Kaunda appointed in November 1968 as part of 'decentralisation' – this was, paradoxically, a

³¹ Sardanis, *Another Side of the Coin*, 215.

³² Mamillan, *An African trading empire*, 295. See also Hugh Macmillan and Frank Shapiro, *Zion in Africa: The Jews of Zambia* (London, 1999), 146, 173.

³³ Sardanis may have got the name wrong, as there was no John Finch in the Northern Rhodesian Government Staff List for September 1963. There was an F. C. Finch, MBE, chairman of committees, born 1916. Information by courtesy of Jeremy Collingwood.

scheme for greater presidential control. According to Sardanis these committees 'usurped the powers of the licensing authority and took it upon themselves to decide who was entitled to a licence, which was against the law'. There were complaints from the rural areas, and also from John Finch, who prepared a circular for distribution to the district licensing authorities 'reminding them that trade licensing was their sole responsibility and that the role of the district development committees was purely advisory'. Sardanis acknowledges that the district governors ignored it and continued to interfere in licensing matters.³⁴

Sardanis also provides his own gloss on the situation of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, expressing surprise that although they had been in the country since 1901,

they did not want any members of their families to get Zambian nationality to overcome the licensing constraints. Nor, after so many years, could they find any long-serving Zambian employees to sell their shops to and help them set up in business. Instead, even though they were not called upon to do so, they voluntarily offered [a] controlling interest to Indeco and retained the management for a few years, which they obviously considered the most profitable course.³⁵

This is, to say the least, a misleading interpretation. The Mulungushi speech, and the new licensing regulations, defined a Zambian company in extremely narrow terms – all shareholders had to be Zambian citizens. Although it was a private company, and a Zambian company, ownership of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, with its various subsidiary holding companies, was split between at least six families, and twenty beneficiaries, living in at least three countries, Zambia, Rhodesia and South Africa. Many of the shares were held by family trusts, and there was no way that ownership could have been transferred to one or two representatives of the various families, even if it had been possible for them to acquire citizenship. Nor was it the case that the company made no effort to sell its rural shops to their managers. They did make an attempt to do this, but their attempt was, as we shall see later, thwarted. The decision of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn to offer shares to Indeco was far from being voluntary, but was forced upon it. The owners of the business did not see their offer as the most profitable course, but as the only one open to them. Edwin Wulfsohn, who, with Maurice Rabb, negotiated the terms of the sale, has always been very critical of the way in which the business was valued. He objected strongly at the time to valuation in terms of book value with no allowance for goodwill or profitability, and he has never ceased to describe the terms of the takeover as

³⁴ Sardanis, *Another side of the coin*, 243. District development committees seem to have come into existence in 1967, while District Governors were appointed in November 1968.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 216. Sardanis was writing his book at the time that I interviewed him in 2001, and this paragraph may have been inserted in response to my questions.

'confiscatory', saying that the company was valued at a 'miserly multiple of less than one year's profit – nine months'.³⁶

The case of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn

There is some evidence that Sardanis's later interpretation differs from his original view. Anthony Martin, who was, as we have seen, very close to Sardanis and Indeco, published a leading article in *Business and Economy*, the magazine that he edited, in June 1968. His paper was a not wholly uncritical conduit for the views of Sardanis and Indeco, and he was almost certainly the author of this unsigned article, which acknowledged that the reforms might cause some distress to the owners of general stores outside the 'expatriate' areas, but suggested that the area from which they were to be excluded was smaller than had been feared. It acknowledged that 'most of the store-owners who will be affected are, obviously, Indians with one or two shops to their name', but suggested that they had a number of lines of action open to them. They could apply for Zambian citizenship – the article acknowledged that applications were 'being processed very slowly in order to prevent too many employing this loophole and conducting business as before'. They could move out of general trade into specialised trade, for which there were some exemptions under the regulations – the article acknowledged that there were few openings for this in rural areas. They could sell their shops to Zambians, and continue as managers of their old businesses, but that had its risks. They could also sell their general stores and move into wholesale business. The article concluded that the retailing reforms 'may encourage the Indian community to go into more sophisticated forms of business than general trading' as had happened in East Africa, where the community had moved into the manufacturing and service sectors in recent years. The article noted that an Indeco team was currently doing a survey of businesses likely to be affected, and that 'the areas in which the danger seems greatest are the Eastern Province and the Southern Province – where neither Zambian business nor large-scale corporate business exists on an adequate scale to serve the consumer if the Indian general stores should close down'.³⁷

It also suggested that the wholesaling option was the one that 'Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, a trading concern based in Livingstone [which] owns over 100 stores in the rural areas [...] seems likely to apply on the grand scale'.

³⁶ Macmillan, *An African trading empire*, 250. The representatives of the mining company, Rhodesian Selection Trust, also objected very strongly to the 51% nationalisation of their company on the basis of book value and eventually got some concession on this point.

³⁷ *Business and Economy in Central and East Africa* (Lusaka), June 1968, 11.

It pointed out that 'all their shops have African managers who are quite capable of running them efficiently as owners, provided they are served by a good wholesaler'. It maintained that wholesale trade had been disappearing in Zambia in recent years as retailers increasingly did their own importing, and that this had made it difficult for Zambian traders to start up on their own in many areas. 'If Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn become wholesalers they will doubtless be able to find additional business to compensate them for the loss of the retail margin. This, once again, would be to everyone's good'.³⁸ Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn had almost always done its own importing, and had never ceased to be involved in wholesaling, which was an important part of its business. This analysis was, therefore, incorrect, but it was almost certainly the Indeco view on the line that the company should adopt.³⁹

The new licensing regulations were not issued until early October 1968. Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn made its applications for licences in terms of these regulations on 22 November 1968. It made 107 licence applications for approximately 123 shops – it was the company's practice to subdivide shops and so one licence could cover as many as four shops on the same site. Fourteen applications related to wholesale licences and were made in the name of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn (Stores) Ltd and of various subsidiary companies such as the Kawambwa Trading Company and Chawama Stores. The applications for retail licences were made in the names of five new companies, Mongu, Balovale, Livingstone, Batoka, and Mansa Retailers Ltd. According to Maurice Rabb and Job Haloba, these were cooperative companies in which the managers of the various retail shops were shareholders. The plan was that Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn would finance these companies and administer them until the managers had paid for the stores and the goods in them. Maurice Rabb and Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn Ltd had presumably received an assurance from Indeco and the ministry of commerce and industry that this arrangement was legal and compliant with the new regulations. The shareholders in these companies were Zambian citizens and licences should have been issued to them. There should also have been no problem with the wholesale licences for which there were exemptions for 'resident expatriate' businesses under the new law. It seems, however, that the licensing authorities, or as now seems probable in view

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ In his annual report for Stores Holdings Ltd (the Zambian holding company for Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn (Stores) Ltd) for the year ending 31 Mar. 1966 the chairman, Harry Robinson, had pointed out that more than a third of the year's increase in turnover, about £47,000 out of an increase of £128,000, had come from wholesale trade and had also pointed out that the increasing proportion of wholesale trade done by retail traders in the country was a notable feature of recent commercial history. Stores Holdings Ltd, minute book, copy in author's possession.

of Sardanis's comments, the district development committees at Balovale and elsewhere, challenged the arrangement and licences were refused. According to Rabb, the refusal at Balovale 'set up a chain reaction and all our licences were refused'.⁴⁰

Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn had, therefore, no option but to 'offer' fifty-one per cent of its retailing subsidiary to Indeco. The interpretation given here differs slightly from that given in *An African Trading Empire*, which was already in proof when I first saw Sardanis's *Another Side of the Coin*. In writing the book I had found it hard to explain why Rabb appeared not to have sought an accommodation with Indeco, but had apparently chosen to evade the reforms. I had not realised that he had almost certainly been given a green light to go ahead with this scheme, which would have involved the company staying in business as a wholesaler while transferring the retail stores to their managers. This new interpretation does, however, confirm the view that I reached in the concluding chapter of *An African Trading Empire* – that the takeover of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn's retail trading network came about as much by accident as by design. I had not realised that the probable cause of this accident was the unexpected intervention of the district development committee in Balovale, which acted in a way that was contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the law.⁴¹

⁴⁰ *Zambia Government Gazette*, 4 Oct., 22 Nov. 1968; Maurice Rabb, 'Recollections', copy in author's possession; interview with Job Haloba, 23 Apr. 2001. It is difficult to pin down the precise number of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn stores. Maurice Rabb, who should probably have known best, gives the figure of 123 shops. My own count of the separate shops listed in the *Zambia Government Gazette* advertisement in November 1968 suggests 121 shops, and Carolyn Baylies in her dissertation mentioned 111 shops. CBC Ltd made more licence applications, but it did not subdivide its shops and had many more urban shops than Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn.

⁴¹ Macmillan, *An African trading empire*, 418. According to Job Haloba, a senior Zambian employee of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, it was Willie Chinyama, a store manager at Balovale, who provoked this crisis. He said: 'The whites are cheating us. This is not our store. It is theirs.' (*Ibid.*, 249.) There was, of course, some nationalist opposition to Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn in Barotseland where it had been criticised for its alliance with the Litunga, Sir Mwanawina III, and the association of some of its leaders, including Maurice Rabb, with Welensky and the United Federal Party. (*Ibid.*, 238-45) Such considerations may have influenced the district development committees, but there is no evidence that they had any influence on the formulation of the Mulungushi Reforms which were not primarily aimed at businesses such as Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn. As is indicated above, the initiative for the takeover of the larger chains came from Booker, Brothers, McConnell, and was related to its own desire to repatriate capital from Zambia.

The longer-term consequences for retail trade

As we have seen, as many as 500 shops in rural areas and urban townships were denied licences and may have remained closed at the beginning of 1969. There is no doubt that the bulk of these were Indian shops, though a number of Indian traders were able to remain open in rural areas as wholesalers. Others closed their shops with the intention of applying for licences in the names of their Zambian-born children when they came of age. Some shops remained open with nominal Zambian owners who were fronts for the real owners who remained out of sight. What happened may have varied from district to district according to the views of the licensing authorities and the district development committees. Phiri points out that these committees were able to frustrate the intention of the reforms in a number of ways: these included denying licences, and the transfer of shops, to Zambian citizens on the grounds that the applicants, though Zambians, were not from the district, but were outsiders. Although there has been no detailed study of this topic outside of the Eastern Province, it has to be concluded that the economic reforms did result in a deterioration of the quality and extent of retail trade in other areas where Indian traders had been dominant. As Phiri notes, '[b]efore long, buildings left behind by expatriate Indian traders fell into a state of disrepair and eventually collapsed. The vibrant economic service centres became ghost service centres with virtually no economic activity taking place. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the dilapidated buildings remained a constant reminder of the failure of the Economic Reforms in the rural areas of Zambia'.⁴²

In view of this, it is, perhaps, all the more surprising that Indeco set out from the early months of 1969 to close small and remote stores, and competing stores, within the newly established state shops network. As soon as it was set up in February 1969 the management of the Zambezi Trading Company (ZTC) received an instruction that they should close all stores with a turnover of less than K5,000 a month. They objected to this instruction, saying that the proper criterion for deciding whether or not a shop should stay open was profitability and not turnover. They were also well aware that Zambian traders would not have the capacity to transport goods and maintain stocks at reasonable prices in remote areas, but they had to implement the instruction. In a move that displayed the urban bias of Indeco, they were also told that they should open 'supermarkets' in Livingstone and Choma. They objected to this instruction as they had no experience of this kind of business, and had no desire to enter into it, but they did as they were told and recruited a manager from the United

⁴² Phiri, *History of Indians*, 60-8. A. A. Beveridge and A. R. Obserschall, *African businessmen and development in Zambia* (Princeton, 1979) is singularly unhelpful on the consequences of the economic reforms.

Kingdom who set up successful supermarkets in the latter towns. They were also told that they should close their stores in the Luapula and Northern Provinces where they were in competition with ZCBC. This instruction is understandable as a rationalisation of the now state-controlled retailing sector, but the result was that customers were deprived of choice and competitive prices.⁴³

Within eighteen months of the takeover, ZTC had closed down forty-two shops. Approximately half of these shops were in the Northern and Luapula Provinces, while the remainder were small and remote shops in the Western, North Western and Southern Provinces. ZTC opened eighteen shops in the same period, including the two supermarkets, and new shops on, or close to, the Line of Rail at the Nakambala sugar estate and the new Maamba Colliery. This number seems also to have included seven shops in the Southern Province, which were taken over from ZCBC. The latter's total network, which included urban shops on the Copperbelt and in Lusaka, had been reduced from 116 shops to 66 shops by August 1969. It is most improbable that it closed urban shops so it must have reduced its somewhat smaller rural network even more drastically than ZTC did.⁴⁴

When C.W. Catt, an Indeco executive, was sent out on a tour of inspection of ZTC, ZCBC and Mwaiseni outlets in the Western and Southern Provinces in July 1970, he was originally given instructions to find reasons for further closures. It was suggested that he should find arguments to justify the closure of all shops with a turnover of less than K10,000 a month. In the end his instructions were changed, and he was told to find ways of reducing 'shrinkage' in state shops – something that was a serious problem in the small Mwaiseni chain of shops, a less serious problem in the ZCBC shops, and not a problem at all in the ZTC shops – he saw the latter as the best run of the state chains.⁴⁵ The continued closure of state shops in rural areas was, however, a feature of Indeco's policy in these years. Beveridge and Oberschall, who did research on African businessmen in Zambia in 1970-1, but did no detailed work on the impact of the economic reforms, suggest that '[in] some rural towns nearly half the businesses were transferred to Africans as a result of these policies. At the same time the opportunities for African business increased, because Indeco

⁴³ Macmillan, *An African trading empire*, 250-55.

⁴⁴ C.W. Catt Papers, Rhodes House Library, Oxford, including his report to Indeco Trading on 'shrinkage', July-Aug. 1970. Comparative data on the extent of the original Susman Brothers & Wulfssohn and CBC networks comes from Catt and from licence application in the *Zambia Government Gazette*, 1968. By Aug. 1969 the ZCBC rural network seems to have been reduced from about 100 to little more than fifty shops. It also seems to be likely that ZCBC had already begun to close rural shops as soon as it was taken over by Indeco Trading in June-July 1968.

⁴⁵ Catt Papers, 'Memoirs of Zambia, 1970-2'.

Trading sharply decreased its rural trading activities shortly after it had bought many expatriate stores. Because of inefficiency, duplication of outlets, declining profits, and political pressure, 154 out of 273 Indeco stores and shops in Zambia were closed between 1968 and 1971, mostly in the rural towns and trade centres'.⁴⁶ Their figures confirm that it was Indeco's policy to close rural stores. In many cases stores were transferred to employees, but they did not always remain open for long under their new managers. Several former employees of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn/Zambesi Trading were given shops as part of retirement or retrenchment packages in the early 1970s, but they all had difficulty in running the shops on their own. One of the reasons for their failure was Indeco's decision, which was taken before the economic reforms, to close its commercial department and to withdraw from the provision of credit to Zambian traders. It transferred this obviously risky business to the Credit Organisation of Zambia (COZ), which soon collapsed under a mountain of political loans and bad debt. The Industrial Finance Company seems to have met a similar fate. Another reason for their failure was, of course, the breakdown of transport networks.⁴⁷

Beveridge and Oberschall's list of reasons for the closure of state shops is not convincing. Inefficiency was not a valid reason for closure in relation to ZTC or ZCBC shops – certainly not in 1968-9 when the old management was still in place. It was generally agreed that the Mwaiseni shops were poorly run, but there were very few of them. Duplication could be a reason for closing shops, but only if it was agreed that competition between state shops was undesirable. Declining profits cannot really have been a factor in the early years. Zambesi Trading continued to pay dividends until 1972-3, and ZCBC probably did the same. Political pressure was, of course, an issue. The takeover agreements left the managements of the old companies in place and they were supposed to be able to run their businesses profitably and without interference. They had a strong interest in doing so because a large proportion of the payments that they were to receive for the shares that they had sold were to be paid for out of future profits – in the case of ZTC over four years.

⁴⁶ Beveridge and Oberschall, *African businessmen*, 164-65. These authors contradict themselves on page 248 of their book where they write that 'to cut losses 154 of 272 rural stores were sold to private businessmen'. The figure of 272 for rural stores cannot be correct – the figures 272 or 273 must refer to the total number of stores taken under the control of Indeco Trading, of which a small proportion were urban. They are, of course, also wrong to suggest that the reason for selling stores was to cut losses. Nor is it the case that all of these stores were sold: some were sold, some closed, and some transferred to employees. Their figures also take no account of the transfer of stores between companies or the opening of new stores.

⁴⁷ On credit see Martin, *Minding their own business*, 96.

Price controls and other pressures

It soon became clear, however, that Kaunda had no intention of abiding by these agreements. Although price controls had been re-introduced in 1967-8, and laid down limits on profit margins, he clearly saw the state shops as another means of controlling prices. In his Matero speech he explained that he was enlisting the state shops in the campaign against inflation in the prices of essential commodities. He made it clear that he expected them to accept narrower than those that the Price Controller had prescribed.

Comrades, I am determined to see a stop in the rise of the cost of living of the poorer income groups. I have, therefore, given directions to the four State trading organisations – ZCBC, ZOK, Mwaiseni, and Zambezi (*sic*) Trading – to ensure that the prices of the following items will be reduced or will be held steady from now on. The items are: Maize Meal; Poultry; Kapenta (dried and frozen); Milk (condensed and powder); Cooking Oils and Fats; Butter; Margarine; Sugar; Candles; Toilet Soaps and Detergents; Cold Drinks; Bread and Flour Meal.⁴⁸

Another kind of political interference tended to occur at the district level where there was pressure on state shops from district governors to provide jobs to their political protégés and family members. Geoff Kates, who managed ZTC efficiently and profitably from 1969 to 1972, gave this as the reason for his resignation and departure from the country in the latter year. He had refused demands from the district governor and a minister that he employ unqualified staff and had told them that he had an obligation to the government to ensure the business was profitable. He resigned when his wife began to receive abusive phone calls. Sardanis says that he agreed to a number of political appointments to jobs in the Indeco group before his resignation in 1970. The dismantling of the rural stores network, the inflation of the management structure, and the employment of unqualified staff, would soon have resulted in losses, even if there had not also been pressure on prices.⁴⁹ By 1972 the management of Indeco was concerned about the effects of price controls on its own profitability. The meagre records of the ZTC, the most efficient and profitable of the Indeco subsidiaries, suggest that it had ceased to make profits by 1973-4.⁵⁰

Beveridge and Oberschall took a generally optimistic view of the economic reforms, which they did not examine in detail, but even they pointed to the problems that African traders encountered in establishing or taking over rural stores. These included the non-availability of credit, the difficulty of organising

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 56-7.

⁴⁹ Interview with Geoff Kates, Virginia Water, Jan. 2001.

⁵⁰ Macmillan, *An African trading empire*; B. Turok, *Mixed economy in focus: Zambia* (London, 1989), 127, quoting Andrew Kashita, Indeco Annual Report, 1972.

transport, lack of experience of retail trade and of bookkeeping.⁵¹ Geoff Kates pointed out that even store managers who had experience of working with trading companies had problems when they took over stores. He gave the example of a ZTC manager who was given his store for nothing and required to pay for the stock over five years. He was unable to distinguish between capital and income and spent K3,200 of his first takings on a second-hand car.⁵² It is hardly surprising that many, probably the majority, of those who moved enthusiastically into rural retail trade in 1969-71 failed to stay the course.

The impact of the collapse of rural trading networks and the depression on rural production and livelihoods

The consequences of the oil price rise, and the subsequent collapse of copper prices, did not hit Zambia with full intensity until 1975, but by that time old-established rural trading networks, whether those of trading companies or smaller Indian businesses, had been largely dismantled, and many of the successor businesses had already collapsed or were in difficulties. The weakening of rural trade networks made it more difficult for people in rural areas to withstand the depression. The collapse of produce buying removed the incentive for rural people to produce and shortages of commodities made their life even more difficult. In an astonishing reversal of the earlier economics of freight, parastatal and government trucks carrying goods into and out of the provinces were actually forbidden to carry back-loads in either direction.⁵³

The consequences of these failures do not seem to have been noticed officially until the end of the decade. Research done in rural areas in 1979-80 for an International Labour Office (ILO) report, which was published in 1981 as *Zambia: Basic Needs in an Economy under Pressure*, provides the first evidence of the longer-term consequences of the economic reforms. The report stated:

Over the past decade rural people have been progressively deprived of access to goods. In urban centres there have been shortages – for example, of soap, washing powder, salt, paraffin, sugar, cooking oil, candles, blankets – but in many rural areas such goods have often been non-existent. Urban people have to queue or buy on the black market; most rural people do not have a queue they can join. They either have to travel long distances in the hope of getting what they want, or do without. The clearest evidence of this trend is the closing of many rural shops and the emptiness of those that remain. In all areas visited by the Mission, it is easy to find shops that have shut down [...]. Many rural people if they wish to buy basic goods have to bear

⁵¹ Beveridge and Oberschall, *African businessmen*, 164-5.

⁵² Interview with Geoff Kates.

⁵³ ILO, *Zambia: Basic needs in an economy under pressure* (Addis Ababa, 1981), volume 2, 135. See also ILO, *Narrowing the gaps: Planning for basic needs and productive employment in Zambia* (Addis Ababa, 1977), 326.

a high cost in time, energy, and cash to travel to district centres. But the district centres are themselves inadequately supplied. When goods do arrive they are quickly bought by those on the spot. And some goods do not reach the districts at all [...].⁵⁴

After pointing to the damaging effects of controlled prices, and their inevitable consequence of shortages, and black market prices which rose to three or four times the official price at any distance from district centres, the report also pointed to the ill effects on agricultural production of fixed producer prices. It went on to point out that:

Shortages and high prices have destroyed livelihoods. Shortages and high prices for nails, gas bottles, leather, wax, needles, cotton thread, and bicycle and other spare parts, have contributed to the decline in shop-front tailoring, watch and shoe repairing, welding and tinkering, bicycle repair, and other small-scale crafts in the rural areas. Local variations can be expected but the Mission is not aware of any rural areas outside a district centre where there has been an increase in shops, trading, and craft services over the past decade. The trend has been less economic activity, less employment, deteriorating terms of trade, and shrinking access to essential goods.⁵⁵

A detailed appendix, which contrasted the situation in the Luapula Province in 1975 with 1980, pointed to the damaging effects of the depression and the decline in retail trade. It noted that insufficient attention had been paid in an earlier report to the recession that began in 1975 because it was seen as a temporary setback following the economic upturn of 1974 and as similar to the earlier short-lived recession of 1971-2. By 1980 it was apparent that the depression was much more serious and deep-seated. So far as retail trade was concerned, the report noted a further concentration of trade in district centres and a decline of village shops and informal traders in remote rural areas. On the supply of essential commodities, it noted:

Supply of basic commodities to the province continues to be erratic: Bread or flour, cooking oil, mealie meal, salt, washing powder, bathing soap, soft drinks, paraffin, candles, sugar, and blankets have each been absent from the shelves of district centre shops for considerable periods over the last 12 months though the situation seems to be improving somewhat with the resumption of trading with South Africa. Such shortages have three characteristics: the failure of national trading systems to provide regular and sufficient stocks wholesale; the failure of the wholesale system to feed the retail distribution in the district centres; the concentration of retail distribution in the district centres which leaves large numbers of people in the Province wholly unsupplied.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ ILO, *Zambia*, vol. 1, 22.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. 1, 23-4.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* vol. 2, 137.

Conclusions

Although the ILO report makes it clear that there had by 1981 been a decade-long decline in retail trade in rural areas, it could still be argued that the real cause of this decline was the depression and not the Economic Reforms. It could also be argued that it was price controls and not the denial of licences to 'resident expatriates' that was the primary cause of shortages of essential commodities and black-markets. Clearly, the depression was increasingly severe from 1975 onwards and price controls did have a distorting effect on retail trade in both urban and rural areas. There is room for more detailed research on what happened to rural retail trade in the 1970s, but I would argue that the deliberate creation of a commercial 'vacuum' by the removal of Indian trading networks, the denial of licences to a company like Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, and then the systematic dismantling of the rural networks of what had become the state shops, was misguided and reckless. It demonstrated little understanding of the value and fragility of commercial networks, the difficulty of running small shops in remote places, and the relationships between retail trade, agricultural production, and local employment in crafts. It was an example of social engineering that drew its ideological inspiration from a misunderstanding of the history of retail trade, and of the emergence of African entrepreneurship, in urban areas. Its main impact was on poor people who lived out of sight in rural areas. Its impact was greatest on the majority of them who lived at some distance from the district centres that were most frequently visited by politicians and civil servants. If the old-established retail trading networks, with their decades of managerial experience, and their international lines of credit, intelligence and supply, had been left in place, they might have enabled people to ride out the depression more effectively than they were able to do. This was especially true of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn because of its dense network of small rural stores and its exceptional links with prominent international retail chains. It is hard to resist the conclusion that the Mulungushi Economic Reforms had disastrous results for most Zambians – especially those in rural areas. 'Resident expatriate businessmen' were not angels, but when dealing with capitalists and capitalism, there is a good deal to be said for dealing with 'the devil you know'.

The informalization of Lusaka's economy: Regime change, ultra modern markets, and street vending, 1972-2004¹

Karen Tranberg Hansen

‘Street vending [is] an initiative of self-employment since there [are] no jobs left in the country [...] We can’t eat the council’. (Street vendor, Julius Katongo, at a demonstration prior to a street clearance by the Lusaka city council, 12 Aug. 2002)²

At the same time as free market policies have encouraged foreign investment in Zambia since the early 1990s, they have entailed restriction on the freedom to market on the part of a large part of Lusaka’s population as I demonstrate in this paper. Events involving confrontations between street vendors, market traders, and agents of the state over the use of space for vending in Lusaka touch the

¹ While this paper is a product of long-term research in Zambia, it draws specifically on work I conducted in Lusaka markets in 1999 with support from Northwestern University’s Research Grant Committee and a research project on urban youth I carried out in Lusaka between 2001 and 2005 as part of a collaborative research project funded by the Council for Research on Developing Countries of DANIDA (Denmark). When in Zambia, I am a research affiliate of the Institute for Economic and Social Research at the University of Zambia. I am grateful to Chileshe Mulenga for his collaboration. I thank Ilse Mwanza for keeping me up-to-date on market developments and many other issues. Parts of the discussion about market developments through 2000 draw on Karen Tranberg Hansen, ‘Who rules the streets? The politics of vending space in Lusaka’, in: Id. and M. Vaa, eds, *Reconsidering informality: Perspectives from urban Africa* (Uppsala, 2004), 62-80. James Ferguson, Jeremy Gould, and Wilma Nchito offered critical comments on an earlier version.

² Quoted in ‘Street vendors protest against re-location’, *The Post*, 13 Aug. 2002.

core of the changing interrelationship between local people, their state, and global forces that together constitute Zambia's political economy. The global processes have to do with the current agenda of international development policy aimed to restructure the economy. The local dynamics concern the age and gender dimensions of informal economic activity and the social and cultural bonds that inform them.

The 'war' between street vendors and local authority in Lusaka has continued on and off since the 1970s, if not earlier. Even then, the confrontations during the Third Republic (since 1991) are fuelled by new dynamics. They are set into motion by a widening economic gulf, carved out by recent politico-economic shifts. To explain this, I first sketch the broader context that has both prompted the recurrence of confrontations on the street and changed them. I then relate these processes to the redevelopment of some of Lusaka's large markets. Despite recent openings of 'ultra modern' market, the vendors' persistent return to Lusaka's streets since a major street clearance in 1999 demonstrates a phenomenon that was not evident in previous confrontations. In effect, the 1999 event marks an important turning point in the relationship between street vendors and their state. Today's vendors are making new claims, just like Julius Katongo with whom I began, who appropriated the discourse of entrepreneurship and micro-enterprise when describing how he made a living.

Globalization and urban socio-spatial structure

With few exceptions, leading theorists on globalization have had little to say about international development cooperation and, in particular, its effects on urban space.³ Their chief focus has been on information technology, culture, and

³ Scholarship on globalization that connects the process to changing urban processes does not substantially engage with international development cooperation. See Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Princeton, 2001); James Holston, ed., *Cities and citizenship* (Durham and London, 1999); Teresa P. R. Caldeira, *City of walls: Crime, segregation, and citizenship in São Paulo* (Berkeley and London, 2000). Critical scholarship on development that approaches globalization as an aspect of transnational governance has not been concerned with its specific effects on cities and their spatial organization. See Arturo Escobar, *Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton, 1995); James Ferguson, *The anti-politics machine: Development, depoliticization and bureaucratic power in Lesotho* (Cambridge, 1990); James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, 'Spatializing states: toward an ethnography of neoliberal governmentality', *American Ethnologist*, 29 (2002), 981-1002. South African scholarship on the post-apartheid city comes perhaps closest to making some of the interconnections I am hinting at. See Christian M. Rogerson, 'Local economic development in an era of globalization: the case of South African cities', *Journal of Economic and Social Geography*, 91 (2000), 397-411; Richard Tomlinson, Robert A. Beauregard,

economy.⁴ Yet international development policy is an important form of globalization that seeks to bring a country like Zambia into the global world of nations on its terms. These terms include transparent democracies and neo-liberal economies promoting the free market as the global standard. As I demonstrate in this chapter, these processes have adverse ramifications for the access to commercial and residential space of the great majority of Lusaka's population whose livelihoods depend on the informal economy.

The specific context for this paper's observations are the succession of structural adjustment programs (SAP) by a World Bank initiated Poverty Strategy Reduction Program (PSRP) in 2002, the compliance with which in April 2005 qualified Zambia for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. PSRP stresses that poverty reduction must take place in a democratic society with open markets and a competitive business environment. With PRSP, the previous development agenda's focus on growth and distribution has yielded to concerns with governance and capacity building.⁵ Spending policy under PRSP targets agriculture, tourism, and the social sector. Zambia's PRSP document leaves out such major issues as urban growth, employment, housing, and markets, thus ignoring the livelihoods of the urban poor.⁶

SAP and recent neo-liberal reforms have important ramifications across urban space, affecting the livelihoods of different population segments in unlike ways, sharpening social and spatial inequalities, and extending them in new

Lindsay Bremner, and Xolela Mangcu, eds, *Emerging Johannesburg: Perspectives on the postapartheid city* (New York, 2003); David A. McDonald and Laila Smith, 'Privatising Cape Town: from Apartheid to neo-liberalisms in the Mother City', *Urban Studies*, 41 (2004), 1461-84.

⁴ Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis and London, 1996); Manuel Castells, *The information age: Economy, society, and culture* (Oxford, 1997); Frederick Jameson and M. Miyoshi, eds, *The Cultures of Globalization* (Durham and London, 1999); Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London, 1992).

⁵ Jeremy Gould and Julia Ojaneen's analysis of Tanzania's PRSP has many parallels to Zambia: 'Merging the vircle': *The politics of Tanzania's poverty reduction strategy*, Institute of Development Studies, Policy Papers 2 (Helsinki, 2003).

⁶ Zambian Ministry of Finance and National Planning, *Zambia: Poverty reduction strategy paper* (Lusaka, 2002). In its 2005 report, the Economic Commission for Africa notes tersely that 'the employment content of PRSPs in Africa remains weak'. See Economic Commission for Africa, *Economic report on Africa 2005: Meeting the challenges of unemployment and poverty in Africa* (Addis Ababa, 2005), 14.

ways.⁷ Two decades of SAP and neo-liberal reforms since the early 1990s have altered the nature and availability of space in Lusaka, including land and infrastructure, and access to markets. In the wake of these reforms, changes in land values have adversely affected access to housing and its location as well as the place and nature of commercial activity. Because housing markets have been privatized and no low-cost government housing constructed since the 1970s, the vast majority of Lusaka's population lives in informal housing in the peri-urban areas.⁸ Inadequate provision of electricity, water, and transport reduces the exploitation of service and small-scale manufacturing by residents in such areas. And due to adjacent commercial developments, the possibilities for expansion of most of Lusaka's low-cost housing areas are limited.

Above all, globally promoted development policy since 1991 has encouraged foreign investment which in Lusaka largely has been directed toward retail. One of the highly visible results is the capital's first modern shopping mall, Manda Hill, that opened in October 1999, financed by British and South African capital, featuring several South African franchises. Not far from Manda Hill another upscale mall, the Arcades, opened in 2003, financed by local business enterprises. Additional malls and upgrading of long-existing markets, some with Chinese financing, are underway.

In popular representations in Zambia, 'freeing the market' comes close to mean opening it to external rather than local participation. Urban retail space in Lusaka has been reconfigured as foreign investments, especially by South African and Chinese firms, have resulted in selective urban upgrading and new patterns of spatial segregation. Exercises to remove vendors from public space have a lot to do with the introduction of 'free market' practices, as well as all the many other matters that also contribute to make street vendors a problem, among them, sanitation, public health, and safety.

Zambia's 2003 ranking on the Human Development Index slid to a low of 164 (of 177 countries).⁹ The two decades of IMF/World Bank initiated SAP programs were marked by growing inequality, unemployment, deteriorating health including a high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate, declining access to education, and an urban infrastructure that did not keep pace with population growth. Lusaka's population is approaching two million, and close to half of

⁷ Jane L. Guyer, LaRay Denzer and Adigun Agbaje, eds, *Money struggles and city life: Devaluation in Ibadan and other urban centers in Southern Nigeria, 1986-1996* (Portsmouth, 2002).

⁸ Chileshe L. Mulenga, *Peri-urban transformations and livelihoods in the context of globalization in Lusaka, Zambia*, The urban and peri-urban research network, Working Paper 3 (London, 2001).

⁹ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *2003 Human development report* (New York, 2004).

Zambia's total population of 11 million is urban. Between 1992 and 1999, formal employment declined from 17 to 11 percent of the labor force, offset to some extent by increase in informal activities.¹⁰

The mere reference to the enormous growth of the informal economy since the 1970s glosses over the many inequalities that are embedded within it, in terms of gender and age as well as of activity, location, and organization. Privatization of the economy has pushed many adults into the informal economy, limiting the entry of young people who perform low-level jobs with few prospects for upward mobility and the acquisition of higher qualifications. As a result, in today's transformed urban space, young women and men from poor backgrounds have fewer economic options than their parents' generation enjoyed.

Informalization: Past and present

The informalization of Zambia's economy is part of the broader context in which confrontations over vending space take place. I use the term informal economy as a shorthand for unregulated production, distribution, and service provision.¹¹ Defined neither by activity, size, nor location, this perspective views informality as a heterogeneous phenomenon identifiable in different types of economies, past and present.¹² The informalization process can be discussed from several angles: As an empirical issue, a research topic, and a concept of development policy.¹³

The informal economy as an empirical issue: From Lusaka's earliest days, African residents developed work and housing initiatives to supply the goods and services the colonial government did not provide.¹⁴ Much like the way that colonial rulings guided the place and type of economic activity Africans could pursue in the city, post-colonial regulations of markets, trade licensing, town and country planning, and public health restricted trading and small-scale

¹⁰ Zambian Central Statistical Office, *Living conditions in Zambia 1998* (Lusaka, 2000).

¹¹ Karen Tranberg Hansen and Mariken Vaa, 'Introduction', *id. and Vaa, Reconsidering informality*, 7-27.

¹² Karen Tranberg Hansen, 'Informal sector', in: *International encyclopedia of the social and behavioral sciences* (New York, 2001), 7450-52.

¹³ Julia Elyachar, 'Mapping of power: The state, NGOs, and international organizations in the informal economy of Cairo', *Comparative studies in society and history*, 45 (2003), 571-605.

¹⁴ Karen Tranberg Hansen, *Keeping house in Lusaka* (New York, 1997), 34.

manufacture to designated market places.¹⁵ Small-scale traders and marketeers throughout the city center and the townships widely ignored these regulations. Although they were chased away from city streets occasionally, traders usually returned.

The informalization process gained considerable momentum from the restrictive import and currency regime during most of President Kaunda's Second Republic between 1972-91 when the state controlled the food distribution system and fixed prices.¹⁶ With shortages of basic commodities a fact of everyday life in the late 1970s and early 1980s, street vending was referred to as 'black marketing'.¹⁷ When IMF pressure in 1982 prompted the price decontrol on several essential commodities and removal of food subsidies, the term black marketing came into use for any illegal marketing activity, including vending in streets, yards, and homes.¹⁸ Police occasionally undertook sweeps of black marketeers, confiscated their goods, and imposed fines or prison sentences. Even then, the Second Republic might never have functioned without these activities because the command economy was unable to produce and distribute basic necessities.

The change of regime in 1991 did not help to increase formal employment but fuelled the rapid expansion of informal activities across Zambia's cities and into the countryside. The removal of controls on foreign exchange, imports, and prices attracted more people to trade than ever before, and vending became particularly visible and dynamic on the streets. The strained economy made state intervention in marketing and street vending a complicated matter. In president Chiluba's first government in 1991, the minister of Local Government and Housing ordered city councils to allow street vending.¹⁹ This decision led many traders to desert designated markets for streets and sidewalks. When in 1993 the Lusaka city council assisted by police and military undertook one of many sweeps of street vendors, it clashed with the vendors and a riot ensued.

¹⁵ For example, the markets ordinance of 1937, and Chapter 473 on Markets in *The laws of Zambia*. John Mulwila and Kaye Turner, 'Small-scale industrial development and the law', *African Social Research*, 33 (1982), 151-74.

¹⁶ Earl P. Scott, 'Lusaka's informal sector in national economic development', *Journal of developing areas*, 20 (1985), 71-100.

¹⁷ Caleb Fundanga, 'Shortages of essential commodities and the urban poor in Lusaka', in: International labour office, ed., *Zambia: Basic needs in an economy under pressure*, Technical Paper 11 (Addis Ababa, 1981), 151-60.

¹⁸ Karen Tranberg Hansen, 'The black market and women traders in Lusaka, Zambia', in: Jane L. Parpart and Kathleen Staudt, eds, *Women and the state in Africa* (Boulder and London, 1989), 143-59.

¹⁹ Christian Peters-Berries, *The urban informal sector and structural adjustment in Zambia*, World employment programme research, Working Paper 62 (Lusaka, 1993), 3, 15, 18.

An angry president Chiluba intervened strongly on the vendors' behalf, blaming the city council for not finding alternate places before forcing them off the streets.

Because of president Chiluba's 1993 intervention, street vending became known colloquially as the 'Office of the President'. Extending this vendor friendly atmosphere, the President in December 1996 established a Vendors' Desk with a deputy minister at State House. This decision was subsequently interpreted to mean that anyone could trade and erect a stand anywhere. And that is precisely what occurred: traders, and aspiring vendors, leaving designated markets within the city and the townships, descending on the city center and setting up stands put together from wood, plastic sheeting, and cardboard. Exploiting the streets as an economic infrastructure, the vendors expanded their operational area across urban space from alleyways, corridors, and streets in the second class trading area, into the light industrial area, and onto the main streets of the capital. The term *tuntemba* came into use for these provisional structures, which in the Bemba language translates approximately as 'area of operation'. This term graphically captured what in fact the traders were doing: Staking claims on space for their own activities.²⁰

Lusaka markets and informality as a research topic: We are fortunate to have studies of Lusaka markets from the late colonial period and on. When in 1954 A.A. Nyirenda examined Matero and Luburma markets, small-scale trading was much a man's world; only one fifth of the market traders were women. They were not full-time traders but mostly sold seasonal fruit, vegetables, and prepared foodstuffs. Marvin Miracle's restudy in 1959 showed that women's participation had increased to one third. The proportion of women traders grew after independence according to Anthony Oberschall's 1970 study in Matero market, as did the variety of businesses and trade.²¹ By the late 1970s and early 1980s those of us who conducted research into small-scale trade began talking about the informal economy. In our studies we observed an increase among middle-aged women traders whose earnings ensured household survival when the adverse effects of SAP on formal employment began to become evident.²²

²⁰ Hansen, 'Who rules the streets?'

²¹ A.A. Nyirenda, 'African market vendors in Lusaka, with a note on the recent boycott', *Rhodes-Livingstone Journal*, 22 (1957), 34; Marvin P. Miracle, 'Apparent changes in the structure of African commerce, Lusaka, 1954-1959', *Northern Rhodesia Journal*, 5 (1962), 170-75; Anthony Oberschall, 'Lusaka market vendors: then and now', *Urban Anthropology* 1 (1972), 107-23.

²² Raj Bardouille, 'The sexual division of labour in the urban informal sector: Case studies of some townships in Lusaka', *African Social Research*, 32 (1981), 29-54; Bennetta Jules-Rosette, 'Alternative urban adaptations: Zambian cottage industries as sources of social and economic innovations', *Human Organization* 18 (1979),

Past and present, trade and retail activities dominate Zambia's informal economy, followed by services and small-scale manufacturing. A common finding from the 1980s and 1990s concerns the age and gender division of activities.²³ In terms of overall numbers, women contributed a lot to the growth of the informal economy, especially in trade, but mostly at much lower returns than men. The majority of traders of both sexes tended to be middle aged (25-40 years of age),²⁴ and women continued to dominate in petty trading, older men in carpentry and tin-smithing, while younger men worked in auto repair, electrics, and mechanics.²⁵ Already in the late 1970s, Wim Hoppers noted that young people were at a disadvantage, '[...] their better education has not prevented them from being forced into the margins of [the informal economy] [...] which offer few prospects for escape'.²⁶ Focusing on informal manufacturing enterprises in Lusaka and Ndola, a 2002 study found many more men (91 percent) than women (9 percent) operators with an average age of 36 years.²⁷

Research findings since the mid-1990s begin to reveal changes in the gender and age composition of the urban informal economy. An unpublished survey of 450 vendors in Lusaka's city centre and near Kamwala market paints a different profile.²⁸ First, the majority of street vendors were male: Close to 90 percent male compared to 10 percent female; and second, the majority were young: three quarters were in the 20 to 30 age category. A 1997 study of *tuntemba* operators in Kanyama and Chelston in Lusaka, and Mongu and Livingstone confirms this profile: 88 percent were men, and 60 percent of them were between 15 and 25 years old. Because street vending entails more risks and dangers than vending in designated markets, this gender and age profile is not

389-408; Karen Tranberg Hansen, 'The urban informal sector as a development issue: poor women and work in Lusaka, Zambia', *Urban Anthropology*, 9 (1980), 199-225; id., 'Lusaka's squatters: past and present', *African Studies Review*, 25 (1982), 117-36; id., *Keeping House*.

²³ Zambian Central Statistical Office, *Women and men in Zambia: Facts and figures* (Lusaka, 1991).

²⁴ Hans C. Hahn, *Some characteristics of informal sector businessmen in Lusaka and Kitwe, Zambia*, World Employment Programme, Southern African Team for employment promotion, Working Paper (Lusaka, 1982), 6-9.

²⁵ Peters-Berries, *The urban informal sector*, 3.

²⁶ Wim H. M. L. Hoppers, Out-of-School Youth and the urban labour market: A case study of selected Lusaka industries, *Urban Community Research Report* 6 (Lusaka, 1981).

²⁷ Chileshe L. Mulenga, *Potential growth sectors, skills endowment and gaps in the informal sector: Case study of Lusaka and Ndola*, Report contracted by the Entrepreneurship and Informal Sector Development Unit of TEVETA (Lusaka, 2002).

²⁸ Report to the technical sub-committee of the inter-ministerial committee on street vending, unpublished report filed at the Research Unit of the Lusaka City Council, 1995.

surprising. What is striking is that only a minority of the young male vendors were married.²⁹ They earned so little that they were unable to establish their own household as I noted in my own research in city centre and township markets since 1992, when I met many more young unmarried male vendors than I did in the 1970s and 1980s.³⁰

The informal economy as a policy concern: Neither the one-party state nor the state in the neo-liberal era has been keen on the informal economy. The general approach to urban growth and along with it, the informal economy, has been neglect if not outright hostility. Intermittently, mostly through external intervention, specific urban issues have been brought into focus. But only recently with World Bank endorsement of PRSP are pro-poor policies called on, including support for micro-enterprises and credit, in a way that recognizes informality as an asset rather than a problem that ought to go away.



Photo 11 Vendor at his tuntemba on Independence Avenue before it was demolished in 1999.

²⁹ L. M. Imboela, *New forms of economic activities in the informal sector after 1990: An investigation of the socio-economic characteristics of the tuntemba operators and their role in household survival strategies in Zambia*, Development Studies Department, Serial 50 (Lusaka, 1997), iii, 27.

³⁰ Karen Tranberg Hansen, 'Getting stuck in the compound: some odds against social adulthood in Lusaka, Zambia', *Africa Today*, 51 (2005), 3-18.



Photo 12 Secondhand vendors on the ground of the construction site of the new market at Soweto.



Photo 13 Completed market at Soweto called the Lusaka City Market.



Photo 14 Fruit vendor turned mobile after being chased away from selling at the bus station and taxi rank in front of the University Teaching Hospital in 1999.



Photo 15 Dried fish vendor inside Lusaka's new City market. Printed cloth at nearby stall in the background.




Figure 2 *The Post*, 3 May 1999



Photo 16 Unfinished market structures at Chilenje




Photo 17 Unfinished market structures at Chilenje



Photo 18 Unfinished market structures at Libala



Photo 19 Crowding at the old Soweto Market

Housing was probably the first aspect of the informal economy on which the state acted in Zambia. This was in 1974 when a World Bank loan supported an upgrading program in three of the capital's largest squatter complexes. Far-flung changes in land laws and property ownership were undertaken, partly under World Bank pressure. Even then, when the project was handed over to the city council in 1980, more people lived in squatter areas than in any other type of housing, as they still do today in Lusaka.³¹

A consistent policy on the informal economy has never developed, neither under the regime of Kaunda nor of Chiluba, the vendors' desk notwithstanding, except by way of encouraging the growth of what today we call micro-enterprise. This concern with micro-enterprise was in 1978 during Kaunda's reign in the form of Village Industry Service, an NGO with close links to UNIP, and the Small Industry Development Organization, established by an act of parliament in 1981.³² Informal employment was first mentioned in a 1986 labor force survey that described it as subsistence farming, own account work, unpaid family work, and business in enterprises with five or less employees.³³ It featured in development plans but was not allocated funds for program implementation. When the informal economy was mentioned at all, it was as a last resort constituting a residual category that might absorb people who had lost their jobs due to SAP.³⁴

Recently, an attempt at a more comprehensive policy has emerged, specifically focused on so-called micro-enterprise with clearly targeted beneficiaries: young women and men out of school from Grades 7 through 12, for a demand driven culture of entrepreneurship. Pressed on in the last half of the 1990s by the World Bank and donors as sector program support to technical training (2001-2005), the new Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training (TEVET) policy was passed by an act of parliament in 1998. Control was moved from the Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training to the TEVET Authority (TEVETA) in an effort to decentralize implementation and disbursement of funds.

As part of TEVET's capacity building program, the dilapidated infrastructure, curricula, and teaching in training institutions are to be upgraded. The aim is to link training with demand which today is considered overwhelmingly to arise from the informal economy. While this policy shift recognizes that the formal economy has not absorbed much skilled labor for the last three decades, it does not acknowledge that Zambia's urban informal economy is dominated by

³¹ Hansen, 'Lusaka's squatters'; *id.*, *Keeping house*, 57-58.

³² Peters-Berries, *The urban informal sector*, 12-13.

³³ Zambian central statistical office, *Women and men in Zambia*, 23.

³⁴ Peters-Berries, *The urban informal sector*.

retail rather than manufacturing activities and that the majority of these activities serve survival purposes that do not generate economic growth.³⁵ And above all, the new policy does not reckon with the way in which the informal economy produces competence and business skills. The 2002 study to which I referred earlier found that 80 percent of the workers interviewed had obtained technical skills through informal apprenticeships.³⁶ A 2003 survey involving interviews with 100 workers in several low-income areas of Lusaka found that 70 percent, average age 26 years, had acquired their skills through informal learning on the job.³⁷ Detracting attention from the structural barriers of the formal labor market in the era of late capitalism, this policy shift raises difficult questions about whether the reinvigoration of technical and vocational training merely will promote survival activities or help balance the supply of skilled work with the demands of the economy by absorbing more young people into productive income generating activities that are capable of sustaining economic growth.

Designated markets

The term designated, or authorized, markets refers to areas where urban retail is permitted under the Market Act. Vending is illegal in the areas in between the designated markets in the city center. By 1980, Lusaka had 36 designated markets. The number grew in the late 1990s to 40 designated city markets and 54 designated township markets.³⁸ As these markets grew in number and size, they diversified their commodity base, service activities, and participants, including from the 1980s on, more adult persons retrenched from formal employment and young people out of school, especially young men.

Lusaka's largest market, Soweto, developed informally and illegally in the late 1970s as a center of the produce trade for peri-urban farmers at the edge of the light industrial area on privately owned land. It soon featured the capital's largest auto part section and numerous small-scale manufacturers, repair shops, and service providers. The name Soweto derives from the large African township outside of Johannesburg whose population was relegated to the periphery of the city, with few services provided.

³⁵ Christian M. Rogerson, 'Urban poverty and the informal economy in South Africa's economic heartland', *Environment and urbanization*, 6 (1996), 167-81.

³⁶ Mulenga, *Potential growth sectors*, 38.

³⁷ Inga Muller, Maurice Pengele and Priscilla Sikaulu, *A survey of traditional apprenticeship practiced by informal sector operators in selected markets and compounds of Lusaka*, Integrated skills training for employment promotion STEP-IN Program (Lusaka, 2003), 5.

³⁸ Scott, 'Lusaka's informal sector', 77; Hansen, 'Who rules the streets?', 68.

The market grew rapidly. Toward the end of 1994, traders in Soweto market's outside section and part of the built-up interior were relocated to yield space for the construction of a new market. Several months of trouble preceded the move before traders vacated their stands. In return, the city council promised them stands in the new market. Some traders went farther out on the open field, establishing stands underneath tall pylons carrying power cables. Others moved on to Kamwala where many set themselves up on the open field outside the built-up market, next to the railway tracks.

Above all, traders spilled into the streets. The 1997 opening of the new Soweto market, now called City Market, did little to halt these processes. Many stand-holders who had fought to be allotted space in the new market soon vacated their stands, complaining of lack of customers and high fees. A few days after the market's opening, the city council burned the *tuntembas* on its outskirts. And stand-holders continued to leave the new market for the streets in ongoing conflicts between inside and outside traders, police, the city council, management, and political cadres.

By Christmas 1998 in Lusaka, street vending had achieved anarchic proportions. Main streets, alleyways, and shop corridors in the city center, and many other places, had turned into one huge outdoor shopping mall with thousands of street vendors selling all manner of goods. The crowding in this the least capitalized and most labor intensive part of the economy caused traffic problems, posed public health dangers, and gave pickpockets and thieves a field day.

In the pre-dawn hours of 28 April 1999, council workers, police, and paramilitary in riot gear razed the temporary market structures, the *tuntembas*, in Lusaka's city center, extending the demolition the following night and weeks across the city, into the townships and, in June, to the Copperbelt and the towns along the line-of-rail. Like many others, Steven Daka, a 23-year-old paint vendor, expressed his disbelief when he found his *tuntemba* demolished. Moses Chishimba, also 23 years old, was shocked when his food stall, from which he had raised money to build a two-room house in a compound, was destroyed.³⁹ Unlike in 1993, the president, who must have approved this costly removal, kept quiet. The deputy minister of the Vendors Desk took the flak, arguing that the move to designated markets would place vendors in enabling environments and enhance their security. Steven Daka commented that the minister should be 'declared redundant'. For a while Lusaka's main streets remained almost free from vendors who were such a common sight throughout the 1990s, yet they soon returned in a variety of disguises, among them car boot sales, sales from containers, and business conducted during rush hours.

³⁹ I paraphrase some statements by persons affected by the demolition, quoted in Hansen, 'Who rules the streets?', 67-68, 72-73.

Market management

Markets in Zambia are state property. The Market Act empowers the minister of Local Government and Housing to delegate development and management of markets to local authorities (district, municipal, and city councils).⁴⁰ In the past, councils or authorized co-operative societies managed markets. Stand holders paid levy to the council, rent to the co-operative society, and daily market fees. Many also paid fees to funeral societies, football associations, and security guards. In the open economy era, local authorities have begun to contract private firms to manage designated markets. Because markets are strategic places for recruitment, their management has been a target of political maneuver. During the Kaunda regime, the ruling party, UNIP (United National Independence Party), usurped power under the Market Act, often through the co-operative societies, in this way controlling, or taking control through its Youth Wing, of the allocation of stands in many markets.⁴¹ UNIP membership became a prerequisite for access to a stand. Stand-holders, especially women, were rounded up to line the streets, cheer, and dance in the airport on the occasion of formal state visits.

The party legacy is still evident today. The MMD (Movement for Multi-party Democracy) has kept a visible presence with an office and staff in many markets as have some opposition parties. Politics in markets complicate the efforts of the Ministry of Local Government and Housing to implement donor required decentralization of the urban administration, an example of which is the market management by private firms.

When it opened in August 1997, the new City Market was the first market to be managed by a private company. This arrangement did not last more than a couple of years. In 1999, when I conducted research there, the MMD maintained an office in the very center of the market's inside section. Lusaka's largest market, Soweto, has offices not only of the council, the MMD, and other parties, but also of the Soweto Marketeers Co-operative, and ZANAMA (Zambia National Marketeers Association), an association involved in markets on the Copperbelt for some years. Within markets, different groups quarrel over who is

⁴⁰ The local government act of 1991 uncoupled the party structure and operations from district councils in a move toward establishing autonomous local authorities with elected councillors and mayors. Yet central government still reshuffles senior officers and controls finances. See Emmanuel Mutale, *The management of urban development in Zambia* (Ashgate, 2004), 41-42.

⁴¹ Andrew A. Beveridge and Anthony R. Oberschall, *African businessmen and development in Zambia* (Princeton, 1979).

in charge in a process that pits marketeers' associations, the city council, the ministry, and political party branches against one another.⁴²

The latest proposal concerning markets is a spectacular illustration of lack of coordination. In April 2005, president Mwanawasa instructed the minister of Local Government and Housing to establish boards to manage the affairs of markets and bus stations. Such an approach is expected to accelerate 'development in Local Authorities and helping them control street vending'.⁴³ A similar idea had been introduced in the late 1990s in the management model that was part of the EU's market rehabilitation project.⁴⁴ In line with the externally mandated policy on decentralization, market boards are to represent marketeers, consumer associations, local government, commuters' associations, and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry.⁴⁵ Perhaps such boards might serve to depoliticize the management of markets, lessening the persistent wrangles between councils, co-operatives and marketers associations, and political parties. But for this outcome to occur, party allegiance must not bias decisions about board membership. Last but not least, aside from mentioning vendors in passing, this new management approach appears to pertain to street vendors only by way of control rather than of assistance that might enhance the earnings potential and livelihoods of the thousands of people whom investment driven market liberalization is displacing from public space.

Ultra modern markets

The term 'ultra modern' market gained currency in 1994 when President Chiluba returned from an official trip to Israel and talked enthusiastically about public markets he had seen during his visit. All ultra modern market projects have included plans for most of the following: Car park, taxi rank, police post, council office, supermarket, restaurants, and (fee paying) toilets. The markets are electrified and have piped water access. I briefly describe the market projects that have been underway in Lusaka.

The City Market: The Israeli-inspired market that was constructed on the grounds of Soweto market was controversial already before its opening. The source of the market's funding was never revealed.⁴⁶ Israeli consultants super-

⁴² 'Taking over markets long over-due', *Times of Zambia*, 28 Aug. 2003.

⁴³ 'Statement by His Excellency Levy P. Mwanawasa, S.C. on the management of bus stations and urban markets in Zambia', *Zambia Daily Mail*, 18 Apr. 2005.

⁴⁴ 'K6.7bn. set for 3 Lusaka markets', *Zambia Daily Mail*, 7 Apr. 2000.

⁴⁵ 'Bus drivers oppose Levy's market boards', *The Post*, 18 Apr. 2005.

⁴⁶ The prefabricated structures were imported from Israel, but the market was not financed by Israel. There were questions about the source of the market's funding as conventional tender procedures seem not to have been followed. When the Auditor

vised the construction by personnel from the Zambian Army and the National Service. Construction began in 1995 and reached completion in 1997. Vendors were slow to take up stands in the new market, which for a long time was referred to as a 'white elephant'.

Prior to and after the 1999 massive clearing of street vendors, the city council encouraged vendors to return to designated markets in the townships, apply for stands in the new City Market or set themselves up in Chibolya, a site west of the light industrial area that in 1997 had been slated for a market. In 1999 when these arguments were made, Chibolya market had not been completed. Only a perimeter wall had been built, while water tanks and ablution blocks still were under construction. A few vendors had put together temporary stalls while others displayed their goods on the ground.

EU market upgrading: In the late 1990s, the European Union launched an urban market upgrading project in Lusaka and the Copperbelt. The project began with a pilot program in Lusaka targeting Chilenje market for upgrading and Libala and Nyumba Yanga for new markets. The markets were to be run according to a new management model that aimed to reduce bureaucracy and political interference, increase participation, and be cost effective. Revenue from the market was to go into a credit fund for disbursement to members. Market advisory committees, along the lines of what president Mwanawasa later on described as boards, with members from stand-holders, were to oversee the market manager, control the credit fund, and liaise with the city council, government, and donors.⁴⁷

When I first saw them in 2002, only one of the EU supported markets had been completed, the market in Nyumba Yanga, a middle-income residential area that did not have previously have a market. The construction of market structures in Chilenje and Libala almost reached completion. Parts of the existing markets had been demolished to yield space, and hundreds of vendors lost their stands. At Chilenje, this meant demolishing half of the old market. Idle for many years, the unfinished market structures are ruins, testifying to a breach between the city council and the building contractor. In 2003, some Zambia Police officers and their families squatted in the unfinished market structures at Chilenje,

General's Office queried the expenditures, it revealed irregularities in the handling of finances, record keeping, and contract allocation. Hansen, 'Who rules the streets?', 65.

⁴⁷ Wilma S. Nchito, 'New markets, new practices, does gender matter? A study of the management practices in the new markets of Lusaka, Zambia', paper presented at the Nordic Africa Institute's workshop on 'Urban Governance, Gender, and Markets', Bamako, 2002.

because they lacked housing.⁴⁸ When construction of the Copperbelt part of the market project was about to begin in 2004, there were indications that the completion of the Chilenje market was to be included in the EU rehabilitation project.⁴⁹

The Luburma-Kamwala redevelopment: Lusaka's 'second class trading area' during the colonial period, Luburma-Kamwala, opened for African trade in the 1950s. After independence it developed into the capital's liveliest trading area with Indian wholesale shops selling anything from groceries to hardware to *chitenge* (colorful printed fabric) to *salaula* (imported secondhand clothing). As the shopping area of choice for people with limited income, it grew rapidly. By the mid-1990s the space outside the market had filled, absorbing traders who were displaced by the development of the new market at Soweto and many others.

When a Chinese-funded redevelopment project began at Kamwala in 2001, hundreds of traders were forced away. The project is a private investment by a firm, China Hainan, through a contract with the city council, allowing the firm to run the market for 65 years in order to recover capital investments.⁵⁰ The redevelopment of parts of the old, dilapidated market appeared as a welcome solution to the oppressive crowding in the market. But the construction progressed slowly, stalling several times as marketeers, including container-based operators, refused to move. Problems arose over rental fees.⁵¹ Politics entered as MMD cadres criticized the high rental fees, their pegging to the dollar, and the implied prioritizing of foreign investors.⁵² The project's joint-venture aspect became suspect. The 65-year lease did not follow the rules of the Local Government Act authorizing the city council to lease out land for 15 years only.⁵³

The new shops at Kamwala market were rented to traders of various backgrounds, including Chinese, Lebanese, Indians, and Zambians. Rumor had it

⁴⁸ '23 Lusaka police officers squat at Chilenje market', *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 22 June 2003.

⁴⁹ 'EU releases K25bn for market repairs', *Times of Zambia*, 31 July 2004. It is unclear from the published news reports whether the completion of Chilenje market will be paid by the city council through a grant of K1 billion from the central government or by the EU. 'Chilenje market gets K1bn,' *National Mirror*, 30 Oct. – 5 Nov. 2004. A person from the EU office involved with the process commented to me in 2004 that newspapers often 'get things wrong.'

⁵⁰ '\$3.5m deal clinched for Kamwala market', *Zambia Daily Mail*, 11 Aug. 2001.

⁵¹ Rentals ranged from \$415 to \$6,300 per month for three types of shops of different size. 'Crisis looms over new Kamwala market', *Sunday Mail*, 12 Jan. 2003.

⁵² 'MMD cadres speak out over Luburma market', *Zambia Daily Mail*, 26 Oct. 2003.

⁵³ The contract contains a 10-year review clause and appears, according to print media reports, to be under renegotiation. 'Re-negotiate Luburma lease', *Zambia Daily Mail*, 29 July 2004.

that some Zambians sublet their shops to Chinese traders.⁵⁴ The Chinese were alleged to bring in merchandize of cheap clothing, footwear, house-wares, and electrical gadgets from Hong Kong, Singapore, and the People's Republic of China. Catering to higher-end traders by charging rents that pushed out less well capitalized traders, the redeveloped market forced small-scale traders who had operated from Kamwala for years to enter the already crowded informal economy.⁵⁵

The Chachacha market redevelopment: In September 1999, the vendors in Lusaka's Town Centre learned that their market was to be demolished to provide space for a 'high-cost shopping complex'.⁵⁶ The Town Centre Market had developed shortly after independence (in 1966) in the heart of the central business district. It catered in the 1970s to expatriate needs. At the height of scarcity in the 1980s, the Town Centre Market was a hive of black marketing and also one of Lusaka's busiest bus stations. In the 1990s, it functioned as a market of convenience for the city center's workers, filled up by small restaurants, *shebeens* (drinking places), and food stalls as well as retail and service activities.

The new shopping complex developed as a joint enterprise between the city council and local businesses with Lebanese background, the United Engineering Group.⁵⁷ The council negotiated a 65-year agreement with the investors. The plans included both small and large shops, altogether providing a smaller number of stands than the old market. The project experienced problems resembling those at Soweto and Kamwala, including construction delays caused by the unwillingness of marketeers to relocate, reports about substandard construction, complaints of excessive shop rental costs, and allegations of foreigners 'taking over the market'. When some of the larger shops opened in December 2004, they included pharmacists, hardware dealers, and bakeries. The rental fees for the smaller shops, according to displaced traders, were 'too high'.⁵⁸ Many of these traders have been forced into street vending because of the limited number of stalls at the newly completed market. And already within a year of its opening, the Chachacha market experienced interference by ruling party members in the running of the market advisory committee.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ 'Opinion article (the Chaina Hainan 65 year lease)', *Times of Zambia*, 3 Sept. 2003; 'At the crossroads: The changing face of Kamwala', *Monitor*, 6-19 June 2003.

⁵⁶ 'Lusaka marketers reject to be shifted', *Zambia Daily Mail*, 28 Sept. 1999.

⁵⁷ Market construction unsettles traders', *National Mirror*, 3-9 June 2000.

⁵⁸ 'City centre marketers complain', *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 19 Dec. 2004; 'Lusaka town centre traders set for business', *Times of Zambia*, 3 Dec. 2004.

⁵⁹ 'Political interference mars business operations at Chachacha market', *The Post*, 8 Dec. 2005.

Acts of displacement

The processes I have described here have not produced any significant changes in how to deal with street vendors. The standard exhortation for street vendors to move to designated markets is reiterated over and over again. To be sure, moving street vendors to designated markets may have potential regulatory effects on supervision and revenue collection. After all, marketers might be charged tax, much like the presumptive tax that was imposed on buses and taxis when the bus stations were de-regulated.⁶⁰ Similar practices have as yet to be applied to markets, perhaps because the construction of 'ultra-modern' markets since the late 1990s has been slow, has stalled, or does not appear effectively to contain the problem of street vending.

Where did all the vendors go when they were displaced by new market developments? Some went to designated markets in the townships where others set up *tuntembas* along streets and in yards, and still others who were better capitalized developed home based enterprises.⁶¹ But many more pressed into the existing, already crowded, markets. After a cholera outbreak in February 2004, the area under the power pylons at Soweto market that had absorbed so many vendors in the past was razed and the entire market closed for a week for a clean-up exercise. The vendors quickly filled up the sides along nearby Los Angeles road and others established themselves at Chibolya, where by the summer of 2004 self-constructed stands filled in any remaining empty space. Without council or donor support, this market has developed into the center of the fish trade in Lusaka. When the Ministry of Local Government and Housing at the beginning of 2005 took over the operation of Soweto market from the council (alleging drop in revenue due to poor management), the minister announced that the evicted vendors would not be provided with alternative land 'because they had opted to trade on [...] illegal land even after advice from the relevant authorities'.⁶²

No wonder that vendors keep turning to the streets and that the council's admonitions that they leave the streets and return to designated markets have had, at most, temporary effects. Vendors have returned to the streets, in new disguises, with new sales strategies, at specific times of the day, and in strategic spots in the city, even though police and paramilitary have kept a visible presence in the city centre since the massive clean-up exercise of street vendors in 1999. New wrangles and clashes continue to arise in conflicts over space for

⁶⁰ 'ZRA launches presumptive tax on buses and taxis to raise K2.3 bn.', *The Post*, 4 July 2003.

⁶¹ Barbara Kazimbaya-Senkwe, 'Home based enterprises in a period of economic restructuring in Zambia', in: Hansen and Vaa, *Reconsidering informality*, 99-119.

⁶² 'Ministry takes over running of Soweto Market', *Times of Zambia*, 20 Jan. 2005.

trading.⁶³ These events are spectacular enactments of disaffection by a population segment whose livelihoods have been squeezed by the problematic convergence of global and local processes I referred to at the outset.

The contradictions inherent in a retail investment approach to development are visibly evident on Lusaka's streets and in its overcrowded designated markets. Chasing for the bottom, recent South African and Chinese investors, and probably others as well, in urban retail employ local people at substandard wages, often on piecework conditions where casual employment never becomes permanent.⁶⁴ The adverse distributive effects of investments in urban retail of this type are among the results of the state's attempt to pursue an internationally endorsed development agenda. Following the initial euphoria in the wake of the shift to market liberalization in the early 1990s, it has now become clear that investment driven market liberalization is pushing a new wedge between Lusaka's already sharply divided population. That wedge is about space and access, specifically markets and streets, and their regulation.

Claiming space

Markets and streets are among the most important sources of non-formal employment in Lusaka. In the 1970s vendors took their own initiatives when they developed Soweto market. When, in the late 1980s-early 1990s, they moved outside Soweto market's built-up area in search of space, they called the large section on the bare ground after 'Kambilobilo', a rural resettlement center established during the Second Republic on the Copperbelt with the aim of turning unemployed urban youth into good farmers. The special meaning of the name derives from the fact that the young people who were brought there were left without any services. At Kambilobilo there is no infrastructure to speak of and no amenities. The term Kambilobilo is used for outside sections of markets elsewhere where traders are left to their own devices. When they relocated to yield space for the construction of the new City Market, many traders went to the open field outside Kamwala market, next to the railroad tracks. They called this section Gabon, a designation also used in other open-air markets. The

⁶³ 'Lusaka vendors vow not to leave streets', *The Post*, 9 Jan. 2006.

⁶⁴ Shop workers at *Shoprite* have staged numerous strikes over wage and casualization issues since the South African owned supermarket opened in Lusaka in 1999. The government appears to be slow to enact a proposed new labour law, the draft of which has been discussed for several years. Among the contentious issues related to shop employment are minimum wages, and employment conditions including pensions. Other issues concern child labour.

connotation is to perish in a disaster, like the Zambia National Football Team who died in a plane crash in Gabon in 1993.⁶⁵

Naming practices such as these highlight widespread cynicism over lacking state's support of efforts to make a living in the past. In the more recent era of market redevelopment and ultra modern markets vendors have wondered whether 'Government would allocate them new land, since each time a new market is constructed, the less privileged traders lose out'.⁶⁶ But the state has few resources. What is more, externally endorsed development policy constrains its ability to promote a development agenda of its own. Most of the state actions I have described here have been ad hoc interventions prompted by political convenience rather than vendors' needs. Other than recent propositions directed towards controlling markets through a new management policy and the establishment of the TEVET policy, the state has not proposed any consistent or substantive policy to improve the opportunities for the thousands of people, the majority of them young men, whose livelihoods depend on markets and streets.

Caught between an impotent state and intrusive global development agendas, the vendors' reactions are evident in the streets. Since the heavy-handed demolition of *tuntembas* in 1999, many vendors have resisted the state's efforts to contain them within designated market spaces. Only after the 1999 event did a new resolve become evident.⁶⁷

Vendors will no doubt continue returning to Lusaka's streets for as long as the problems in the economy and the structure of the labor market keep fueling overall economic informalization. The hopes and aspirations of a large segment of Lusaka's population for household livelihoods and social mobility are nourished by vending. Street vendor Julius Katongo, whom I quoted at the outset, spoke about initiatives of self-employment, that is, of filling in the employment gap that results from the state's inability to grow the economy. When he and other vendors speak about their *tuntembas*, they make unprecedented claims on ownership. The meanings of *tuntemba* revolve around notions of area of operation/influence, that is to say, being in charge, as a part of a larger whole. Such narratives undermine the state's lackluster control efforts and challenge its neglect/lack of support in the rhetoric of entitlement and aspirations that democracy has promoted since the early 1990s.

⁶⁵ Karen Tranberg Hansen, *Salaula: The world of secondhand clothing and Zambia*. Chicago (Chicago and London, 2000), 158.

⁶⁶ 'Lusaka town centre market: who'll benefit?', *Zambia Daily Mail*, 26 Sept. 2004.

⁶⁷ The street vendors' ability to maneuver appears to be much wider in Zambia than in neighboring Zimbabwe, where *Operation Murambatsvina* (meaning approximately in the Shona language 'drive out trash/filth') in 2005 devastated the livelihoods of thousands of people.

The body politic of vending and marketing

Zambia's multi-party elections in 1991 ushered in neo-liberal development priorities that have sharpened long-existing socio-spatial polarizations, extending them by new dynamics that are particularly visible in urban areas. Shopping malls are displacing street vendors. Changing property values are relegating low-income residents to housing on the edge of the city. While labor is free in the sense described by Marx, cut loose from its means of production, today much of Lusaka's potential labor force has few other work options than the informal economy. At the center of public confrontations over space are people's livelihoods which are not only, or exclusively, about economic processes. Because households are at the heart of the economy,⁶⁸ household dynamics and the gender and generational relations that inform them play important parts in generating livelihoods from the informal economy.

The vast majority of vendors and small-scale marketeers in Lusaka seek to ensure household provisioning over enterprise expansion. The activities at this economic level are first and foremost oriented around the survival needs of individuals and households. This helps explain to some extent the striking fluidity of the market scene where traders come and go, change commodities, move between indoor and outdoor spaces, and at times handle other jobs as well. It also helps illuminate the fragmented expression of political agency on the part of vendors. Lusaka's informal market scene lacks overarching organized groups that represent the interests of the diverse traders in different goods and services, the women, the old, and the young. Although they keep re-occurring, the struggles of Lusaka's street vendors and market traders have been episodic and disjointed, by and large concerned with immediate survival issues. The scene is so fragmented that the ruling party in 1999 had no qualms about launching the largest exercise to remove vendors from urban space ever to be conducted in Zambia. In recent years, new market associations have emerged, adopting the language of free agents and entrepreneurship, calling for a place in decision making, including membership in new governance structures such as market boards. As with so much else in Zambia including naming practices such as 'Office of the President', 'Soweto', 'Kambilobilo', and 'Gabon', they do so with a good deal of cynicism because experience has made them doubt the outcome.

This paper has noted two policy examples whose constraints have adverse implications for the future livelihoods of many urban residents, including vendors and traders. One example, hinging on the policy of decentralization, is the new market management model that is likely to diminish the role of local government and reduce state access to market revenue. The focus of this model

⁶⁸ Hansen, *Keeping house*, 96.

is control, rather than support, of vendors. The second example, revolving around the PRSP promotion of democracy and governance, concerns the liberalization of the economy. So far, rather than reducing poverty, the free market promotion of foreign investment has contributed to widening the extent of poverty, deepening its nature and scope, and restricting many people's access.

The local effects of internationally endorsed development efforts to bring Zambia into the global fold of democracies play out across a reconfigured urban space. In effect, the streets have become a major stage in the struggle for economic access in Zambia's open, but very constrained, economy. In the process, questions about vendors (young and old; women and men; dealing with different commodities/services) have been redefined into 'the problem of street vending', with a formulation that masks the complexities of livelihoods made from vending on the streets. Because the problem of vending is bound up with much more than vendors, streets, and markets, including all manner of concerns ranging from public health to safety, it constitutes a potentially volatile urban political geography that invites repressive action by the state.

PART IV:

POLITICS AND THE THIRD
REPUBLIC
OR
NEW AND OLD FORMS OF
POLITICS IN THE THIRD
REPUBLIC




Photo 20 ZCTU leader, Fackson Shamenda

Fighting for democracy of the pocket: The labour movement in the Third Republic

Friday E. Mulenga

Introduction

My main aim in this paper is to answer the question of why did the labour movement in Zambia, after playing such a central role in the democratisation process of the country, see its power and influence decline from a relatively strong position during the First and Second Republics (1964-1991). The potential for the movement to become really powerful has not been realised in the Third Republic owing to a number of internal and external factors that lie deep in its history and threaten the very existence of the movement.

Labour issues in Zambia, one of the most heavily urbanised sub-Saharan African countries, have attracted a lot of academic interest over the years because unions started asserting their interests during the anti-colonial struggle and, later, also played a pivotal role in the overthrow of the Kaunda regime.¹

¹ H.S. Meebelo, *African proletarians and colonial capitalism: The origins, growth and struggles of the Zambian labour movement to 1964* (Lusaka, 1986), Chapters 7-8. Other key works are: R.H. Bates, *Unions, parties and political development: A study of mineworkers in Zambia* (New Haven, 1971); J.L. Parpart, *Labour and capital on the African copperbelt* (Philadelphia, 1983); C. Perrings, *Black mineworkers in Central Africa* (London, 1979); M.R. Mwendapole, *A history of the trade union movement in Zambia up to 1968*, Institute of African Studies, Communication No. 13 (Lusaka, 1972); A.L. Epstein, *Politics in an urban African community* (Manchester, 1958); E.L. Berger, *Labour, race and colonial rule: The copperbelt from 1924 to independence* (Oxford, 1974); A. Gupta, 'Trade unionism and politics

Moreover, given the country's mono-economy, it was very important for both the colonial and post-colonial governments to control the copper mining companies and therefore the mineworkers. This, more than anything else, accounts for the centrality of the position attained in the political economy of the country by both the European and African mineworkers.²

Important sources of information regarding the labour movement have been the monthly and annual labour reports and the reports of the numerous commissions of inquiry that analysed labour issues from the government's perspective. These reports stopped being produced from the mid-1980s; as a result, data on contemporary workers have become more difficult to access. There are, however, a number of theses that have covered aspects of Zambian post-colonial labour history from which this article has benefited.³ Other recent works have adopted a narrowly political perspective, being mainly concerned with explaining labour's role in the democratisation process from the late 1980s and the problems the labour movement has faced as a result of that participation.⁴ By concentrating solely on the political role of the labour movement, they seem to lend credit to the argument that African trade unions became an interesting object of study only when they took up political roles.⁵ This chapter, instead, will examine the factors that have made it difficult for the trade unions to

on the Copperbelt', in: W. Tordoff, ed., *Politics in Zambia* (Manchester, 1974), 288-319; I. Henderson, 'Early African leadership: The copperbelt disturbances of 1935 and 1940', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 2 (1975), 83-97, an id., 'Wage-earners and political protest in colonial Africa: the case of the Copperbelt', *African Affairs*, 72 (1973), 288-99.

² J. Kraus, 'African trade unions: progress or poverty?' *African Studies Review*, 19 (1976), 98; B. Freund, 'Labour and labour history in Africa: A review of the literature', *African Studies Review*, 27 (1984), 8-9.

³ N.N.J. Mijere, 'The mineworkers' resistance to governmental decentralization in Zambia: nation-building and labour aristocracy in the Third World', PhD. thesis, Brandeis University, 1985; B.B. Liato, 'Organised labour and the state in Zambia', PhD thesis, University of Leeds, 1989; F.E. Mulenga, 'The development of worker consciousness among the African railway workers in Zambia, 1953-1972', MA thesis, University of Zambia, 1987; and M. Larmer, 'Zambia's mineworkers and political change, 1964-1991', PhD thesis, University of Sheffield, 2004.

⁴ See, for example, Emmanuel Akwetey, *Trade unions and democratisation: A comparative study of Zambia and Ghana* (Stockholm, 1994); L. Rakner, 'Trade unions in the process of democratisation: a study of party-labour relations in Zambia', Chr. Michelson Institute, Report No. 6, Bergen, 1992; id., 'The pluralistic paradox: the decline of economic interest groups in Zambia in the 1990s', *Development and Change*, 32 (2001), 521-43; and P. Mihyo, 'Against overwhelming odds: The Zambian labour movement', in: H. Thomas, ed., *Globalization and third world trade unions: The challenge of rapid economic change* (London, 1995), 201-14.

⁵ See, for example, V.L. Allen, 'The study of trade unionism', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 7 (1969), 289-90.

effectively represent their members in terms of improving their social and economic status.

Development of the Zambian labour movement after independence

Shortly after Independence, the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance was enacted. The official patronising government view was that the Ordinance was meant to strengthen the trade union movement and help the trade unions to conduct their affairs freely. However, as I show elsewhere in this paper and indeed as other writers on labour in Zambia have shown, the Ordinance aimed at helping UNIP control the trade unions. The then Minister of Labour and Mines, Justin Chimba, a former trade unionist himself, said that the Bill would protect the trade union movement from disruptive outside influence by prohibiting affiliation with foreign agencies and the receipt of outside material assistance without his approval.⁶

The 1965 Ordinance, however, can also be read as a response to the disunity by which the labour movement had been plagued during the last few years of colonial rule. It was with these internal tensions in mind that Mwendapole a veteran trade unionist himself, wrote: 'And when President Kaunda and former Governor Evelyn Hone stood before the hoisting of the independence flag on 24th October 1964, the great and exciting history of the trade union movement lay prostrate and powerless to make a significant impact upon the life of independent Zambia'.⁷ Among the other things, the Ordinance endorsed the principle of 'one union, one industry' and compelled all registered trade unions to seek affiliation with the newly established Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), now the only legal trade union federation in the country. The Industrial Relations Act of 1971 later replaced the 1965 Ordinance. For all of these efforts, however, the disunity in the labour movement did not end. In 1974, the enormously influential Mineworkers' Union of Zambia (MUZ) threatened to pull out of ZCTU after its leader, David Mwila, lost the ZCTU elections alongside numerous other MUZ officials. MUZ only remained in ZCTU because the law did not support such a split.⁸ Enforced membership of ZCTU undeniably helped the labour movement to remain relatively strong: In 1990, trade union member-

⁶ International Labour Office (ILO), *Report to the government of Zambia on labour administration* (Geneva, 1975), 5; Debates of the first session of the first legislative assembly, 10th March – 20th March 1964, 97; *Debates of the first session of the first national assembly, 14th December – 18th December 1964*, 73.

⁷ Mwendapole, *History of the trade union movement in Zambia*, 54.

⁸ *Annual Labour Report for 1973* (Lusaka, 1974), 19; *Annual Labour Report for 1974*, (Lusaka, 1975) 19.

ship among workers in formal employment stood at about 56%, one of the highest in Africa.⁹

From the late 1970s, Kaunda's increasingly unpopular and embattled regime contributed directly to foment divisions within the labour movement. The UNIP leadership considered ZCTU's Chairman General, Frederick Chiluba, a political threat and made numerous attempts to weaken and divide the labour movement by attempting to incorporate him and General Secretary Newstead Zimba into the UNIP Central Committee. When both men refused to work for UNIP, the party tried to lessen their popularity among their followers by arguing that the duo was pursuing interests different from those of the workers they led. *Africa Confidential* stated that in 1988 the police Special Branch infiltrated the National Union of Building, Engineering and General Workers (NUBEGW) with a view to persuading its executive to suspend Chairman Chiluba. The aim of the move was to disqualify the latter from standing for election to the ZCTU, membership of whose executive was restricted to those who held a post in an affiliated union.¹⁰ When ZCTU nullified Chiluba's suspension and suspended some NUBEGW officials after charging them with conspiracy to remove Chiluba from office unconstitutionally, the NUBEGW officials, led by Luciano Mutale, took the matter to court. While the Kitwe High Court ruled in favour of ZCTU, the Supreme Court, led by Deputy Chief Justice Matthew Ngulube, overturned the ruling in favour of the NUBEGW officials.¹¹ Chiluba's position was only saved by the Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT) and the Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers (ZUFIAW), which gave him senior positions in their organisations.¹² When he was eventually re-elected as Chairman of ZCTU in October 1990, Chiluba delivered a speech in which he said he believed he had been saved because God sent angels to redeem him through ZUFIAW.¹³

Although Chiluba had not declared his candidature for the presidency in the 1988 presidential and parliamentary elections, he was widely seen as a possible presidential candidate capable of unseating Kaunda.¹⁴ Such was the threat posed by Chiluba that, in another attempt to weaken him, Kaunda accused ZCTU of being close to the CIA and several unnamed Western Countries. Kaunda also

⁹ T. Fashoyin, 'The contribution of social dialogue to economic and social development in Zambia', Working Paper, International Labour Office, Geneva, Jan. 2002, 10.

¹⁰ *Africa Confidential*, 12 Oct. 1990.

¹¹ *Times of Zambia and Zambia Daily Mail*, Sept. to Oct. 1987.

¹² *Africa Confidential*, 12 Oct. 1990; *Africa Contemporary Record*, 20 (1987-88), Section B, 823.

¹³ *Times of Zambia*, 29 Oct. 1990.

¹⁴ *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 29, No. 2, January 1988, p. 4.

accused Friedrich Brunke, head of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Lusaka, of funding ZCTU and told him to leave the country.¹⁵

During the late 1980s, the labour movement had shown public support for Chiluba and his Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) party. In fact, when this party was voted in power, they celebrated by holding 'victory marches' in Lusaka and other parts of the country. The workers now looked to the Government with 'great expectations' of good remuneration for their labour, and 'respect for professionalism'.¹⁶ However, after about two years, the labour movement realised that it had claimed a false victory. If political democracy had been achieved for the people, the workers still had to fight for 'economic democracy', or 'democracy of the pocket',¹⁷ by winning better salaries and better conditions of service. The MMD, for reasons that I will shortly expound on, did not fulfil its promise to the Zambian workers, despite its 1991 campaign manifesto on labour.

The decline of the labour movement in the Third Republic

Katz, Kuruvilla and Turner, basing their research on some select Asian countries argue that a number of factors produced weak unions that hindered the establishment of genuine and stable collective bargaining. The factors include, the relatively small size of the organised industrial labour force (typically, the unorganised informal and agricultural sectors were much larger than the industrial one); the comparative low education of a labour force that could be manipulated by leaders whose goals differed from those of the members and firms that employed them; the fragmentation that ensued from the existence of several unions at both the national and workplace levels; the absence of legislation promoting single bargaining agents inside firms and an orderly bargaining structure; repressive state policies that granted decertification and deregistration powers to government officials; successful employer opposition to union formation; government persecution of labour leaders; the absence of a unified employer association that could inspire stable industrial level bargaining; and union constitutions that mandated union elections on a yearly basis, thus preventing the development of long-term plans by union leaders.¹⁸

Zambia has not been the only African country where trade unions have lost much of their former influence. Schillinger argues that with the notable excep-

¹⁵ *Africa Contemporary Record*, 20 (1987-88), Section B, 823.

¹⁶ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 24 Nov. 1991.

¹⁷ *Africa South & East*, March 1993, 28.

¹⁸ H.C. Katz, S. Kuruvilla and L. Turner, 'Trade unions and collective bargaining', Policy Research Working Papers, Education and Social Policy Department, The World Bank, Feb. 1993, 8-9.

tion of the industrially more developed South Africa and Mauritius,¹⁹ the influence of labour movements in Africa have remained weak in the traditional fields of labour relations and that, more than elsewhere, trade unions in Africa today are fighting an uphill battle. Their financial position is becoming increasingly weak as a result of the continued decline of formal employment and the ensuing loss of members. Moreover, the neo-liberal policies of the IMF and World Bank have created a labour-unfriendly environment that has eroded their chances of influencing policy decisions. In many places, too, internal divisions, splits or rivalry between unions organising in the same sector further have weakened labour movements. In many cases the divisions are driven by personal ambitions of (would-be) union leaders.²⁰

Some of the factors that produce weak unions have existed in Zambia for a long time, while others have only come into being after the transition from a one-party state to a multi-party state. The revolutionary political and economic changes that have taken place in Zambia since October 1991 have obscured some of the important continuities in the historical development of the labour movement.

Financial weakness of the trade union movement

A factor that has existed for a long time and has undermined the strength of the labour movement has been its financial weakness. Berg and Butler argued that one criterion through which to judge the political impact of a labour movement, or its contribution to political affairs, was the money it supplied to political parties. He went on to show that labour movements in Africa supplied much less by way of financial resources than those in Europe.²¹ In Zambia, even the African Mineworkers' Union that by 1952 'towered over its fellow unions' had financial problems.²² From its inception, the ZCTU was plagued by financial problems.²³ The weak financial position of ZCTU sometimes negatively affected its relationship with some of its financially stronger affiliates, as happened in 1973, when MUZ threatened to strangle ZCTU financially by with-

¹⁹ It should be noted that in his definition of "industrially more developed" countries in Africa, Schillinger included Mauritius with South Africa.

²⁰ Hubert Rene Schillinger, "Trade unions in Africa: Weak but feared", Occasional Papers: International Development Cooperation (Responsible.Erwin.schweisshelm@fes.de), March 2005.

²¹ E. Berg and J. Butler, 'Trade unions', in: J.S. Coleman and C.G. Rosberg Jr., eds, *Political parties and national integration in tropical Africa* (Berkeley, 1970), 340-1.

²² Northern Rhodesia Labour Department *Annual Report for the Year 1958* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1959), 15.

²³ *Debates of the first session of the first national assembly, 14th December – 18th December 1964*, cols. 69-113; *Annual Labour Report for 1967*, 12.

drawing its contribution over a wrangle involving Edwin Thawe, who had been MUZ General Secretary.²⁴

After 1992, when the labour movement's membership began to shrink, the issue of its financial weakness became, if possible, even worse. Chiluba and his team left ZCTU with financial problems, and in May 1995, the Acting ZCTU President, Austin Liato, attributed ZCTU's failure to help out former workers of the liquidated Zambia Airways to the fact that the Chiluba-led ZCTU executive had left empty coffers because it had not invested wisely the money from workers' contributions. Liato also stated that ZCTU's financial position was being further weakened by the ongoing splits within the labour movement.²⁵

Lack of political direction of the trade unions

Another internal factor that has contributed to undermining the strength of the labour movement has been the lack of political direction. Berg and Butler observed that during the colonial period the African labour movements largely failed to become politically involved and that, even when they did so, they only had a limited political impact. After independence, the parties that formed governments further restricted the unions' political role. Although Zambia's economic and social structure was conducive to the development of good relations between the labour movement and political parties,²⁶ there developed instead a troubled relationship, as attested, for example, by the frequent tensions between MUZ and UNIP.²⁷ In 2000, when the trade unions became disappointed with the performance of the MMD government and wanted to urge their members to vote against the ruling party in the elections in 2001, ZCTU leader, Jackson Shamenda, refused to support this stance, arguing that while leaders of individual trade unions might speak on behalf of their own unions, ZCTU must not become politically involved. He further argued that in 1990-91 ZCTU had become involved in politics only to help restore democracy and not because it was a partisan organisation.²⁸

²⁴ *Times of Zambia*, 1 May 1973 (see also issues of May, June and July of the same year); *Annual Labour Report for 1973*.

²⁵ *The Post*, 19 May 1995.

²⁶ Berg and Butler, 'Trade unions', 353.

²⁷ See, for example, D.C. Mulford, *Zambia: The politics of independence, 1957-1964* (Oxford, 1967), 170-74; Bates, *Unions, parties and political development*, 126-65; A. Gupta, 'Trade unionism and politics on the Copperbelt', 293-302; R. Hall, *Zambia 1890-1964: The colonial period* (London, 1976), 124-25, 182-83; Parpart, *labour and capital on the African copperbelt*, 136-158; and Meebelo, *African proletarians and colonial capitalism*, 414-50.

²⁸ *Times of Zambia*, 11 Aug. 2000.

Shamenda was reluctant to throw the labour movement into the political arena in order to ensure that neither the MMD nor any other party would be given an excuse to interfere in the labour movement's internal affairs after the elections. This reluctance was understandable and may be traced as far back as Lawrence Katilungu's behaviour in the 1950s, when the founder of African trade unionism in what was then Northern Rhodesia had resisted appeals from political parties to use the unions for political strikes.²⁹ But some younger trade union leaders challenged Shamenda's position. Leonard Hikaumba, president of the Civil Servants Union of Zambia (now Civil Servants & Allied Workers' Union of Zambia), urged the labour movement to take a stance on politics. He argued that trade unions could not entirely stay away from politics, because the decisions made by politicians affected both the labour leaders and the members of their unions. Shamenda counter-charged that it was difficult for the ZCTU to decide which political party to support because the same people were rotating from one party to another. He however said individual trade unions could choose a political party to support.³⁰

We could also say that the strength of the unions has been undermined by the fact that strong labour leaders have always been co-opted into the political and government system. As early as 1963-64, a time of great turmoil in the labour movement, UNIP thought that the co-optation of quarrelling labour leaders into government would solve the labour movement's problems. Those who were co-opted as cabinet or deputy ministers included such prominent trade unionists as Wilson Chakulya, Basil Kabwe, John Chisata, Jonathan Chivunga and Matthew Nkoloma; others (Alfred Chambeshi, Gabriel Mushikwa and Timothy Kankasa) were seconded to the diplomatic service. However, these men came to be accused of willingly abandoning the labour movement for government jobs and eroding the confidence of rank and file members in labour leaders. It was partly because of this that, from 1974, radical trade unionists, such as Chiluba, who placed emphasis on the economic interests of the workers and the autonomy of the labour movement ascended to its leadership.³¹

Another challenge the labour movement faces is its lack of effective bargainers.³² Some observers of the Zambian labour situation have argued that the

²⁹ Meebelo, *African Proletarians and Colonial Capitalism*, 418.

³⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 12 Aug. 2000. Interestingly, the ZCTU under the leadership of Hikaumba is presently facing exactly the same problem it had under Shamenda. With presidential and parliamentary elections set for 28 Sept. 2006, in August 2006, Hikaumba and ZCTU have yet to decide which party or candidates to support.

³¹ Bates, *Unions, parties and political development*, 27-73; Liato, 'Organised labour and the state in Zambia', PhD Thesis, University of Leeds, 1989. See "Abstract", no page number indicated.

³² *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 31 Dec. 1995.

labour movement's fight for survival is not made any easier by it lacking a university-trained leadership. This damaging situation results from the combined efforts of the UNIP government, the employers and, unwittingly, the trade unions themselves,³³ all of whom worked towards ensuring that well trained and educated workers would normally be placed in management positions and prevented from belonging to trade unions where they could provide an adequate leadership.

Disunity within the labour movement

Disunity – about which much has been said at the outset – has continued to hinder the effectiveness of the Zambian labour movement in the Third Republic. In 1990, the 1971 Industrial Relations Act was replaced by a new Act that abolished the 'one union, one industry' policy. Although the 1990 Act contravened ILO Conventions and was greatly resented by the labour movement, the MMD Government did nothing to revoke it. Instead, it soon replaced it with the 1993 Industrial and Labour Relations Act, that not only confirmed the demise of the 'one union, one industry' principle, but also allowed the creation of trade union mother bodies other than ZCTU. The MMD-promoted change of policy made an immediate impact and was accompanied by the formation of numerous splinter unions, such as the Primary Education Teachers' Union of Zambia and the Secondary School Teachers' Union of Zambia, which broke away from ZNUT. In a similar vein, the Bankers' Union of Zambia broke away from ZUFIW.³⁴

The major split occurred in 1994, after MUZ leader, Francis Kunda, lost the elections for the position of president of ZCTU to Shamenda. Kunda, unlike Mwila in 1974, pulled MUZ out of the ZCTU because in the new democratic environment, the law about compulsory affiliation to ZCTU no longer applied. Four other unions, namely ZUFIW, ZNUT, NUBEGW and the National Union of Commercial & Industrial Workers (NUCIW) followed MUZ's example by pulling out of ZCTU to form the Federation of Free Trade Unions (FFTUZ) in 1994.³⁵ FFTUZ was only registered as a second trade union federation in 1998 after the law permitting the formation of a rival federation was changed in 1997. The MMD Government had in 1996 ratified the ILO Convention No. 87 of 1948, which made it inevitable that the relevant provisions of the labour law

³³ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 6 Dec. 1992.

³⁴ *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1990-1992, Vol. 23, p. B712-13; Mihyo, 'Against overwhelming odds', 211; D. Banda, 'The trade union situation in Zambia: an overview of the law, practice and the way forward', Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Zambia Office, Lusaka, July 1997.

³⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 26 Dec. 1994, and *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 24 Dec. 1995.

would have to be amended to conform to international labour standards. The Industrial and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act of 1997 sought to align the law with the provisions of Convention No. 87 of 1948. The Amendment paved the way for the formation of more trade unions, including union federations. The 1993 Act had only changed the law to allow the formation of more trade unions but not of more trade union federations. This was allowed after the 1997 Amendment. As a direct result of this liberalisation of the law on freedom of association, there emerged a crop of small unions that faced problems of lack of resources, poor organisation and general instability.³⁶

However, by 1998, all but one of the five breakaway unions had returned to ZCTU. Only ZUFIW remained outside ZCTU and ultimately became the nucleus of FFTUZ. In 1992, it had more than 10,000 members, but in 2001 the membership had dropped to 6,300. In 2001, ZUFIW was joined in the FFTUZ by four other unions, including two splinter unions in the teaching profession, to bring its membership to about 32,000.³⁷ As shown in Table 10.3 below, some sources put the ZUFIW membership in 2001 at only 5,000.

In 1992, ZCTU General Secretary, Alec Chirwa, said the proliferation of unions in one industry would weaken the labour movement (as employers would play unions against one another) and break the solidarity that the labour movement had had over the years.³⁸ It is interesting that Chirwa should talk about solidarity in the labour movement when scholars and many other interested observers have recognised the fact that the disunity and the emergence of splinter unions are processes associated with internal divisions within the ZCTU that became apparent in 1994 and culminated in a split in the trade union movement.

Effects of economic liberalisation

Finally, another factor that has contributed to undermining the strength of the labour movement has been the decrease in numbers of trade union members as a result of the country's shrinking industrial base and the retrenchments and redundancies that started well before the MMD era. In 1980, the Department of Labour observed that the employment situation had been deteriorating since 1975, when the copper price on the world market collapsed.³⁹ In 1990, President Kaunda called for a 'quick' solution to the crisis as the economic decline was

³⁶ Fashoyin, 'The contribution of social dialogue', 10.

³⁷ E.J. Nyirenda and A. Shikwe, 'Trade union country report – Zambia', Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Zambia Office, Lusaka, Dec 2003, p. 20; Fashoyin, 'The contribution of social dialogue', 12.

³⁸ *Times of Zambia*, 13 Feb. 1992.

³⁹ *Annual Labour Report for the Year 1980* (Lusaka, 1981), 5.

creating an unemployment time bomb. He said that formal employment had declined from 381,490 in 1980 to 365,190 in 1984, a decline of 4.3%, and that and by 1989 it had dropped to 359,620.⁴⁰ The declining employment levels meant that the labour movement was losing members and becoming weaker.

The period from 1992 was particularly challenging for the labour movement because fundamental economic and political reforms, focusing particularly on privatisation, trade and agricultural liberalisation, were implemented. They were meant to promote growth and development by reforming a non-competitive state-managed economy and integrating it into the competitive global economy.⁴¹ The period under review, of course, also witnessed global changes in business, trade and information and communication technologies.⁴² Globalization led to intensified trade reforms designed to integrate the Zambian economy into global markets, but the policies had fundamental detrimental effects on employment and labour relations policies and practices.⁴³

The MMD Government began the privatisation programme in Zambia in 1992 with the enactment of the Privatisation Act No. 21 and the creation of the Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA) that targeted 280 parastatals for privatisation. By the end of 2001, 257 companies had been privatised.⁴⁴ There were also public service reforms that led to the reduction of the civil service from about 139,000 in 1997 to approximately 101,000 in April 2000, a decrease of more than 27%.⁴⁵ Chiluba, in spite of his trade union background, strongly supported the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and in August 1994, underlined its inevitability in the following terms:

I don't like the Structural Adjustment Programme but I kiss it and will continue doing so. In this respect I can declare that I don't care losing the coming presidential elections if people hate me because of the programme. Even when I lose, I will go a happy man because I have so far managed to change people's minds from perpetual borrowing to fend for themselves.⁴⁶

As Table 11.1 below shows, the impact of SAP on the labour market and unionisation has been devastating. Zambia's labour force has continued to grow

⁴⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 12 May 1990.

⁴¹ Fashoyin, 'The contribution of social dialogue', ii; L.C. Situmbeko and J.J. Zulu, 'Zambia: condemned to debt – how the IMF and World Bank have undermined development', *World Development Movement*, Apr. 2004, 18.

⁴² Fashoyin, 'The contribution of social dialogue', ii.

⁴³ *Ibid.*; D. Narasimba Reddy, 'Economic globalization past and present: the challenges to labour', in K.S. Jomo and K. Khay Jin, eds, *Globalization and its discontents, revisited* (New Delhi, 2003), 42-43.

⁴⁴ Situmbeko and Zulu, 'Zambia: condemned to debt', 20.

⁴⁵ Fashoyin, 'The contribution of social dialogue', 2.

⁴⁶ *Times of Zambia*, 31 Aug. 1994.

despite the economy's inability to create employment opportunities, particularly in the formal sector.⁴⁷ In 1997, out of a total labour force estimated at 4.4 million, only 11% were employed in the formal sector. The remaining 89% of the labour force were either unemployed or employed in the informal sector. It is moreover estimated that formal employment has been declining at an annual average of 2%. The contribution of the formal sector to employment has continued to decline mainly due to the retrenchments, closures and liquidations of companies that accompanied the implementation of SAP. Even the privatisation programme embarked upon by the government did not create the much-needed jobs. Experience has shown that jobs were usually lost in the process of privatisation.⁴⁸

Table 11.1 Formal employment and labour force trends

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Total labour force (millions)	3.3	3.5	3.7	3.8	3.99	4.4	4.41	4.6
Formal sector employment (thousands)	546	526	496	485	479	475	467	478
Formal sector employment as % of total labour force	17	16	15	13	12	11	10.5	10.4

Source: ZCTU 2001, citing various CSO sources 1992-1999

In 2003, President Levy Mwanawasa, his Minister of Finance, Ng'andu Magande, and other ministers and deputy ministers, all expressed views that suggested that they had lost faith in the privatisation programme. Their views mirrored those of most Zambians, who argued that privatisation was enriching foreign investors at the expense of ordinary people.⁴⁹ But Mwanawasa's break with the economic policies of the Chiluba era remained a pious intention. Towards the end of the year, the President was forced to admit that Zambians needed IMF, whether they liked it or not.⁵⁰

FFTUZ leader, Joyce Nondé, expressed a sense of betrayal with the results of privatisation. She stated that the labour movement had generally welcomed the principle of privatisation on the understanding that both the government and

⁴⁷ P.A. Mulenga, 'I.L.O./FTF/ICFTU-AFRO/ZCTU Project on Trade Union Capacity Building Through Education: Zambia Action Plan', January 2001 – December 2004, 23.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 24.

⁴⁹ Situmbeko and Zulu, 'Zambia: condemned to debt', 21-22. See also, *The Post*, 5, 26 Aug. 2003; 10 Oct. 2003.

⁵⁰ Situmbeko and Zulu, 'Zambia: condemned to debt', 33.

the new investors would protect the workers' interests. This hope – Nondé continued – had not materialized. Shamenda and other labour leaders had earlier reached the same conclusion as Nondé. ZCTU supported privatisation and the SAP in principle, but resented the rapidity with which the government was implementing its programmes, ignoring the plight of the workers who could not make ends meet because of the meagre salaries and wages they earned.⁵¹

As shown by Table 11.2, trade and agricultural liberalisation have been disastrous for Zambia's mining, manufacturing and agricultural sectors, as employment declined in all these sectors.

Table 11.2 Formal employment in Zambia, 1990-2000

Year	Public	Mining & Manufacturing	Agriculture	Other	Total
1990	159,000	142,000	80,000	162,000	543,000
1991	162,000	140,000	78,000	164,000	544,000
1992	171,000	136,000	82,000	158,000	546,000
1993	168,000	126,000	83,000	143,000	520,000
1994	174,000	108,000	79,000	136,000	497,000
1995	173,000	108,000	69,000	135,000	484,000
1996	176,000	95,000	68,000	140,000	479,000
1997	170,000	92,000	59,000	155,000	475,000
1998	174,000	86,000	59,000	157,000	467,000
1999	184,000	85,000	60,000	148,000	477,000
2000	185,000	83,000	50,000	158,000	476,000

Source: Situmbeko and Zulu, 'Zambia: Condemned to debt', 27.

It is clear that the implementation of the SAPs and the liberalisation of trade union activity itself have fundamentally undermined the labour movement's power.⁵² Various sources put total union membership at under 250,000 (in 2001). On the basis of wage employment records, a realistic estimate put union density at about 50%. While this is comparatively high in the Southern African sub-region, the Zambian trade union movement has suffered an enormous decline in membership, particularly during the 1990s. As shown in Table 11.3, during a 5-year period, 1990-1995, ZCTU membership declined from 355,197 to 290,847, mainly due to privatization and industrial restructuring that led to the shrinking of the industrial base and to public service reforms that led to job

⁵¹ *Times of Zambia*, 3 July 1992; *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 21, 22 Nov. 1992; *Times of Zambia*, 31 July 1993; 16 Dec. 1994; 12 Jan. 1995; *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 5 Mar., 23 July 1995.

⁵² Laurent C.W. Kaela, "Democracy in Zambia's Third Republic: Dilemmas of Consolidation", DPMF Publications, <http://www.dpmf.org/democracy-laurent-1998.html>.

Table 11.3 Major Zambian Trade Unions, 1990 – 2001

Name of trade union	1990	1995	1996	1997	1999	2001
Mineworkers' Union of Zambia (MUZ)	58,808	48,000	47,000	40,000	31,251	29,106
National Union of Commercial & Industrial Workers (NUCIW)	27,000	18,000	15,000	15,000	18,000	19,780
National Union of Building, Engineering & General Workers (NUBEGW)	25,000	11,000	10,000	10,100	11,392	11,346
Guards Union of Zambia (GUZ)	13,000	10,000	10,000	11,000	6,720	5,038
National Union of Communication Workers (NUCW)	6,319	5,547	5,000	4,500	4,381	9,780
National Union of Transport & Allied Workers (NUTAW)	7,392	5,500	5,000	4,500	1,099	2,050
Zambia United Local Authorities Workers' Union (ZULAWU)	25,000	22,000	18,000	21,300	10,000	15,000
Zambia Union of Financial Institutions & Allied Workers (ZUFIAW) ***	11,754	7,000	6,000	6,000	5,800	5,000
Airways & Allied Workers' Union of Zambia (AAWUZ)	8,558	2,800	3,000	2,100	775	775
University of Zambia & Allied Workers' Union (UNZAAWU)	2,794	5,000	4,000	4,000	2,500	300
Civil Servants & Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ) *	28,000	29,000	29,000	34,500	39,267	34,973
Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT)	36,000	52,000	46,000	35,000	38,249	25,249
National Union of Public Service Workers (NUPSW)	65,610	35,000	34,000	33,000	16,000	15,000
Railway Workers Union of Zambia (RWUZ)	10,000	7,000	6,000	4,250	4,000	2,726
National Energy Sector & Allied Workers Union (NESAWU) **	3,850	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	3,980
National Union of Plantation & Agricultural Workers (NUPAW)	16,674	16,000	18,000	17,000	16,020	16,000
Hotel & Catering Workers' Union of Zambia (HCWUZ)	7,000	5,000	6,000	4,000	8,000	3,530
Zambia National Union of Health & Allied Workers (ZNUHAW)	1,219	6,000	5,000	4,010	5,000	6,300
Zambia Typographical & Allied Workers' Union (ZTAWU)	1,219	2,000	1,500	1,200	1,000	5,169
Total membership	355,197	290,847	272,500	255,460	223,454	211,102

* Formerly civil servants union of Zambia (CSUZ)

** Formerly Zambia electricity and allied workers' union (ZEAWU)

*** Not affiliated to Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)

Sources: Various, i.e., ZCTU, CSO & Ministry of Labour & Social Security.

losses. The decline, of course, was also due to the liberalization of the labour law that led to unions breaking away from ZCTU. The changed labour law has also impacted on union recognition by employers for bargaining purposes. While in the past the law made it more or less mandatory for an employer to recognize trade unions, this is no longer the case.⁵³

Employers are now able to resist union organization, especially new investors who prefer 'union-free' workplaces. The effects of globalization on employment and labour relations meant the world of work has been changing fast. The concept of a job for life is becoming outdated everywhere in the world. Many employers have developed various strategies to frustrate union organization, for example through informalization, casualization and feminization of employment.⁵⁴ They use threats of lay-offs and redundancies for those who want unionization, and these have tended to discourage workers from joining unions. The unions attribute employers' resistance to unionization partly to the absence of any effort to inform new investors of the country's industrial relations tradition. The ZCTU is aware of the reasons why it has lost a large part of its membership and that it needs to strengthen its membership base. In order to achieve this, in 1996, it amended its constitution to accommodate informal sector workers as associate members.⁵⁵

All of the factors discussed above have combined to undermine the strength of the labour movement, leading to its marginalization and incapacity effectively to influence economic policy making during the period of democratisation. The Chiluba government was, therefore, relatively unconstrained by labour and pursued a harsh neo-liberal adjustment programme that even threatened democracy.

Conclusion: Survival hopes for the labour movement in Zambia

Schillinger has remarked that for some time now a largely unnoticed generational change has been taking place in the world of African trade unionism. Its potential implications still remain unclear. In South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania, a new generation of trade union leaders, who have not had their formative years before independence or under the post-independence, single-party system, has moved into leadership positions.⁵⁶ Larmer agrees and sees a revival in the Zambian labour movement under new leaders,

⁵³ Fashoyin, 'The contribution of social dialogue', 12.

⁵⁴ D. Narasimba Reddy, 'Economic Globalization', 42-43.

⁵⁵ Fashoyin, 'The contribution of social dialogue', 12-13; Mulenga, 'Project on Trade Union Capacity Building through Education', 19-21.

⁵⁶ Schillinger, 'Trade unions in Africa'.

Hikaumba and Nonde, detached from the MMD.⁵⁷ Perhaps this is so, but many workers I have talked to disagree. The move to incorporate the informal sector workers into the labour movement has not yet taken off. What many people see is a labour movement that is fortunate to have the support of a vibrant civil society and Churches willing to forge alliances all across the board. Relations between the labour movement and the Government are as frosty as ever. However, it is encouraging that the labour movement is aware of its problems and its prospects. It is aware of the challenges it faces and how it should respond.⁵⁸

I agree with Schillinger and many other scholars that have argued that as long as most African economies do not improve, the prospects for stronger trade unionism will remain slim. But Schillinger is also right to argue that it is premature to conclude that, because of the challenges that the labour movements currently face in Africa, the latter should be written off as relics of the past. This is because there are important counter-trends as well, such as new foreign investment in Africa that promises new areas of employment and opportunities for trade union organisation. Above all, in many countries, labour movements remain important political forces that have to be taken into account by the holders of political power. Despite their massive membership losses, labour movements continue to be among the very few societal organisations in Africa with sizeable constituencies, countrywide structures and the potential for mobilising members on social or political matters.⁵⁹ It should be noted that in spite of the labour movement being as fragmented as the opposition political parties in Zambia, labour leaders still 'shake' government and its leaders with some of their statements and observations on social, economic and political issues. This means that many people, including the political leadership, are aware of the potential of the movement to be influential.

⁵⁷ Miles Larmer, 'Reaction and resistance to neo-liberalism in Zambia', paper presented at the Centre for Civil Society, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 27 May 2005.

This paper has been published in *Review of Political Economy*, XXXII, 103, 2005.

⁵⁸ Nyirenda & Shikwe, "Trade Union Country Report – Zambia", pp. 29-34.

⁵⁹ Schillinger, 'Trade unions in Africa'.

Gender and politics: The Zambia national women's lobby group in the 2001 tripartite elections

Bizeck J. Phiri

Introduction

It has long been established that at least fifty-two percent of the world's population is composed of women. What has not been clear is what percentage of the women do participate in the electoral process. As observed by Lise Rakner and Lars Svasand, "the distinction between *qualified* and *registered* voters is one of the most problematic issues [...]"¹ in this respect. In the case of Zambia, most political parties tend to appeal to the women electorate for political support and encourage them to register as voters in large numbers. Yet, in reality Zambia has exhibited under registration by qualified voters for a variety of reason. And because one needs to be a registered voter to qualify for nomination to run for political office, women's movements have taken up the challenge to encourage women to register as voters and therefore qualify to stand for election. Indeed, as Gisela Geisler correctly pointed out "democracy has proven to be no guarantee for a more equal representation of women in government, [...]"² The apparent withdrawal of women from political participation has a long history.

Women in national Zambian politics have long been seen as having played an essential, but largely supportive, role. There is a sense in which the African

¹ Lise Rakner and Lars Svasand, "Stuck in transition: Electoral processes in Zambia 1991-2001", *Democratisation*, 12, 1 (February 2005), 89.

² Gisela Geisler "Troubled sisterhood: Women and politics in Southern Africa: Case studies from Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana", *African Affairs*, 94, (1995), 545.

tradition of viewing women as mere supporters of the male-dominated society has permeated the literature on and discussion of the nationalist struggle. Yet on closer examination, and in the context of the twentieth-first century, it is evident that women in Zambia played more than just a supportive role in the nationalist politics of the country. While it is true that, organisationally and from the 1950s, women in Zambian politics were generally confined to the women's wings of the independence movements, they nonetheless created their own political space within the larger movement of independence politics.

The question that remains unanswered is why women are presented as followers rather than leaders in their own right. Mbuyu Nalumango provides some explanation to this when she observed that "African women were not writers until the last two decades, hence the scanty information available about their past".³ It is in this context that "history" is projected as "his-story" and therefore largely projects male dominance in the governance of society. Yet, as Nalimango has demonstrated, Zambian pre-colonial history has several examples of women leaders. In fact, the chapters in their edited volume has persuasively demonstrated the role that women have been playing in politics through the "three phases political environment-pre-colonial, colonial and post independence".⁴ Arguably, therefore, when the Zambia National Women's Lobby Group (ZNWLG) and the Zambia Women Writers Association (ZAWWA) decided to collaborate on the project they were embarking on a project that would highlight the important role that women play in politics and governance.

The ZNWLG decision to lobby for women's participation in post colonial political processes was informed by the concept of power, which "denotes the control over material assets, intellectual resources and ideology".⁵ The Women's Manifesto sought to redress an imbalance in the distribution of power between men and women. In the pursuit of this agenda, the ZNWLG held a National Conference to establish the Women in Politics Forum and to adopt the Zambia Women's Manifesto between 26 and 27 March 2001 at the Mulungushi International Conference Centre. Of the several objectives of the conference, one is most relevant to this discussion and it was to "make women in politics visible and acceptable".⁶ Undoubtedly, this was an attempt to address the gender

³ Mbuyu Nalumango, "Women in governance in pre-colonial Zambia", in: Mbuyu Nalumango and Monde Sifuniso, eds, *Women power in politics*, (ZNWLG, Lusaka: 1998), 15.

⁴ Nalumango, "Women in governance in pre-colonial Zambia", 16,

⁵ ZNWLG and Women in Politics, *Zambia women's manifesto*, (March 2000), 7.

⁶ ZNWLG, Report of the National Conference to Establish the Women in Politics Forum and adopt the Zambia Women's Manifesto, Held at the Mulungushi International Conference Centre, 26-27 March 2001, 10.

inequality in the political arena where Zambian women not only seemed invisible but were projected as only playing the supportive role.

It is in this respect that both Schuster and Geisler have described Zambian politics as 'an all-men affair'. The latter wrote:

The Women's Brigade [of the United National Independence Party (UNIP)], later renamed Women's League, initially had no independent leadership structures but instead was 'an all-men affair'. Its members were expected to help men archive political power and not to seek it themselves.⁷

In keeping with the ideals of 'traditionalism', the UNIP Women's League saw its role in the nation as that of preserving traditions and therefore embarked on a vigorous campaign to win the approval of the male-dominated political establishments by discrediting the more modern women movements that sought to challenge male dominance in the political arena.⁸ Arguably, therefore, the Women's League was not progressive in advancing women's participation in national politics and giving women support in seeking political power.

This paper seeks to go beyond this view of women as supporters of men in the political arena, but also to deal with the reason behind women's failure to take a leading role in politics despite the increased opportunities of the 1980s and 1990s. The paper examines women's performance in the 2001 tripartite elections with a view to understanding the poor performance of women in politics, in general, and why they did poorly in 2001, in particular. The focus on women's attempt to enter Parliament in larger numbers than before was as a result of the realisation that because Parliament controls finance, women could only influence decisions if they were involved in large enough numbers.

The role of Zambia national women's lobby group in Zambian politics

In 1995 the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women observed that although it was almost two decades since the UN conference on women of 1975, the statistical picture for women's participation at high levels of decision-making remained bleak. Brenda Mofya, further pointed out that most countries in the world failed to give due space and representation to women in their

⁷ G. Geisler, "A second liberation": lobbying for women's political representation in Zambia, Botswana and Namibia', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 32 (2006), 71. See also I. Schuster, 'Constraints and opportunities in political participation: the case of Zambia', *Genéve-Afrique*, 21 (1983), 17.

⁸ Geisler, "A second liberation", 71. For a more detailed discussion see G. Geisler, *Women and the remaking of politics in Southern Africa: Negotiating autonomy, incorporation and representation* (Uppsala, 2004).

political life.⁹ The paper noted that by the end of 1996 only Norway and Sweden had achieved gender equity at ministerial level. Another fifteen countries throughout the world had achieved twenty to thirty per cent female representation at this level. Globally, only 9.9 per cent of all Deputy Ministers, Permanent Secretaries and Deputy Permanent Secretaries were women. The need to include more women in decision-making positions was therefore a matter of serious concern for all the supporting gender equality. There was, however, a need to identify some of the main obstacles that deterred women from political participation. The Zambian Non-Governmental Organisation Co-ordinating Committee (NGOCC) correctly pointed out that 'the realisation of women's participation in decision-making and the development process requires that impediments to such participation be identified, later on addressed'.¹⁰

Earlier, in July 1991, the National Women's Lobby Group (ZNWLG), a non-governmental organisation (NGO), was formed in Zambia. Its foundation on the eve of the rebirth of multi-party politics in Zambia was a direct response to growing concerns about the role and participation of women in the socio-economic and political spheres. At its inception, the ZNWLG was well aware that, despite the fact that women constituted 52 per cent of Zambia's population, they continued to face widespread discrimination, leading to their virtual absence from power. With the return of plural politics in 1991, there was hope that women's contribution to decision-making processes would be enhanced. The ZNWLG was therefore founded on the premise that it should promote women's equal participation in decision-making at all levels through advocacy, lobbying, and capacity building for women in Zambia.¹¹

Despite its vigorous campaigns during the decade that followed its inception, the ZNWLG continued to see Zambian women discriminated against in almost every sphere of life. By 1999, the ZNWLG noted that the situation of Zambian women remained much the same as that obtaining in the early 1990s. The Lobby Group noted, for example, that although women in Zambia constituted 52 per cent of the population, there were only 16 women parliamentarians out of 158, a mere 10 per cent. Worse still, there were only 80 out of 1,300 Councillors in Local Government (6 per cent). Furthermore, the Lobby Group observed that, out of a Cabinet of 25 Ministers, only two were women, and that, out of 8

⁹ B. Mofya, 'Embodying the female body into politics vis-à-vis decision-making', The International Women's University (IFU) Project Area: Body, University of Hannover, Germany, 15th July – 15th October 2000.

¹⁰ NGOCC, 'Movement 2000 Project Document', Dec. 1999, cited in Mofya, 'Embodying the female body into politics'.

¹¹ ZNWLG, Report on the proceedings of the National Symposium on 'Millenium 2000: Leadership Challenges for Women – Changing the Face of Politics in Zambia', held at the University of Zambia, 1-3 July 1999, 3.

Supreme Court Judges, only two were women.¹² The picture was similar in other national key decision-making positions in both public and private sectors.

In January 1995, the Caucus of Women Councillors in Ndola held a Gender Consultation Workshop on 'Increasing Women's Participation in Local Government'. The workshop specifically focused on local government, and was attended by 18 women local government councillors out of the 26 female councillors who were in office at the time. In December of the same year, the ZNWLG organised a sub-regional conference on the 'Role of Women in Politics'. In 1996 the Lobby Group held a workshop on 'Women in Politics'. One year later, there came a sub-regional conference on 'International Covenants on Women and Children'. All these workshops and conferences were held in Lusaka and were aimed at enhancing women participation in decision-making processes.

In August 1998, in preparation for the impending local government elections, the ZNWLG held a planning meeting of chairpersons and treasurers from its provincial chapters to jointly plan for activities concerning local government elections. Shortly thereafter, the Lobby Group organised four training workshops to empower women candidates who were adopted for the 1998 local government elections in Monze (September), Chingola (October), Kabwe (November) and Lusaka (November). The objectives of the training were to:

- improve women's skills as they contested the local government elections;
- encourage and foster dialogue between women of different political affiliation, to afford them an opportunity to devise strategies among themselves;
- devise effective strategies for women in the 1998 local government elections;
- increase gender awareness and its application to local government administration.¹³

The workshops addressed several other issues, including resource mobilisation and time management in the political arena. The workshops also ensured that more women were equipped with leadership and campaign skills, assertiveness and self-confidence – all attributes that were considered lacking in most women aspiring political leaders.

The outcome of these efforts was certainly encouraging for the Lobby Group. In 1992, 88 women contested the local government elections and 26 were elected as councillors. Because of the advocacy work by the Lobby Group, in 1998 there were 275 women contestants and 80 were elected councillors. This represented an increase of almost 200 per cent. One of these emerged as Mayor, while two others emerged as Deputy Mayors. The 1999 symposium

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, 18.

therefore expected an improvement on these figures. Yet, despite these efforts and achievements, women remained largely marginalised in the political arena.

Resulting from the above scenario, the Lobby Group decided to hold a national symposium on the theme 'Millenium 2000: Leadership Challenges for Women-Changing the Face of Politics in Zambia'. The aim of the symposium was to critically examine and analyse the performance of women in political decision-making since the foundation of the Lobby Group in 1991. The idea was to prepare women for the 2001 tripartite elections. The symposium drew women from all walks of life and particularly attracted women who previously held or were at the time holding political and other decision-making positions in Zambia. A total of 150 participants attended the symposium. A majority of the participants were drawn from nine political parties. Others came from the chapters of the ZNWLG from around the country, NGOs and government departments. Members of the donor community and members of the Press attended the symposium, which was officially opened by Professor Elizabeth Mumba, then Deputy Vice Chancellor of the University Zambia.

The organisers set forth four broad objectives, which were to guide the symposium participants. These were:

- To bring together women who [had] held decision-making positions to share their experiences;
- to identify and analyse the obstacles that [...] hindered women from participating in decision-making positions;
- to come up with strategies that [would] address the identified obstacles;
- to draw up an action plan on how to increase women's participation in parliament and local government in the year 2001.¹⁴

The organisers expected that the outcome of the symposium would serve as a beacon to women and men in Zambia who were concerned with democratic practice. The focus of the symposium was on politics because politics played a dominant role in all other spheres: Economic, social and cultural.

In September 2001, the Zambian Women in Politics Forum, in conjunction with the Lobby Group, held a three-day conference on 'Women in Politics' at the University of Zambia. The conference opened on Monday 24 September and closed on Wednesday 26 September. Participants were drawn from all political parties and NGOs. The overall objectives of the conference were similar to previous conferences and workshops. More importantly, perhaps, the 2001 September conference drew up the 'Zambian Women's Manifesto'. Introduced by the motto 'More Women in Politics', the Manifesto was meant to guide women

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

participation in politics as well as ensure gender balance in the political arena.¹⁵ The conference also called upon all political parties to ensure that when adopting candidates for the 2001 tripartite elections, at least 30 per cent of the adopted candidates would be women. The conference also pledged to support all women candidates irrespective of party political affiliation.

The overall aim of the 'Zambian Women's Manifesto' is to clearly outline the issues of gender equality as demanded by female voters. The Manifesto has the following eight specific objectives:

- To assist female politicians to take part in writing, amending and interpreting their party manifestoes;
- to encourage and urge voters to consider issues that are pertinent to women, children and youth concerns, as they are selecting candidates for upcoming elections;
- to mobilise and encourage all female voters and candidates to participate actively in all elections;
- to bring political parties and government to accountability to their commitment for equality in the sharing of power especially to have at least 30% women in all elective positions;
- to lobby the presidential prerogative in Decision Making appointments to at least 50% and a constitutional provision that nominated MPs should comprise the under represented gender, other minority groups and those with disabilities;
- to raise the general public's awareness about gender issues in light of the adoption of the National Gender Policy;
- to publicise the National Gender Policy and persuade political parties and government to prioritise the interest of women, children, youths and people with disabilities in policy formulation and implementation; and
- to help fund female candidates in good time.¹⁶

The 'Zambian Women's Manifesto' is a comprehensive document covering almost all areas concerned with women's issues. It is therefore not possible to address all the issues in this study.

However, in line with the objectives of this study, let us briefly examine what the Manifesto has to say about women and politics. It argued for women's political empowerment on the basis that this has been central in Zambia's development process since the colonial days. The notion of power, broadly defined as the control over material assets, intellectual resources and ideology, informs the Manifesto, which noted that men hold this power and therefore influence the distribution of assets. As a result of this control, men confer on themselves the power of decision-making in a way that tends not to favour women or take into account their concerns. On the basis of these observations,

¹⁵ ZNWLG and Zambian women in politics forum, 'Zambian women's manifesto', published in *The Post*, 26 Nov. 2001.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

the Manifesto argued that female voters and candidates faced numerous problems because the playing field was not levelled. Another observation that was brought out by the Manifesto pertained to the question of voter education in Zambia, which education did not entrench gender equality as a central feature of democratic citizenship. After formulating the 'Zambian Women's Manifesto', the ZNWLG began a practical implementation of its objectives, especially the empowerment of female candidates in the 2001 tripartite elections which took place on 27 December 2001.

By 20 November 2001 a total of 140 female parliamentary candidates had been adopted by various political parties to participate in the tripartite elections. The Lobby Group undertook to support these female parliamentary candidates and acquired 70 bicycles which it later distributed among them. The Lobby Group also acquired 80,000 metres of Women's Movement *chitenge* material which it distributed equally to all registered adopted female parliamentary candidates. Each female parliamentary candidate received fifty metres of material. The Lobby Group further undertook to produce 200 personal posters for each female parliamentary candidate. Furthermore, it called upon Independent Parliamentary candidates to register with the Lobby Secretariat by 26 November 2001 to qualify for similar assistance. Table 12.1 shows how the 70 bicycles were distributed to parties that adopted female parliamentary candidates.

Table 12.1 Distribution of bicycles by ZNWLG

Parties	Adopted candidates	Number of bicycles
AZ	1	1
HP	--	--
NCC	23	10
MMD	16	8
FDD	29	14
ZRP	11	5
UPND	26	12
SDP	3	1
NLD	16	8
UNIP	19	9
PF	4	2
TOTAL	148	70

Source: ZNWLG's press release, 20 Nov. 2001, published in *The Post*, 22 Nov. 2001.

The Lobby Group also extended this assistance to female municipal candidates throughout the country, and added that the assistance would be made available to this category of candidates through Provincial Lobby Chairpersons. The assistance to this category consisted of campaign posters and caps. There is

no doubt therefore that the Lobby Group did all in its power to assist female candidates in the tripartite elections. This was really the first time in Zambian elections that a national women's movement took a deliberate and a clearly affirmative action to support female parliamentary and municipal candidates irrespective of political party affiliation. The Lobby Group demonstrated that it was going beyond the meaningless rhetorical statements that often accompany political campaigns and electioneering.

While the ZNWLG undertook these practical steps to assist female parliamentary candidates, there were cases in which women within political parties undermined each other. Symptomatic was the cases of Mandevu Constituency, Lusaka, where two female candidates were at the centre of a controversy over who should stand as the UNIP candidate. This reflected badly on UNIP, which did not seem to follow the letter of the 'Women's Manifesto'. Engiwe Mzyece won the primary elections for the constituency and, in line with the UNIP constitution, should have been adopted as the parliamentary candidate. However, the Central Committee of the party chose to adopt Mwangala Zaloumis as its candidate. The decision prompted Mzyece to threaten legal action against her party.¹⁷ The squabble appeared to work against what the Lobby Group and the Zambian Women in Politics Forum stood for and to undermine that gender solidarity that the 'Zambian Women's Manifesto' had so forcefully advocated. Engiwe Mzyece eventually stood as an independent, a decision that obviously divided the UNIP votes in Mandevu.

Despite these developments, the NGOCC, together with the ZNWLG assisted 200 female aspiring parliamentarians in the tripartite elections with campaign materials. The NGOCC also gave material support to 300 women who contested ward positions to enable them successfully conduct their campaigns in their respective areas. The support was channelled through the ZNWLG, which was mandated to distribute the campaign materials to all women parliamentary and ward candidates irrespective of political party affiliation. The NGOCC mobilised 120 bicycles, 25,000 posters, 8,000 metres of Women's Movement *chitenge* material and 18,000 caps. The support for women candidates was carried out under the M2000 programme, whose objective was to provide room for pooling resources together to assist women advance their status.¹⁸ There is no doubt that the 2001 tripartite elections provided the women's organisations for the first time with opportunities to assist women in the political arena.

While the ZNWLG mobilised resources to assist women parliamentary and local government candidates during the campaign period, chances on women

¹⁷ *Times of Zambia*, 28 Nov. 2001.

¹⁸ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 16 Dec. 2001.

being elected in large enough numbers were undermined by lack of strategy. For example, while there were at least 170 female parliamentary candidates, there was a tendency for women to stand against each other in various constituencies. It would appear that political parties preferred to have women candidates stand against each other instead of standing against male candidates. The list of all parliamentary candidates who successfully filed in their nomination papers for the 27 December elections shows that very few female candidates were fielded in constituencies where there were no other female candidates. Undoubtedly, political parties felt that their female candidates stood a better chance of winning the seat if they stood against fellow female candidates.

Consequently, there were no female parliamentary candidates in as many as 36 constituencies. Another 52 constituencies fielded only one female candidate. Twenty-nine of the 150 available constituencies fielded two female parliamentary candidates each, bringing the number to 58. The remaining 33 constituencies fielded three or more parliamentary candidates each, thus accounting for the remaining one hundred female candidates throughout the country.

To be sure, this strategy worked against the aims of the Women's Manifesto because only few women would emerge victorious under these circumstances. Furthermore, even where female candidates stood as independents, they tended to do so in constituencies where there were already female candidates adopted by various political parties. It is largely because of this that the number of female elected candidates represents a minute fraction of the total figure of female parliamentary candidates. It is the view of this author that, in future elections, female parliamentary candidates should avoid standing against each in constituencies if their number in elected positions is to increase to a level where they can make a substantial difference.

The 2001 tripartite elections results

The Electoral Commission (ECZ) set 27-30 November 2001 as nomination dates for presidential candidates. At the close of nominations, Chief Justice Matthew Ngulube declared that eleven presidential candidates had successfully filed valid nominations. For the first time in the political history of Zambia, there were two women presidential candidates. While this indicated the determination of women to rise to the occasion, there were however some disturbing reports of lack of support for the female presidential candidates during nomination. Although both female candidates managed eventually to lodge in their nominations with the Chief Justice, they had difficulties in raising the required 200 supporters who were registered voters. Dr. Inonge Mbikusita-Lewanika, the President of Agenda for Zambia (AZ), failed to file her nomination papers on time because she had a shortfall of 18 supporters. She only managed to file her

nomination when the Heritage Party (HP), which was next to file its papers, assisted in finding volunteers from the crowd of its supporters.¹⁹

Ms Gwendoline Konie, President and candidate of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), faced a similar problem and took over four hours to find the required 200 supporters. She only managed to file her nomination papers after renting supporters who demanded to be paid K20,000 each. At the end of the exercise, the rented supporters blocked her vehicle within the Supreme Court premises demanding to be paid their dues. Police went to her rescue and advised the mob to discuss the matter outside the Supreme Court premises. Ms Konie left to organise the payment while some SDP leaders were 'detained' by the mob as 'hostages'. According to the programme the SDP was scheduled to file nomination papers at 09:30 but because it could not raise the 200 supporters, the party only managed to do so at 14:30, after allegedly bringing in some students from a college at a fee.²⁰

The difficulties experienced by the women presidential candidates in mustering the required 200 supporters to file in their nominations raise serious questions about the commitment of the ZNWLG and the Women in Politics Forum towards the participation of women in elections. It is hard to envisage how the Women's Manifesto can be transformed into practical reality if its signatories fail to support female presidential candidates even at the nomination level. Interestingly, there were many more women who turned up to support and provide pomp when male presidential candidates were filing in their nominations. It is tempting to suggest that the majority of Zambian women are yet to come to terms with the struggle they have on their hands. It is also tenable to suggest that Zambian women contribute quite significantly to the process of marginalising each other in the political arena. This is borne out by the various cases in which female politicians have failed to cooperate and enhance their chances of success against male politicians.

Reacting to the almost humiliating experience of female presidential candidates, some women complained against gender-sensitive NGOs for failing to support female presidential candidates when they were receiving donor funding for such a cause. When the author conducted a quick survey in Lusaka, a female lawyer observed that while educated women were clear about the issues and the need to have women in decision-making positions, the majority, who were largely illiterate, held different views.²¹ She pointed out that there was a big gap between the educated women and their fellow women in the compounds. These views were confirmed by several women in the compounds, who did not appear

¹⁹ *Times of Zambia*, 30 Nov. 2001.

²⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 1 Dec. 2001.

²¹ Interview with Anonymous, Lusaka, 3 Dec. 2001.

to have much trust in female politicians. A considerable number of the interviewees justified their stance by using the vernacular expression: '*Ninchito yaba muna*', meaning that politics was a men's job. It would therefore seem that the major problem facing female politicians is the cultural baggage, which has become heavier and heavier as more and more women leave school prematurely. Evidently, while the ZNWLG and the Women in Politics Forum gather women and lobby for women to support one another, the majority still look to men for political leadership. It is for this reason that male presidential candidates easily mobilised women to add colour to their nomination programmes, while women were almost failing and had to hire supporters.

While the female presidential candidates faced difficulties in raising 200 supporters, some male presidential candidates succeeded in doing so by using paid cadres. The National Citizens Coalition's presidential aspirant, Dr. Pastor Nevers Mumba, was reported to have courted trouble when his party failed to pay the cadres the promised allowances for rendering their support on nomination day.²² The confusion is said to have started soon after Dr. Pastor Nevers Mumba had successfully filed in his nomination papers. Similar incidents were reported regarding Patriotic Front (PF) cadres in Kaunda Square, who threatened to beat up PF officials who failed to honour their promises to the cadres who supported Michael Sata's nomination for the presidency. These demands for payment raised serious questions regarding the true affiliation of the supporters. The above revelations prompted *Times of Zambia*'s political editor, Samuel Ngoma, to ask, 'Nominations: Was it a rent-a-mob affair?'²³ Because of the immediate benefits involved in supporting presidential candidates, the nomination process succeeded in producing 'professional cadres' who literally camped at the Supreme Court premises, ready to be hired to provide the required numbers for nomination. Ngoma likened the 'professional cadres' to the shanty compounds' notorious 'professional mourners', who specialise in moving from one funeral house to another with a view to taking advantage of the hospitality traditionally provided by mourning families. These 'professional cadres' are not committed to any one political party. Their behaviour was driven by economic necessity.

That the 2001 tripartite elections were heavily contested was exemplified by the large turnout of voters on 27 December 2001. Throughout the country, queues formed as early as 05:00 in most polling stations. Voting was officially scheduled to start at 06:00 and voting went one well beyond the official closing time of 17:00. This was because of the large numbers of people who turned up for voting, as well as the fact that voters were casting votes for three candidates.

²² *Times of Zambia*, 30 Nov. 2001.

²³ *Times of Zambia*, 1 Dec. 2001.

The process was unusually long. In several polling stations around the country voting went on until the early hours of the next day. For the first time in the political history of Zambia there was a visible presence of young voters who had mounted a strong campaign urging young voters to, first, register as voters and, secondly, to vote on 27 December 2001. As Royda Banda observed in the *Times of Zambia*, the response to the 2001 tripartite elections included an overwhelming turnout by youths. This reflected the successful campaign by the Operation Young Vote, a youth NGO formed to mobilise youths to register as voters.²⁴ This observation was confirmed by the ECZ in their voters' analysis by age. For the first time in the electoral and political history of Zambia, the youngest Member of Parliament elected in the Eastern Province was twenty-six years old.

Table 12.2 2001 National presidential election results

Political party	Candidate's name	Results	%
AZ	Dr. Inonge M. Lewanika	9,882	0.57
HP	Brig. Gen. Godfrey Miyanda	140,678	8.09
NCC	Dr. Pastor Nevers Mumba	38,860	2.24
MMD	Mr. Levy P. Mwanawasa	506,694	29.15
FDD	Lt. Gen. Christon Tembo	228,861	13.17
ZRP	Mr. Benjamin Y. Mwila	85,472	4.29
UPND	Mr. Anderson Mazoka	472,697	27.2
SDP	Ms Gwendoline Konie	10,253	0.59
NLD	Dr. Yobert Shampande	9,481	0.55
UNIP	Mr. Tilyenji Kaunda	175,898	10.12
PF	Mr. Michael Sata	59,172	3.4
TOTAL	Eleven	1,741,948	99.37

Source: Electoral Commission of Zambia, 18 Jan. 2002.

In addition to the eleven political parties that provided presidential candidates, a further four parties put up parliamentary and local government candidates throughout the country. There were also at least eighty independent parliamentary candidates, and at least one hundred independent candidates for local government elections throughout the country (Table 12.3). Because of the large number of presidential, parliamentary and local government election candidates campaigning was very heavy. Voting continued for a second day running on Friday 28 December 2001 in a number of constituencies. In some parts of Northern and Luapula Provinces, voting continued up to Saturday 29 December 2001. This later became a source of concern by losing opposition political parties, because the extension of the voting period that resulted from logistical problems on the part of ECZ was interpreted as a deliberate move to rig the

²⁴ *Times of Zambia*, 12 Jan. 2002.

elections. Opposition political parties would later cite this, among other irregularities, in their unsuccessful petition to the High Court.

Table 12.3 Parliamentary candidates by party and gender

Political party	Male	Female	Total	%
AZ	14	1	15	6.66
HP	96	21	117	17.94
NCC	58	20	78	25.64
MMD	133	17	150	11.33
FDD	117	32	148	20.94
ZRP	123	16	139	11.51
UPND	122	28	150	18.66
SDP	2	3	5	60.0
NLD	7	10	17	58.82
UNIP	126	19	145	13.01
PF	88	16	104	15.38
NP	1	0	1	0.00
DP	1	0	1	0.00
ZUDP	3	0	3	0.00
ZAP	10	4	14	28.57
Independents	62	18	80	22.50
TOTAL	963	205	1168	1755

Source: Compiled by author from lists of nominated candidates published in the national press, 2001.

The FDD fielded the largest number of female parliamentary candidates with 32 aspirants and was followed by the UPND, which fielded 28 parliamentary candidates. Third in line was the HP, with twenty-candidates; it was followed by NCC and UNIP, which fielded 20 and 19 parliamentary candidates each, respectively. Disappointingly, the ruling MDD only fielded 17 female parliamentary candidates. This was disappointing because the ruling MMD government was a signatory to the SADC protocol which required member states to adopt at least thirty per cent female candidates in elections in order to raise the number of female participants in decision-making bodies. The number of female candidates adopted by the MMD accounted for only 11.33 per cent.

The 2001 tripartite elections were not only the most heavily contested elections in the political history of Zambia, but also attracted the largest number of female candidates, among whose number were two presidential aspirants. Yet, as observed elsewhere, female candidates for presidential, parliamentary and local government elections performed very poorly (Table 12.4). Only eleven female parliamentary candidates won seats out of the more than two hundred who stood in the 2001 tripartite elections.

Table 12.4 2001 National assembly elections results: Seats won per party and by gender

Political party	Male	Female	Total	%
AZ	0	0	0	0.00
DP	0	0	0	0.00
FDD	9	3	12	8.00
HP	4	0	4	2.67
MMD	65	4	69	46.00
NCC	0	0	0	0.00
NLD	0	0	0	0.00
NP	0	0	0	0.00
PF	1	0	1	0.67
UNIP	13	0	13	8.67
UPND	47	4	49	32.67
SDP	0	0	0	0.00
ZAP	0	0	0	0.00
ZRP	0	1	1	0.67
ZUDP	0	0	0	0.00
Independent	0	1	1	0.67
TOTAL	137	13	150	100

Source: Electoral Commission of Zambia, 18 Jan. 2002. (Male and female columns added by the author.)

Conclusion

On reflection, it can be suggested that political parties in Zambia, and women politicians in particular, need to develop mechanisms for realistically assessing their real potential for winning elections. Most opposition parties attracted large crowds, mostly of women, at their rallies and confused that with membership and people who would vote for them. What most political party leaders failed to comprehend was that the crowds at most rallies were composed of the same people who also attended rallies organized by different political parties. Because of handouts that were given at most rallies, such as money, *chitenge* material and other forms of rewards, people attended rallies to get 'empowered', but voted differently on voting day. The concept that one's vote is secret was effectively put to use by the voters. Women politicians were most disadvantaged because they lacked resources compared to male politicians. Women entered the political arena as a disadvantaged lot and did not enjoy the same support that male politicians enjoyed.

While the opposition parties' complaints that they lost the elections because of suspected rigging is a clear manifestation of their denial of the realities on the ground, for women, the same complaint reflected the difficulties of their role in

politics. Democracy, especially mature democracy, takes long to develop and the path towards it is not a smooth one. Thus with each election that takes place, democracy moves a step further towards maturity. Zambia is no exception, and it is to be hoped that the lessons learnt from the tripartite elections of 2001 will go a long way towards consolidating the democratic process and women's changing fortunes in the political arena.

Subsidiary sovereignty and the constitution of political space in Zambia¹

Jeremy Gould

The irony of writing the history of ‘post-Independence’ Zambia is, sadly, the nation’s stark lack of genuine independence. Over the course of her forty-odd years as an internationally recognized state, Zambia – like much of Africa – has had less and less to say about the basic facts determining the welfare of her citizens. A further irony is that Zambia’s vulnerability to forces beyond her control – a condition which can be termed ‘subsidiarity’ – seems to have deepened in the wake of the post-Cold War onslaught of liberalization that promised to revitalize the nation’s economy and her democratic institutions.

Evidence of Zambia’s deeply rooted subsidiarity is extensive. For starters, her constitutional order, and indeed a sizable chunk of her extant legislation, are not of the nation’s own making but a colonial legacy. Zambia’s gross national product – based heavily on copper export revenues – is hostage to strategic commercial, military and technological decisions made in cabinet meetings and

¹ This paper is the product of a research project sponsored by the Academy of Finland (2002-2006) on ‘Legal pluralism and state formation in Zambia.’ Many thanks to seminar participants at Cambridge University and the London School of Economics for valuable comments on an earlier version of the paper. Thanks also to the editors for their patience and encouragement. I am deeply in debt to a great many Zambians for sharing their time and knowledge with me in the course of my fieldwork. I would like to note especially Fr. Joe Komakoma, Prof. Alfred Chanda, Dr. Patrick Matibini, Wynter Kabimba and Ngande Mwanajiti for insightful discussions. Needless to say, none of the above are responsible for my inevitable errors and misunderstandings.

corporate boardrooms on distant continents. Her state budget, and the policy instruments by which government claims to address the banes of poverty, unemployment, ill-health and illiteracy, are strictly controlled by transnational debt-masters in Washington. Even Zambia's major religious bodies – and their concomitant items of doctrine and faith – are beholden to unassailable episcopal hierarchies the apices of which reside in Europe and North America. On the whole, Zambians have virtually no say at all on vital questions of life and death – like the price of copper and fossil fuels, the right of Christian clergy to exorcise demons or the affordability of anti-retroviral drugs.



Photo 21 Oasis protestors at the University of Zambia during the final years of President Frederick Chiluba's rule.

The frailty of Zambia's sovereignty is well known, yet still we continue to use the vocabulary of 'independence'. Why is this? Partially, no doubt, out of discretion. Given devastating deterioration of living standards over the past four decades, the benefits of Zambian citizenship have been reduced to little else than a rather empty juridical sovereignty. Etiquette aside, the prevailing conceptual diplomacy is also based on the premise that 'independence' is the normal state of affairs for a sovereign nation like Zambia. The endless list of caveats that belie this fundamental truth, for Zambia as for countless of her neighbors, must be aberrations. Whether these anomalies are seen to be struc-

tural or contingent, constitutive or transient, contemporary thinking on statehood is such that sovereignty and subsidiarity are mutually negating concepts.

The inability of state theory to problematize subsidiary sovereignty as an analytical notion is evidenced by the generous use, of late, of the residual category of 'failed' or 'collapsed' states in African political analysis; 'failed' states are effectively excluded from the domain of established theory by relegating them below the normative threshold of genuine stateness. But this move, as noted by Roe, 'exceptionalizes' African government and effectively removes African concerns from the realm of serious consideration – beyond the pale of what could lead to new insights in political or social theory.² The fact that this methodological ploy is a sign of theoretical torpor is evidenced by the volume of empirical entities that are assigned, *ad hoc*, to this shelf. Somewhat alarming, for the dedicated Africanist at least, is the tendency for African politics as a whole to be portrayed as a failed enterprise. Indeed, Africa is increasingly represented as a continent of states in various stages of failure, either imploded or simple waiting for the inevitability of collapse. Conventional political actors of democratic discourse – parliaments, nationalist politicians, civic activists, intellectuals, professionals, the enlightened urban middle class – are widely dismissed as ineffectual or actively complicit in the ostensible, self-interested patrimonial meltdown.

Within academic discourse, one finds two competing explanatory frameworks which uphold the perceived crisis of politics in Africa. The dominant position, especially within mainstream political science, asserts that the sorry state of national economies and populations are evidence of the somehow flawed (or incomplete) nature of African states. Collapsed states like Somalia, or even relatively stable polities like Zambia, are all plagued by the survivals of a premodern political order which systematically block or co-opt efforts at consolidating institutions and practices of rational, not to say democratic, government. Despite the post-Cold War return of political pluralism and elements of media independence, elected leaders are prone to 'semi-authoritarian' practices – self-interested abuse of office and kleptocracy, nepotism and ethnic bias – all of which corrode the developmental potential of state regulation. As a result,

² E. Roe, *Except-Africa: Remaking development, rethinking power* (New Brunswick, 1999). 'African concerns' are of course no different than the concerns of any section of humanity. Yet, as Ferguson has compellingly argued, 'Africa' has become an idealized place in the Western imagination in which empirical facts and differences are reduced to stereotypical abstractions. Such stereotypical features of 'Africa' – hunger, war, superstition – can arouse disgust or compassion, but for mainstream academia in much of the West, they are not *interesting*. J. Ferguson, *Global shadows: Africa in the neoliberal global order* (Durham, 2006).

economic productivity and competitiveness falter, rendering the national as a whole hostage to the vagaries of global market forces.

The competing view is equally single-minded. It reaffirms the aberrations of subsidiarity, but reveals them to be externally imposed – caused by the malevolent foreign masters of an unjust global system. The thrust of this defensive narrative is to provide a reasonable explanation for the vast evidence of state failure and the persistence of authoritarianism despite nominal democratization. Thandika Mkandawire, for example, explains the persistence of authoritarianism by reference to the conditions on public policy and action imposed by external debt masters. These conditions have produced, in his memorable term, “choiceless democracies” by which the very notion of democratic and accountable government is compromised.³ Following this track, Mary Kaldor argues that choiceless democracy is a main cause of the spate of intrastate violence and associated state collapse that plagues post-Cold War Africa.

These are the circumstances that give rise to the ‘new wars’. It is the lack of authority of the state, the weakness of representation, the loss of confidence that the state is able or willing to respond to public concerns, the inability and/or unwillingness to regulate the privatisation and informalisation of violence that gives rise to violent conflicts.⁴

The internalist and externalist portrayals of subsidiarity and concomitant socio-political pathologies are functionalist, airtight explanations that negate one another. Neither has any room for a notion of political contestation as a source of social change. In the end they agree on everything but on whom to blame. Indeed, voluminous empirical evidence suggests that both accounts are valid. All African governments perform their self-assigned functions – collect revenues, manage the economy, regulate social institutions, deliver basic social services and amenities – far more poorly than almost any other states on the planet. Equally true is the assertion that this poor performance is largely an outcome of decades of ill-conceived and erratic intervention by foreign governments and development agencies.⁵

Clearly sovereignty and subsidiarity are not mutually exclusive, but can and do intermingle in complex ways and in relatively stable social formations. Asking where the blame lies for Zambia’s marginal position in the world order would seem to be the wrong question. What we need to understand better is

³ T. Mkandawire, ‘Crisis management and the making of “choiceless democracies” in Africa’, in: R. Joseph, ed., *The state, conflict and democracy in Africa* (Boulder, 1999), 119-36.

⁴ M. Kaldor, ‘Cosmopolitanism and organized violence’, n.d., <http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/010kaldor.pdf> (accessed on 21 Aug. 2006).

⁵ See, e.g., W. Easterly, *The white man’s burden: Why the West’s efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good* (New York, 2006).

how, *specifically*, do the internal and external factors interact to produce states of subsidiary sovereignty.⁶ This demand for specificity is not simply about attention to empirical detail, important as this is. It also implies that internal and external articulations vary substantially from context to context – from country to country, and over time in the same socio-physical space. Different political contexts exhibit different factors, different configurations of actors and institutions. And these (f)actors and configurations have specific histories, that are not identical with the assemblages or trajectories one will find in any other context. These specificities can only be made clear through close empirical study of a given context.

Zambian subsidiarity

In the case of Zambia, then, the years of the Third Republic⁷ have been a unique and curious concoction of ultra-liberalism coupled with deep subsidiarity, deriving from severe indebtedness and concomitant aid dependence. Upon secession to executive power in 1991, President Chiluba and his Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) became model pupils of structural adjustment as endorsed by Washington-aligned transnational public financial institutions.⁸ Under the tutelage of the World Bank and the IMF, the MMD government, among other moves, sold off the bulk of the nation's public assets, relinquished regulation of the value of the national currency, eliminated import and export restrictions and abdicated responsibility for the welfare of small-holder agricultural producers.⁹

It is not unusual, of course, for a government to accede to power, and/or hold onto it, by virtue of its deference to a vastly more powerful foreign patron. In

⁶ Cf. Harrison, 'Post-conditionality politics and administrative reform: reflections on the cases of Uganda and Tanzania', *Development and Change*, 32 (2001), and T. Callaghy, 'Networks and governance in Africa: Innovation in the debt regime', in: Id., R. Kassimir and R. Latham, eds, *Intervention and transnationalization in Africa* (Cambridge, 2001).

⁷ The revision of the Zambian constitution in 1991, revoking the political monopoly of the reigning United National Independence Party (UNIP) of President Kenneth Kaunda, ushered in a new constitutional regime, termed the Third Republic. Zambia's First Republic was born at independence in 1964. The transition to a Second Republic was the result of UNIP's constitutional instatement of a 'one-party participatory democracy' in 1972.

⁸ Lusaka rumor in the mid-nineties had it that the IMF felt obliged to exhort the Zambian government to slow down its over-zealous program of liberalization and privatization.

⁹ See, e.g., L. Rakner, *Political and economic liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001* (Uppsala, 2003).

imperial and colonial history, such a relationship has been often termed ‘suzerainty’ – the subsidiary state is run, in practice, by a configuration of political forces which operates within more or less stringent limits laid down by foreign patrons; the subsidiary sovereign plays ‘vassal’ to the external ‘suzerain’ power. In Zambia’s case, her astronomical indebtedness has left her defenseless against the dictates of the transnational development industry. Indeed, Zambia’s contemporary niche in the global political economy is a function of her role as a subservient client of the transnational development industry – above all, the Bretton Woods institutions, countless bilateral donor bodies, and the numerous agencies of the UN system, from UNDP to UNHCR.

Since the final years of the 1990s, the transnational development industry has dealt with the world’s heavily-indebted poor nations as problematic clients. They owe too much to be abandoned, but are no longer considered productive investments in any foreseeable timeframe. Countries like Zambia (and most of Africa) are no longer expected to ‘take off’ into industrial modernity. From the point of view of their major creditors – the World Bank and the IMF – the main aim is to build their capacity to be good clients. Good clienthood involves, above all, maintaining a large loan portfolio and meeting repayment targets conscientiously. In the rhetoric of contemporary development-speak, this specific form of suzerain subsidiarity is termed ‘partnership,’ and it comprises three key elements:

- 1) ‘ownership’ – this means that the client politicians will take responsibility for policy decisions and refrain from blaming the creditors for the negative social consequences of neo-liberal measures;
- 2) ‘good governance,’ which implies that the client government will keep its expenditures within the agreed macro-economic frame, thus ensuring predictable debt repayment; and
- 3) ‘rule of law’, which means that individual officials can be held accountable for the abuse of public resources (but not, for example, for incurring bad debt), and that whatever assets foreign investors bring into the country can be repatriated upon demand.

In general terms, one might hypothesize that the structural tension within subsidiary sovereignty is heightened under conditions of political pluralism. An asymmetrical ‘partnership’ such as prevails between the Zambian state and its transnational creditors requires a configuration of complicit social forces to manage the client state. Since the political leadership is theoretically accountable to its electorate, this implies a basic contradiction: the needs of the electorate are subordinate to the demands of foreign creditors, and yet the political leadership must appear to be the people’s advocate and to hold full responsibility for its actions.

Despite some turbulent moments (related to the privatization of the copper mines and the concomitant theft of large cobalt reserves), the MMD has

managed this balancing act rather well. The most serious challenge to its hegemony has come, ironically, not at the polls, but from outside the conventional political arena.¹⁰ While the MMD presidential candidate came close to losing the 2001 elections, and MMD managed to garner less than half the seats in the same parliamentary elections, this was not so much the result of a successful oppositional challenge (UPND's performance at the polls was much weaker, and regionally even more lopsided than that of the MMD¹¹), but reflected near-fatal wounds inflicted on the MMD by a coalition of civic advocates calling themselves the Oasis Forum.

In what follows I will examine the background and experiences of the Oasis Forum to illustrate the contradictory nature of the political space of subsidiary sovereignty.

The Oasis saga

The Oasis Forum was formed in 2001 to block the bid by the then-incumbent President, Frederick Chiluba, to manipulate the Republican constitution so that he could stand for a third term in office. The Forum united the efforts of the statutory Law Association of Zambia (LAZ), Zambia's three main Christian mother bodies, as well as the country's numerous and geographically diffuse women's organizations. An auspicious wedding of 'the legal authority of the lawyers, the moral authority of the Church, and the popular authority of the

¹⁰ I don't want to overestimate the empirical legitimacy of the MMD regime. Despite the Supreme Court's ruling to the contrary, evidence submitted to that august court strongly suggest that MMD systematically abused public resources in the 2001 elections while also engaging in at least sporadic rigging to secure its razor-thin (29%) mandate. In the previous 1996 general elections, MMD's actual support at the polls was 70% of a 40% turnout, i.e., also around 28% of the franchised electorate (J.K. van Donge, 'Flexible SWAPs for strategic policy-making: reflections on the Zambian experience', paper presented to the Development Studies Association conference, Milton Keynes, 7-9 September 2005). In other words, one can make a strong argument that MMD has ruled Zambia for at least the past ten years with the active support of less than a third of the population. Clearly, much of its 'success' is the harvest of political skullduggery and manipulation. On the other hand, no other political grouping has managed to garner more substantial support at the polls.

¹¹ While the United Party for National Development (UPND) came within roughly 35,000 votes of wresting the presidency from MMD in 2001, its showing in the contemporaneous Parliamentary and Local Government elections lagged considerably behind. According to the Electoral Commissions results, MMD surpassed UPND by 75,000 votes in the parliamentary poll, while in the council election, MMD candidates received roughly 110,000 votes more than their competitors from the UPND.

women's movement',¹² the Oasis Forum represents an unparalleled alliance of Zambia's mainstream civic leadership. Nothing like it had ever occurred before within Zambia's civil society, which had been chronically prone to competitiveness and divisiveness. The earlier fragmentation was fuelled, in part, by the subcontracting processes of donor agencies which constantly pitted fragile civic organizations against one another. The government's practice of establishing and funding loyal 'non-governmental' organizations also tended to politicize relationships within the civic sector. Against this background, the emergence of the Oasis Forum, and its proven ability to hold together amidst funding droughts and other adversity clearly signalled an unprecedented turn in the constitution of political society. The initial impetus for this turn was the dramatic collapse of Frederick Chiluba's credibility as a political leader.

In 1991, Mr Chiluba and his MMD forced Zambia's president of 27 years, Kenneth Kaunda, to change the Republican constitution and reinstate political pluralism. MMD then proceeded to defeat him and his United National Independence Party at the polls in a landslide victory. MMD captured a 2/3+ majority in Parliament in 1991, and again (albeit contentiously) in 1996, allowing Chiluba to co-opt the constitutional reforms and effect constitutional changes at whim. Among his reforms were constitutional provisions restricting presidential tenure to two terms. These reforms were widely seen as a deliberate move to end Kaunda's political career once and for all. Chiluba was feted as a national emancipator in 1991, but by 2001 his administration was at the nadir of its popularity. For one, the MMD government's drastic neo-liberal reforms had plunged large sections of the population into absolute poverty without the protection of a safety net. Adding insult to injury, Chiluba was ensconced in widespread allegations of abuse of office and the plunder of public assets.

In February of 2001, as Chiluba's second term of office was coming to a close, key figures in the LAZ; in the national Catholic, Protestant and Evangelical church bodies; and in the umbrella organ of Zambia's women's organizations joined forces to organize a Public Debate in order to rally popular opposition to Mr Chiluba's third term bid. The meeting issued a tightly-worded Declaration instructing the incumbent to respect the constitution and give up further designs on the presidency. After the convention, the organizers – constituting themselves as the Oasis Forum – mobilized a national campaign in support of these demands.¹³

The Forum's campaign incited an extraordinary wave of non-violent civil protest across the country and proved unexpectedly successful. In early May,

¹² Paraphrasing Fr. Joe Komakoma; interview, Lusaka, 4 Apr. 2003.

¹³ The names Oasis Forum and Oasis Declaration come from the site of a February 2001 rally, held at the Oasis Restaurant in Lusaka.

after less than three months of concerted pressure, Chiluba announced that he would not be available as a candidate for the presidency in the forthcoming elections, 'in the interest of the nation'. Although his announcement aroused deep scepticism, he stood by his word and anointed lawyer Levy Mwanawasa as the MMD candidate. Mwanawasa eventually won the contentious elections in December of 2001 on an incredibly thin majority.

A new strategy

The Oasis Forum leadership was understandably elated by their unexpected success and somewhat intoxicated, perhaps, with their display of civic muscle following Chiluba's official withdrawal from the presidential race. In June 2001 (5 months before the slated elections) the Oasis Forum retreated to a lodge outside of Lusaka to reconnoitre and strategize. The gathering – comprising 17 participants all tolled – concluded that the Zambian people still needed the Oasis Forum, and the five original partners organizations vowed to consolidate their alliance. With the issue of Chiluba's third term out of the way, the Forum needed a new rationale and focus. At the retreat, the organizing committee redefined their purpose as follows:

- promote a culture of Constitutionalism
- promote the doctrine and practice of separation of powers
- promote gender equity
- promote law reform
- promote civic activism
- promote and conduct public interest litigation
- promote professionalism and integrity in the holders of the public offices; and
- promote a culture and practice of accountability and transparency in governance.¹⁴

As a shopping list of liberal aims, this agenda is ambitious, but unexceptional. Over the preceding decade, African advocacy groups had become increasingly adept in producing cosmopolitan charters, often in hope of securing foreign donor funding. The Oasis Forum's *Strategic Plan 2002-2004* (from which this and the following list are drawn) falls in this category, and was drawn up at least partially with a view to attracting further financial support.¹⁵ What is remarkable about the Forum's strategic plan is not so much the ends as the means. In pursuit of its liberal agenda, the Oasis Forum charted out a 19-step path of activities, including the following key items:

¹⁴ The Oasis Forum, *Strategic Plan for the Period 2002-2004* (mimeo, n.d.), 5.

¹⁵ The volumes are hard to establish but, unsurprisingly, the Oasis Forum received substantial donor support during its anti-Third Term campaign.

4. *Conduct public debates and consultations in relation to laws requiring reform...*
7. Mount a *civic education campaign* to introduce people to basic principles of a **constitution** and **governance**, including the **rule of law**, through media, workshops, meetings
8. Arrange for points for collecting submission from *the public*
9. Gender *training* in **constitutional** drafting
10. Drafting a *popular constitution*
11. Carry out **Constitutional** development *conferences*
12. Annual *Convention*
13. Convening of a *Constituent Assembly*¹⁶

Given the fact that the Forum's Organizing Committee (its sole management body until late 2001) comprised at most a couple dozen individuals, all of whom had heavy responsibilities in the leadership of large and busy organizations (e.g., the Non-Governmental Organizations' Coordinating Committee and the Catholic Church), the sheer scope of the Plan is astonishingly immodest. But mundane logistic considerations aside, one is struck with the outright audacity of the Forum's self-proclaimed mandate. After having been in existence for less than a year, the Oasis Forum considered itself 'legally, morally and socially' entitled to oversee the drafting and adoption (through a Constituent Assembly) of a new Republican Constitution for the Zambian nation! And they expected to be taken seriously. Against all odds they were and, at this writing nearly five years down the line, still are.

This remarkable situation – how a small elite group of cosmopolitan professionals finds itself imagining itself as the genuine (moral) leadership of a country – opens up space for a discussion of two central issues. The words in *italics* highlight the first issue. These terms indicate the central concern of the Forum with what one might term, borrowing from Habermas, the public sphere.¹⁷ I hypothesize for the sake of argument that the Oasis Forum embodies the sensibilities of an emergent “public bourgeoisie” that is preoccupied, much like the emergent European bourgeoisies of the eighteenth century studied by Habermas, with establishing, expanding and consolidating a realm of public political discourse based on ‘critical-rational debate’. A corollary of this concern with publicity is the problem or representation, in both of the term’s primary meanings: the new public bourgeoisie is involved in a critique of the way that the incumbent political leadership (mis-)represents its exercise of power to the citizenry. At the same time, the elite social forces undergirding the Oasis Forum are concerned with their own mandate, i.e., with their right to represent ‘the people’ and their interests.

¹⁶ Strategic Plan, 17-8.

¹⁷ J. Habermas, *The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society* (Cambridge, 1989).

The text in ***boldface*** signals a second dimension to the analysis. These terms relate to the Constitution and to the legal domain more generally. Their prevalence in this pivotal policy document indicate that, despite the fact that lawyers represent by far the smallest partner to the alliance (LAZ's membership totals roughly 600), juridical concerns dominate the Forum's agenda. Following suggestions originally formulated by Judith Shklar,¹⁸ I would argue that some form of 'legalism' constitutes the ideological and rhetorical common denominator for this remarkable socio-political experiment.

The irony here is that this ideological frame of legalist liberalism derives from the same realm of transnational institutions as the development industry, the steward of Zambia's subsidiarity. Yet it is intrinsically contradictory. It provides standards for critique of the prevailing political culture (of unaccountable government); but at the same time empowers a procedural, formalistic legalism that is prone to privilege (individual) 'rights' over collective 'justice'.

But before we can discuss the conundra of representation and legalism as elements of the political landscape of the Third Republic, there are some preliminary issues to deal with. The Oasis Forum story raises three immediate questions: Who are the social actors behind the Oasis Forum, why did they opt to challenge the prevailing political culture, and how (and to what extent) did they succeed? The following section attempts a provisional sociology of the political society of the Third Republic with a focus on the professional elite from which the Oasis Forum draws its leadership. This social mapping then acts as a backdrop to a discussion of the central analytical issues of representation and the role of legalism in the post-Chiluba era political arena.

Contrary to conventional wisdom about the disembodied nature of the African state, the Zambian state *is* embedded in 'society', but this is an elite *political* society (in Chatterjee's sense) of middleclass, largely urban professionals. The social context of the Zambian state is a complexly interwoven assemblage of elite social forces who share, if nothing else, a substantial social distance from the vast majority of the population whose living standards have, since the 1970s, gradually slid down the slippery slope into 'absolute' poverty. This section of the population – living in both in rural villages and urban compounds – is many, many times more likely to be unemployed, scantily educated, undernourished, suffering from dilapidating but treatable illnesses, etc – than any senior member of government, the upper crust of the civil service or the leadership of the Oasis Forum. On the other hand, individuals in the latter three categories are very likely to share a large number of social qualities with respect to education, income, property ownership and lifestyle, which are beyond the ken of most of their fellow Zambians.

¹⁸ J. Shklar, *Legalism: Law, morals and political trials* (Cambridge [Mass.], 1964).

This is not to say that 'political society' as a whole is cut from the same cloth. On the contrary, and here is the rub – members of elite political society differ sharply in their political values, in their ideas about the 'rules of the game' and in their conception of their role in society. They are thus caught up in zealous struggle among themselves, a struggle over the scope of state power which is simultaneously a contest of ideas and principles. Unlike many countries in the region, ethnicity plays a negligible role in this struggle (*pace* Posner¹⁹). Nor is it simply a struggle among political parties – of incumbent politicians vs. the opposition; indeed, this distinction can be relatively fuzzy as politicians circulate among parties and ever-shifting inter-party alliances with dizzying speed (especially in election years). Rather the key confrontation within political society is between an 'old guard' of partisan veterans, on the one hand, whose *raison d'être* and *modus operandi* is alignment with whoever controls the Executive branch of government, with broad discretionary powers and, at the other end of the continuum, an emerging new faction of nonpartisan political agents, epitomized by the Oasis Forum, who seem to be driven by principles of accountable government, which they hope to promote by strict constitutional constraints on Executive discretion. The roots of division are more difficult to trace than the actual point of fissure.

What kind of a class or classes populate Lusaka's political society? The bulk of the political class derives its livelihood from the state; that is, indeed, its basic objective. The public bourgeoisie from which the Oasis Forum springs, is similarly an ancillary, even parasitic class. Its main incomes derive from service provision (lawyers) and rents²⁰ (clergy, NGOs). Much of the wealth that supports this group originates abroad. Professionals appear to invest their often substantial but irregular earnings in property, in their children's education, and in 'appearances' (furnishings, personal vehicles, attire, recreational electronics, etc). Beyond this, the more successful have subsidiary business interests in real estate, services (private schools, clinics) and commerce (restaurants, boutiques, tourism).

As a rule, this class/stratum has little interest in manufacturing and processing, and has only subsidiary connections to primary production (with only minor agricultural investments, mostly as a 'retirement fund' rather than a serious business). These people – many members of the clergy will be an exception – largely think of themselves as involved in 'business'; but they do not take significant risks with – nor enjoy large returns on – their generally meagre capital (although one pair of lawyers managed to purchase the former

¹⁹ D.N. Posner, *Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa* (Cambridge, 2005).

²⁰ Rents, i.e., based on exploiting an 'artificially created transfer' (Tollison) which derives primarily from international donors agencies (including, e.g., the Vatican).

presidential jet). If this is a bourgeoisie, its relationship to circuits of capital accumulation, be they national or international, is tenuous. It is, one could say, an 'imaginary' class, whose bourgeoisie resides more in its liberal-cosmopolitan value-orientation than in direct capitalist interests. It is also an 'intermediary' class – caught between the ruling faction of its class and the people it would represent; and between its vision of the future and the harsh realities of the present. The precariousness of its situation is hard to overestimate: In absolute terms the rural and urban poor are most vulnerable to life-threatening crisis. But in relative terms, any major economic or political upheaval can easily erode whatever security this non-productive bourgeoisie currently enjoys, flinging them out into the margins of the formal economy.

This sense of in-betweenness resonates with my experience of contemporary Lusaka. The rising public class is anxious to be recognized for its lavish and conspicuous material achievement. Perhaps this reflects the pervasive insecurity of social life in Zambia today. The HIV epidemic has left a horrendous dent in the population pyramid, and has no regard for class. A number of my living middle-class friends from the 1980s – and many more have died than not – are the last surviving offspring in a family of 6 or more children. But of course the anxiety of the rising public bourgeoisie is also about distinction. Lusaka's middle class is not a cultural elite. The South African Ster Cinekor cinema complex at the new Arcades shopping mall thrives on action cinema and ethnic comedy; cinema for the new public bourgeoisie is an escape, not a source of critical debate.²¹ There is a new generation of Zambian playwrights, but performances at the Lusaka Theatre Club play to half-empty halls of expatriates. My middle-class friends have lavish bookshelves, but John Grisham – and not an up-and-coming Zambian Emile Zola – would seem to be the most popular author. There is also a boom in the Lusaka music scene, a veritable mushrooming of independent labels and local artists. Although the genre is heavily influenced by American rap/hip-hop – a textual art form – there is little social content in the lyrics. Popular rappers and lyricists dwell on off-colour humour and soap opera themes: the obsession of the modern Lusaka girl with finding a guy who could deliver 'House, money, car' provided the biggest popular hit of 2005.

Critical debate is channelled, then, directly into politics, without diversion through the arts. Nevertheless, humane, liberal values prevail. The Forum's cosmopolitan orientation reflects legacy of colonial rhetoric and practice as well as contemporary international influences. To a large extent, these are the children of junior colonial civil servants, brought up in the ethos of public profession-

²¹ A survey of DVD consumption in private homes could lead to other conclusions, however.

alism preached, if not always practiced, by the British colonial service that administered Northern Rhodesia (as Zambia was previously known) until 1964, and remained a major element of government administration well into the seventies. In the postcolony, the rhetoric of public service has largely been supplanted by a (neo-)liberal rhetoric of good governance and efficiency. And yet, when asked about its aims and motivation, the Oasis leadership invokes, in quite a consistent pattern, a vocabulary of patriotism, duty and service. Many central Oasis actors see themselves as a social conscience. They claim to be driven by a strong social obligation deriving from their elevated social position, and from the privilege of education and employment provided by society. Another motivational theme, especially among the Forum's juridical and clerical members, is that of law and justice. Both lawyers and clergy stress the persistent lack of 'rule of law' under MMD (and later) as insidious and deeply frustrating.

In my reading, the somewhat aristocratic values of duty and service, alongside an emphasis on rules and transparency express nostalgia for an (idealized) version of Zambia as imagined in the immediate postcolonial period, i.e., initially a product of the anti-colonial struggle. The hankering for law and justice in particular, appears as a longing for a return to a primordial, more genuine form of government, where public authority was exercised for the greater good, and not for private benefit. While this vocabulary is not unaffected by other influences – i.e., the transnational rhetoric of human rights and good governance – the immediate referent is to the practical experience of recent Zambian history. In any event, this specific public bourgeoisie would seem to be in pursuit of greater stability, reciprocity and equilibrium, be this modelled on an idealized past or a keen vision of the future.

Nostalgic or not, the Forum's perspective on politics contrasts sharply with the rhetoric of the MMD. From its inception, the MMD has deployed a 'modernist' language of change. Its 1991 slogan 'the hour has come' meant that Zambia was ready for new leadership, but it also referred to the ambitious and ambiguous projects of democratization, liberalization and modernization. Far from nostalgic, MMD promised to lead the nation away from the bad habits of the past (the Second Republic). This inevitably meant a journey into an uncertain, but promising future. As it turned out, the open-endedness of the MMD's political vision – about change and process, and not about an explicitly imagined social order – proved fully compatible with the Chiluba's government's gradual drift away from accountability into semi-authoritarianism and plunder.

'Representative publicness' and the postcolonial party/state

Despite its nominal transition to a more liberal, pluralist dispensation in the 1990s, Zambia's political system retained much of the legacy of 'absolutist' Party/State publicity. For most of the Second and Third Republics, the Party/State has functioned as a kind of 'quasi-feudal' public authority. The party elite under the 'Humanist' President Kaunda, and again under 'neo-liberal' President Chiluba, constituted a kind of state nobility (to borrow Bourdieu's term), surviving primarily on rent extraction (copper revenues and foreign aid; later on the proceeds of privatization). It was socially positioned on the basis of ascribed status (i.e., as Central/National Executive Committee members and Cabinet Ministers) and linked to society through an elaborate system of political patronage, which fanned out from Provincial Party executives and Members of Parliament to Ward Councillors and beyond. This Party 'nobility' dominated the public sphere – it directly controlled the media, defined the terms and vocabulary of public discourse and represented itself through 'a strict code of "noble" conduct', i.e., 'insignia (badges and arms), dress (clothing and coiffure), demeanour (form of greeting and poise) and rhetoric (form of address and formal discourse in general').²²

This pattern brings vividly to mind Habermas' notion of 'representative publicness' (*representative Öffentlichkeit*), against which an earlier emerging bourgeoisie struggled in eighteenth-century Europe. Thomas McCarthy summarizes Habermas' basic idea like this:

In its clash with the arcane and bureaucratic practices of the absolutist state, the emergent bourgeoisie gradually replaced a public sphere in which the ruler's power was merely represented before the people with a sphere in which state authority was publicly monitored through informed and critical discourse by the people.²³

Not unlike the feudal nobilities of Habermas' historical study, UNIP exercised a similarly opaque form of absolute power, especially after 1972, wherein the population was largely deprived of information concerning the rationale or inner workings of government. The Oasis Forum's consistent tirade against the government's lack of 'transparency and accountability', then, might be seen as a direct strategic reaction to this absolutist legacy of performative representation. Through this critique, the new public bourgeoisie has explicitly set itself against the *ancien régime* grounded in an absolutist culture of politics – of repre-

²² Habermas, *Structural transformation*, 8, with reference to the German imperial class in the High Middle Ages.

²³ T. McCarthy, 'Introduction' to Habermas, *Structural transformation*, xi.

sentative publicity, neo-patrimonial domination and parasitic clientelism.²⁴ This can be seen in their dedication to mass mobilization campaigns; to public 'workshopping' as a means of provoking critical debate; in their insistence on a regular stream of clear public statements explaining their positions and actions; and in their scrupulous maintenance of full public transparency in all dealings with government. In all of these efforts, the Forum has been closely allied with the independent *Post* newspaper which carried the Oasis Declaration on its websites for years, and which has been a major channel for all Forum publicity.

The political strategy of the Forum, then, might be defined in relationship to the problem of representation – in the dual sense of mandate and publicity. Publicity refers to the means – including the language – by which the common concerns of Zambian society are dealt with in public. The Forum's fundamental aim, as we have seen, appears to be a transformation of 'the public', the rules of the game of political behaviour. But what support can it leverage in this endeavour? Rooted in an ancillary class, the Forum is plagued by a general anxiety about its mandate – to what extent can it genuinely exercise the voice of 'the people' who interests it seeks to promote? Their long-term success in institutionalizing a democratic transformation of the public realm will inevitably depend on the strength of their mandate.

The limits of success

The Forum was immensely successful in its politics of mobilization against Chiluba's third term bid in 2001. It clearly responded to a deeply felt public demand and provided a conduit – the green ribbon and car-honking campaign – for Zambians to vent pent-up frustrations with the political establishment. The Oasis Forum was also successful in its innovative exercise in alliance-building and maintenance. Above all, it contributed profoundly to the shaping of the agenda of public discourse – the Forum's actions between February and May 2001 effected a transformation of public culture, the issues discussed and the vocabulary used, but also the *attitude* of public debate. The Oasis Forum (re-)instilled in Zambian 'bourgeois society' a sense of confidence about its political efficacy, something that had been deeply shaken by MMD's apparent betrayal of the liberal ideals that brought it into power in 1991.

The Forum's attention to publicity is also an attempt to constitute a public sphere in its own image, i.e., create a forum where they will be fully understood by their 'audience'. This implies a strong dose of 'education/capacity building', first around the Third Term issue and more recently around Constitutional

²⁴ Both J.-F. Bayart, *The state in Africa: The politics of the belly* (London, 1993) and A. Mbembe, *On the postcolony* (Berkeley, 2001) cover this ground in detail.

reform. The Forums' rhetoric does not only attempt to speak to an audience, a public, it also seeks to constitute a public sympathetic to its agenda.

Despite its significant and unprecedented successes, the Forum seems to have had virtually no impact on established partisan politics, opposition political parties in particular. Despite its popularity and success in mobilization and agenda setting, and despite the keen interest of opposition parties in associating themselves with and indeed co-opting its campaigns and slogans, the Forum cannot claim any clear real leverage on partisan politicians. The point is not really whether or not the Forum has been efficacious in the partisan political arena, but about the lack of a mechanism linking civic and partisan action.

Two political registers

The new 'public' bourgeoisie represents a liberal-bourgeois vision for the future of Zambia, rather than any specific social constituency. Their liberalism ties them – especially the clergy and the feminists – to specific segments of the population – i.e., 'the poor'. But their claims to represent these groups vis-à-vis the government or donor agencies are simply claims. They are reasonable claims and in most respects borne out by practical actions, but not established by any tangible mandating mechanism (vote, charter).

The elite urban professionals that conjured up the Oasis Forum had, quite evidently, sufficient legal-moral 'credibility' to challenge the Party/State apparatus of Chiluba's MMD. But just as evidently, this pivotal asset of legal-moral credibility is both immaterial and fragile. It is easily compromised by any impression of intimate association with unscrupulous politicians. The lack of a clear, verifiable constituency generates insecurity within the Forum and its social base. This insecurity expressed itself in a fundamental distrust of partisan politics and political parties in general. The basic dilemma was an understanding of the need to 'do politics' in order to achieve their substantive normative ends, but the inability to identify or even conceive of a political mechanism – a form of collective agency – that could be expected to survive the corrupting bruises of Zambian political skirmishes with its integrity, and credibility, in tact.

As the Chisamba retreat of June 2001 concurred: 'The Oasis Forum should not be transformed into an organization, but should remain as a loose alliance, *faceless*'.²⁵ I understand 'facelessness' in this context to imply the lack of *personalized* self-promotion. The Forum's credibility can only be maintained if it draws directly on abstract, or perhaps better, *transcendental* forms of authority – spirituality, morality, legality, solidarity. Immediately there are grounds to

²⁵ Oasis forum, *Strategic plan 2002-2004* (my emphasis).

suspect that such intrinsically authoritative rhetoric is (ab)used to advance the ambitions of a specific individual, it loses legitimacy. Clearly this is not true of conventional political campaigning. Party politicians clothe their soapbox rhetoric in references to 'development' and 'peace' – selfless aspects of the greater good. But no politician campaigns 'facelessly'. This suggests that the Oasis Forum is intuitively working a different political register, one reserved for disinterested political rhetoric, walled off from the partisan fray.

Like apartheid in South Africa, subsidiary sovereignty is a legal order premised on exclusion. It operates through a constitution, caters to regular elections and encompasses a range of institutions of democratic representation. At the same time, the voice and genuine interests of the vast majority of the population are kept in the margins, with no real power to influence public policy and its implementation.

As in South Africa, where lawyers played a crucial role in the fight against apartheid,²⁶ the legal profession has been a key actor in the struggle for institutional reforms to ensure greater justice in the exercise of power. Indeed, their imprint on the Oasis Forum and its achievements has been far greater than the jurists' modest numbers would suggest. Through becoming the architects of the Forum's public rhetoric, and its leading authority on the strategically crucial constitutional review process, the lawyers have had a huge impact on the Forum's political trajectory.

I have discussed the implications of legalism at length elsewhere and will not repeat those arguments here.²⁷ One related issue deserves special attention, however. As we have argued above, the Oasis Forum has played an unprecedented and progressive role in defining a political agenda for the reform of Zambia's political culture. Yet it has been silent on the issue of subsidiarity. Perhaps this reflects the fact that many individuals in the Forum leadership have benefited, or expect to benefit financially from a commissioned assignment from the World Bank or an allied agency. While it is my informed belief that the Forum would have reached all of its major goals without any donor support, it is also true that the women's movement (NGOCC and many of its member organizations), the various church bodies and even the Law Association are all beneficiaries of the donor dollar to some extent. It is in the very nature of subsidiary sovereignty, no doubt, that the suzerain must, from time to time, invest in the sovereignty of the client state.

²⁶ R. Abel, *Politics by other means: Law in the struggle against apartheid, 1980-1994* (New York and London, 1995).

²⁷ J. Gould, 'Strong bar, weak state? Lawyers, liberalism and state formation in Zambia', *Development and change*, 37 (2006).

Such cynicism aside, one might also ask to what extent might the ‘juridification’ of the Forum’s approach itself affect the role that subsidiarity takes on in the political agenda of the new public bourgeoisie. Echoing Benhabib’s critique of Habermas, one can claim that the Forum has exercised a very weak distinction between “juridification” [...] on the one hand, and making public, in the sense of making accessible to debate, reflection, action, and moral-political transformation, on the other’.²⁸ Indeed, the Forum draws on three bodies of rather inflexible canon: Statutory law, religious dogma and orthodox development discourse. None of these is particularly conducive to critical-rational debate in the Habermasian sense; but, more cogently, neither do they provide conceptual tools to reveal the mechanisms of subsidiarity. Of the three, it is perhaps the procedural mindset of legal reasoning that provides the dimmest view of the broader structural mechanisms that constrain Zambia’s economy.

Perhaps the main problem is that the new public bourgeoisie’s strategy of incursion into the public sphere does not address long-term structural problem of its social reproduction as a class, its base in material production/capital accumulation. Without such a base, can the public bourgeoisie exercise sustained leverage on the state? Can it effect a transformation of the public sphere without solid links to a wider ‘public’ beyond itself? Or, to put a Marxist twist on the problem at hand, can the cosmopolitan bourgeoisie constitute itself as a class without controlling the material conditions of its social reproduction?

Perhaps it is enough, at this juncture to suggest that subsidiary sovereignty be thought of dialectically – as an organically constituted struggle between two contradictory principles: Subordination and emancipation. Neither of these principles exists in a ‘pure’, abstract form. The specific motives and mechanisms of subordination, and the social sources of the emancipatory moment derive from a specific historical, ideological, political context. This is an important reason why it is so necessary to maintain rigorous scrutiny of the unfolding history of independent Zambia.

²⁸ S. Benhabib, ‘Models of public space: Hannah Arendt, the liberal tradition, and Jürgen Habermas’, in: C. Calhoun, ed., *Habermas and the public sphere* (Cambridge [Mass.], 1992), 94.

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